The Impact of the International Community on the Fall of the South African Apartheid System: A Realist Perspective

Patricia Di Brigida

Historically, South Africa was a segregated society, but it was in 1948 that the system known as apartheid became the legally sanctioned policy of the white Afrikaner National Party Government. It was not one single policy, but a set of acts that restricted the lives of people of African origin. Rather than the implementation of a complete transformation of the political climate, changes were made as situations developed. The ruling party wanted to create a society that would ensure the separation of the races, while maintaining a limited and controlled presence of the African people. The nature of the system required that the state possess a high level of power.[1] The white majority government used this power to assuage white society's fear of being overwhelmed by the black majority.[2] South African leaders attempted to justify, at the international level, this rigid conduct and control when the attention was directed towards their country following the Sharpeville incident of 1960. During this event, sixty-eight protesters were killed and two hundred were wounded during a peaceful demonstration against the 'pass laws', which restricted the movement of Africans within the apartheid state. Although South Africa's racial policies were debated in the United Nation's General Assembly from 1946 onwards, it was the Sharpeville incident that marked the turning point in the international response to the South African apartheid question.[3]

There is a consensus that the development of a worldwide anti-apartheid movement, beginning at the grass roots level and organized by citizens' groups, combined with the continuous dialogue occurring within international institutions put the spotlight on South Africa and received credit for affecting a universal repugnance for the discriminatory political system of apartheid. Repeated international calls for reform in the treatment of its citizens are considered to be the catalyst for the release of African National Congress (ANC) member Nelson Mandela after twenty-seven years of imprisonment. In conjunction with this, foreign governments, through their imposition of sanctions, are credited with having forced South African President F.W. de Klerk's decision, in 1991, to abandon apartheid policies. These capitalist nations that imposed sanctions are said to have chosen to follow a universal norm of racial equality, even if this constrained their economic interests.[4]

The preceding interpretation of the impact of the international community on the fall of apartheid calls into question realist assumptions that the state is the unitary actor in the international system, that international organizations do not achieve effective change, and that states are not guided by ethics, but consider their own self interest above all else. A deeper analysis of the international response demonstrates, however, that the realist model can explain states' reaction towards South Africa. The debate, spanning forty years, which occurred within the United Nations (UN) underscores that power relations had an impact on shaping the actions taken, as well as on the decisions to refrain from taking action. Conflicts between different organs of the UN, as well as conflicts between different principles of the UN Charter precluded the organization from agreeing on appropriate action[5] thus debilitating its role. The situation, which occurred within the Commonwealth, stressed the importance of plurality and that international institutions are a reflection of the international system. Although there were varying degrees of results, both the UN and the Commonwealth proved unable to restrain the behaviour of a member state. Finally, with regards to placating public opinion and the imposition of sanctions, Western governments were able to find a delicate balance whereby they catered to both the demands of public opinion and their national interests.

In the years following World War II, decolonisation was a major development whereby many African and Asian peoples were gaining independence from former colonial powers. This represented a shift in the international system from an imperialistic situation to a more pluralistic one. These newly formed states sought admittance into the UN in order to obtain recognition and a place in the existing world order by joining an inter-governmental organization that could afford them the means with which to voice their concerns and defend their interests. Many of the existing UN members were in agreement with this desire because they wanted the make up of this international organization to mirror the pluralistic nature of the international system. There were, however, some states that were averse to this enlargement. Such an influx of new members would represent a large number of diverse opinions, thus creating a forum where long debates would not easily result in consensus. The Americans, the British, and the French believed that this was a situation which would cause a shift in the existing balance of power[6] within the United Nations where power politics played a very large role. This was evident over the years with the use of the veto by the five permanent members of the Security Council (SC). The use of the veto was a major factor in the admission of new members in the 1950s. The issue of the balance of power was not lost on the smaller powers within the UN: "Pearson said that the UN could not carry out its full function unless the qualified sovereign countries of the world were made members and that the UN should not just be a club of the Western Powers".[7] It was apparent that the Western powers were hoping that the UN would serve as a vehicle to further their own interests, but other members were adamant about advancing their ideology of diversity, mutual respect, the plurality of international actors, and the delimiting of power of all member states. The Western powers' fears of long debates became reality with the inclusion of many of the African and Asian states. This inclusion can be credited with the long history of discussions concerning South Africa at the UN. Scholar Audie Klotz goes as far as to state that "Without a Pan-African commitment to racial equality, there would have been no international anti-apartheid sanctions movement".[8]

These newly independent members found themselves in the General Assembly (GA) where all states are able to voice opinions and vote on resolutions. There was an obvious split of opinion between Pan-Africanists and Western powers, namely, the U.S., the U.K. and France, which would serve to fuel the debates and also cause a rift between the GA and the SC. The latter included the above mentioned Western nations, along with the U.S.S.R. and China as its permanent members. In 1946, a request was made by the Indian government to include the treatment of South African citizens of Indian origin in the GA agenda. The Indian question was then amalgamated with the first resolutions regarding the policies of apartheid in 1952. The introduction of these resolutions and the establishment of the United Nations Commission on the Racial Situation in the Union of South Africa (UNCORS), initiated what would prove to be the beginning of long-term inimical responses from the representatives of the South African government. After UNCORS submitted reports, in three successive years, stating that apartheid policies went against the principles of the UN and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, South Africa disregarded suggestions made in resolution 820 of 1954, which made recommendations on how to resolve their racial problem. Also, in 1955, they withdrew from UNESCO, objecting to the organ's actions against racial discrimination. That same year, they also withdrew their delegation from the tenth session of the GA, as well as the following session in 1956, and they would have only a token representation in the GA until 1958, because of their opposition to the inclusion of the apartheid issue on the GA agenda.[9] In the following years, South Africa's negative reactions and continued unyieldingness to numerous GA resolutions demonstrated the government's unwillingness to allow itself to be checked, preferring to opt out of the UN organs rather than comply with the norms that the organization attempted to implement. In this regard, concerning one of its members, the UN was failing to achieve its objective of setting guidelines for states' behaviour. Under South African Prime Minister, H.F. Verwoerd, the confrontation between South Africa and the international community deepened, due to the impression he gave that his country would never submit and all international pressure would be futile.[10] Despite all this, in the 1960s, the UN attempted to assume the upper hand by taking the initiative and excluding South Africa from

participation in the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the World Health Organization (WHO).[11] This did very little to change South African attitudes.

After fourteen years of debates regarding South Africa's policies in the GA, the SC, upon the request of African and Asian states, considered the apartheid question for the first time following the Sharpeville incident in 1960. The situation in South Africa had reached a point where the international community of states was finally forced to address seriously a political system, which the GA had condemned on numerous occasions. The SC adopted resolution 134, which proclaimed that the South African situation led to 'international friction' and could represent a danger to international peace and security.[12] This resolution was adopted with nine votes in favour and none against. The U.K. and France abstained from voting, marking the first of many conflicts between the GA and the Western members of the SC, when it came to matters dealing with the South African problem. Since 1960, the GA had requested that the SC consider the South African question, under Chapter 7 of the Charter, as a threat to international peace and security, but the SC wanted to refrain from using the strong terminology and the serious implication of Article 39 of Chapter 7. Considering the matter thus would have suggested that serious action was being contemplated against a member state in matters which seemed to fall essentially within the "domestic jurisdiction" clause. The SC preferred instead to be cautiously diplomatic stating that apartheid was 'seriously disturbing' international peace and security.[13]

There were also numerous requests for the imposition of sanctions that continuously received opposition from South Africa's major trading partners. The most significant impediments to effective action came from the opposition of the three Western permanent members of the SC, namely the U.K., the U.S. and France. It was this situation that most frustrated the members of the GA:[14]

But there were sharp differences of opinion between Member States as to what further action was needed – differences which inevitably limited the ability of the United Nations to exert effective pressure on the South African government to secure an amelioration of the situation inside the country.[15]

The GA continuously attempted to affect change but the reluctance of the SC to endorse its resolutions and the suggestions of UN agencies thwarted its efforts. This situation demonstrated that the aspirations of a few powerful nations dictated the decisions and actions taken by the international body, thus calling into question its legitimacy. The GA showed its frustration publicly when, in a 1966 resolution, it castigated the main trading partners, as well as the SC council members for continuing relations with South Africa, going as far as to suggest that they were responsible for supporting the state's racial policies, which led to violent conflict.[16]

The GA's castigation of the SC may have been prophetic because violent conflict did develop out of the voluntary arms embargo of 1963, in which the nations who imposed sanctions made a distinction between specific types of arms. France and Britain stated that they would restrict items used for internal repression but continue to provide South Africa with items required for self-defence. Thus, they were demonstrating their condemnation of apartheid while simultaneously maintaining economic interests. However, this action would lead to future problems, as South Africa was able to embark upon a military build-up through collaboration with other nations.[17] They then used their military equipment in their continued exertion of control over Namibia as well as in destabilizing efforts in neighbouring African states known as the Frontline States.[18] During the apartheid regime, destabilization caused the displacement of seven million people during the 1980s and cost the Frontline States about twenty-five to forty percent of their GDP annually.[19] One of the main objectives of the creation of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), of which the Frontline states were members, was to reduce economic dependence on South Africa; a situation the apartheid regime sustained through its strength and dominance of the region.[20] Arguments have been made that the Soweto riots of 1976, in which police shot and killed many student protesters, were partly responsible for the adoption of

resolution 418 by the SC, which called for a mandatory arms embargo.[21] However, although resolution 418 condemned South Africa for its internal repression, it also emphasized the SC's concern for the apartheid regime's attacks on neighbouring states and its possible development of nuclear weapons.[22] The catalyst for the embargo was the arms trade, which represented a real threat to international peace and security and not the apartheid issue per se.[23]

A very important event took place in September, 1974 when African members within the SC proposed a draft resolution recommending that South Africa be expelled from the UN, because its apartheid policy was inconsistent with the principles of the Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights.[24] The debate was concerned with the GA's claim that the white minority National Party Government of South Africa did not represent the people of South Africa and did not respect the principle of universal suffrage. Ultimately, the U.K., the U.S., and France went against the majority opinion of the GA and vetoed the expulsion of South Africa from the UN.[25] This was a clear situation where the SC chose the political right of the state above the rights of the individuals, namely the black South Africans.

The conflict between the GA and the SC highlighted the ineffectiveness of the UN to achieve any significant results to bring about change for the people suffering from apartheid in South Africa. GA resolutions made attempts at encouraging member states to restrict diplomatic and economic relations, while mandatory action, through selective sanctions, was imposed for the first time by the SC only in 1977.[26] Most actions taken by the SC were less severe than had been intended by the GA. Due to the division of powers within the UN, the GA, being the more radical body, was restricted from taking enforcement action because this was the responsibility of the more conservative SC. Moreover, the SC's action was also restricted due to the permanent members' veto power, which the Western members invoked throughout the South African debates when they felt their interests were being threatened.[27]

There was also conflict within the UN between the issue of domestic jurisdiction and respect for human rights. The South African government relied heavily upon Article 2(7), which kept other states from interfering with domestic issues of member states. It used the article in its defence whenever it found itself being questioned in the GA. During the 1940s and 1950s, South Africa had the support of some member nations that continued to back the principle of respecting the territorial integrity and political independence of states.[28] The country was using some of the principles of the UN as a shield against any pressure from other states to conform to new norms taking shape within the changing climate of the post-War world.[29] However, when it attempted to apply the domestic jurisdiction principle to the Sharpeville incident, support declined, and apartheid and the principle of human rights were thrust into the international spotlight.[30] Once the SC, whose main function was the maintenance of international peace and security, considered the matter, apartheid was no longer looked at as a matter of domestic concern. It became a question of whether the policy was a threat to the world's peace and security.[31] The South African government was steadfast in maintaining that state rights took precedence over human or individual rights due, once again, to the wording of Article 2(7):

> Nothing contained in the present charter shall authorize the UN to intervene in matters which are essentially within domestic jurisdiction of any state ... but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.[32]

The word *nothing* includes the provision for the respect for human rights found in Article 55 and, as the SC made clear in its debates with the GA, it was not willing to condemn South Africa under Chapter 7.

Clearly the apartheid system was based on discriminatory policies that subjugated the majority racial group. Also, apart form invoking action under Chapter 7, there was no mechanism with which to enforce the respect for and the abidance of human rights. South Africa emphasized Article 55's ambiguity in defining human rights when attempting to thwart the debate relating to its policies.[33] Due to the fact

that this principle was not legally binding on states and that many members had suspect human rights records,[34] the SC did not take any action. Thus, the non-intervention principle held up over the human rights clause stressing the priority of state rights over individual rights. Throughout the long South African debate, while black South Africans were enduring serious abuses, the state was held up as the important actor in the international system whose security was taking precedence over the security of the individual within that state.

Almost from the UN's inception, due to South Africa's racial policies, the country was forced to take a defensive stand.[35] A conflict between South Africa and the international community arose in 1948, when South Africa had been one of only eight nations to abstain from voting in the GA for the adoption of the Declaration of Human Rights: "If anything, this challenge to world opinion spurred the UN into even greater efforts to make South Africa conform to the new international value system".[36] Ironically, former South African Prime Minister J.C. Smuts, who had also been pre-eminent in the creation of the League of Nations, drafted the preamble of the UN charter, which reads: "... to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small ..."[37] Clearly, he never had any intention of applying this to his own nation.[38] Smuts' duplicitous performance, demonstrated by his conflicting domestic and international policies, would foreshadow the problems of credibility that the UN as an effective organization would face in the future. Smuts himself, who had proclaimed that all nations had equal rights, was now calling for a modified world organization which would not be quite so large and would not entail 'incompetents and misfits [ruling] by the counting of heads'.[39] He, like the Western powers mentioned above, was not comfortable with the inclusion of so many dissenting opinions, whose originators he felt had neither the knowledge, ability nor the right to make international decisions that would adversely affect the proud European society which had developed within South Africa.[40] It was apparent that this was not what he had in mind when taking part in the formation of the UN. Therefore, when the organization was transformed and no longer catered to the needs of his domestic issues, Smuts, as well as successive South African leaders, ceased to live and abide by its principles.

South Africa's obstinacy engendered alienation, not only from the UN, but also from other international organizations. In 1961, the country became a republic and even though the Commonwealth had made the decision in 1949 to allow countries to retain membership after having declared themselves a republic, South Africa was asked to reapply for membership.[41] The Commonwealth had, until that point, been a symbol of British dominance with emphasis on the links that each member nation had with the historical colonial power. The focus was on the proud white societies that the British colonials had established within these countries. In the period just after World War II, when decolonisation, the right to self-determination and pluralism were in favour at the global level, South Africa sought refuge and, for a short while, found it within the confines of this organization. In 1953, South African Prime Minister Malan's declaration: "the Commonwealth permits us the greatest freedom that I can imagine" was a reflection of the country's ability to retain membership but sever constitutional links with the British Crown.[42] This allowed them to practise their apartheid policies without having to abide by other states' principles. However, with many members including Western states such as Canada, Australia and the newly independent African and Asian states craving more autonomy, the leadership of the organization shifted. This was a fear that Malan had at the time of his statement.[43] This shift began to force other states, most importantly the British hegemon, into accepting a change in focus from a white British association to a multiracial one in addition to having to yield to a collective policy.[44] Thus the member nations succeeded in putting the accent on the association's pluralism, while limiting the dominance of the ex-colonial power.

There was a common sentiment among many members of the Commonwealth that a set of principles should be established: an obligation to racial equality being of the utmost importance. However, one of the existing principles of the organization, like that of the UN, was the issue of non-

intervention in matters of domestic jurisdiction of member states. Britain and Australia were eager to respect this principle and accept South Africa's membership after it became a republic, but the African states refused to participate in the organization if that country retained its membership.[45] Once again, South Africa was causing a rift within another international organization. In this case, Canada would serve as the mediator in the conflict between domestic jurisdiction and human rights, the same issue which was being dealt with at the UN. Then Canadian Prime Minister Diefenbaker expressed a call for the respect of the multiracial nature of the Commonwealth while not actually wanting South Africa to be ousted from the association, recognizing that the country's continued participation was in the best interest of all parties concerned: "Yet he also would have accepted even minor symbolic concessions from South Africa".[46] World leaders understood the importance of propagating racial equality, but the extent to which they were willing to go to achieve actual equality for the world's diverse groups of people was questionable. The issue was more a matter of following perceived international norms and ensuring that there was a semblance of an adherence to these norms from the states in the international system. Moreover, South Africa was placing itself above the system, not so much by following discriminatory policies, but by its staunch defence of them in the face of international pressure. Some form of symbolic initiative would have appeased the international community for it can be argued that it was not so much their system of apartheid that concerned other states but their refusal to follow universal standards and their insistence on placing their country above or outside the international system.

Ultimately, because Commonwealth nations were not willing to separate the constitutional and racial issues, South Africa was forced to either acknowledge the principle of racial equality or face expulsion. They withdrew their application for membership and were forced out of the organization in 1961.[47] The preceding situation interestingly juxtaposes two realist tenets. It highlights the triumph of enhancing the pluralist nature of an international organization, while simultaneously demonstrating that it was not able to constrain the actions of a member state. As soon as the majority of states achieved the goal of a collective policy and the Commonwealth adopted a principle that no longer suited one of its members' interests, rather than adhere to it, South Africa chose to leave the organization and its principles behind. In the short period between 1953 and 1961, a complete change in attitude of South African Prime Ministers is evident when, upon leaving the Commonwealth, H.F. Verwoerd stated: "... we have freed ourselves from the pressure of Afro-Asian nations who were busy invading the Commonwealth".[48]

The Commonwealth members collectively decided not to separate ethics and politics in their dealings with the South African government, yet on a unilateral basis, Western nations were slow in making any significant efforts to discourage the continued enforcement of apartheid policies. During this time, many nations maintained trade and pursued investment with the African state, acknowledging the benefits of continued economic relations. In the years following the GA's resolution to ban exports to, or imports from South Africa, trade with the renegade state actually increased. In 1962, Britain, the U.S. and Japan accounted for fifty percent of South African exports while West Germany, Belgium, France, and Italy accounted for a further twenty-five percent. In 1966, however, the rate of importation by Britain, the U.S., West Germany, and Japan grew to sixty-two percent. This increase follows the GA's attempts to trigger changes in the foreign policies of Western states towards South Africa. High levels of economic interaction between these countries and South Africa continued into the 1980s.[49] This illustrates that, despite years of condemnation of the apartheid system, ethical and moral factors did not affect the political and economic behaviour of these capitalist countries. However, pressure leading to change in policies towards South Africa did come in the form of public opinion in Western nations, as South African obstinacy "provided grist to the mill of the international sanctions lobby"[50] as well as from black South African groups such as the ANC. Once it was evident that no consequential action was being taken at the international level or individual states' level, the citizens of these Western nations took it upon themselves to raise awareness of the issue.[51] The anti-apartheid movement became the cause célèbre of the 1980s as the outcry against apartheid took different forms in different countries. After a long and

arduous struggle to sway Western leaders, they were eventually led to a consensus on policy. In the United States, for instance: "For liberals and conservatives, Democrats and Republicans, South Africa has become a bandwagon issue ...".[52] In Britain: "Thatcher's subsequent acquiescence to limited sanctions by the European Community against the Republic probably has less to do with South Africa itself than with Britain's status as a leader in international political fora".[53] These situations demonstrated that powerful states or powerful parties within states influenced one another to jump on the political bandwagon of the anti-apartheid issue. Taking up the so-called moral cause legitimized these states and parties in the eyes of the public. Western leaders recognized that the most effective form of displaying support for racial equality with regards to South Africa was the use of sanctions.[54] It is also important to note that although these leaders understood that public opinion was crucial to their longevity, they had to maintain a balance between a positive domestic, as well as international, image and a favourable economic policy.

As noted earlier, Western nations were reluctant to implement sanctions against South Africa. Attempts were made to disprove the efficacy of placing bans on imports and of disinvestment. These capitalist nations, along with the apartheid regime, claimed that the black population would suffer most.[55] They also asserted that, rather than alienating it completely, maintaining friendly relations with the South African government would be more effective in initiating change. Then British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher stated that the effects on the economy of the country and its African neighbours would be extremely damaging and equally so to UK interests.[56] In 1986, U.S. President Ronald Reagan, who experienced domestic pressure, vetoed the implementation of sanctions stating that the situation in South Africa was: " ... a battle between the 'abhorrence' of apartheid and the 'unacceptable alternative of Marxist tyranny'".[57] The House of Representatives and the Senate would subsequently override this veto but these Cold War worries of alienating South Africa and leaving it vulnerable to Socialist regimes underscored a preference, on the part of Western nations, for the apartheid system and an endorsement of realist tenets. Moreover, while sanctions were eventually implemented, this Western reluctance caused a long delay in any form of effective action.

Many scholars argue that the nature of the sanctions placed on South Africa did little to precipitate any real change in its domestic policies. Margaret Doxey states that: " ... sanctions represent 'something' in the way of a response rather than 'nothing' but are deliberately chosen to minimise cost and dislocation while symbolizing a willingness to act",[58] and that the "... 'something' is likely to be 'as little as possible'".[59] This type of sanction would then satisfy public pressure without actually hurting domestic interests. Many bold sanctions policies came from Western nations whose economic interests were not tied to South Africa. Sweden, which did not have a significant economic relationship with the nation, introduced a total ban on trade,[60] and Canada implemented coal import sanctions when it had never imported South African coal prior to the sanctions.[61] There is evidence that specific sanctions were selected by states in order to ensure that their interests were not jeopardized. Statistics show that a disproportionate number of sanctioned products were imports rather than exports such as steel, iron, coal, textiles, uranium, agricultural goods and Krugerrands (South African gold coins). The U.K. did not sanction agricultural goods because they were heavily dependent on South Africa for this commodity.[62] William Kaempfer and Anton Lowenberg suggest that some nations benefited from certain sanctions levied against South Africa:

> In the case of coal, only the United States and Canada (or the Commonwealth) applied an import embargo. Significantly, these countries were not large overall importers of coal and in fact were major exporters in competition with South Africa. The intent of the U.S. and Canadian sanctions on coal may have been to pressure Europe, which was a heavy importer of South African coal, to levy a similar import ban. Such a move would have secured almost the entire European market for North American exporters.[63]

All the above clearly supports that even the application of sanctions followed realist principles. Western nations continued to be guided, not by ethics, but by their own self interest.

With regards to disinvestments, U.S. and Japanese firms simply pulled their capital out of South Africa leaving behind the facilities to domestic firms, which profited greatly. However, U.S. firms continued to benefit because they maintained ties through licensing, patent, and export arrangements.[64] Beginning in 1987, there was an emphasis placed on financial sanctions, which proved to be ineffective as foreign banks allowed the South African government to reschedule debt repayment.[65] This was particularly the case with Britain and West Germany, which held $5.5 billion and approximately $2 billion, respectively, of South Africa's $18.5 billion debt, as of 1984.[66] Although investment in South Africa may have been discouraged for altruistic reasons, ultimately, the reality was that investment in the country had become an unwise business venture. South Africa's political system created a volatile climate.[67] The subordination of the majority led to unrest and a desire for equality: sentiments which the ruling minority suppressed forcibly. But this desire for justice could not be quelled indefinitely and led to political gatherings and violent opposition to them. These, in turn, led to riots followed by terrible violence, which rendered South African society extremely unstable and not conducive to economic profit. In such a climate disinvestment was a sagacious action rather than an ethical one.

It would be difficult to belie the importance of international actors other than states in the fall of apartheid. The efforts of the African liberation movement as well as suppressed African groups such as the ANC, attracted international public and institutional support. However, it would be too simplistic to proclaim that international organizations played as large a role as it was perceived that they had in the dismantling of the discriminatory system. The many years of debates proved to be mostly discussion without any real action. Following reluctance to change foreign economic policies, especially on the part of the Western powers, imposed sanctions were mainly symbolic. Sanctions imposed during the late 80s, which represented a period of heightened international pressure against South Africa, cost the country less than one percent of its GNP. Also, these same Western powers were among the first nations to lift trade bans, in 1991, as soon as de Klerk announced the forthcoming apartheid reforms despite negative reaction from the ANC.[68] Therefore, foreign governments had to endure losses for a short period relative to the forty-year struggle of the African people. Furthermore, their haste in lifting bans demonstrated that states would have preferred not to impose sanctions against South Africa at all. The fact of the matter is that Western governments trade with many nations that may have perceived suspect human rights records and they do this because it is in their best economic interest to do so. This was demonstrated in the case with China. The massacre of students in Tiananmen Square, in 1989, was a catalyst for worldwide condemnation. However, although the debate about whether sanctions should be imposed against China raged for years, eventually countries were able to continue to trade with the nation without much pressure to desist. In both the South Africa and China issues, the failure to place individual rights above the rights of the state underscores the realist claim that the state continues to take precedence over the individual. This was clearly illustrated when, in 1966, even though the GA condemned apartheid as a crime against humanity, the international community failed to intervene in South Africa's domestic situation.

Notes

[1] James Barber, *South Africa in the 20th Century* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999) 141.
[2] Ibid, 140.
[3] United Nations, *The United Nations and Apartheid 1948-1994* (New York: United Nations, 1994) 13-14.
[4] Audie Klotz, *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid* (Ithaca: Cornell U. Press, 1995) 111 & 120.
[5] Ibid, 57.
[6] Clyde Sanger, *Canadians and the United Nations* (Ottawa: External Affairs Canada, 1988) 49.
[7] Ibid, 49.
[8] Audie Klotz, *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid* (Ithaca: Cornell U. Press, 1995) 90.
[9] United Nations, *The United Nations and Apartheid 1948-1994* (New York: United Nations, 1994) 12-13.
[10] Deon Geldenhuys, "The Head of Government and South Africa's Foreign Relations" in Schrire, Robert, ed, *Malan to De Klerk: Leadership in*

    the Apartheid State (New York: C. Hurst & Co., 1994) 259 & 262.

[11] John Dugard, *International Law: A South African Perspective* (Kenwyn: Juta & Co., 1994) 6.

[12] United Nations, *The United Nations and Apartheid 1948-1994* (New York: United Nations, 1994) 14.

[13] Margaret P. Doxey. *International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspectives* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987) 48.

[14] United Nations, *The United Nations and Apartheid 1948-1994* (New York: United Nations, 1994) 38.

[15] Ibid, 27.

[16] Ibid, 27.

[17] Ibid, 52.

[18] Audie Klotz, *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid* (Ithaca: Cornell U. Press, 1995) 80.

[19] 5 January 2004. <http://www.newint.org>

[20] Bertil Oden, "Regionalization in Southern Africa: The Role of the Dominant" in Ojendal, Joakim, Michael Shulz and Fredrik Soderbaum, eds,
    Regionalization in a Globalizing World (New York: Zed Books, 2001) 84.

[21] Audie Klotz, *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid* (Ithaca: Cornell U. Press, 1995) 51.

[22] United Nations, *The United Nations and Apartheid 1948-1994* (New York: United Nations, 1994) 50.

[23] Margaret P. Doxey. *International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspectives* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996) 23.

[24] United Nations, *The United Nations and Apartheid 1948-1994* (New York: United Nations, 1994) 47.

[25] John Dugard, *International Law: A South African Perspective* (Kenwyn: Juta & Co., 1994) 300.

[26] United Nations, *The United Nations and Apartheid 1948-1994* (New York: United Nations, 1994) 50.

[27] John Dugard, *International Law: A South African Perspective* (Kenwyn: Juta & Co., 1994) 302.

[28] Audie Klotz, *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid* (Ithaca: Cornell U. Press, 1995) 44.

[29] Dugard, *International Law: A South African Perspective* (Kenwyn: Juta & Co., 1994) 19.

[30] Ibid, 18.

[31] Audie Klotz, *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid* (Ithaca: Cornell U. Press, 1995) 47.

[32] United Nations, 25 January 2003. <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter1.html>

[33] Dugard, *International Law: A South African Perspective* (Kenwyn: Juta & Co., 1994) 201.

[34] Ibid, 64 & 203.

[35] Ibid, 18.

[36] Deon Geldenhuys, "The Head of Government and South Africa's Foreign Relations" in Schrire, Robert, ed, *Malan to De Klerk: Leadership*
    in the Apartheid State (New York: C. Hurst & Co., 1994) 246.

[37] United Nations, 25 January 2003. <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter1.html>

[38] Deon Geldenhuys, "The Head of Government and South Africa's Foreign Relations" in Schrire, Robert, ed, *Malan to De Klerk: Leadership*
    in the Apartheid State (New York: C. Hurst & Co., 1994) 246.

[39] Ibid, 247.

[40] Ibid, 247.

[41] Audie Klotz, *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid* (Ithaca: Cornell U. Press, 1995) 58.

[42] Deon Geldenhuys, "The Head of Government and South Africa's Foreign Relations" in Schrire, Robert, ed, *Malan to De Klerk: Leadership*
    in the Apartheid State (New York: C. Hurst & Co., 1994) 251.

[43] Ibid, 43.

[44] Audie Klotz, *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid* (Ithaca: Cornell U. Press, 1995) 10.

[45] Ibid, 59.

[46] Ibid, 60.

[47] Ibid, 60.

[48] Deon Geldenhuys, "The Head of Government and South Africa's Foreign Relations" in Schrire, Robert, ed, *Malan to De Klerk: Leadership*
    in the Apartheid State (New York: C. Hurst & Co., 1994) 263.

[49] Jennifer Davis, "Squeezing Apartheid: Economic Sanctions Against South Africa", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 49.9 (1993) 16 Dec. 2002
    http://web3.infotrac.galegroup.com/itw/infomark/828/172/56524772w3/purl=rc2_EAIM_1_squeezing+apartheid&dyn=sig!1?sw_aep
    =yorku_main

[50] Deon Geldenhuys, "The Head of Government and South Africa's Foreign Relations" in Schrire, Robert, ed, *Malan to De Klerk: Leadership*
    in the Apartheid State (New York: C. Hurst & Co., 1994) 283.

[51] Jennifer Davis, "Squeezing Apartheid: Economic Sanctions Against South Africa", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 49.9 (1993) 16 Dec. 2002
    http://web3.infotrac.galegroup.com/itw/infomark/828/172/56524772w3/purl=rc2_EAIM_1_squeezing+apartheid&dyn=sig!1?sw_aep
    =yorku_main

[52] Elizabeth Boles, *The West and South Africa. The Atlantic Institute for International Affairs 67.* (London: Croom Helm, 1988) 58.

[53] Ibid, 58.

[54] Audie Klotz, *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid* (Ithaca: Cornell U. Press, 1995) 106.

[55] Margaret P.Doxey, *United Nations Sanctions: Current Policy Issues* (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1997) 13.

[56] Robert Harvey, *The Fall of Apartheid* (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001) 172.

[57] Elizabeth Boles, *The West and South Africa. The Atlantic Institute for International Affairs 67.* (London: Croom Helm, 1988) 60.

[58] Margaret P. Doxey. *International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspectives* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987) 94.

[59] Ibid, 98.

[60] Elizabeth Boles, *The West and South Africa. The Atlantic Institute for International Affairs 67.* (London: Croom Helm, 1988) 51.

[61] William H. Kaempfer and Anton D. Lowenberg. *The Origins and Demise of South African Apartheid: A Public Choice Analysis* (Ann Arbor:
    Michigan U. Press, 1998) 116.

[62] Ibid, 111-113.

[63] Ibid, 114.

[64] Ibid, 122-133.

[65] Margaret P. Doxey. *International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspectives* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996) 26.

[66] Margaret P. Doxey. *International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspectives* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987) 136.

[67] William H. Kaempfer and Anton D. Lowenberg. *The Origins and Demise of South African Apartheid: A Public Choice Analysis* (Ann Arbor: Michigan U. Press, 1998) 126.

[68] Margaret P. Doxey. *International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspectives* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996) 25.

Works Cited

Barber, James. *South Africa in the Twentieth Century*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1999.

Boles, Elizabeth. *The West and South Africa. The Atlantic Institute for International Affairs 67*. London: Croom Helm, 1988.

Davis, Jennifer. "Squeezing Apartheid: Economic Sanctions Against South Africa." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. Vol. 49 no. 9, 1993. 16 Dec. 2002
http://web3.infotrac.galegroup.com/itw/infomark/828/172/56524772w3/purl=rc2_EAIM_1_squeezing+apartheid&dyn=sig!1?sw_acp=yorku_main

Doxey, Margaret P. *International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspectives*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1987.

Doxey, Margaret P. *International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspectives*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1996.

Doxey, Margaret P. *United Nations Sanctions: Current Policy Issues*. Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1997.

Dugard, John. *International Law: A South African Perspective*. Kenwyn: Juta & Co., 1994.

Geldenhuys, Deon. "The Head of Government and South Africa's Foreign Relations." *Malan to De Klerk: Leadership in the Apartheid State* Ed Robert Schrire. New York: C. Hurst & Co., 1994.

Harvey, Robert. *The Fall of Apartheid*. Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001.

Kaempfer, William H. and Anton D. Lowenberg. *The Origins and Demise of South African Apartheid: A Public Choice Analysis*. Ann Arbor Michigan UP, 1998.

Klotz, Audie. *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1995.

Oden, Bertil. "Regionalization in Southern Africa: The Role of the Dominant" *Regionalization in a Globalizing World*. Eds. Joakim Ojendal, Michael Shulz and Fredrik Soderbaum. New York: Zed Books, 2001.

Sanger, Clyde. *Canadians and the United Nations*. Ottawa: External Affairs Canada, 1988.

United Nations. *The United Nations and Apartheid 1948-1994*. New York: United Nations, 1994.

United Nations. 25 Jan. 2003. <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter1.html>

5 January 2004. <http://www.newint.org>