

Human Nature and Kant's Vision of International Society

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International relations theory cannot ignore the fact that all political actions in the world are carried out individually and collectively by human beings. Because of this, human nature must always be incorporated into international relations theory. Kant theorized about the state, international relations, and war and peace, but he constantly took human nature into account in his theories and molded these theories to accord with his view of human nature. Kant's vision of human nature, and how it influenced his theories of the state, international relations, and war and peace will be explained below.

Kant's conception of human nature

Kant highlights the **dual** or **animal/rational** character of human nature. In his view, man has two competing natures: the animal side and the rational side.¹ This conception of human nature forms the base on which he builds his other theories. The animal nature is the side which people possess because they are living beings.² It is the mechanical, impulse-oriented side of human nature. It seeks the preservation of the self, reproduction, and community with other humans with the goal of maximizing personal pleasure and minimizing pain. In other words, the animal nature is based on sensuous impulses.³ Because animal nature urges personal pleasure and avoids personal pain, it is inherently self-interested, ignoring the effects of one's actions on other people.⁴ This side of human nature can never be eliminated, but it should be tamed so that natural inclinations will not clash with each other. This can only be done through reason.⁵ Rational nature is possessed only by human beings; they are the only rational animals.⁶ This side of human nature involves the exercise of reason rather than impulse.⁷ It is the exercise of reason and moral law which distinguishes people from animals.⁸ The rational side of human nature does not take its examples from experience (which would make its principles subjective), but rather uses reason to derive its principles, which are called the laws of nature, or moral law, making its principles objective and universally true.⁹ The basis of moral law is that one should never behave in such a way that his action could not be made into universal law. From this base, all moral principles can be deduced.¹⁰ It is these principles which the rational side of human nature urges people to obey, compelling them to act in a moral way. All people are endowed with reason, and all can understand correct morality.¹¹ It is this ability which gives all people dignity and value, regardless of whether or not they choose to obey rational, moral law or to obey sensuous impulses, and they must therefore never be treated simply as the means to an end.¹² People are not motivated uniquely by either their animal or by their rational side. Each person has freedom of choice, and can decide for themselves whether to obey their impulses and ignore moral law, or to suppress their inclinations and allow reason to dictate their actions.¹³ However, neither side of the individual can be completely eradicated, so while people recognize the obligatory nature of moral laws, they are affected by sensuous desires and may be tempted to act contrary to them.¹⁴ Indeed, Kant believes that everyone initially chooses to obey the animal side of themselves instead of the rational side, because the temptation to seek pleasure is so strong. Therefore, every effort to become moral meets with resistance, hence the tendency of men to evil (ignoring moral law).¹⁵ However, this temptation can be overcome. By developing their reason, people can find the strength to oppose their impulses and act morally. It takes effort, but it can be done.¹⁶

Social asociability is another key component of Kant's conception of human nature. It is based primarily on the animal side of people and how it affects their behaviour. People have a tendency to want to be a part of a society so that they can develop themselves and find companionship. They want the approval and recognition of others as well as the chance to develop themselves that society offers them.¹⁷ At the same time, people resist uniting in a society because they have a natural tendency to be antagonistic toward one another. They see themselves as isolated and in competition with others for the satisfaction of their desires. They see others either as obstacles to the fulfillment of their desires or as a means to their fulfillment. They do not want to limit their own freedom to do as they please by being forced to respect the rights of others. They may disagree with the laws or with some aspects of society and want to change them to suit their own ideas, so they look for ways to get around the laws and avoid moral duties. They expect others to resist as well, because they themselves were inclined to resist.¹⁸

Kant believes, nevertheless, that human beings were given their rational nature for a reason, and that **nature has a plan** for them.¹⁹ Reason develops through the antagonism of individuals. Hostility of one person for another pushes people to find new solutions to their problems. Without this antagonism, reason would cease to develop, simply because it would no longer be needed. Since people naturally have this antagonism (asocial sociability), Kant believes that the purpose of man is not to achieve happiness, but to achieve a peaceful society. If man's ultimate purpose was to be happy, nature would not have given him reason, since his natural inclinations would have served much better than reason to achieve this end.²⁰ He believes that, by looking at history, it is evident that all natural faculties are destined to unfold completely to their natural end, and that this will happen with reason, too. However, this cannot happen with the individual, but only with the species as a whole. This is so because reason, unlike natural impulses, requires information and experience to develop. This development is a very long process, far too long to be completed in the lifetime of a single person. However, human beings can pass on the enlightenment and understanding that they have reached in their lifetime to the next generation, allowing them to start the development of their reason at a higher level than the previous generation. Over time, reason will fully develop. This will allow us to finally control our animal impulses and be motivated solely by reason. Since it is uncontrolled animal impulses which keep people from living in harmony with one another, this development will bring peace.²¹ It should, however, be emphasized that only general trends, not exact instances, can be predicted. This is because each person can choose their own actions. Yet, while pursuing their own ends, individuals unknowingly fit into larger patterns, which can be observed and from which general predictions can be made.²²

Kant's conception of the state

To understand Kant's theory of international relations, it is necessary to understand his theory of the state. This is because states are considered moral "persons" in international society, just like individuals within the state. States follow the same rules of human nature as individuals. Also, international society must respect the sovereignty of individual states, which continue to provide the base of law and of order in international society. As a result, there are many similarities (though there are also many differences) between the relations of the individual to the state and the relation of the state to international society.

Much like Hobbes and other liberal thinkers, Kant attributes the **formation of the state** to men's desire to escape fear and insecurity. He believed that in the state of nature, men were ruled almost solely by their animal natures. Without a government to control them, they were free to pursue their own desires, but so was everyone else, consequently they had no security for themselves or their property. Everyone was at war with everyone else, and all people lived in fear. It was the fear of war and worse evils which motivated them to leave the state of nature and impose laws and a government on themselves to protect themselves from others. Therefore, it was self-interest which motivated people to enter into a lawful society which could peacefully resolve their disputes, rather than a reasoned, rational argument that laws should be imposed.²³ Reason justifying the state would develop later, within the state, motivating people to perfect their constitution and laws. It is a good state which leads to the moral improvement of people. In fact, reason and morality cannot flourish outside of civil society.²⁴

The state is based on a **civic constitution**, which lays out the basic rights and restrictions of citizens within the state. The constitution protects the rights of citizens against infringement by others, allowing them to live together in peace. The basis for a just civic constitution must be natural law, as known through reason.²⁵ The goal of society is to develop a perfectly just civic constitution which allows all citizens as much freedom as possible while protecting the rights of all. This allows people to pursue their own ends with as little restriction as possible. It also allows for peaceful solution of conflict in society.²⁶ By allowing for the venting of antagonism, people are allowed to continue to develop their reason (which is impossible without conflict) to fulfill the purpose of nature. This reason will help them to identify and solve injustices in society, ensuring the preservation of a just state and maintaining its vitality. The civic constitution must also recognize the absolute equality of all citizens as possessors of reason and rationality and give no exceptions or special rights to anyone.²⁷ A civic constitution which guarantees the freedom and equality of citizen, on the basis of common law, is a republican constitution. A perfectly just civic constitution cannot be achieved until states achieve lawful external relations. What would be the point of working hard to develop a perfectly just civic constitution for the purpose of ensuring domestic peace and tranquility, if the state is constantly being forced into war? The motivation to perfect the civic constitution simply will not exist until war ceases to be a constant threat on the international front.²⁸

With respect to the **structure of government**, it can take, in Kant's view, one of three forms: monarchy (rule by one), aristocracy (rule by a few), or democracy (rule by all).²⁹ Any of these forms can be either republican or despotic, depending on how they rule.³⁰ Republican governments rule according to the "general will" of the people, namely they rule according to natural law, which all people understand and know to be true through their reason. Despotic governments ignore the law of nature and rule according to their own individual will. Republican government must be representative.³¹ This ensures against the tyranny of the majority. If it were not representative, most of the citizens of a state could turn against a single person or a smaller number of people, and decisions could not really be said to be made by all of the people.³² Therefore, representative government guards against the tendency of people to put themselves above the law and try to change it to suit their own needs. It ensures that reason and rationality, not animal nature, will determine the laws. However, the problem of who is to rule the state is a very difficult one. People need a master (or masters) because, though as rational beings they want law, as animal beings they want to put themselves above the law. However, this master must be a

human being himself, with the same animal nature as everyone else, and therefore needing a master as well. Kant does not see an immediate solution to this problem, which he thinks will be one of the last political problems to be solved.³³ For the time being, he advocates for the **separation of powers** within the state, namely the separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers. Ensuring that these powers are controlled by different people keeps the government from becoming despotic. Kant believes that the legislative power should be with all the people, since it is from their will that the law should emanate. Executive power should reside with the sovereign, whether this is one person or a group. Judicial power should reside with the courts.³⁴ This arrangement keeps people from executive and judicial power, which, if they were controlled by everyone, would allow everyone to act as ruler at the same time, and their animal nature would tempt them to put themselves above the law and be hostile to those who did not agree with their interpretation of law, making the government a despotic anarchy. Popular pressure could also result in privileges for the majority or injustices for specific minorities, which is not permissible because of the absolute equality of all people by virtue of their possession of reason.³⁵ If all government institutions were in the control of the sovereign, his will would be law, and no one would be able to challenge his absolute despotic power.

Kant stressed, therefore, the importance of **law in the state**. He believed that all people have the right to live under public coercive laws to protect their rights and their property.³⁶ This is the purpose of the law: to constrain the animal natures of individuals with the aim of protecting the rights of every individual. These laws must be based on natural law as determined by reason and expressed as the will of the people. In this way, the law requires the consent of the people (at least, their theoretical consent, as the people do not actually have to be asked about every law). The law of the state must never be contrary to natural law. This law identifies the rights of men, but also their duties to other people.³⁷ The law should allow citizens as much room as possible to make their own decisions about how they wish to live their lives. Under no circumstances should the state become paternalistic, telling its citizens how to be happy. Instead, it must recognize that everyone has different priorities and will find happiness in a different way. Because everyone has different goals in life, the state must not impose equality of material conditions on its people, because some people may choose the accumulation of wealth as an end, while others believe it to be of lesser importance. Instead, the state must ensure equality of opportunity, so that any position can be achieved by any person in the state, regardless of the condition of their birth. This eliminates the aristocracy of the wealthy and powerful and acknowledges the equality of all people as rational beings.³⁸ The law of the state must recognize the equality of all citizens as people. Equality entails a right of coercion over others, to express one's opinion and to try to convince others of it. This right is lost only through crime.³⁹ Equality also requires that all men be equal before the law, with none having more or fewer rights than others. No exceptions can be made to the law, for everyone is subject to it equally. Even the sovereign must be subject to the same law as his subjects.⁴⁰ Laws which do not find their immediate base in the law of reason are also necessarily present in the state. These laws are present to ensure the smooth functioning of the state, and cover very specific matters, such as on which side of the street people should drive. These laws vary from place to place, because local culture, customs, etc. may be different. However, these laws must never be contrary to natural law.⁴¹

Law, though it leads people to a more moral existence, cannot force them to use their reason and become moral. The law can impose only the external form of morality, but

cannot force people to have certain motives when obeying the law; that is, they cannot force people to obey the law simply because it is right to do so. This is why it is allowed to enforce the law. People have freedom of choice, and a person who prefers to listen to their animal desires because of self-interest may transgress the law of nature and do something which infringes on the rights of another person. For these people, the pain, material or otherwise, which is inflicted as punishment for the crime may be enough to deter the person from offending again, or may deter them from breaking the law in the first place.⁴² Punishment in no way infringes on a person's rights, according to Kant. While punishment may take away a person's civil liberties, it does not affect the person's autonomous personality.⁴³ Punishment must be for the purpose of expiating a crime, not to reform the person. To force the criminal to reform against his will would be to treat him as a means in someone else's plan, not an end in himself, as his human nature requires him to be treated.⁴⁴ Enforcement of the law is the only situation in which it is legitimate for the state to use force against its citizens.⁴⁵ In a state, law must come before freedom. If this was not so, a person could exempt themselves from the law by declaring that they are not citizens, and the state would have no power of coercion over them. The ultimate end of this would be the exemption of everyone from the coercive power of the law, ending in the voiding of the state itself.⁴⁶ To guard against despotism, however, the citizens of the state have the right (and duty) to express their grievances over unfair laws to the sovereign, so that he can see that a law is unjust and change it.⁴⁷ If those laws which are contrary to natural law are not changed, people may disobey them, but they cannot revolt against the sovereign. Revolution is the ultimate breach of law to Kant, and the act of revolution puts the populace above the law, effectively returning them to the lawless state of nature. Instead of revolt, people can choose to emigrate from the state instead of remaining subject to its unjust laws.⁴⁸ People must be given the right to emigrate, for to deny them this right would be to treat them as the property of the state, denying their human value as possessors of reason and autonomous beings with the right to decide their own future.⁴⁹

Kant's Conception of International Society

Kant thought that the international society of his time was still in the state of nature and that this was far from an ideal situation. He laid out, therefore, his own vision of a future international society. This society would consist of a **league of states**, allied in their commitment of peace, which would eventually encompass all of the states in the world. The ultimate end of this union would be the union of states in perpetual peace, allowing reason to develop and giving states the opportunity to perfect their constitutions. The development of international society is very similar in method and motives to that of the development of the state. Before an international society can develop, people must unite into states, which are then moral persons. These states are the actors in the formation of an international society. Like people in the state of nature, states in the state of nature exist in a state of war and preparation for war. Most states will be despotic, for the development of a just civic constitution within a state requires some measure of security. As a result, the animal nature will rule on the international field, and war will result as states try to defend their interests at the expense of other states. No law will exist to restrict the action of states. The result of this chaos will be fear, hostility, and distrust, just as was the result for the individuals in the state of nature. To protect their interests, or out of sheer exhaustion from constant war, states will form unions to give themselves security. These unions will need to have a constitution to protect the interests of all participants from the others, with the basic rights and duties of member states well defined.⁵⁰ This is similar to the

constitution formed after the union of people in a state. The unions and constitution initially formed by states, fleeing from the state of nature, may not be the best ones for international society. War will continue to break up these unions until stable ones, which effectively balance each other and protect everyone's rights, are formed. The achievement of this balance could take a very long time, since it is due mostly to accident and luck. Only nature can and will arrange the best possible balance of states, according to nature's plan for the eventual emerging of perpetual peace necessary for man to develop his faculties to their full capacity.⁵¹ Therefore, nature forces states who have not yet developed a just, rational constitution to form a peaceful international order in spite of their hostile inclinations.⁵² While states will eventually form a union encompassing the entire world, they must not form a single world state. Such a state would have no outside authority to monitor it and keep it under control, and the larger a state gets, the less force its laws have, because the state becomes more difficult to police. This arrangement would leave both the sovereign and the subject ample opportunity to exercise their animal desires to the expense of the rights of other people. The result of a world state would, therefore, be despotism and anarchy.⁵³

Kant favours instead the development of an **international constitution and international law**. International law may be seen in many ways as the ultimate extension of all other forms of public law.⁵⁴ The principles of natural law as understood by reason must remain the base for all laws in the international realm, but the beings constrained by the law are now states, not individuals. Many of the laws that apply to the relations of individuals within a state can therefore be applied to the relations of states on the international level, but there are also important rules unique to the international field. States have the same duties as any other moral beings. Their duty is to obey natural law and to respect the freedom, autonomy, and other rights of other states.⁵⁵ The international constitution must recognize the autonomy of all states, powerful or not. As moral beings, each state has the right to pursue its own ends, and no other state has the right to interfere with this unless international law or right is being violated. State sovereignty is inviolable. No state may interfere by force in the domestic affairs of another state, even if it is committing offenses against its own people. To do so would be to trample on the rights of an independent people who are struggling against the inner weakness of their animal natures to develop their rational side and manifest it in a constitution. They must be allowed the opportunity to develop on their own, just as all other states before them had done.⁵⁶ The offending state should instead be isolated by other states, since morally they cannot associate with it, so that the state will serve as an example to other states of the consequences of seeking to rule with animal desires instead of rational ones.⁵⁷ States are the possessions of those who live under their authority. The international constitution must recognize this, and deny governments the ability to sell, inherit, exchange, or give their state away. Only the people as a whole can make this sort of decision. To allow governments to dispose of their states in this way, against the will of their people, would be to treat the people as mere possessions of the state, as animals with no reason who can be owned and given away without a second thought. This is against natural law, and it must be prohibited.⁵⁸ All states are equal, because they are all moral beings with the potential to become rational beings with just civic constitutions. No state has the right to attempt to control another, no matter how powerful it is or how weak the other state is.⁵⁹ A framework of law must be constructed to deal with states who resort to war against international law. States have the right to go to war only if they feel threatened by or are attacked by another state, or if they are not part of the league of nations and therefore have no common higher authority to

peacefully resolve their disputes. Wars of punishment, subjugation, or extermination must not be allowed, even against those states which are not part of the union. Punishment cannot exist without law, and states outside of unions are in a lawless state of nature.⁶⁰ Any state who breaks external treaties must be punished, but the method of punishing offenders must comply with the law of reason. Loss of civil liberties or punitive damages are the best ways to punish wayward states.⁶¹ Plunder cannot be allowed, since plunder would be the robbery of individuals, and it was the state which was at war, not specific individuals. Plunder does not harm the state in any way, for the state has little plunderable property. Slavery, because it treats rational men as mere property and because it was the state and not the individuals who were warring, must also be forbidden.⁶²

The defense of human rights and the related concept of **world citizenship** are, in fact, key components of Kant's vision of a future international society. When a league of nations is formed, another international constitution should be drawn up. This constitution would not regulate the relations of nations, however, but would instead outline the rights of individuals when visiting or trading in nations of which they are not citizens.⁶³ Every person visiting a foreign country has the right not to be mistreated.⁶⁴ He is a person of value as a rational being, and to harm him would be an affront to natural law. As a citizen of a common planet, every person has the right to visit and to conduct commerce in all parts of the world without fear. Peaceful contact of people of different cultures promotes common understanding and international peace.⁶⁵ However, foreigners are guests. The territory in which they are travelling is not their own land, and apart from safety and protection under law, they do not have the right to demand anything else of the country. As the owners of the state, the citizens may choose to give foreigners additional rights, but they are not required to do so. Therefore, the traveller does not have the right to settle in a land which is not his, if the citizens of the land do not wish for him to settle there. The people in possession of the land have their own ends, and these may for some reason preclude certain foreigners from settling in their land. It is their right as an autonomous people to control their own domestic affairs, including who may settle in their land. On both the national and international level, human nature will lead to the progress of the world. People, who live in a state, feel attached to their state, since it belongs to them. As a result of their asocial sociability and their egotism, they feel hostile to other neighbouring states, who are more prosperous or advanced than their state is. They will try to make their state superior to all others and more competitive, by educating their population. Residents of other states will then do the same in their own state. In this way, nature uses the antisocial nature of people to bring about progress.⁶⁶

The issue of **war and peace**, notably how to end war, is a critical topic in Kant's discussion of international relations. In particular, the quest for perpetual peace is frequently discussed in his works. Like other facets of international relations, the role of human nature in the processes of war and its ending can be clearly seen. In Kant's view, the ultimate goal of nature for the human species is eternal peace. This is the reason why human beings have been given reason. People's animal natures cause them to act selfishly and with hostility toward one another. People develop the state to protect themselves so that they can live in relative safety. However, conflict cannot be suppressed, even in the state. It is this conflict that causes reason to progress, for reason must be utilized to solve each conflict, leaving reason a little more developed than before. War between nations will follow the same course, with states banding together for protection and reason developing through the solving of conflict. When reason on both the domestic and international level

has reached perfection, the world will have conquered war and will achieve perpetual peace. However, conflict will persist, for the animal side of man cannot be eliminated, and conflict is necessary to keep reason in its perfect form.⁶⁷ Therefore, it is war and conflict which drive all progress. Although the time before the achieving of perpetual peace is difficult, the gift of reason gives the human species the opportunity to reach a state of harmony, even against its will.⁶⁸

Kant's long-term vision of international society is that of **perpetual peace**. In fact, though war, as a means to an end, can be a constructive thing, it is also a dreadful thing. It is a threat to justice, because it makes military concerns more important than freedom, equality, and justice, values upheld by reason.⁶⁹ Therefore, it should be eliminated as soon as possible. However, hostility and fear make states unwilling to give up the state of war, which is the natural state.⁷⁰ Even the absence of war is not a state of peace in Kant's opinion. The state of peace must be founded on a treaty.⁷¹ This treaty will eventually include all states, just as the league of nations will eventually include all states.

In "*Eternal Peace*", Kant laid out the six basic requirements for a treaty of perpetual peace. The first requirement is that no party must have secret reservations, planning to resort again to war, when the situation is in their favour to do so. The signing of a peace treaty of this nature requires that states have reached a sufficiently advanced level of reason that they wish to eliminate the possibility of future war. A state who is not truly prepared to give up war has not gained sufficient control over its selfish animal nature, and perpetual peace will not be possible, as this state will continue to be a threat to other states. This condition would produce a truce, not a peace.⁷² The second condition for peace is that states must recognize each other as moral personalities with full internal and external sovereignty. This protects the state from being given away or bought by another against the will of its citizens, requiring them to go to war to defend it. Only when citizens are unafraid of having another force his will on them, will they be more willing to give up their weapons.⁷³ The third condition of perpetual peace is that states must give up their standing armies. Standing armies threaten other states by their mere presence, suggesting that the state is willing to go to war. Other states will then build up their own military, both out of fear and out of asocial sociability, which presses them to seek military superiority over other states. Only if states commit to the elimination of these threats will all states be willing to reduce their armaments instead of increasing them.⁷⁴ The fourth condition is that debts must not be contracted in connection with foreign affairs. This reduces the amount of money available for war, and reduces the temptation of states to use this money for war if the opportunity should arise. If all money must come from within the state, it is the people themselves that will have to pay through heavier taxes, and their selfish nature will lead them to prefer peace.⁷⁵ The fifth condition is that military intervention into the domestic affairs of another state must be forbidden. This rule eliminates the risk of another country invading a state, because they disagree with its internal policy. Citizens will feel more secure in expressing their will in their own state, though other states may disagree with them, and will be willing to make changes which are in accordance with the laws of reason. They will also be more willing to give up their weapons, because a potential excuse for war will have been eliminated.⁷⁶ The last condition for perpetual peace is that war, when conducted, must be conducted in such a way as to make future peace treaties possible. The use of spies, assassins, and other practices which would undermine the trust of the other party are not allowed. The undermining of this trust would produce the animal desire for revenge, and the war could never truly end.⁷⁷

Kant also lists three "definitive articles" for perpetual peace. These are the actual structure that will be put in place, when peace is founded, while the previous articles were conditions that must be present before peace can be founded.⁷⁸ The first definitive article is that the civil constitutions of every state must be republican. Under a republican government, it is the people themselves who must consent to war. Because only they will be hurt by the war, their self-interest as well as their reason will prevent them from voting to go to war. If this requirement was not in place and state were allowed to have despotic governments, the risk of war would be ever-present. War would still harm the citizens, but it would not harm the sovereign, so he would have no difficulty arbitrarily deciding to send his citizens to war, if it was in his own interest to do so.⁷⁹ The second definitive article is that the law of nations must be founded on a federation of free states, as opposed to a world government in the image of that of the state. A world government would have no external monitor, and could easily become despotic and warlike, if it saw war to achieve its own interests. A union of states, however, would not pose this risk. If any one state demonstrated a move toward despotism, the other states would provide a check and guide it back to republicanism. Also, in a union of states, citizens would be able to express their opinions in a small group, while still being a member of the larger group. This solves the problem of asocial sociability, allowing the individual to continue to be a member of his own group or state, thus retaining his own identity even within the larger international union of states. Since the animal and rational desires of men are best fulfilled in a union of free states, it is this arrangement which is most conducive to peace.⁸⁰ The third definitive article is that the conditions of world citizenship should be limited to hospitality. This dictates that every person should be able to visit any part of the world without fear of hostility, but does not have the right to settle unless the people who live in that state allow him to. This permits people to come into contact with each other and promotes harmony of interests through trade and mutual understanding among peoples, who may thus become less prone to go to war. Economic ties will make it undesirable for the state to go to war with its economic partners, because it will suffer greatly in doing so. Therefore, on account of both the rational and animal character of human nature and on the basis of self-interest, world citizenship promotes world peace.⁸¹

Conclusion

The analysis of Kant's theories of the state and international relations clearly shows that his conception of human nature played an important role in their formulation. Kant never assumes that people will always act in a selfish way, or that they will be completely altruistic. He judges their actions based on the level of development of their reason. On the one hand, he takes into account the permanent character of the animal sides of human nature and its pursuit of self-interest, which tends to lead to conflictual relationships. On the other hand, it is the quest for the solution of conflicts, that stimulates the development of reason, hence the ability to tame man's animal side. Kant's conception of human nature permeates his theories of the state and international relations. To fully understand Kant's reasoning behind these theories, one must grasp his perception of the dynamics and delicate balancing of the animal and rational forces within man.

Notes

- 1 Immanuel Kant, "Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone", in *The Philosophy of Kant: Moral and Political Writings*, ed. Carl J. Friedrich. New York: The Modern Library, 1949, p. 373
- 2 *ibid.*
- 3 Immanuel Kant, *The Doctrine of Virtue*, trans. Mary J. Gregor. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964, p. 10
- 4 Roger J. Sullivan, *An Introduction to Kant's Ethics*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 10
- 5 *ibid.*
- 6 "Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone", 394
- 7 Immanuel Kant, "Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Intent", in *The Philosophy of Kant: Moral and Political Writings*, ed. Carl J. Friedrich. New York: The Modern Library, 1949, p. 118
- 8 Allen Wood, *Self and Nature in Kant's Philosophy*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984, p. 33
- 9 William James Booth, *Interpreting the World: Kant's philosophy of history and politics*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986, p. 92
- 10 Gregor, p. 13
- 11 Roger J. Sullivan, *An Introduction to Kant's Ethics*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 29
- 12 *Ibid.*, p. 13
- 13 *Ibid.*, p. 15
- 14 Gregor, p. 10
- 15 Roger J. Sullivan, *An Introduction to Kant's Ethics*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 35
- 16 *Ibid.*, p. 134
- 17 Roger J. Sullivan, *Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 45
- 18 "Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Intent", p. 120
- 19 *Ibid.*, p. 125
- 20 Booth, William *Interpreting the World*, *op. cit.*, p. 78
- 21 *Ibid.*, p. 103
- 22 "Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Intent", p. 118
- 23 *Ibid.*, p. 117
- 24 Friedrich Paulsen, *Immanuel Kant: His Life and Doctrine*. New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1963, p. 348
- 25 Hans Saner, *Kant's Political Thought*, trans. E. B. Ashton. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973, p. 40
- 26 Immanuel Kant, "Metaphysics of Morals", in *The Philosophy of Kant: Moral and Political Writings*, ed. Carl J. Friedrich. New York: The Modern Library, 1949, p. 148
- 27 "Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Intent", p. 121
- 28 Immanuel Kant, "Concerning the Common Saying: This may be true in theory but does not apply in practice", in *The Philosophy of Kant: Moral and Political Writings*, ed. Carl J. Friedrich. (New York: The Modern Library, 1949, p. 416
- 29 Booth, William *Interpreting the World*, *op. cit.*, p. 106
- 30 *Ibid.*, p. 143
- 31 Charles W. Hendel, *The Philosophy of Kant and Our Modern World*. New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1957, p. 117
- 32 Immanuel Kant, "Eternal Peace", in *The Philosophy of Kant: Moral and Political Writings*, ed. Carl J. Friedrich. New York: The Modern Library, 1949, p. 440
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