BUILDING ARAB-ISRAELI REGIONALISM ON JERUSALEM’S FOUNDATIONS

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Introduction

Why is it that the Middle East should remain an anomaly for political scientists seeking to understand its myriad contradictions? On the one hand, it is by majority an ethnically and religiously Arab-Islamic region. On the other, the infusion of Western influences, colonial legacies, religious and ethnic minorities, resource disputes, fratricidal rivalry and the Jewish-Israeli dilemma throw the region into a tailspin of disorder and insecurity. The region has its problems like any other, but unlike many other regions that have managed to overcome their interstate squabbles, the countries of the Middle East lag far behind the rest of the world in peace, prosperity, security and stability.

Although many reasons have been given for the debilitating state of affairs in the Middle East, it is arguably the Arab-Israeli conflict which has been the most prominent issue. This paper attempts to explain the lack of regional integration in the Middle East with a specific focus on the Arab-Israeli (and the more narrow Palestinian-Israeli) rivalry that has dominated the region for over 60 years. This will be done by first taking into account destabilizing aspects of the Middle Eastern conundrum in a historical context and comparative perspective to better understand why regional integration has been achieved in many other parts of the world, but not in the Middle East. Once this is done, the use of realist and regionalist theoretical frameworks will help to better explain the cynical presumptions and pessimistic patterns of thinking that run rampant among leaders in the region and inhibit mutually beneficial relations.

In order to break out of the deadlock that the determinacy of realist theories force upon the theoretical analyst, theories of conflict resolution will be explored. By combining liberal-informed and optimistic conflict mediation and negotiation theories with realism’s explanatory power, it is argued that a more multi-dimensional picture of Middle East’s predicaments will emerge, more susceptible to conflict resolution and thus to increased regional integration. Finally, perhaps the most pressing issue in the Arab-Palestinian-Israeli conflict is the division in the holy city of Jerusalem. The inability to find a workable solution to the city means that it is continuously relegated to final status talks; in other words, the primacy and visibility of the Jerusalem problem translates into the ongoing polarization and radicalization of would-be moderates in the region, stifling peace and security in the region for all actors involved. This paper argues that a Middle Eastern regionalization process is possible only if the core concern, Jerusalem, is tackled head-on and finally resolved.

THE STATUS OF REGIONALISM

How deeply or widely a regional system is integrated is often a matter of dispute. Absolute figures in terms of immigration and trade flows are useful in the economic sense while confidence-building-measures such as transparency in troop movements and disarmament campaigns are helpful in the military-security sense, but these figures are meaningless without some meaningful context within which to place them. For that reason, a comparative historical perspective is the most commonsensical
approach to take when measuring levels of positive or negative regional integration and development, whether concerning Europe and East Asia (Beeson 2005) or competitive US-European strategies in Latin America (Grugel 2004). In a comparative spirit, a brief overview of regionalism or regional integration in diverse parts of the world will first be undertaken, followed by a closer look at the lack of regionalism between the states of the Middle East.

Regional Integration Worldwide

In all corners of the globe, processes of regional integration are giving birth to regional organizations that bring together many different states with a shared purpose. Most times, that purpose is ostensibly economic; witness, for instance, the similarities between the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR). These regional associations both aim to promote free trade and the fluid movement of goods, services, people and capital according to neoliberal theories of mutual benefit and absolute advantages (Duina and Buxbaum 2008). It is often neoliberal theories expounding the benefits of the increased trade flows and mutual interdependence that accompany globalization that are most accepted in these types of regional institutions. There is one big difference between the two Americas, however: security concerns were made irrelevant in the creation of NAFTA, which merely added Mexico to the already existing Canadian-American free trade agreement of the 1980s (Baggs and Brander 2006). In the case of MERCOSUR, the two founding members, Brazil and Argentina, used the inauguration of the Southern Common Market to help them overcome their mutual hostilities, incorporating other regional members, Uruguay and Paraguay, to help balance out the institution (Amayo 2007). In both cases, nevertheless, the incentive of mutual economic rewards encouraged member-states to join and profit from regional integration.

For other organizations, however, like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the unifying factor can be geopolitical in nature. In essence, the strategic rationale behind the decision of the member-states to join these regional groupings was the achievement of national security through the maintenance of international peace and stability (Chung 2008). It was essentially the border disputes between the Central Asian republics that came to the forefront in the years following the Soviet Union's collapse that provided the impetus for a regional security organization. With regional giants Russia and China sandwiching the region, it was only natural for both to take an active interest in the stability and peaceful resolution of disputes between their energy-rich and potentially quarrelsome neighbors (Haas 2007). Due to the difficulty of any regional power establishing its hegemony in Southeast Asia, like Indonesia's, ASEAN was formed in 1967 to provide a forum for discussion and transparency between states. At the height of the Cold War, the autocratic rulers decided that instead of fighting one another, they would focus instead on a policy of nonintervention and for the most part nonalignment in the Cold War (Wanandi 2005). By infusing their security concerns with realist prescriptions, conflict was minimized between states that had little to gain from it in any case.

Finally, there are others who have already graduated to the point where the economic and the political benefits are considered inseparable. The obvious example here is the hallmark of regional integration upon which much of the literature is based, the European Union (EU), but the members of
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have also evolved from a collective defense organization to take on a wide range of economic goals (Nonneman 2006). With its humble beginnings in the European Coal and Steel Community, and later on the European Common Market and Economic Community, the European integration project began as a security measure to prevent German rearmament after the Second World War, but has lately become much more of a politico-economic mega-project. There has been much debate about the ramifications of pooling sovereignty and the emergence of a new supranational political space in much of the European regionalist literature (Thumer and Binder 2009). The GCC was also initially formed out of the insecurity and instability rampant in the Persian Gulf throughout the Iran-Iraq War during the 1980s. Originally banding together as a security community in collective defense, the original aim of the Arab Gulf states has been expanded more recently to include, thanks to substantial and exceptional oil and gas revenue, greater economic projects (Dar and Presley 2001). Many more regional organizations and rationales exist, but there is no need to mention all of them. The important point is that many such organization exist and that they are multiplying.

The ‘Paradox’ of the Middle East: The Lack of Regionalism in the Middle East

In direct contrast to the previously mentioned examples of regions engaging in healthy and mutually beneficial activities of regional integration, the paradox of the Middle East has been aptly captured by its description as a “region without regionalism” (Aarts 1999, 911). The proliferation of regional groups that have been sweeping across the globe over the past six decades has largely skipped over the Middle East. In comparison to other regions, it has the lowest relative degree of regional cooperation in the contemporary world. Aside from the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, which renders any attempt to achieve an all-embracing regionalism pointless, Arab countries have essentially failed to create any long-term regional unity among themselves; it seems that the only uniting factors for the majority of Arab states are their mutual hostility of Israel and wavering degrees of support and sympathy for Palestinians. Therefore, the Middle East has remained synonymous with conflict, insecurity and instability insofar as structures for regional peace, security and stability have not been, and are unlikely to soon be, created.

The trend in a globalizing world then seems to be one of increased regionalization, but this has not quite been the desired result in the Middle East. At this point, it would be wise to define the region in question before continuing. Although there is no generally agreed upon definition for the boundaries of the Middle East, the most commonly employed one is the area enclosed by five seas: the Black, Caspian, Mediterranean, Persian and Red Seas. Therefore, the Middle East can be said to encompass the geographical region of Israel, Iran, Turkey and all Arab states East of Egypt (Kilchevsky et al. 2007, 648). This is a more or less contiguous geographic region that shares a common type of landscape, semi-arid climate and drastically uneven distribution of natural resources, whether renewable but limited, like fish and freshwater, or finite but abundant, like oil and gas.

The region is one of the oldest in the world, having been continuously inhabited for thousands of years. Whereas other regions can commonly relate to a collective cultural or religious identity, the Middle East lies at the crossroads of three continents and is home to a wide range of different peoples. When it comes to that which divides the region, however, it seems that there is no shortage of reasons,
excuses, rationales or explanations for the lack of regional unity in the Middle East. In an attempt to explain the lack of regionalism in the Arab-Israeli Middle East, analysts give many reasons, but the most frequently cited are: religion, nationalism and colonialism. For the sake of space, only these three central factors will be examined here.

As to the role of religion, regional integration in the Middle East is undermined not only by inter-religious conflicts, but also by intra-religious disputes. In fact, although the three monotheistic faiths tracing their lineage to the patriarch Abraham – Judaism, Christianity and Islam – are often thought of as monolithic blocs in direct conflict with each other, this view is not very accurate. A recent study has shown that intra-religious disputes are much more common and much more lethal than inter-religious conflicts (Svensson 2007, 934). This means that Muslims will fight Jews with far less frequency than they will fight each other, often along three fronts. First and foremost, the Islamic World can be divided into two broad camps, the extremists and the moderates. The extremists are the fundamentalist, religious zealots often associated with terrorism and typically united by their hatred towards the United States and Israel, like Iran, Syria, Hamas and Hezbollah. The moderates are typically backed by the United States, formally if not tacitly friendly with Israel and value stability and security at the regional level above ideology. Secondly, Islam can be divided between Sunni and Shiite branches of the religion, analogous to Catholics and Protestants but rooted much further in history. Regional pariahs like Iran and Hezbollah are fundamentally Shiite entities, which has historically been persecuted by the Sunni majority in the Islamic faith. Thirdly, religion plays in a Muslim’s lifestyle in the Middle East a role far more intensive than in the secular West (An-Na’im 1999; Khalili 2007). The above three points suggest that the difficulty encountered in bridging the religiously rooted obstacles to regional integration can be found also within the same religion.

Usually interwoven within religious identity is the ideology of nationalism, which presents an especially volatile combination in the Middle East. In the 1950s and 1960s, many of the Western-backed Arab regimes installed during the interwar period were replaced by military dictatorships or republican forms of government in popular revolutions and coups d’état. Arab nationalism became known as panArabism, an effort to bridge the artificial borders between Arab countries created by the legacies of great power colonialism (Zoli 2008). This was aided immensely by the combined Arab opposition to Zionism, which by those years had become synonymous with Israeli nationalism. Zionism propagated the desire for Jewish immigration to the land of Israel after two millennia living in the Diaspora, a move widely seen in the Islamic World as an extension of Western imperialism and domination (Long 2009). Because both types of nationalism espoused strong connections to the land, agricultural farming and settler communities came to symbolize both peoples’ claim to the land. This possessive colonization of the land on both sides became even more complicated by the rise of Palestinian nationalism in the 1960s, which for the first two decades of the Arab-Israeli conflict had been eclipsed by the ideals of pan-Arabism (Gerber 2008). Today, the Palestinian-Israeli standoff has come to represent the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict, showcasing the inevitable challenges that arise in overcoming nationalism and arriving at a resolution of the conflict acceptable to all sides involved.

Both the religious and the nationalist dimensions of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its detrimental effect on Middle Eastern regional integration have to be considered in light of colonialism’s lasting effects. For instance, not only were the colonial powers of Great Britain and France Christian as opposed to the Muslim masses in the Middle East, but they imposed their Western conception of nation-
statehood on a region which had for thousands of years been held together by imperial rule. This meant that borders were often drawn on maps with little concern for geography, topography or national realities on the ground; witness the problems that have plagued the region because of the Kurdish population’s displacement among the four so-called nation-states in Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran (Berwari and Ambrosio 2008). Ever since the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine that led to the establishment of the State of Israel, any Western support for the Jewish State is seen as a revival of Western imperial and colonial practices in a new guise. Hence, the appeal of the propaganda disseminated via the airwaves by al-Qaeda figureheads like Osama bin-Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri of a Muslim’s religious duty to wage jihad – holy war – against the “Zionist-Crusader alliance and their collaborators” (PBS Online NewsHour). It is thus comprehensible how the scars of colonialism continue to inform the worldviews of a region already reeling from the indulgence in religious and nationalist conflicts.

Considering the lack of unifying factors from religious disagreements to nationalist tendencies to its colonial past, the region fails to offer convincing evidence of regional integration. Little to no intraregional trade means little intercultural contact, which leads to hostile relations on both sides. Nearly three decades after Egypt and Israel signed a historic peace treaty, Egypt’s top cultural official, Farouk Hosny, in 2008 replied to a reporter when asked if any Israeli books were featured in an Alexandrian library, “Burn these books; if there are any there, I will myself burn them in front of you” (BBC World News). Similarly, Israel’s controversial Foreign Minister, Avigdor Lieberman, has publicly said that Egypt’s President, Hosni Mubarak, should pay the Jewish State an official and diplomatic visit, but that “if he doesn’t want to come, he can go to hell” (Ilan et al. 2008). Both sides have since offered apologies, but the tension simmering under the surface of a peace treaty that has long gone cold remains and complicates the pursuit of increased peace and security through regionalism.

THEORETICAL REALISM AND REGIONALISM

The point has been sufficiently made that a serious and significant lack of regional integration plagues the Arab-Israeli Middle East. In order to fully comprehend why this is the case, an explanatory theory is needed with the power to expose the inner workings of Middle Eastern politics. For this task, the insights afforded by realist scholars of various stripes will help to explain the actions taken and the decisions made by the numerous heads of state in the region. An in-depth focus on Barry Buzan’s (1991) theorizing of regional security complexes will then provide a useful analytical tool for portraying the interconnectedness of all state actors involved. Finally, Patrick M. Morgan’s (1997) discussion of regional orders as hypothetical security ladders to be climbed combines realist and regionalist theories to place the Arab-Israeli Middle East, a regional security system, along a regional security spectrum.

Many scholars have found realist theory to be a useful framework within which to investigate world politics. Realist theory addresses the key questions that Quincy Wright originally envisioned for the field of international relations: “What are the causes of conflict and war among nations, and what are the conditions for cooperation and peace among them?” (Wright 1935). As one of the most conflict-prone region in the world, the same questions could be asked about the current state of affairs in the Middle East. The underlying logic of regional processes will hopefully be clarified after examining some
of the central realist assumptions about states along with the propositions that realists derive from those core assumptions.

Beginning with the first of realism’s three core assumptions, the nation-state is seen as the fundamental unit of political organization in international politics. It is the main actor on the world stage and continues to wield what Weber denotes a “monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force” (Weber 1919). This means that although non-state actors may still use violence for their own ends, the state is the only body that can legally go to war with other states. In other words, “the state is the principal actor in that the nature of the state and the pattern of relations among states are the most important determinants of the character of international relations at any given moment” (Gilpin 1981, 17-18). If states are the main regional actors, how do non-state actors, like terrorist groups Hamas and Hezbollah, continue to destabilize the Middle East? For one, it would be impossible for them to exist without the explicit support of like-minded states Iran and Syria. Secondly, the goals of these non-state entities are still state-oriented: either to destroy a state, like Israel, or to establish their own state, like Palestine. Therefore, states are still the “basic actors in the international system” since “the behavior of other actors... is conditioned and delimited by state decisions and state power” (Krasner 1985, 28).

Once it is assumed that the state is the key unit of action in the international arena, the second assumption deals with the nature of state behaviour. They are said to “behave in ways that are, by and large, rational, and therefore comprehensible to outsiders in rational terms” (Keohane 1986, 7). State rationality, from a realist viewpoint, has at least three elements; realists assume that states are goal-oriented, that these goals are consistently ordered from most to least desirable and that states devise strategies to achieve these goals (Grieco 1997, 165-166). It naturally follows that states are “sensitive to costs” and will inevitably alter their strategies as external constraints and opportunities change, after learning from their own negative experiences and by observing what has succeeded and failed for other states (Waltz 1986, 331). A good example of state rationality involves two Arab-Israeli wars six years apart. In the morning hours of June 5, 1967, Israeli fighter jets caught Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian armies unaware and practically obliterated their aerial forces, allowing Israel to claim victory against impossible odds in the Six-Day War. After recognizing that only a surprise attack would enable them to gain the upper hand in battle, Egypt and Syria secretly mobilized their armies along the Israeli border and launched a two-pronged attack on Israel when it was most vulnerable, on the holiest day of the Jewish calendar, in the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

The third of realism’s three assumptions moves beyond the state as the referent object and tackles the international system instead. Although the state remains the main guarantor of authority in the domestic sphere, there exists no comparable enforcer of security at the international level. That is to say, war “lurks in the background of international politics just as revolution lurks in the background of domestic politics” (Carr 1964, 109). This absence of a central and reliable authority above individual states is what realists call the condition of international anarchy. International relations can thus be seen to “take place in the shadow of war, or, to use a more rigorous expression, relations among states involve, in essence, the alternatives of peace and war” (Aron 1973, 6). This vibes with another essential realist idea: the inevitability of war means that states can only rely on themselves for physical defense. Professor Alan Dershowitz, a vocal supporter of Israel, defends the Jewish state’s bellicose behaviour by making this exact point: “Israel’s permanent security must be assured against enemies both external and internal. Until and unless that occurs, Israel must continue to maintain a qualitative military superiority
over the combined armed forces of its potential enemies as the best assurance of peace in the region, since Israel can count on no one else to assure its survival" (Dershowitz 2003, 241).

Combining realism's three main assumptions about states – that they are the main actors in international politics, that they can be considered rational actors, and that they coexist in a context of international anarchy – leads to key propositions about their essential character and how they choose to interact with other states. Chief among these propositions is that states are first and foremost concerned with power and security. Yet, the definition of power and its relation to security have been and remain contested issues. Hans J. Morgenthau, an early proponent of realist theory, characterized international politics as a struggle for power and justice, but in his view the struggle for power tends to prevail. In fact, he argued that statesmen “think and act in terms of interest defined as power” (Morgenthau 1948, 5) and this due to the “limitless character of the lust for power [which] reveals a general quality of the human mind” (Morgenthau 1946, 194). This conception of power certainly requires clarifications and has been questioned and criticized on several fronts, in particular: the inadequacy of using human nature to explain the occurrence of international conflicts (Waltz 1959, 39); the apparent inability to distinguish between the tangible and intangible elements of power, namely between power as a resource and power as influence over others’ behavior (Keohane 1986, 11); and, even more important, the lack of a clear distinction between power as an end in itself and power as a means to an end, a concept in line with T.R. Fox’s instrumental view of power, based on Bertrand Russell’s definition of power as “the capacity to produce intended effects” (Fox 1988, 234).

As to the relation between power and security, the fundamental question is whether the maximization of power or the maximization of security should be sought. Realist theory easily acknowledges that the quest for power is not identical to the quest for security. Power is relational; as Morgenthau points out: “the concept of power is always a relative one” (Morgenthau 1948, 12). This could be and is often interpreted as leading to a so-called zero-sum game in which one state’s gain is invariably another state’s loss, while, obviously, “one state’s security is not necessarily every other state’s insecurity. Greater security, like greater prosperity, but unlike dominant power, is an objective toward which it is at least conceivable that all states can move simultaneously” (Fox 1944, 11). But the realist insistence on the relativity of power clearly rejects the idea of dominant and absolute power. The relativity of power, therefore, could also be interpreted as suggesting a necessary subordination of power to other objectives, notably security, thus stressing the instrumental nature of power. Clearly, in this case, the so-called the zero-sum nature of power will give way to the absolute-sum nature of security, in which states can either gain or lose, depending on the degree of cooperation and collaboration with one another. Given realism’s emphasis on states as self-help and rational agents, “it would follow that if a state had an opportunity to increase its power, but this conflicted with its goal of security maximization, then the state... would forego the former in favour of the latter” (Grieco 1997, 167). Similarly, Waltz notes that “in anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if survival is assured can states safely seek such other goals as tranquility, profit and power” (Waltz 1979, 126). Power, then, can never be seen as an end in itself, but just as one in a list of many means for achieving (inter)national security. And that realism generally favours the maximization of security, not the maximization of power, is demonstrated with luminous clarity by its main theory of international relations: the Balance of Power Theory.
Regional Security Complex (RSC) Theory

The utility of the regional level theories as opposed to realist-inspired theories is the incorporation of the supranational element in the theoretical analysis. The following analysis defines Buzan’s (1991) regional security complex with its accompanying ideas of global overlay and patterns of amity/enmity before moving on to Morgan’s (1997) regional order concept as a security ladder. By tweaking with realism’s precepts and taking into account regional-level theories, the predictive ability of the theory grows beyond the level of the state and factors in the nature of the regional system, situated somewhere between the national and the global levels of analysis.

To this point, the term region has almost exclusively been used to refer to the Middle East, that is, the geographical region bounded by five seas and comprising the geographical region of Israel, Iran, Turkey and all Arab states East of Egypt (Kilchevsky et al. 2007, 648). The region referred to as the Arab-Israeli Middle East logically subtracts the non-Arab states of Iran and Turkey from that list, leaving Israel splashing about in a sea of exclusively Arab states. The basic unit of analysis here is really the regional security complex, a concept devised by Barry Buzan (1991) to describe a specific kind of region united by common security problems. In such a complex, the member-states are so interrelated in terms of their security that actions by any member, and significant security-related developments within the domestic sphere of any member, are recognized as having a major impact on the others. Regionalism in the Arab-Israeli Middle East, lacking any meaningful economic or cross-cultural-normative component, will be analyzed in terms of regional security. Consequently, as opposed to the general tendency to exclude Israel from regional frameworks, here it is argued that this exclusion cannot be permitted to continue.

Buzan defines a regional security complex (RSC) as a “group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another” (Buzan 1991, 190). Thus, the central elements in these complexes are the security relationships between each member-state and any elements of interdependence that concern security. Security, like power, is a concept liable to change with time, and has been the object of heated debate in the past few decades. Scholars generally tend to acknowledge that security is a relational concept centered on the existence of a danger or a threat, and as Buzan points out, the security of an individual actor is relevant only if considered in light of the systemic interdependence it shares with its fellow components in the system (Buzan 1991, 187). Despite major disagreements concerning the width and depth of the concept, the Middle Eastern RSC is likely for some time to continue to be defined in the traditionally realist sense as political and military threats against the government, territory and/or population of the state (Buzan 1997; Sørenson 2006). Furthermore, RSCs will in all likelihood continue to “be of much greater importance for coping with security issues and problems than in the past, and the management of order and security will increasingly be found [in these RSCs], especially if regional conflicts continue to flourish” (Morgan 1997, 31).

The concept of RSC is intended to emphasize that while regional security processes differ considerably from the global system, they may still refract the impact of that global system. Reflecting the bipolar Cold War system in which the theory was developed, any foreign powers’ penetration into the regional system is defined as overlay, driven by the global-level conflicts and concerns behind great or superpower foreign policies. Further refinement of the concept might characterize the RSC in terms of its degree of autonomy and distinctiveness from the global system since under the condition of
overlay, regional-level dynamics cannot reasonably be considered apart from global-level dynamics; on the other hand, if no great or superpower conflict drives penetration into regional complexes, then overlay loses much of its relevance (Morgan 1997, 25-28). The Cold War had a dual effect on regional conflicts, on the one hand internationalizing otherwise local conflicts and on the other suppressing otherwise explosive interactions. In the Arab-Israeli Middle East, competitive arms racing behaviour no doubt increased the likelihood of either side resorting to war to achieve security, but it also created an eventual balance of power in which neither Israel nor the combined might of its Arab neighbours could decisively emerge victorious from armed combat. In the post-Cold War world, the United States' influence can still be felt.

There are numerous dimensions along which RSCs can be seen to differ and might reasonably be of theoretical interest, but Buzan (1991) has proposed for this to be done in terms of their patterns of amity and enmity. While RSCs are mostly generated by patterns of conflictual relations, hence the focus on traditional, politico-military issues of security, the theory accommodates variations in degree of conflict. This use of the amity/enmity spectrum is logical since “in seeing each other as relevant to their national security interests, each member-state must respond to perceived or actual threats and conflicts among themselves and, in the same fashion, to perceived or actual security relations that are friendly, indifferent, or [hostile]” (Morgan 1997, 31). Decades into the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Kingdom of Jordan and Israel both began to see each other’s securities as inextricably linked. This connection was so profound that when Syrian troops prepared to invade Jordan in 1970 in support of Palestinian guerillas threatening to topple the King, the stability of superpower overlay allowed Israel to come to the moderate monarch’s aid and maintain the regional balance of power although the two countries were technically still at war.

**Regional Order/Security Ladder Theory**

Much different from a regional security complex, however, is Morgan’s (1997) notion of a regional security order. These regional orders are patterns of conflict management that can be used to rank a specific regional security complex – like the Arab-Israeli Middle East – along a theoretical security ladder from most to least integrated. While a security complex tends to have elements of more than one of these ideal types of orders, one is usually “dominant in terms of states’ preferences, perceptions and strategies” (Lake and Morgan 1997, 12). In order from most to least ordered and secured, the list of regional orders is as follows: integration, pluralistic security community, collective security, great-power concert and power restraining power or balance of power. The list of regional security orders can be thought of as rungs on a ladder to be climbed by RSCs as they pursue regional cooperation and conflict management (Morgan 1997, 32-33). In this sense, the top of the ladder corresponds most closely to liberal ideas of regional cooperation and the bottom effectively mirrors realism’s pessimistic view on the inevitability of conflict and the spontaneous emergence of a regional balance of power. Evidently, the example of the EU in Europe rests atop the ladder while the situation in the Arab-Israeli Middle East resides at the bottom.

Since the Middle East is said to be located on the bottom rung of the security ladder, it would be prudent to discuss the implications of achieving security via the use of power to restrain power. In
traditional politics, this is often referred to as the balance of power, which is often characterized by a prevalent form of power distribution that it is argued leads to stability and security for all within the system. This distribution of power may be dominated by one state in a unipolar system as popularized in the hegemonic stability theory (Gilpin 1971; Kindleberger 1973; Keohane 1984). The balance of power may also be dominated by two great/superpowers in a bipolar system as was largely the case during the Cold War (Waltz 1979). Finally, the distribution of power may not be dominated by any one or two powers, but spread diffusely among three or more great powers in a multipolar system, like the Concert of Europe was between the Napoleonic and Crimean Wars (Waltz 1987; Mearsheimer 2001).

In the Middle East, it is often unclear in which direction the balance of power tends to shift. Conceptual and empirical problems plague researchers’ attempts to assess this distribution of power: “The Arab system in the 1950s and 1960s stood between an unbalanced multipower system and a one-power system, although it more closely resembled the latter” (Noble 1991, 63). It was simply unclear how superpower overlay and the Israeli factor impacted Egyptian ambitions for regional hegemony. Egypt and Israel were often seen at two opposite ends of a bipolar system for most of the Cold War, but this is problematic since no Arab state would openly admit to support Israel, although some did so tacitly (Pervin 1997, 274). Towards the end of the Cold War and as the balance shifted drastically in its favour, Israel was seen as an aspiring hegemon that “intervene[d] at will, unchallenged, from Baghdad to Beirut” (Hudson 1984, 156). Recently, the balance of power has come to be supplemented by three interesting ideas: the balance of threat in which physical or actual power is supplanted by perceived power (Walt 1987), the checkerboard pattern in which neighbours are likely to be opposed while more distant countries are likely to be allied (Rustow 1989) and the tendency to balance rather than bandwagon in order to avoid a unipolar system dominated by Israel (Sayigh 1993).

Although the balance of power is difficult to determine in the Arab-Israeli Middle East, the hope is that the regional order can provide a model with which to determine where on the proverbial security ladder the RSC resides. If the traditional realist rung of the ladder at power restraining power can be surpassed, perhaps the Middle East can graduate to the next stage: security via a concert of great powers. In a concert, regional security is the collective responsibility of the most powerful states in that complex, whose actions derive legitimacy by providing order and security as a common good (Rosecrance 1992). Importantly, a concert makes the provision for each major state’s vital interests and the right to participate in the concert so that each curbs their own foreign policies accordingly. The concert therefore contributes to regional security in two ways. “First, it embodies the determination of the major powers to mute and manage their own conflicts. Second, it provides a vehicle for them [with which they can] cooperate to deal with other security issues” (Morgan 1997, 34). As a mechanism for conflict management, regional orders differ according to the levels of amity and enmity characterizing a certain RSC. As relations of enmity become less charged and eventually morph into ones of amity in the Arab-Israeli Middle East, perhaps the elusive balance of power will give way to a multipolar concert.

Theories of realism and regionalism offer powerful conceptual tools for deciphering the maze of interwoven and often complex intraregional processes. While realism uses the core tenets of classical political thought to rationalize the decisions of cynical and pessimistic national leaders, regional theories are more helpful in reconciling the diverging and typically opposing national interests of individual state leaders within a broader and more inclusive security-critical regional context. RSCs first establish the actors and their relationships within the region so that regional orders can be conceived of as methods
to manage regional conflicts. The expected manner of conflict management in the Arab-Israeli Middle East is the traditional realist concern with the balance of power, but as history has repeatedly shown, this method of managing conflictual relations is beset with difficulties.

CONFLICT RESOLUTION THEORIES

Theories can be powerful tools since they paint a mental picture of how and why the world works the way it does. In this sense, noting the difference between explanatory and prescriptive types of theories makes all the difference (Brown and Ainley 2005). Realism provides an excellent explanatory theory for understanding the continuity of war and peace in international politics because it bases its predictions on the belief that all states are primarily motivated by the quest for economic and military power and security. Furthermore, realism posits that war is ultimately inevitable, either because of imperfections in human nature that render man prone to warlike tendencies (Morgenthau 1948) or because of constraints imposed by an anarchic international system on states wishing simply to survive (Waltz 1979). What regional theories add to this image of international relations is the ability to construct mechanisms for managing that inevitability of conflict, apparatuses for conflict management.

Coincidentally, where a permanent resolution of the conflict is the desired aim instead of a momentary management of it, the limits of explanatory theories are exposed and the utility of prescriptive theories become evident. Conflict resolution theories do not ignore the explanatory power of realism, but “the furthest that the realist can be persuaded to go is the moderation, limitation and channeling of conflict, not its abolition” (Clinton 2007, 245). Therefore, the benefit of these theories of conflict resolution is that they provide points of overlap with more optimistic liberal theories capable of transcending realism’s deterministic outlook on the intractability of certain conflicts, like the Arab-Israeli one. The following sections will first delve into the origins of the prescriptive theory along with some of its basic tenets and then explore ways in which the Arab-Israeli conflict can be ended peacefully.

Conflict Resolution’s Origins and Classical Ideas

The field of conflict resolution, even from its origins in the 1950s and 1960s, has always been a controversial enterprise. Realism has leveled some of the most stinging criticisms at the burgeoning discipline. This is not surprising if it is remembered that “rivalry, suspicion, confrontation: these are the relations that realists find most illuminating about international politics” (Clinton 2007, 248). If this is the case, why should realists have seen conflict resolution as anything other than “soft-headed and unrealistic, since in their view international politics is a struggle between antagonistic and irreconcilable groups, in which power and coercion were the ultimate currency? Might not lasting peace more often result from decisive military victory than from negotiated settlement? And might not third party intervention merely prolong the misery?” (Miall et al. 1999, 3). These types of questions plagued the nascent field, but it was consistently argued that conflict resolution would in time “include not only mediation between the parties but efforts to address the wider context in which international actors, domestic constituencies and intra-party relationships sustain violent conflicts” (Miall et al. 1999, 4).
In terms of some of the core ideas representative of conflict resolution's origins, the decision was made early on to distinguish between the positions held by diametrically opposed actors and their underlying interests and needs. Imagine two neighbours quarreling over a tree that each claims is on his land, but it turns out that the interest of one is in using the tree's fruit while the other's is in having the shade. Two opposing positions can be reconciled by identifying the interests of each and then finding mutually compatible albeit modified positions that allow each to meet their original interests. Matters become more complicated when the conflict is over values, which are often non-negotiable, or relationships, which may need to be fundamentally reconfigured to resolve the conflict. Some analysts consider the denial of profound human needs, like identity, security and survival, to be at the root of many intractable conflicts (Miall et al. 1999, 9). Thus, in the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is essentially a battle for national survival on both sides, but identity and security are prime motives behind the conflict. Moreover, as long as the conflict is translated into the language of needs, an outcome that bridges the gaps in each side's interests and positions can, in theory, be found.

Third party intervention, as has been the case with the United States in the Arab-Israeli Middle East since 1967, has long been recognized as a dynamic-changer in any conflict. Where two parties are reacting to each other’s actions without a third party to act as the arbiter and mediator, misperception sets in and it is easy for a spiral of hostility and escalation to develop. The entry of the third party alters the conflict structure by allowing a “different pattern of communications to emerge, one in which the third party can filter or reflect back the messages, attitudes and behaviours of the conflict parties” (Miall et al. 1999, 9; Wilkenfeld et al. 2003). The conflict resolver’s view of power is also slightly more nuanced than that of the realist and possesses three ‘faces’: threat, exchange and integrative power. Threat power is similar to the realist conception of the ability to command, order and enforce, or ‘hard power’, while the next two are closer to ‘soft power’. Exchange power is associated with bargaining and the compromising approach whereas integrative power is seen as persuasion and transformative long-term problem-solving (Boulding 1989; Miall et al. 1997, 10). Third parties may use all three faces of power, but circumstances both internal and external to the conflict will dictate how successful they are.

From Preparing for Peace to Peace Processes

After reviewing some of the basic points of the study of conflict resolution, the analysis now turns to more practical considerations. Conflicts in the Middle East are rarely ever fought between evenly matched opponents; even during the Cold War, it was the effects of superpower overlay that enabled the combined might of the Arab states to reach strategic and military parity with Israeli forces.

Asymmetrical conflicts usually erupt between a majority and a minority, or between an established government and a group of rebels; both apply to the Palestinians living in Israel. Here the root of the conflict risks surpassing the issues and interests dividing the parties by taking on a structural tone, where the root of the conflict becomes bogged down in the uneven structure of roles and relationships between the actors (Miall et al. 1999, 12). In a unipolar order where the hegemone is despised, the only way to resolve the conflict is to change the structure. Since this is often not immediately beneficial to the stronger side, it is the role of the third party to assist in the structural transformation by convincing the de facto oppressor that the role of hegemone carries with it heavy
costs that are unsustainable over the long term and will ultimately lead to its downfall (Gilpin 1981; Dreu et al. 2008). The role of the news media in asymmetrical conflicts in the Middle East is not simply negative; it has also the power to change minds and create environments conducive to peaceful relations between former enemies. This was precisely the case in 1994, where the media prepared both publics for the Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty (Wolfsfeld et al. 2008).

While most studies on the peaceful settlement of disputes see the actual content of proposals aimed at resolving the conflict as essential to its success, more attention has recently been paid to its timing. In other words, parties resolve their problems only when unilateral and alternative measures have led to unsatisfactory and uncomfortable ends. Third parties must be aware that old proposals suddenly become attractive when all other options have evaporated since “ripeness of time is one of the absolute essences of diplomacy” (Campbell 1976, 73). The concept of a ripe moment in conflict mediation also centers on the perception of a mutually hurting stalemate (MHS) for both sides. This is where asymmetry loses some of its bite because both sides face costs and pressures resulting from the continuity of the conflict. The MHS is also fully consistent with realism’s assumption of rationality, which states that a party will choose its goals carefully from a consistent and prioritized list of objectives. Finally, ripeness is also a perceptual event, so if the parties themselves are not cognizant of the readiness of the conflict to be resolved, it is the task of the third party to point out the costs and benefits associated with the continuation or the resolution of the conflict (Zartman 2003, 19-20).

Many attempted peace initiatives fail to reach the negotiation stage, but if they do, multiple phases of the process become routine. At least seven phases have been identified: the pre-talks phase, an era of secret talks, the opening of multilateral talks, negotiating for a settlement, gaining endorsement, implementing its provisions and institutionalization of the new dispensation (Guelke 2003, 56). Without going into detail about each stage, suffice it to say that the first two are invaluable in initiating the dialogue that may lead to reconciliation; in the case of Palestinians and Israelis, it was only in 1993, with the signing of the Declaration of Principles, that both sides even recognized each other’s legitimate rights to exist in peace and security. Shimon Peres, the current Israeli President and an avid negotiator of the 1993 Oslo Accords, has said that if the Palestinian-Israeli agreement were not conducted in secret, away from the spotlight of the media – unlike the following years Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty – the agreement was unlikely to have survived public scrutiny (Peres 1993). Nevertheless, these phases are not definitive; they only suggest optimal time periods for negotiating an end to violent conflicts.

JERUSALEM – THE CITY OF PEACE?

When it comes to peace accords, and this is truly poignant in the case of Israel-Palestine, the problem of exclusive state sovereignty, whether over a city or larger territory, has long dogged efforts to resolve final status talks in the contested city of Jerusalem. The inflexibility of state sovereignty and state borders in the face of demands for separation and statehood steers states towards the granting of limited autonomy and provision for minorities (Darby and MacGinty 2003, 137). This stems directly from the fact that regional actors consider their own national securities without proper consideration for the security of others the region as a whole, feeding the security dilemma that overrides any chance of
regional unity and reconciliation between former enemies (Buzan 1991). Any resolution to the contested status of the city of Jerusalem will have to take into account the divergent positions, interests and needs of both Arabs and Jews (not to mention Christian minorities), but most importantly those of Palestinians and Israelis.

Controversially, some have even gone so far as to say that a comprehensive peace between Palestinians and Israelis that resolves all conflicting issues – Jewish settlements/outposts, the right to return of Palestinian refugees, final borders, water sharing, economic viability, security strategy and, of course, Jerusalem – is not possible nor should it continue to be advocated (Miller 2008). Backing away from this fatalistic view of the world is the only feasible option; like all problems in the world, the solution for this one has simply not yet been found. Considering that over the course of thousands of years, Jerusalem has been destroyed twice, besieged 23 times, attacked 52 times, captured and recaptured 44 times and been privy to at least 118 separate conflicts (Cline 2005), it only makes sense to discover the contested city’s relevance for Judaism, Christianity and Islam. What follows is an in-depth look at why the city of Jerusalem is so important for each of the three faiths, followed by some political approaches to pragmatic problem-solving and creative political solutions for the city of Jerusalem. The order of religions chosen reflects their chronological development on Earth, not a personal preference.

Relevance for Judaism

There is no city in the world that has played a bigger role in all of Jewish history than Jerusalem. The first Prime Minister of the State of Israel, David Ben-Gurion, said it himself in a speech to the Israeli Knesset, or Parliament, in 1949: “We regard it as our duty to declare that Jewish Jerusalem is an organic and inseparable part of the State of Israel, as it is an inseparable part of the history of Israel, of the faith of Israel” (Jewish Virtual Libraryb). This view is commonly shared among Jews wherever they may reside, not just within Israel. Furthermore, Jerusalem is specifically mentioned over 800 times in the Hebrew Bible, Jews the world over pray in its direction three times a day and for thousands of years have finished the Passover service in the hope of repeating it ‘next year in Jerusalem!’ (Gabay 1999).

Historically speaking, it is impossible to separate the history of Jerusalem from its religious and cultural significance for the Jews. Circa the year 1000 BCE, King David conquered the city for the Kingdom of Israel and it quickly became the political, cultural and religious capital. Nearly 40 years later, King Solomon would build the First Jewish Temple in Jerusalem, a place from which Israelite priests would make animal sacrifices to their God and pilgrims from all over Ancient Israel would gather three times a year for key rituals. The First Temple Era lasted nearly 400 years until both the city and the Temple were burned and looted by the invading Babylonian forces in 586 BCE. For 70 years thereafter, the Israelites prayed daily for its speedy rebuilding in future days, and managed with the help of the Persian King Cyrus to return to Jerusalem and rebuild the Temple once more in 516 BCE. For close to 600 more years, Jerusalem remained the centre of Jewish life in Ancient Israel under the yokes of Persian, Greek and Roman imperial rule (Ir David Foundation).

At the end of the Second Temple Era in 70 AD, tragedy struck (again) when the city of Jerusalem and the Jewish Temple were both razed to the ground by the Romans. This date marks the beginning of
a two thousand years Jewish Diaspora, during which millions of Jews were killed, enslaved or uprooted from their homes and scattered throughout the known world, an event that rivals the Nazi Holocaust in the Jewish psyche. For close to 2000 years, the Jews wandered the Earth, homeless in strange lands, but always there remained in Jerusalem a tiny Jewish population that treasured the remnants of their once mighty past, a section of the Second Temple which the Romans by chance left standing: the Western Wall.

The city of Jerusalem was divided in the aftermath of the 1948-49 Arab-Israeli war, leaving the Western Wall, the holiest site in Judaism, in Arab hands. Therefore it was considered truly miraculous when against all odds the Israelis captured the Old City of Jerusalem in the 1967 Six-Day War and after 2000 years in exile achieved full sovereignty in their ancient homeland. Upon reaching the Western Wall for the first time, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan summed up the Jewish zeitgeist succinctly: “We have returned to all that is holy in our land. We have returned never to be parted from it again” (CAMERA). The notion of relinquishing parts of Jerusalem to the Palestinians just decades after fighting and dying for the ‘eternal’ capital of Israel is a troubling one for most Israelis.

Relevance for Christianity

Although the Christian connection to the city of Jerusalem (and elsewhere in Israel/Palestine) is significant, it is of a more spiritual and religious nature as opposed to a territorial and political one. In other words, there exists no ‘Christian-nationalist’ movement based in Jerusalem comparable to Israeli nationalism for Jews or Palestinian nationalism for Muslims. Nevertheless, the life and death of Jesus Christ – the rock of Christian faith – is deeply embedded in Jerusalem’s story. According to the Christian Gospels, it was circa the year 30 – 33 AD that along with preaching and healing in the Temple courts (he was, after all, Jewish), Jesus’ Last Supper, his arrest in Gethsemane, his trial, his crucifixion at Golgotha, his burial nearby and his resurrection/ascension all occurred within the gates or atop the nearby hills of Jerusalem (Luke 2; Mark 11, New Revised Standard Version).

In the years after Jesus’ death in 33 AD, Christianity had to find a way to surmount the Jewish claim to Jerusalem. With the destruction of the Second Jewish Temple (and by extension Jerusalem) and the beginning of the Jewish Diaspora in 70 AD, physical ownership of the city was impossible during the formative days of the Christian religion. Thus, the essential nature and meaning of Christian Jerusalem quickly became spiritualized and delocalized in the early Christian context (Eters 1987). From its centre, Christianity radiated to other cities and towns beyond Palestine and throughout the Roman Empire. When Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire in the 4th century AD, Constantine the Great ordered the Church of the Holy Sepulcher built to commemorate Jesus’ final ordeals on Earth.

As more churches and Christian domiciles were constructed and pilgrims continued to grow in numbers, Jerusalem became a physically Christian city in addition to a spiritual one (Microsoft Encarta).

For hundreds of years after the Arab conquest in 637 BC, the Christian population of Jerusalem lived under foreign rule. Their persecution and the Church of the Holy Sepulcher’s destruction spurred on the Crusades of the 11th to 13th centuries, aimed at liberating Christian Jerusalem from ‘infidel hands’. Regardless of whether the Christian or Muslim armies won the day, the native Christian
community was always seen as collaborating with the enemy and was frequently slaughtered or exiled from the city (History Channel Online). Since the time of the Crusades, communities both native and foreign have been jockeying for ownership and administration of the churches in the city of Jerusalem. For example, while the precincts and fabric of the Church of the Holy Sepulcher are claimed by the three major denominations of the Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox and Latin Roman Catholic churches, on the very same plot of land, the Egyptian Coptic Orthodox, Ethiopian Orthodox and Syrian Orthodox orders all possess certain rights and small properties (Jewish Virtual Library).

The contentious nature of inter-church politics has resulted in a fragile status quo. The Christian sects residing in Jerusalem are more fearful of and hostile to each other than their Jewish or Muslim counterparts since all religions within the city's walls respectfully stay out of one another's affairs. By extension, as long as their religious and spiritual rights are protected by the ruling power's authority, the Christian population in Jerusalem remains passive and reclusive. Furthermore, the lack of any religious-nationalist movement aimed at establishing a Christian state atop Jerusalem ensures that the Christian community has little to fear from the turbulence caused by the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Relevance for Islam

Unlike the inseparability of Judaism's historical development from its religious and political roots in Jerusalem, the separation must be made between the religious and political aspects of Islam's historic claim to the holy city. Religiously speaking, Jerusalem is not mentioned once by name in the Qur'an, yet all Jewish and Christian claims to Jerusalem are subsumed within Islam since it sees itself as the natural continuation of and final link in the three Abrahamic faiths. Interestingly, this means that venerated Jewish and Christian leaders like Moses, King David, King Solomon and even Jesus Christ himself are considered Islamic prophets, so their connections to Jerusalem inevitably take on an Islamic character. Jerusalem was also designated as the first Kiblah, or direction of prayer, for Muslims before Mecca, though this has become more of a theological non-issue today (Encyclopedia Britannica).

The Dome of the Rock, a shrine for pilgrims, and the al-Aqsa Mosque, the third holiest in Islam, are widely believed to be built atop the ruins of the Second Jewish Temple and almost directly above the Western Wall, the holiest site in Judaism. Needless to say, this is a source of constant tension and strife. Perhaps the most important religious nugget of all is Muhammad's mystical nighttime journey in 620 AD where he is supposed to have been flown to the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem — though it would not be built until many years after Muhammad's death — on a winged horse where he led the 'Islamic' prophets in prayer, visited heaven and was then returned safely to the Sacred Mosque in Mecca. Some maintain that this metaphysical experience was 'not a physical experience but a visionary one' (Armstrong 1997) while others literally accept the story word-for-word (Noble Sanctuary Online Guide). Whether or not it actually happened, this miraculous event makes Jerusalem a holy city in the eyes of Muslims worldwide.

Whatever the strength of the religious bond between Islam and Jerusalem, politically, it should be noted that the city has never served as the capital of a sovereign Muslim state and has never been a major cultural or scholarly centre of gathering for Muslims. It has even been argued by looking at major turning points in Islam's history that the religious stature of the city inevitably swells for Muslims when Jerusalem assumes political significance but shrinks when the utility of the city has expired. An often
cited test case is the 20-year period of Jordanian sovereignty over the holy sites in Jerusalem during which time no foreign Arab or Muslim leader visited the city (Pipes 2001). In any case, Muslim political demand for Jerusalem has taken off like a rocket ever since the status quo of a divided Jerusalem was shattered by the Israeli reunification of the city in the aftermath of the 1967 Six-Day War. From that date on, Palestinian nationalism has been intimately linked to the establishment of Muslim sovereignty over the Arab half of Jerusalem. This is the nature of the Muslim claim to the holy city.

**Problem-Solving and Pragmatic Solutions**

Evidently, the religious side of the Jerusalem debate cannot be ignored, but faith is just one part of the conflict. While the Jews claim the city of Jerusalem as the eternal (and as of 1967 the undivided) capital of Israel, the Palestinians claim the Arab half of East Jerusalem as their future capital city in an independent Palestine. The Jerusalem conundrum has become so divisive that even the negotiators of the famous 1993 Oslo Accords, credited with the attempt at Palestinian-Israeli reconciliation, recognized that at least 5 more years of confidence-building measures would be needed before addressing the status of the city of Jerusalem (Isseroff 2002). Similarly, many of the most recent peace initiatives such as the Quartet Road Map and the Arab Peace Initiative follow in Oslo’s footsteps by attempting to resolve the secondary issues without even touching upon Jerusalem (Abu-Daya and Mann 2007). In contrast to the well-meaning albeit ineffective trend in the literature to procrastinate on the final status talks of Jerusalem, it is absolutely essential to regional peace and stability that the resolution of the holy city’s status precede any realistic peace settlement between Palestinian/Arab Muslims and Israeli Jews.

One of the main hurdles to overcome in the city’s status is the issue of sovereignty. Obviously, neither side will willingly sacrifice it. Therefore, what is needed is a mechanism that allows sovereignty to be shared, not mutually exclusive. Although this is still mainly a theoretical construct, all practicable solutions have been more or less exhausted in the 60-year long struggle; it is only by creating original solutions that the Arab-Israeli conflict will be resolved. An extremely versatile combination of strategies like resource expansion, compensation, issue linkage, functional division, sharing and delegation have been used in the approach to tackling the sovereignty issue. A number of hypothetical solutions have already been proposed for the city, but none of them have found practical resonance (Albin 1997). Similarly, questions of sovereignty inevitably become entwined with the question of power-sharing (whether federal or municipal). This has led some to suggest autonomy or partition for Palestinians in Israel while still others break the concept of power-sharing down into the consociational or group-building block approach and the integrative approach, both of which contain relative strengths and weaknesses, and none of which have been successfully applied to Jerusalem (Sisk 2003).

Little so far has been said about the two-state solution: the idea that a separate and Palestinian state should coexist alongside the current Jewish State of Israel, albeit with slightly modified borders. This model has grown in popularity in the past two decades as the only way out of the present crisis and would look something like the following: “West Jerusalem can be the capital of Israel; East Jerusalem the capital of Palestine, and each state can exercise control over its respective holy shrines. The city must have two separate political sovereignties yet remain physically united. It might thus become a model of
coexistence and cooperation between the two states” (Fahmy 2004, 15). Indeed, Jerusalem has been a city where a great degree of mutual understanding between religions has historically taken place.

The views of a former United Nations Observer in Israel at the height of the Cold War sum up this position eloquently: If Jerusalem is “ever to become a city of peace... its foundations will have to be based on justice and not falsehood. This means that the Arabs will have to regain that part of the City which was theirs until 1967 and that the whole City must be a place where Arabs and Jews can come together in confidence and understanding. Were this to happen in one place, it is conceivable that understanding might spread further, and that in this way Jerusalem might become the seed from which a general reconciliation between Arabs and Jews would grow” (Bull 1973, 43). It seems that the holiness of Jerusalem, that which makes it so coveted, might be the root of its problems. Arabs and Jews have had very little difficulty cohabitating in cities without the spiritual allure of Jerusalem. Take the city of Haifa in Northern Israel in the final days of Britain’s Mandate in Palestine, for instance: “The work of the Haifa Municipality rests on the fundamental presupposition that neither section of the population should be allowed to dominate the other... a striving for cooperation, on the other hand, results in actual cooperation” (Smelansky 1947, 66). Along the same idealistic vein, the Jerusalem Old City Initiative, a research project undertaken at the University of Windsor, outlines how and when a joint Palestinian-Israeli task force would govern the Old City together, effectively sharing sovereignty and taking into account the diplomatic, security, governance, development and religious concerns present between two mutually fearful and distrustful populations (Bell et al. 2009). Finally, it is vital that each side strive to bring the best possible future out of themselves and each other for this type of solution to work. If this sounds too idealistic, it should be remembered that even conflict resolution theories at once seemed utopian in the eyes of classical orthodox realists. In the words of Alan Dershowitz, “A two-state solution ... holds enormous promise for both the Palestinians and the Israelis... By abandoning unrealistic claims and recognizing each other’s right to live in peace, Israel and Palestine can become beacons of enlightenment, progress and hope in an increasingly dangerous world” (Dershowitz 2003, 243).

Conclusion

It has been shown that there exists a severe lack of regional integration in the Middle East, and that among many causal factors, the most serious is the Arab-Israeli conflict, at the centre of which rests the Palestinian-Israeli struggle for survival. These conflicts not only impede the growth of a mutually beneficial regional order, but they also provide no opportunity for intercultural dialogue, peace or security for the peoples of the Middle East. International relations theories based on realism were explored in order to get a better grasp on the inability of regional leaders to overcome their differences and reconcile national interests with international security and stability. Essentially, the argument being made is that there needs to be a universal realization on both sides of the divide that while realist mindsets may lead to temporary increases in power, this fails to easily translate into increased security for either side. This is why national security cannot realistically be considered apart from regional and international security any longer. (Buzan 1991). Instead, a collaborative and integrated regional order can only come about by taking steps to build confidence, reduce misperceptions and eliminate the misconceptions that plague both sides (Morgan 1997).
With particular reference to the Middle East, conflict resolution theories are not only useful, they are necessary to overcome the pessimism that often characterizes the situation in the region. As realism and liberalism would agree, only by taking into consideration the positions, interests and needs of other regional actors can conflicting positions be broached (Miall et al. 1999). By joining the two perspectives and using the comparatively more liberal conflict resolution theories, the explanatory power of realism's conflict management is transformed into the prescriptive power of liberalism's conflict resolution. Hopefully, this could help to overcome the mutually hurting stalemates and reach the long awaited Arab-Israeli compromise (Zartman 2003), including on the highly coveted city of Jerusalem. Conflicts that were once thought to be similarly intractable have been resolved in Northern Ireland, South Africa and the former Yugoslavia, among others. Why, then, should optimists stop praying, hoping, debating, reading, researching and writing for the deeply-sought and long-overdue end to violence and the beginning of peace in the Middle East.
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