TURKEY'S BID FOR E.U. MEMBERSHIP AND THE GLOBAL BALANCE OF POWER:
A CONSTRUCTIVE-REALIST ACCOUNT OF TURKEY'S ACCESSION PROCESS TO THE EU

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ABSTRACT

The question of Turkey's accession to the European Union has been vastly under-theorized. This study uses a constructivist form of realism in order to explain the positions taken by France, Germany, and Great Britain on the question of Turkey's membership in the EU. So far Turkey's accession process has mainly been described in terms of human rights violations, the Kurkish question, and in terms of satisfying the Copenhagen criteria. This study makes an attempt to explain the issue at hand in terms of the balance of power theory. It will be the core of my argument that the question of Turkish membership to the EU deals with a broader question of power politics. Although European integration remains a theoretically challenging subject for realists, and neo-realists alike, this paper suggests a more ideational approach to the study of European integration in general.

INTRODUCTION

It was Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic and its first President, whose vision of a secular, Westernized state, established modern Turkey in 1923. Ever since, Turkey has long sought ever-closer ties with Europe and the United States. —Successive Turkish governments have looked into Western organizations and institutions to form alliances and realize foreign policy objectives.(Yildiz and Muller 2008, p. 21) Turkey's accession process to the European Union (EU) has given rise to considerable debate among existing Member States and their populace. The EU, throughout its history, has gone through five waves of enlargement, resulting in the current 27 Member States. And although Turkey has been and still continues to be closely tied with Western Europe, it has not been generally considered an appropriate member of the EU. In turn, Turkey's accession process has been an unusually long one, relative to other states. The question of Turkey's membership in the European Union has been mainly characterized by a persistent opposition to its accession, owing to the divergent interests of various EU Member States as well as the United States. This has resulted in a very strenuous negotiation process and Turkey's questioning of EU's real intentions and interest. Opposition has been based mainly on the following grounds: Turkey's grave human rights violations, its inability to satisfy the Copenhagen Criteria, the unresolved Kurdish and Cyprus questions, claims that Turkey is not European enough politically and that geographically it is not in continental Europe and thus does not qualify as a potential member state (see, for example, Murphy 2004; Walker2007-08; Yildiz and Muller 2008). However, these issues alone do not capture the scope of apprehension over Turkish accession, for they do not take into consideration a greater global conception of the European Union in the geopolitical context. Thus, there exists another dimension to understanding the question of Turkish accession process to the EU. This dimension deals with two separate ideas of the European Union and consequently about its role in global politics: the more political or Franco-German conception and the predominantly economic or British-US vision of Europe. Turkish membership of the EU could well tip the balance in favour of one or the other of these two visions. This may provide a deeper explanation of
why Turkey membership has become so controversial. Thus, the main purpose of this paper will be to describe and explain this process from a realist perspective. Having examined several theoretical approaches, I have come to a conclusion that a neo-realist account works best in explaining the assertively sought support of and aggressively-heated opposition to Turkey’s accession to the EU. However, an exclusively neo-realist approach will not be sufficient on its own. A constructivist form of realism will be necessary in order to explain conflicting ideas about European Union, its role in the global politics, as well as its future. For this sole purpose, I have chosen Kenneth N. Waltz’s Theory of International Politics as a theoretical book for my analysis of Turkey’s accession process to the EU. Primarily because balance of power theory, as presented by Waltz, possesses considerable capacity to explain the balancing behavior of states. The author’s main concern in Theory of International Politics regards the distribution of power in the international system and how it influences states’ behaviour.

In short, this study set out to explain the stances of various European Union Member States on the question of Turkey’s membership of the EU from a realist point of view. However, moving beyond the scope of hard-core neo-realism, we explicitly suggest in this essay that Turkey’s accession to the European Union in particular, and the process of European integration in general, can better be explained in constructive realist terms. Primarily because such an approach takes into account core realist assumptions about power’ and emphasizes core constructivist assumptions about the role of ideas’ in international relations. Thus it is suggested that constructivist form of realism is helpful in explaining central feature of European politics in the light of Franco-German opposition to and British-American support of Turkish accession to the European Union. The theoretical part of this paper outlines major constructive realist and realist concepts which might be helpful in understanding the behaviour of key states in relation to the process of regional integration, alliance formation, and the balance of power. The empirical part of the study seeks to apply and illustrate the relevance of this conceptual framework. The empirical part of this essay tries to explain positions taken by various EU Member States regarding Turkey’s membership in the European Union.

THE HISTORY

Turkey’s path towards institutional integration into Western Europe began in the late 1940s, when it became an original member of the Council of Europe, and the early 1950s, when it joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952. As Turkey pursued closer relations with Europe, it applied, in 1957, for associate membership of the then nascent European Common Market (ECM), later known as the European Economic Community (EEC) and finally the European Union (EU). In 1963, Turkey entered into an Association Agreement with the EEC. The Association Agreement offered Turkey a possibility of a future membership within the Union. It covered a broad spectrum of trade-related issues and various other areas of cooperation, and was intended as a step towards an eventual customs union. (Yildiz and Muller 2008, p. 21) In November of 1970 an Additional Protocol was signed, in which rules for a customs union were outlined between the EEC and Turkey. (Grigoriadis 2006, p. 148) The fact that Turkey participated as a full member in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1973-75 and became a founding member of the issuing Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), further symbolized Turkey’s pro-Western orientation. These promising developments, however, were short-lived. For nearly a decade thereafter relations between the
Community and Turkey stifled, partly due to the question of Cyprus. It was not until the late 1980s that
the relationship between the European Community (EC) and Turkey began to improve again. Turkey's
filed a formal application for full membership of the EC in 1987. But the application was rejected in
1989 as the Community concluded that it would be inappropriate for the Community ... to become
involved in accession negotiations at this stage. (Yildiz and Muller 2008, p. 21) However despite such a
disappointment close ties continued to grow. In 1995, Turkey and the EU signed a Customs Union
agreement, which came into effect in 1996. As the critical EU-Copenhagen Summit of December 2002
approached, Turkey's political liberalization seemed to proceed at a surprising pace. (Grigoriadis 2006,
p. 148) Yet, Turkey's application was once again shelved, as the Copenhagen Summit decided to defer
its decision until the Summit in 2004. Finally, as expected, on October 6th, 2004, the recommendations
issued by the European Commission concluded that Turkey had sufficiently fulfilled the criteria
necessary to open accession negotiations. (Yildiz and Muller 2008, p. 24) Starting date for Turkey's
accession negotiations to the European Union were set for October 3rd, 2005.

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

In order to construct a theory of international politics Waltz makes a necessary distinction
between domestic and international politics. He defines both domestic and international political
structure first by the principle by which it is ordered or organized, then by the differentiation and
specification of its units, and lastly by the distribution of capabilities across these units. (Waltz, 88)

However, the aforementioned distinction between the domestic and the international is necessary in
order to explicitly portray the rationale behind the behaviour of units, namely the alliance formation.
For "It is not possible to understand world politics simply by looking inside of states" (Waltz 1979, p. 65)
since the structure of the domestic system (hierarchy) is different from the structure of the international
system (anarchy). A structural approach, on the other hand, allows for the parsimonious explanation of
the similar behaviour among diverse units. Since we are concerned with international relations, I will not
focus deeply on domestic political structures of the units although it is immeasurably important for
constructive form of realism. Lack of central authority within international system is the fundamental
basis of Waltz theoretical framework. Such international-political systems are formed by coactions of
self-regarding units. (Waltz 1979, p. 91) Because there is no overarching government or governance that
rules over such units their motivation has to be assumed rather than described in realistic terms. Thus,
Waltz assumes that all states seek to ensure their own survival. In comparison to domestic system,
security under anarchy is not guaranteed. Because of the self-help system and the uncertainty of other
units, states' focus shifts from absolute gains towards relative gains. Since all of the units under anarchy
are in a self-help system, there is no functional differentiation among them, all are legally equal.

However, Waltz further applies his analogy of economic thinking of domestic system to the international
structure in order to point out that we, the students of international politics, ought to focus mostly upon
'large firms', namely relatively powerful states. This is due to the fact that the difference between those
units that matter and those that don’t are the differences of capability, not of function. (Waltz 1979, p.
96) Similarly, although it is acknowledged by Waltz that there are non-state actors that exist in the
international system, their relevance is miniscule comparing to a state actor. The two explicitly stated,
relevant characteristics of the international system, therefore, are anarchy and relative capability of
states. Furthermore, Waltz explores the question of anarchy and the balance of power. He explicitly
states that cooperation among states is possible, and indeed often desired. However, such cooperation is possible "only in ways strongly conditioned by the anarchy of the larger system." (Waltz 1979, p. 116) Continuing on the point, he further states that anarchy of that system strongly affects the likelihood of cooperation. Such cooperation is primarily driven by the balance-of-power theory, where states are unitary actors who seek, at a minimum, their own preservation and, at a maximum, universal domination. (Waltz 1979, p. 118) States are determined to achieve their ends by, internally, increasing economic capabilities and military strength and, externally, by strengthening and enlarging their alliances or weakening the opposing ones.

Although indispensable to this essay, a purely neo-realist approach will not suffice on its own. For, the thrust of argumentation presented within this paper will be inadequately portrayed, and could possibly be rendered as flawed. Thus, in order to fully understand the absolute vigour of the argument at hand, a more ideational approach is needed. One such theoretical approach bridging the (neo-)realist and ideational spheres has been referred to as constructive realism. In this fusion of approaches the end product may be summarized as a constructive form of realism that takes ideas seriously as objects of analysis. Constructive-realism is a hybrid-theoretical approach that bridges the power-idea gap. It takes into account core realist assumptions about power' and emphasizes core constructivist assumptions about the role of ideas' in international relations. (Barkin 2003, Sørensen 2008) In this sense, both realism and constructivism complement each other to a certain degree. Alexander Wendt, a prominent social constructivist, concluded, for example, that the power and interest have the effects they do in virtue of the ideas that make them up. (Wendt 1999, p. 135) The rationale behind such thinking is that the distribution of power in international relations is primarily constituted by distribution of interests among states, and the essence of states' interests is in turn constituted by ideas. (Wendt 1999, p. 135) For this particular reason this theoretical approach of the study of...ideas, is integral to a full understanding of international politics. (Barkin 2003, p. 336)

Ideas give meaning to the material forces and states' actions. As such the role of power and interest in state's foreign policy is reinforced by the state's ideational beliefs. Indeed, the central thesis in Wendt's argument is that the meaning of power and the content of interests are largely a function of ideas. (Wendt 1999, p. 96) In other words, how states act in the international relations, and what interests they hold, as well as the structure within which they operate are defined by states' ideas. This is consistent with Morgenthau suggestion that a nation-state's foreign policy ought to be rational in view of its own moral and practical purposes.(Morgenthau 1985, p. 10) Thus, a state ought to act in accordance with its ideas and perception of itself and its role in the international system. This ideational or constructive form of realism, as such, grants considerable explanatory weight to both material and ideational forces in international relations. Material forces matter in that states actions depend upon relative distribution of power among states. Ideational forces (ideas) matter in that ideas too explain aspects of state behaviour. States actions are constituted by the role of belief systems and perceptions in foreign policy decision-making. In Sørensen's words quoting Max Weber, this constructive form of realism offers students of international relations an "interpretive understanding of social action" combined with "causal explanation of its course and effects" (qtd. in Sørensen 2008, p. 13).

On the final note, one of the most essential arguments that needs to be explicitly stated is that there are no compelling ontological or epistemological obstacles to the ambition of supporting an approach that considers both material and ideational forces.(Sørensen 2008, p. 13; Wendt 1999, p. 92-
Indeed, in explaining Waltz’s systematic conceptualization of international material structure, Wendt argues that Waltz’s model can only explain what it purports to explain by relying on an implicit model of the distribution of interests, and insofar as interests are themselves material (defined in terms of power) Wendt’s argument does not violate the spirit of Neorealism, and can be seen as a friendly amendment to the theory. (Wendt 199, p. 97) There are, in other words, strategic and ideational forces that determine states’ actions. All in all, “material power matters, but so do ideas”. (Sørensen 2008, 14)

EMPIRICAL CONTEXT

Two Visions of Europe

Since the idea of the European Union was conceived, its Member States as well as the European citizens in general have been preoccupied with the question of what is to become of Europe, and what role the European Union is to play on the international arena. Jose Cutileiro, in Duas Visões da Europa, comments that since the early 1970s the debate on the European project has been primarily dominated by two divergent visions of Europe. On one side of the debate is the French vision of a European Union which emphasizes the idea that Europe is to converge into a single political entity that should speak with one voice. In this vision, individual Member States submit their sovereignty to a supranational EU government. Europe’s global role in such a context is that of an international power player. Contrary to this European ideal, on the other side of the debate, is the English vision of Europe as a mainly economic, trade, and financial power. British European ideal envisions European Union as an instrument of global stability, but anchored within the transatlantic alliance. (Cutileiro, 2005) Whether Turkey successfully accedes to the EU or finds itself abandoned, may largely depend upon which vision of Europe triumphs. It is therefore essential to establish a clear understanding of these two divergent visions of Europe and what do they mean for Turkey.

Paris-Bonn European Ideal

The advocates of the French vision of Europe, would like to see the EU evolve into a novel political/judicial entity one encompassing a close-knit federation of states, nations, and regions, with linked approaches to economic, social and environmental matters and an independent foreign policy. (Murphy 2004, p. 584) (italics added) Germany and France, since the days of Chancellor Adenauer and General Charles de Gaulle, have been strong proponents of such a Europe. In fact, the discourse on European enlargement and integration and a dissection of the role European Union ought to play in the world, has a Gaullist origin. As a former president of the French Republic, General Charles de Gaulle sought a policy which would bring France back to its former state of “grandeur” and in doing so he was compelled to challenge those whom he referred to as les Anglo-Saxons, namely the British and the Americans. (Ellison 2007, p. 1) Critical to France’s initiative was the exercise of influence and control over Western Europe, the development of a war-broken and divided Germany, as well as European integration over all. De Gaulle built on these foundations by making the European Economic Community (EEC) the institutional foundation of his policy of a European Europe free from American influence.
Within the new French-led Europe, de Gaulle saw France’s interests converge with European interests to produce a European détente. For both the French and the Germans, European integration would serve as a security guarantee of the post-war era. Thus, on January 22nd of 1963, a Franco-German Treaty of Friendship was signed between de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany. Ostensibly, the Germans had signalled their allegiance to de Gaulle’s vision of Europe. (Horber, 224)

To counterbalance the British-American dominance in Europe, successive French and German governments throughout the “1970s, 1980s, and 1990s strove to galvanize the European Community’s political, economic, and defense capabilities in order to create a ‘third force’ in global affairs...” (Pagedas 2001, 111).

The primary objective of de Gaulle’s vision of Europe and the Franco-German alliance was to build a European Europe, a Europe outside of American influence and transatlantic strings. Britain had to be kept out of the Franco-German European ideal for the fear of turning Europe into an Atlantic system. (Hendriks and Morgan, 23) The grand strategy was a creation of a concert of European states that would serve as a means to prevent certain others, in particular Great Britain, from dragging the West into an Atlantic system which would be totally incompatible with a ‘European Europe’. (Ellison 2007, p. 3) De Gaulle challenged American influence in Europe via drastic actions, however symbolic of its general trajectory was France’s dual rejection of British application to the European Economic Community in 1963 and 1967, and France’s intent to liberate itself from subordination to military integration in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Ellison, 1). As such, France clearly outlined its vision of the European Union and France’s role within it: an independent France within an independent Europe. (Hendriks and Morgan, 24) European integration, while satisfying the needs of the French, would work to benefit all of Europe.

De Gaulle’s legacy outlived the Cold War and seems still influential at the beginning of the new millennium. Today, Franco-German European ideal is seen through somewhat the same lenses. The idea that Europe should be free of American influence remains strong. For example, after the end of Cold War, Franco-German pursuit of European autonomy and rise to a global power moved forward with enhanced military cooperation through the creation of the Eurocorps and the revitalization of the Western European Union (WEU). This resulted in the typical US response of trying to strengthen the influence and role of NATO in Europe. “The Maastricht meeting was preceded by a clash between the Bush administration, which wanted the WEU to be an integral part of NATO, and the Mitterrand government, that adopted the Gaullist view of a Europe able to defend itself and, hence, saw the WEU as the military arm of the EC”. (McCarthy, 115) Furthermore, Franco-German coalition once again rose to challenge the United States in January of 2003 in their opposition to the war in Iraq. In essence such a position could be interpreted as an attack on the transatlantic partnership, a stance against U.S. influence and intentions. It remains, however, to be seen what might happen to the de Gaulle’s legacy under Nicolas Sarkozy, the current president of France.
The Anglo-American 'Special' European Ideal

On the other side of the European integration debate is the aforementioned 'British vision'. Murphy refers to it as a "loose association of states" cooperation among which is facilitated by economic, trade and financial links. (Murphy 2004, p. 584) Emphasis here is put upon the extent to which Europe ought to be embedded in the Atlantic Alliance with United States. Indeed, the relationship between Britain and the USA is so close and beneficial that it has become customary to refer to it as 'special'. Indeed, the Anglo-American idea of Europe was born out of this 'special relationship'. The close and natural collaboration between these two powers derives from long-shared political and legal traditions, close cooperative and lucrative ties in trade and investment, and last, but not least, from common cultural heritage. (Pagedas 2001, p. 108) The United States and Britain, since the days of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and currently under President Barak Obama and Prime Minister Gordon Brown, are the advocates of such a Europe. They are also two of the most vocal advocates of Turkish membership in the European Union.

The idea of a special relationship' has been enthusiastically endorsed by London, while Washington perceived it through the spectacles of British support of U.S. interests, first in World War II, then throughout the Cold War, and more importantly in the post-9/11 era, particularly in the ongoing Iraq War and the War on Terror. "Throughout this time, British statesmen and historians have represented the Special Relationship as the anchor of foreign policy: the means by which Britain has ensured American support of its national and international interests, and maintained an effective front against Communism and other threats to the world order" (Boyce 2003, pg 67). However, as Boyce further argues, "the two powers have enjoyed a close working relationship only when the United States has perceived a particular need for Britain's support" (2003, pg 67).

In the Spring of 1964, the Foreign Office in London began to take diplomatic initiative to counter de Gaulle and his European ideal. On March 12, Sir Person Dixon, Britain's Ambassador in Paris, cautioned that France's European trajectory and policies were aimed in an opposite direction to that which her Western Allies [Britain and the United States] wish to take..(Ellison 2007a, pg 21) It could thus be inferred that Britain's Foreign Office advocated closer Atlantic-European policies, stronghold of which was the United States.

Indeed, "in American expectations, the British could be relied upon to act as a stabilizing influence, countering the actual and potential ill-effects of the Gaullist challenge and leading Western Europe in a direction that was sympathetic to US policies". (Ellison 2007b, 105) Hence, the role that United States awarded to Great Britain in the 1966 NATO crisis. At the same time, the U.S. encouraged Britain to play a more prominent role in Europe by submitting a membership application to the European Economic Community (EEC). Washington's aim was to amplify London's influence in Europe. British application and subsequent membership in the EEC did not weaken the 'special' Anglo-American relationship, but rather acted as a catalyst for strengthening it. "The position of leadership in Europe that Britain desired ... was not intended to succeed relations with the US, but reinforce and supplement them (Ellison 2007, p. 117). The conviction in Britain was that Europe needed British leadership, and the Americans needed British leadership in Europe, if the 'right sort of Europe', one set within an Atlantic framework, should finally prevail. (Ellison 2007, p. 29)
In 2003, at a House of Representatives hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on International Relations, it was underlined that “the partnership between the United States and Europe not only remains relevant but is more necessary than ever in a world as uncertain as ours is today. Thus, the transatlantic relationship must be preserved and strengthened”. (p. 1) As it is the case with the French idea of Europe, the English vision of Europe too is still on the British agenda today. This is evident from the British support of the United States in the Iraq War. Today, Britain’s conception of itself is that of a power in its own right, American strongest and most powerful ally. The moral of the Anglo-American ‘Special’ Vision of Europe suggests that there has been and continues to be an Anglo-American position as to role of the European Union in the global context. Throughout the Cold War, Washington looked to Great Britain to defend the principles of the Atlantic partnership and the Anglo-Saxon vision of European integration. London responded readily and effectively. The controversy between the Franco-German and the British-American vision of Europe persists and the question of Turkish accession to the EU may well depend on which of these two visions of Europe finally prevails.

U.S.-Turkey Strategic Relations

In the light on the British-American ‘special’ relationship, it would be beneficial to examine the U.S.-Turkey relations and point to the Turkey-U.S.-British triangle. Turkey’s relations with Europe and the United States have been most active since World War II, relations dictated mainly by the Cold War policy of containment of Communism. For half a century, Turkey earned a reputation of a loyal NATO ally. Leaders of both the United States and Turkey sought ever closer bilateral ties within a multilateral security framework. Strategically, Turkey identified itself with the transatlantic alliance and served as a stronghold against the expansion of communism, protecting the interests of the United States and the West in general (Flanagan and Brannen., 2008, p. 2). Although Turkey’s relevance and significance diminished after the end of Cold War, a turning point of the Ankara-Washington relationship was the Gulf War of 1991. The war gave Turkey “new purpose” as it “played a key role in the U.S.-led campaign” against Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. (Flanagan and Brannen., 2008, p. 2) Turkey’s role, in terms of strategic value for the United States’ interests, expanded. It was not only seen as a loyal NATO ally, but came to be seen more along the lines of a stabilizing factor in the greater Middle East or even Central Asia. “Turkey increasingly was regarded as an anchor of stability in a region of growing volatility and was expected to project that stability.(Heinz 2000, p. 225)

Furthermore, Turkey’s importance for U.S. regional strategic interests expanded to include non-security issues. In terms of “energy cooperation” Turkey was regarded as “crucial link within the east-west energy corridor, which is promoted by the United States as the best solution for bringing Caspian and Central Asian energy resources to market” (Heinz 2000, p. 225) Following the tragic events of 9/11, Turkey’s relevance once again became a priority for Washington. In 2004, at a hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on International Relations, it was underlined that “there is no greater priority for the United States in Europe than to assist the world’s only Muslim-majority democracy, Turkey, in its effort to join the European Union” (Committee on International Relations 2004, p. 7). Flanagan and Brannen conclude that Turkey is “instrumental” in any U.S. strategy in the region (2008, p. 3), notably concerning the situations in Iraq and Iran. Thanks to its geopolitical position in the Middle East, Turkey remains a major U.S. ally in the War on Terror and the Iraq War.
The E. U. Council of Ministers and the (re-)Distribution of Power

Power, whether absolute or relative, is one of the main components of realism. It is therefore improbable to discuss an issue, any issue for that matter, in realist terms without reference to it. With respect to the European Union enlargement, states are often concerned with new challenges that new Member States may pose. The primary concern is whether admission of the new members is relatively beneficial or detrimental to existing members. Such analysis of enlargement is correlated directly with realist emphasis upon relative power. Accordingly, Baldwin et al. claim that "one of the most sensitive issues surrounding expanding membership is that of power in EU institutions." (qtd. in Aleskerov et al., 2002, p. 380) Within the context of the European Union, in fact, states’ abilities to affect decision-making and therefore defend their interests are primarily based upon the distribution of voting power within the various EU institutions. The analysis here will be confined to the most significant and intergovernmental of such institutions: the Council of Ministers of the European Union.

To assess the past and emerging relative voting power of any single member and thus the distribution of such power among EU Member States, the Sharpley-Shubik Power Index is used most commonly. (Hosli 1996; Aleskerov et al., 2002; Baldwin et al., 2005) At a very basic level, the Sharpley-Shubik Power Index can be explained in terms of a three-member voting body. Assume, for example, that members A, B, and C of the voting body hold five (5), three (3), and two (2) votes respectively, resulting in a total number of votes of ten (10), with a qualified majority vote (QMV) of six (6). As such, there are, as Hosli points out, 6 ways in which coalitions can be formed: {5,3,2}, {5,2,3}, {3,5,2}, {3,2,5}, {2,5,3}, {2,3,5} (Hosli 1996, p. 261). (The expression ‘!’ represents ‘faculty’ and requires multiplication by every lower integer. Thus, 3! equals 3 x 2 x 1 = 6). The given members in bold sh rift are the “critical ones...that...give the marginal contribution that renders the coalition winning” (Hosli 1996, p. 261). In the above example, member A is critical four out of six times, thus holding 4/6=2/3 of total voting power, whereas members B and C each hold 1/6 of total voting power.

Madeleine O. Hosti in her article, titled Coalitions and Power: Effects of Qualified Majority Voting in the Council of the European Union, focuses upon “particular aspect of the power of Member States and of coalitions between members holding close policy preferences with respect to decision-making in the Union, namely their (quantitative) influence in the framework of qualified majority votes.” (Hosti 1996, p. 256). Throughout the course of its evolution, the European Union has evolved and developed largely due to divergent interests of Member States. Prominent amongst them were France and Germany. So much so that it has been observed and argued that rarely were decisions made against the Franco-German coalition. (Hosti 1996, 259) Hosti observes that “in relative terms, the shares of individual members in the vote total decreased with an increase in the number of members” (1996, p. 263). Thus, with each additional wave of EU enlargement, the relative power of individual member states decreased. Hosti conveniently concludes that Franco-German alliance, from the establishment of the European Community, held nearly one-half or 46.66 per cent of the total voting power. That figure, however, decreased drastically to 26.84 per cent between 1986 and 1994, and by 1996, when her article was published, had gone down to 23.34 per cent. (Hosti 1996, p. 263) Currently, with the power reconfiguration of EU-27, their combined Sharpley-Shubik power index is only 13.11 per cent. (Aleskerov et al., 2002)
The voting rules of the Council of the European Union were radically transformed under the Treaty of Nice in 2001 and the Constitutional Treaty in 2004. Although traditional qualified majority voting is still maintained within the Nice framework, additional qualification were introduced concerning the required number of votes and voters and the percentage of the population represented. According to the Nice Treaty, “the vote threshold is 72.2 percent of Council votes (232 of 321 votes); the member threshold is 50 percent of members (13 members); and the population threshold is 62 percent of the EU population” (Baldwin 2005, p. 331). In the context of this essay, therefore, the relevant question is: what will be, under present rules, the impact of Turkey’s EU membership on the redistribution of seats, voting power and power indices within the EU Council of Ministers or EU institutions generally?

Aleskerov et al. focused primarily upon the Council of Ministers, however, in order to better evaluate the power distribution within EU, they broadened their research and analysis to include the European Parliament. In line with such an assessment, vote distribution in the Council of Ministers would give Turkey an equal amount of votes to that of France, Germany, and Great Britain. Furthermore, Turkey would seize the second largest amount of seats within European Parliament, second to that of Germany. (see Appendix C: Vote Distribution In The Case Of Enlargement in Aleskerov et al., 2002, p. 391)

How, then, does this translate in terms of power re-distribution? According to Baldwin and Widgrén, Turkey’s relative power within the EU framework, in term of decision-making capabilities, would be quite substantial. They explicitly point out that “under either the Nice Treaty or the Constitutional Treaty, Turkey would be second most powerful member of the EU...Under the Constitutional Treaty rules, Turkey would be substantially more powerful than France, Italy and Britain...” (Baldwin 2005, 337). Indeed, power indices under the Constitutional Treaty rules in a EU-29 show that Germany’s power index would be 0.10203 and Turkey’s 0.09960, followed by Great Britain at 0.07644 and France at 0.07611. Under the Nice Treaty rules, Turkey’s power index would be equivalent to 0.07189, again second only to that of Germany. (see table 13.1 and 13.2 in Baldwin 2005, p. 335) Furthermore, gain of power by one state is a loss of power by another. As pointed out earlier, relative power of states decreases as the number of Member States in the European Union increases. As Baldwin indicates, “countries relative power losses are proportional to their sizes” (Baldwin 2005, p. 336). From such a perspective, Germany and France, currently the most populous members of the European Union, would suffer the most since they would lose the most voting power.

To appreciate more fully the impact of Turkey’s membership on the power redistribution within the EU, it is necessary to keep in mind that when states form a coalition, this results in an increase of their relative power, as demonstrated by Hosli’s analysis of the Paris-Bonn axis. The author points out that, when in coalition, France and Germany have benefited from an increase of relative power, compared to the sum of their individual power indices. Specifically, “their collective Shapley-Shubik index was 66.67 per cent as compared to 46.66 per cent when summed over their individual shares”. As a country with relatively large population, Turkey would play a relatively larger role than any other country with less population. As a result, it could be a very important, strategic partner for any large state, especially if forming an alliance. And, although a state’s preferences cannot be pinpointed with absolute certainty, in time or space, it would be safe to presume that Turkey’s alliance formation would not be with the Franco-German power boat, but rather with Atlanticist Great Britain. If Hosli’s logic of coalition formation and its consequences in regards to increase of relative power are applied to a
probable U.K.-Turkey alliance, the increase of relative power could be estimated to be either equal to or greater than the Franco-German alliance. However, further analysis of this issue is surely required. For instance, the long term effects of the substantive and close human and economic ties between Germany and Turkey cannot be easily ignored and should be brought into the equation. But whatever Turkey’s alliance preferences may turn out to be, there is no denying that its accession would certainly have a drastic impact upon the power re-distribution within the European Union.

THEORETICAL APPLICATION

How, then, does Waltz’s balance-of-power theory, enriched with ideational or constructivist elements, help to explain the issue of Turkey’s EU membership? According to Waltz, in order for one to understand the relationship between units (actors) in the international political space, it is absolutely necessary to define international political structure in terms of the principle by which it is ordered or organized. The current structure of the international political arena is that of anarchy. For, there is no supra-national entity which regulates the relations among all units in the international political arena. No overarching authority exists to which one state can turn for justice or protection in its interaction with other states. The distribution of power in the anarchical system, Waltz claims, is the key independent variable to understanding important international outcomes such as war and peace, alliance politics, and the balance of power. Thus, it is imperative to analyze the existing distribution of power, and the re-distribution of power that would take place within the EU, if Turkey were to be granted a membership status, and the consequences that this would have.

At the political level, Turkey’s membership within the European Union is seen by many as strengthening the anti-federalist and the Atlanticist blocks. “Steps towards the empowerment of European political institutions would become more difficult...while the deployment of a European security structure independent of NATO and U.S. influence would be shelved, and a common foreign policy would be harder to achieve.” (Grigoriadis 2006, p. 151) Indeed, this would undermine the vision of Europe as a counter-weight to the U.S. and would play into Washington’s security doctrine. As the Committee on International Relations points out:

The more important issue [for the United States] is the one of the security doctrine, and is...to a large extent going to depend on the United States. Because, who is capable of deciding which security doctrine will prevail? The United States is the only one. And therefore, the doctrine will depend on the world vision of the United States. Right now, there clearly is a difference between the American and European concepts. The document which was published in September last year on the security strategy of the United States is based on the concept of balance of power between the major countries of the world under the guidance of the United States. As such, there is no room for Europe. There is only room for individual member states as good allies of NATO. Right now there is no European doctrine, and there are no separate European resources for collective security. (p. 43-44)

The above quotation, that basically reflects the Anglo-American vision of Europe and the world, leaves no room for any meaningful role for the European Union in world politics. However, Germany’s and France’s vision of the European Union - a political entity based on the rule of law - stands in clear contrast to the Anglo-Saxon project. This alternative vision of the European Union, as a power player on
the international arena, should serve as a counter balance to the US hegemony and unilateralism. Germany and France have formed an alliance which, with the possible help of the Eastern European states, could counter the United States, Great Britain, and eventually Turkey. The role of these contrasting visions of the European Union is thus of huge importance here, because of their potential impact on Turkey’s membership of the EU. These divergent visions of Europe are also important because they confirm that the behaviour of the EU member states too could be understood in terms of Waltz’s conception of the anarchical system, which “strongly affects the likelihood of cooperation” (Waltz 1979, p. 118). EU member states too are concerned with the question of relative power or the balance of power, and seek alliances that better promotes their national interests and objectives, at home and abroad. This has also been the case of the Franco-German alliance since the end of World War II.

It is important to understand that state actors are constantly presented with daily choices, knowing that such choices and the outcomes of their decisions will have unpredictable consequences beyond the near future. Such conditions have clear relevance to the Turkish accession question. For, if its accession to the EU is successful, such a membership will have a dramatic impact on the European Union as a whole and will shift the balance of power between EU member states and their conflicting visions of Europe. Thus, the bigger question concerning Turkish accession to the EU goes beyond the Kurdish question, the human rights issues, or the political and economic standards of the Copenhagen criteria. Explicitly, it deals with the global balance of power and the two visions of Europe. Primarily, the issue concerns the position of Turkey in a form of US, and thus British, ally and a tool as a regional power, especially in the wake of the War on Terror, Iraq War, and Turkey’s geopolitical position in the Middle East. This is an important issue, given that US-Turkish relations are focused upon the strategic dimension of regional and functional interests, vital to the US. (Abramowitz 2004; U.S. Committee on International Relations 2003) The question of Turkey’s membership in the European Union is therefore a matter of high priority for Washington: “Anchoring Turkey in Europe has always been a U.S. priority because of its global role and strategic vision. In Washington, having Turkey be part of Europe and the transatlantic community more broadly has always been preferential to a Turkey that operates more as a regional counterweight with regard to Iran or Russia.” (Walker 2007-08, p. 101)

Furthermore, as long as the secular elite are in the position of power and decision-making, the United States will remain influential in Turkey. Thus, it would be strategically and practically important for Turkey to remain anchored in the West, under the US control. The most efficient and direct means of achieving such a close-knit alliance with the West is via EU membership. Grigoriadis, for example, explicitly points out that “Turkey’s membership in the European Union is seen as the best guarantee for the consolidation of Turkey’s secular, pro-Western political system and globalized economy” (2006, p. 151). In addition, if Turkey is to join the EU, the British-American idea of the European Union may be strengthened, while the Franco-German vision will probably be weakened. The idea of relative gains and power, as outlined by Waltz, clearly explains British, German, and French positions on Turkish membership.
There are a number of realist assumptions that justify and provide a solid foundation for Waltz's balance of power theory, which in turn enlightens the analysis of Turkey's accession to the European Union. One core realist assumption holds that the structure of international system is that of anarchy. Furthermore, it is assumed that the key units of the international system are nation states. Great significance is given to relative power and to the role of the relatively more powerful states. Lastly, the primary goal of all units is the pursuit of power and security, and such units act rationally in order to achieve those goals. Another assumption that needs to be mentioned, although not a purely realist one, is that states' ideas and perceptions matter. The fusion of constructivist and realist approaches has here been examined and presented in terms of a constructive form of realism, that takes ideas seriously both as objects of analysis and determinants of human and state behaviour. As such, Waltz's balance of power theory has not been undermined, but rather supplemented and strengthened.

From this perspective, the balance of power theory provides an explanation for the balancing behaviour of states that has been observed. Indeed, among three of the most influential and powerful decision-makers and role players in European Union, two are against Turkish membership, and one is in favour. Both Germany and France have stated publicly their opposition to Turkey's full membership of the European Union, in the short run. Great Britain, on the other hand, is very much in support of Turkish membership. France and Germany, due to their perception of relative gains or losses as a result of Turkey's accession to the EU, have expressed their opposition to its membership. The realist account also explains British and US stand on the issue. Turkish accession to the European Union will/would likely strengthen US and British power, influence and role in European and global politics. Such a shift in the balance of power would be favourable to one side and unfavourable to the other. As stated earlier, the primary aim of all states is their own survival; whether it is defined in terms of power, security or territorial integrity. Contrary to the liberal theorists, who believe that international organizations, presumably by imposing overarching restraints, compel states to adjust their goals, it is quite evident that even in the context of NATO and the EU the most important goals for the state is security, survival and pursuit of power. As realists contend, cooperation among nation states is possible, but only under certain conditions.

Finally, it should be emphasized that the position of existing member countries on the question of Turkey's accession to the European Union is mainly influenced by two interrelated factors: their particular vision of the European Union and their policy vis-à-vis the United States. As it has been illustrated, there are two divergent visions of the European Union and its relation to the United States. The Franco-German political vision of the European Union as a world power, that could counterbalance the United States. The British vision of the European Union places instead great emphasis upon economic and financial matters and fully anchors the European Union within the Atlantic alliance, subservient to the United States. Presumably, Turkey's perception of the EU could be more in line with the British vision of a European Union with close transatlantic ties. In any case, the balance of power theory, infused with the ideational and constructivist concerns about the importance of ideas, appears to successfully explain the behaviour of all the states discussed in this paper.
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