Glendon Papers

Travaux de recherche des étudiants rédigés dans le cadre des cours offerts par le Programme d'études internationales

Research essays by undergraduate students submitted in courses offered by the International Studies Programme

Volume no. 3, 2003

Edited by / Sous la direction de
Patricia Di Brigida, Lilly A. Lo Manto and Gina Mori

Supervised by the coordinator of the International Studies Programme
Supervisé par le coordonnateur du Programme d'études internationales
Prof. Domenico Mazzeo

Glendon College / Collège Glendon
2275 Avenue Bayview
Toronto, Ontario M4N 3M6

YORK UNIVERSITÉ UNIVERSITY

Celebrating the bilingual nature of Glendon College, the third volume of the **Glendon Papers** continues the tradition of melding French and English undergraduate research essays written by students of the International Studies Programme. In years past, the focus of the publication has been on first year students. Although we do not wish to venture too far from the original vision of this project, in this volume we hope to illustrate the evolution of learning in the International Studies Programme and the importance of acquiring strong research skills. Therefore, we have included works written by both first and fourth year students. We would like to thank those students who prepared and contributed their work for publication. Lastly, we would also like to thank Professor Domenico Mazzeo, coordinator of the International Studies Programme, for his continued encouragement in the past, present and, by way of this publication, future students of the programme. His commitment has ensured the continuation of this project.

The editors – Gina, Lilly and Patricia.

Témoignant du bilinguisme à Glendon, le **Glendon Papers** en est à son troisième volume. Cette année encore, divers travaux de recherche rédigés en français et en anglais, tous élaborés dans le cadre des cours du Programme d'études internationales, sont rassemblés. Alors que les premiers volumes du Glendon Papers ne publiaient que les textes des étudiants de première année, le volume 2003 se veut plus diversifié. Celui-ci englobe des travaux de recherche effectués par des étudiants allant de la première à la quatrième année d'études. D'autre part, le présent volume poursuit un double objectif, soit celui d'illustrer l'évolution des connaissances assimilées dans le Programme d'études internationales et ensuite, celui de souligner l'importance de maîtriser différents outils et techniques de recherche. Finalement, nous désirons remercier la contribution des étudiants ayant participé à la présente publication ainsi que celle de Professeur Domenico Mazzeo, le coordonnateur du Programme d'études internationales. Son soutien, son engagement et ses encouragements ont incontestablement permis la réalisation de ce projet.

Les éditrices – Gina, Lilly et Patricia.

Virtue and the Individual: Confucius' Conception of International Society

Aaron Doupe

Confucius, or K'ung Fu-tzu, had many ideas of what a proper society should be and how it should function. These ideas were a product of an ancient Chinese society that believed that oceans on all four sides of their land surrounded the inhabited world. This space included the Chinese people themselves as well as those people they recognized as culturally distinct.[1] This idea, as well as that of the non-existence of the contemporary definition of the nation must be considered when examining Confucius' views of international relations. The Chinese regarded many of these people who were culturally distinct as barbarians. In great part, Confucius' views on the nature of international relations stem from his conception of the virtuous individual. This essay will examine the conceptions of international society of this great ancient Chinese philosopher and teacher, through an analysis of his conceptions of the nature of man and state. Moreover, this paper will also examine the historical and contemporary significance of Confucius' teachings.

Confucius' Concept of the Nature of the Human Being

Confucius' concept of the nature of the human being centres mainly on his theories regarding virtues and human relations. Indeed, the philosopher believed that a virtuous person could transform anyone who did not practice Confucian ideals, simply by living amongst them for a period of time thereby exposing them to virtue. Confucius thus believed that it was simply a matter of time before all people would be absorbed into the Chinese world due to the power of Confucian virtue.[2] Within the parameters of such traits, Confucius places the ideas of "jen" (goodness and virtue), the "harmony chain", "tao" (the way), the importance of the family, "i" (righteousness or justice), "chung-shu" (loyalty and consideration), and "li" (propriety or justice). Confucius uses these concepts to identify the way he believes common people, public servants, and especially rulers should act. Virtues are of supreme importance to Confucius. He wants people to be virtuous in everyday action. He identifies the main virtues to be humaneness, dutifulness, wisdom, good faith, and observance of ritual.[3] He believes humaneness to be the most important of these virtues, as he says it plays an integral role in social relationships. Confucius defines humaneness in two parts: The first is to have an attitude of reverence in human relationships and to behave respectfully at all times; the second is to show consideration of others by not carrying out actions one would not want done to oneself.[4]

Humaneness is most closely linked to the idea of "jen", a main component of Confucian philosophy. In its simplest form, "jen" signifies goodness or virtue. When expanded by Confucius and his followers, the concept is a whole universe and an attitude towards life. It is supreme in the teachings of Confucius. To explain this complex term, Confucius said that "jen" could best be demonstrated in how a man lives his life among his peers, specifically to be compassionate, understanding, and sympathetic towards the feelings and sufferings of others.[5] He explains that "jen" is the highest perfection of goodness and that although people may strive to achieve it, few succeed.[6] The Chinese pictograph character for the term is composed of two symbols, that of a man and the number two. Together, these symbols imply that man is unable to exist in the world alone and must live among his peers. Confucius extrapolates this basic idea and develops it into a way of life that specifies that man should live in the world aiding, respecting, and ultimately understanding others.[7] The individual must possess the qualities the philosopher outlines and only then society may be virtuous. Confucius hopes that all individuals will achieve "jen" and thus lead a jen-like existence.

In fact, the concept of "jen" is an integral part of Confucius' conception of international relations, as seen through the idea of the "harmony chain". Specifically, if the individual can put the "jen" way of life into practice, then this concept will spread to one's family, then state, then country, and eventually to the world.[8] The idea of the "harmony chain" also applies, in Confucian theory, to virtues. Harmony, for Confucius, means having everything in its place, and functioning properly, with virtues. Confucius believes that if every person can put the virtues of courtesy, generosity, good faith, diligence, and kindness into practice, then everything under heaven will be humane, through the means of the "harmony chain".[9] Indeed, "if you behave with courtesy, then you will not be insulted; if you are generous, then you will win the multitude; if you are in good faith, then other men will put their trust in you; if you are diligent, then you will have success; and if you are kind, then you will be able to command others."[10] According to the philosopher, this concept is applicable at the international level: If all people exemplify the aforementioned virtues, relations between humans, whether in government or civilians, would be peaceful and harmonious.

Another central component of Confucian theory is the concept of "tao" or "the way." Like "jen", "tao" is also an abstract concept, in the sense that it is not easily definable. In Chinese, "tao" simply means road or path. However, according to Confucius, the term means "the way", and applies to the nature of man, the state, and international relations, as it represents the manner in which he thought that behaviour should be conducted between individuals and states worldwide. Confucius explains that "if all under heaven have the way" or a particular state "has the way," moral principles prevail.[11] If an individual has "tao" or "the way", he or she acts properly and is a person with an outstanding moral character. Confucius states: "my way is pervaded by a single principle,"[12] but he never specifies the principle. However, according to Herrlee Glessner Creel, if Confucius' major work, *The Analects*, and its historical setting are studied closely, the principle of a cooperative world is apparent.[13] Confucius is convinced that suspicion, strife, and suffering are largely unnecessary, while cooperation between people of the earth is possible, for war and injustice hurt everyone, even those who supposedly profit from them.

Confucius notes that each person's way differs according to his or her interests and abilities. According to the author, this is important and indeed correct, because of the many different things to be accomplished in the world. He explains, "what is important is that each man pursue his own way with virtue and be honest to himself."[14] Since the "tao" of each man differs, Confucius believes that ultimately the final test for following the right path and doing the proper thing is left to the individual.[15] This point further emphasizes the Confucian notion that the individual is at the centre of international relations. How one chooses to conduct his or her life and its inherent aspects reflects his or her relations with others. At the international level, if a country decides to be virtuous in its interactions, it will be more respectable and conducive to peace than a country choosing to be unscrupulous in its interactions.

Moreover, Creel specifies that such a cooperative world is based on the relationship between members of a family.[16] The family is and has been a very important unit in China. A virtue that Confucius emphasizes is that of filial piety. The virtue consists of being respectful to one's parents and always obeying them. Filial piety is an important factor for Confucius because ancient Chinese society, before his time, was based on the family unit. Indeed, in the early days of the Chou dynasty, plots of land were allotted to feudal lords in a system of planned colonisation. These lords were linked to one another and to the royal house by marital ties and together with their families, peasants, artisans, and soldiers formed self-sufficient agricultural economies. These large family groupings were only preserved as long as the relationships of parents to children, of brothers to brothers, and of masters to servants, were effectively managed. Filial piety was necessary for the health and survival of the family, and, in turn, ancient Chinese society. Confucius realized that if this virtue was not practised and respected, the family as a social unit would fall into ruin, as he had seen happen to many prominent families in his lifetime.[17] Therefore, in order to respect filial piety, he maintains that one must not harm the physical body that one receives from his or her parents and that one should establish one's character and practise "the way", so

as to make one's reputation known. In turn, by doing so, this will bring glory upon one's parents.[18] Critics challenge Confucius in this respect, maintaining that the family and the state, or, similarly, that "tao" and filial piety are in conflict. In *The Analects*, the Duke of Shê provides the example that if one's father steels a sheep and one is following "the way", he or she would testify against his or her father. This would therefore go against the virtue of filial piety and consequently against "the way". Confucius replies that the individual is to protect the father and thereby follow "the way" and protect filial piety. With this response, Confucius displays that he does not believe the state and the family to be fundamentally opposed. He explains that it is in the family that the individual learns attitudes of obedience and cooperation, and gains experience in socialized activity, which make it possible for he or she to be a useful citizen and/or official.[19]

Furthermore, "i", according to Confucius, signifies righteousness or justice. He defines it more concretely than the abstract concepts of "jen" and "tao". He defines this concept as something that is fitting, right, or seemly.[20] He believes that people must learn to distinguish between what is right and what is wrong, through concrete situations of life and only then may they achieve "i". Confucius feels that loyalty and consideration or "chung-shu" is of great importance for those individuals involved in public life. By loyalty, Howard D. Smith suggests that Confucius implies serving wholly with all one's heart, whereas, by consideration, the ancient Chinese philosopher refers to putting oneself in the place of others.[21] Confucius believes this to be an important characteristic for man to possess in order to properly interact with other members of his community, especially in the public forum. Though Confucius stresses loyalty to one's leader, nonetheless he acknowledges that it is more important to remain constant to one's own principles.

The final main component of Confucius' philosophy of the nature of man is that of "li". Translated, the term means propriety or the rules of good behaviour. It is simply the interactions of polite society and the proper way to conduct oneself. Confucius specified that two elements are necessary to achieve "li" within a society. The first is to bring about an inner peace of mind to people, so that they have a proper outlet for each emotion that arises, and that emotions are not expressed in an unbridled manner. The second element is to have an external restraint upon one's conduct, so that one does not exceed what is deemed to be right and proper.[22] The term has much to do with the performance of rituals in certain situations, such as proceedings in a court, for example, or the proper and respectful way to conduct a funeral. Confucius is careful to emphasize that if the actions are not carried out with sincerity, then "li" is not being observed.[23]

Fundamentally, Confucius is very optimistic about the ability of the individual. In his view of a cooperative world, the individual is of utmost importance. He believes simplistically that the world can be no better than all of the individuals who are part of it. Confucius notes that if many of these individuals lack most moral values, the world is in danger. This is why the philosopher emphasizes the aforementioned virtues and ethical processes. This is further exemplified by the notion offered by Confucius, largely regarded as a revolutionary one, that men of all classes possess worth in themselves, not just those of noble birth. Consequently, people must not be treated as means by which the state accomplishes its purposes, but as the ends for which the state exists.[24] This indicates the interconnectedness of individual and state within the teachings of the ancient Chinese philosopher.

Confucius' Conceptions of the State

Confucius' conceptions of the state are rooted mainly in what he disliked about his home state of Lu. He was against a feudal state and wanted a society based on order, harmony, respect, ethics, and fraternity. These values are parallel to those that Confucius expected of individuals, because he felt that the state should reflect the individuals that compose it. Ultimately, Confucius' thoughts on the nature of

the state may be examined by discussing his views of the individual in government, the importance of ritual, virtue, litigation, education, and the role of a good leader.[25]

Confucius believed that the government should benefit all people, not just the representatives involved therein. Keeping in line with the themes of individuality and virtue, Confucius wanted a social order that was based on personal ethics where the political is the result of the personal. This is to say that, if people are virtuous and kind, then the state can be so as well. Furthermore, if harmony is to be present in the state, it must begin with the people.[26] Confucius was often asked how one could contribute to government. To this question, he offered the idea of personal contribution through actions. He is quoted in *The Analects* as having said, "only be dutiful towards your parents and friendly towards your brothers, and you will be contributing to government."[27] Confucius implies that the practice of social virtues, within the family, by those without political power, makes a significant contribution to government, by contributing to social harmony, which he believed to be the purpose of government.[28]

Even though Confucius believed that the purpose of government was to strive for social harmony, he failed to see how the government of Lu, his home state, tried to provide this. He used subtle language in his work, entitled *Spring and Autumn*, to criticize the political situation in Lu, describing it as decadent. Confucius was irritated with the Duke of Lu, because the Duke was reluctant to give Confucius a position in government, in which the philosopher would have implemented his ideas. Although, Confucius was later given a position with a prestigious title, he was given little real advising power. Angered, Confucius went on a mission, spreading his word of ethics, virtuosity, and morality in neighbouring states, hoping to enlighten them.[29] Moreover, Confucius was convinced that since Lu was not a properly run state, it could not be effective in relations with other states.

In terms of how a state should be run, Confucius felt that ritual and tradition were very important aspects. He thought the correct performance of ritual to be essential to the welfare of the state. These beliefs stem from the influence that the decline of the culture of the Chou dynasty in China, partially due to the abandonment of rituals, such as sacrifices and judicial processes, had on Confucius. Indeed, what most appalled Confucius was the decline in morality of the Duke of Lu. Controlled by three families, the Duke was occupied with food, drink and debauchery.[30] For Confucius, rituals were necessary in many facets of life such as etiquette, relations with people, and matters of government. He stressed the significance of rituals by stating: "if the ruler loves ritual, the people will be easy to employ."[31]

In line with ritual, Confucius also felt that virtue was an integral part of a state. As previously mentioned, a main theme in Confucian philosophy is virtue: It is important not only in an individual but in the state as well. He believed that a true king would be able to run a state politically and virtuously. By doing so, the king would be able to convert the populace of the state, so that all behave virtuously and harmoniously. Therefore, in order to have proper states, it is necessary to have virtuous leaders. For this to happen, Confucius wanted a bloodless revolution where those with wisdom and virtue replaced the power of rulers who inherited their thrones. He felt that wise and virtuous leaders were better equipped to run a state than someone who was simply born into power. Confucius felt that if such a bloodless revolution were to occur, the virtue of loyalty would be possible between the people and their ruler, thus helping to create the ideal virtuous society.[32]

Confucius and his followers believe so strongly in the power of virtue and ritual that they take a negative view of litigation, feeling that if all people observe the moral code, there would be no need for lawyers and litigation within the state. This view, however, contrasted sharply with that of the Legalists who felt that it was necessary to control people through fear and stringent punishment. Ironically, the former view did not promote good inter-state and intra-state relations. Confucius gives two main reasons not to control people by penal law. The first is that laws cannot take into account all possible circumstances of a situation, so it is better to leave matters of judgment to morally qualified individuals,

rather than applying a mechanical legal code. The second reason is that law controls merely through fear of punishment and does not build moral character within a person. Indeed, "if you lead the people by means of regulations and keep order among them by means of punishment, they will be without conscience in trying to avoid them. If you lead them by virtue, and keep order among them by ritual, they will have a conscience and will reform themselves."[33] Law does not educate, rectify past deeds, or make any contribution towards the Confucian aims of transforming people, where the emulation of virtuous role models would.[34] In turn, if a state is corrupt because it contains corrupt individuals, it will be unsuccessful in building positive and mutually beneficial relations with other states.

Despite Confucius' distaste for the operations of the governments of his time, he wanted to reform them and in teaching his pupils, he had the ultimate goal of educating the right kind of people for positions in government. Thus his education policy was linked to political ideas, and one of the foremost aims of Confucianism was to produce a constant supply of the right kind of people for government and administrative service.[35] Confucius felt that since he was unable to completely impact the decisions of his government, he would educate the young who, should they become leaders, would influence governments using his teachings as a base. Through education, Confucius fundamentally felt that he could change all of China. As previously mentioned, he briefly held a position in the government of Lu and hoped that by setting an example, a form of education, he could affect the relations between states and the relations of China with outside territories. He thought that the influence of a virtuous Lu would spread throughout China.[36] Nevertheless, as previously stated, Confucius' position did not offer him this power.

Confucius also placed great importance upon the role of a good and strong leader. He felt that a ruler had a significant impact upon how a people acted. In a discussion with the Duke of Lu, Confucius said, "if you act in a proper manner as a ruler, the people will act as proper subjects and you will have to kill none of them. If you act improperly, if you are not good yourself, the people will act badly no matter how many you kill. The actions of the people are like the grass. The grass bends in the direction that the wind blows."[37] Confucius suggested that a proper ruler had to learn how to govern himself properly before he could hope to properly govern his people. He must follow "tao" and be a virtuous person to do this. Simply put, Confucius believed a ruler should possess the qualities of the ideal Confucian, those of "jen", filial piety, and loyalty. The people under the ruler also play an important role. Confucius felt that they should be loyal to their leader, if he is just and good to them. Conversely, if he is tyrannical, then Confucius advocated rebellion. To understand the importance Confucius placed on the ideal ruler, the historical context must be examined. Many of the rulers of the time were lacking in self-control, and were unable to properly govern a state, as most of the time; states were embroiled in conflict and unrest. Confucius places so much emphasis on the importance of having a competent and able representative, because a good and proper ruler was the individual who was the most directly involved in all aspects of inter-state and international relations.

Conclusion

Confucius would finally have an immense impact on his society as well as contemporary society. In his time, the simple idea of schooling was almost deemed radical. Some primitive forms of education for youth existed in Confucius' time, but he wanted to teach adults. In essence, Confucius created the first college.[38] It was much more informal than the complex systems in contemporary society, but it was still the foundation upon which future establishments could be built. In reality, Confucius did not have a huge impact in his lifetime. Soon thereafter, however, through the messages of his disciples, his theories were studied, popularized, and accredited. His ideas spread beyond the borders of ancient China to foreign lands. This can be seen in a more contemporary light, with Jesuit missionaries who entered China in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to become scholars and even court officials. They brushed aside the facades that had been built around Confucius' teachings over the millennia and worked to find the real Confucius through study of ancient literature. In several letters back to Europe, these individuals praised

this "new" philosopher they had discovered. It was through these missionaries that Confucius' teachings were brought to Europe. At the time he became known to the West, it was the beginning of the great philosophical movement known as the Enlightenment. Many philosophers, such as Voltaire, Leibniz, and Wolff used Confucius' name to further their arguments, and they were themselves influenced in the process.[39]

Other instances of Confucius' influence in the West occurred during the time of the Enlightenment, when European scholars discovered that the Chinese had virtually abolished hereditary aristocracy. In France and in Great Britain, anti-monarchists used this in their quest for abolition of hereditary privilege. Thus Confucius and Confucianism helped to promote the rebirth of democracy in Europe.[40] Creel also notes that the development of democracy in the Untied States of America was partially influenced by French and Chinese thought.[42] Thomas Jefferson proposed an educational system that shows similarities to the Chinese examination system, describing it as the "key-stone of the arch of our government."[41]

In addition, along the lines of democratic changes, Confucius exerted ancestral influence upon the Chinese revolution. Sun Yat-sen declared that "both Confucius and Mencius, a prominent disciple of Confucius, were exponents of democracy"[42] and thus gave the Republic of China a constitution that bears many resemblances to Confucian principles, such as that of leadership through ability, rather than hereditary rights and privileges.[43] Indeed, through the Confucian views that a ruler must be loyal and sincere, while subjects must be true to their principles rather than exhibit blind loyalty to a leader, one of the conditions essential to democracy was emphasized. Without allegiance to principles, the state is constantly at the whim of any political figure that is able to gather a following of people. This concept that Confucius emphasizes has made possible the existence of the Censorate; a body in the Chinese government that, for the past two thousand years, has been in charge of criticizing neglect of duty by any official, even the emperor.

In conclusion, Confucius' philosophy of international relations is largely based upon his views of the individual and the state. His concepts of these entities centre on the ideas of virtues and propriety, and good relations, whether it is between individuals, leaders, states, or countries. Despite the fact that Confucius lived over two thousand five hundred years ago, his theories and teachings were relevant then and remain relevant to our present day social and international relations. Ultimately, his emphasis on virtue and fraternal values, among other values, are timeless qualities that he felt everyone should possess in order to achieve a better world for all.

Notes

[1] Raymond Dawson, *Confucius* (Oxford: Oxford U. Press, 1981) 70.
[2] Ibid, 70.
[3] Herrlee Glessner Creel, *Confucius: The Man and the Myth* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1951) 45.
[4] Raymond Dawson, *Confucius* (Oxford: Oxford U. Press, 1981) 10.
[5] Bennett B. Sims, *Confucius* (London: Franklin Watts, 1968) 83.
[6] D. Howard Smith, *Confucius* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973) 74.
[7] Bennett B. Sims, *Confucius* (London: Franklin Watts, 1968) 84.
[8] Raymond Dawson, *Confucius* (Oxford: Oxford U. Press, 1981) 41.
[9] Ibid, 42.
[10] Ibid, 34.
[11] Herrlee Glessner Creel, *Confucius: The Man and the Myth* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1951) 152.
[12] Ibid, 123.
[13] Ibid, 125.
[14] Bennett B. Sims, *Confucius* (London: Franklin Watts, 1968) 58.
[15] Ibid, 60.
[16] Herrlee Glessner Creel, *Confucius: The Man and the Myth* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1951) 142.
[17] D. Howard Smith, *Confucius* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973) 57.
[18] Raymond Dawson, *Confucius* (Oxford: Oxford U. Press, 1981) 83.

[19] Herrlee Glessner Creel, *Confucius: The Man and the Myth* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1951) 147.
[20] D. Howard Smith, *Confucius* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973) 73.
[21] Ibid, 74.
[22] Ibid, 76.
[23] Raymond Dawson, *Confucius* (Oxford: Oxford U. Press, 1981) 103.
[24] Ibid, 130.
[25] Raymond Dawson, *Confucius* (Oxford: Oxford U. Press, 1981) 103.
[26] Ibid, 46.
[27] Ibid, 45.
[28] Ibid, 45
[29] Ibid, 50.
[30] Ibid, 13.
[31] Ibid, 54.
[32] Ibid, 60.
[33] Ibid, 56.
[34] Ibid, 84.
[35] D. Howard Smith, *Confucius* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973) 94.
[36] Bennett B. Sims, *Confucius* (London: Franklin Watts, 1968) 68.
[37] Ibid, 64.
[38] Herrlee Glessner Creel, *Confucius: The Man and the Myth* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1951) 151.
[39] Ibid, 156.
[40] Ibid, 98.
[41] Ibid, 5.
[42] Ibid, 6.
[43] Ibid, 6.

Works Cited

Creel, Herrlee Glessner. *Confucius: The Man and the Myth*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1951.

Dawson, Raymond. *Confucius*. Oxford: Oxford U. Press, 1981.

Dow, Tsung I. "Universality in Chinese Culture". *Dialogue and Humanism: The Universalist Journal* 4 (1994).

Hansen, Chad D. "Classical Chinese Ethics". *A Companion to Ethics*. Ed. Peter Singer. Cambridge: Blackwell, 1991.

Murthy, Viren. "The Democratic Potential of Confucian 'Minben' Thought." *Asian Philosophy* 10 (Mar 2000).

Peerenboom, Randall P. "Confucian Justice: Achieving A Humane Society." *International Philosophical Quarterly* 30 (March 1990).

Sims, Bennett B. *Confucius*. London: Franklin Watts, 1968.

Smith, D. Howard. *Confucius*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973.

Hobbes' Theory of International Society

Dominika Klej

Considered to be one of England's most prominent philosophers of all time, Hobbes is recognized as one of the fathers of modern philosophy and political theory.[1] He was, "both the founder of this school and a principal contributor to the realist tradition."[2] In this realist tradition, he contributed to thought on security, human behavior, and the separation of ethics and politics. He was also very influential in idealist philosophy and law.[3] Literary critic Nolan J. Cathal once stated, "As contradictory as they are original, Hobbes' ideas are debated to this day."[4] Hobbes distinguished himself, gained immense recognition and inspired awe for centuries that followed. This was due in part to the meticulousness, originality, and inquisitiveness that characterized his works, but more so to the revolutionary ideas he advocated concerning the social contract, the *Leviathan*, government as well as the security dilemma. He continues to be regarded as the greatest classical figure of the contractarian tradition.[5]

Hobbes was born on April 5, 1588 in Malesbury, England. He claimed that his mother gave birth to him when she heard that the Spanish Armada was set to destroy the nation. He insisted that she gave birth to twins: Himself and fear.[6] The sense of fear and hostility that surrounded Hobbes was reinforced when the sacred bond of family was broken. This occurred when his father abandoned his family, forcing Hobbes into the care of an uncle. He continued to live in fear even after completing his education and publishing several of his works. In fear of persecution for his radical views Hobbes fled from his home, spending a major part of his life outside of England.[7] It was this continuous, ever-present fear that was Hobbes' driving force, as it was the founding principle on which he built his theories. Although the influence of other thinkers and philosophers is great, it was fear that contributed most to the formation of his theories. It was fear that gave him the uniquely Hobbesian perspective. The political and social situation of instability and civil warfare in Hobbes' England instilled in him this continuing preoccupation with fear.

There were several other influential forces in Hobbes' life that become readily apparent. One of these was Galileo Galilei. He influenced Hobbes to be a mechanist: To view the world as a matter in motion, and man as movement of limbs.[8] There was also a strong Machiavellian influence that may instantly be detected in Hobbesian thought. This is especially true with his insistence on looking at things as they are and not as they should be, and that lack of morality motivated political obedience.[9] Hobbes dismissed Aristotle and his followers, declaring himself the creator of civil philosophy, which is presently known as political science.[10] It was in the *Leviathan* that Hobbes wrote that man's life in nature was "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, short."[11] This observation was the precursor and catalyst for all of Hobbes' political theories and ideas. It was on this very concept of fear that he constructed the theories of man and state that hold numerous implications for international society. Thus, through meticulous research of the nature of man and of the nature of the state, the main aspects of the philosophy of international society, as postulated by Thomas Hobbes, may be deduced.

Before being able to make a credible and accurate assessment of Hobbes' fundamental ideas on international society, it is essential to examine the smallest entity that it is comprised of, namely man. In his theories of the nature of man, Hobbes asserted his firm belief that once all of society's restraints are removed, the true nature of man emerges: One of cruelty, brutish egotism and unconstrained passion that is directed by insecurity and fear:

> no alts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.[12]

Hobbes insisted that regardless of how generous or charitable our actions appear to be, they are ultimately directed by egotism, self-fulfillment, and self-concern. He also asserted that the cause of the fear of men lies partly in their natural equality and partly in their temptation to hurt each other.[13] Thus, Hobbes considered all men to be equal, both mentally and physically. [14] Due to this equality, men are susceptible to conflict for three natural causes. These are competition for wealth and limited supplies, distrust, and man's search for glory.[15] The first assumption is illustrated in Hobbes' insistence that "...all men are equal to each other by nature. Our actual inequality has been introduced by civil law."[16] The second assumption that "everyone is looking for profit, not friendship"[17] is manifested in Hobbes' belief that "...every voluntary encounter is a product either of mutual need or of the pursuit of glory."[18] Furthermore, he stated that there are no moral principles in the state of nature.[19] The common conception of morality, as understood today, involves an individualistic duty of each man to adhere to what is right and noble, regardless of what others are doing or of what is most profitable. To Hobbes, this was unrealistic and unattainable. Morality was something achieved through the collective effort of all, for the benefit of all. In this definition, he captured the essence of what morality signified:

> Morality is a system of rules that promote each person's overriding interests, and hence to which each person has reason to adhere, only when everyone complies with them.[20]

Although often misunderstood and taken out of context, Hobbes did not deny that objective ethical principles do exist. He recognized that they were simply suspended when overshadowed by the greater concern for survival.[21] Striving to become a good person, which includes the relevance of being honest and forgiving in one's life, should not be an objective that stands in the way of a person's safety:

> In essence, according to these laws, people have a "duty" only to preserve themselves. Seeking peace is a corollary of this, as are, consequently, "duties" to be fair and forgiving; but the primacy of self- preservation dictates that individuals are required to take no significant risks to comply with them.[22]

Because of the prevailing condition of chaos and anarchy, each man has the right to protect his life and possessions by any means he deems possible or necessary. This was clearly stated in Hobbes' work, *De Cive*. In it he states: "Each man has the right of self-preservation, he has also the right to use any means and to do any action by which he can preserve himself."[23] To Hobbes, this right of self-preservation is a most sacred right and one, which no man may be denied. Any man who is denied this most human and fundamental right not only can, but must, do anything in his power to regain it. Thus, war initiated by this man is justified, whereas war initiated for any other cause is inexcusable:

> Every man is not only right, but naturally compelled, to make every effort to win what he needs for his own preservation, anyone who tries to thwart him for the sake of luxuries will be to blame for the war which breaks out, because he was the only one who had no need to fight. [24]

Hobbes was adamant in his insistence that this perpetual state of competition and war could not be altered by the introduction of an individualistic and loosely-enforced set of rules, for any set of conventional rules followed by some, but not all men, would restrict man's behavior and limit his ability to defend himself. Clearly, this was not only inadequate but also unsafe for any man, "for that were to expose himself to prey, which no man is bound to do."[25] This unstable setting in which man must carry out his life is further perpetuated by ambitious schemes and cunning approaches: "Each man's hope therefore of security and preservation lies in using his strength and skill to stay ahead of his neighbor,

either openly or by stratagems."[26] It may be thus concluded that in the state of nature, "nothing can be just or unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have there no place.[27]

Aside from his theory of the nature of man, Hobbes has also been greatly recognized for providing the "first organizational and juristic model of a state, equated with coercion and authority."[28] The state was Hobbes' main concern, because it was the method through which, he believed, that the state of war could be tamed and lessened. Man, as an individual is alone, exposed and endangered: "Now, if no man can be safe during the Hobbesian war of every one against every one, it is because no man has the power to cancel out the threat of the other."[29] However, all is not lost; the situation can be remedied. Even though the threat posed by each man cannot be canceled out by anyone else, the institution of a state can overcome this menace. It is through the social contract that Hobbes proposed the elimination of fear and danger. It is through the social contract that each individual surrenders natural liberty to the state in order to gain physical safety and a new civil liberty in return.[30] This social contract is established through consent, and not imposition. It is only in a collectivity that a social contract may be applied. However tempting and inviting it may be to view the social contract as the ultimate solution to the problem of fear, it must be recognized that there are several faults inherent within the social contract. Primarily, man cannot give up his right to self-preservation or self-defense because that is the very reason he entered into the contract.[31] Secondly, because people are selfish, each person will see it as advantageous to violate the contract.[32] Where there is no government, there is no reason to comply. It is illogical to adhere to a set of morals when there is no assurance that others will do the same. However, these faults are not irreparable. In order to reconcile them, Hobbes suggested the institution of a political sovereign to enforce and uphold the social contract.[33]

Thus, the social contract is the method by which individuals voluntarily come together in political decision. This contract is only effective if it is upheld by an appointed political sovereign: The *Leviathan*. The *Leviathan* is an absolute, but not totalitarian, authority that ensures security of the individual and of property without intervening in economic activity and personal autonomy.[34] Like Machiavelli, Hobbes insisted that both fear and love for the ruler allow him to sustain his subject's loyalty and obedience.[35] The sovereign's primary duty is to protect himself and his subjects at all cost: "The sovereign may, without injustice, inflict any harm whatsoever on 'innocent' foreign persons in the pursuit of state interests, also in peacetime."[36] The *Leviathan* is almost like a 'mortal god' who defines justice; thus, his actions cannot be either just or unjust.[37] For this reason, there is no right of rebellion against the *Leviathan*.[38]

States are formed to escape the state of insecurity and war, and to enforce order domestically.[39] These states, however, remain in the state of nature among themselves. This state of nature is of course, the state of war.[40] This state of hostility and danger makes it justified for states to defend their interests by any means they deem necessary. Hobbes wrote that states indulge in their defense, "and, in fact, do so justly."[41] This state of war, however, has one main advantage: it eliminates the possibility of a dictatorship or empire rising in the state of nature. This is simply because no actor is strong enough to dominate the others.[42] According to Hobbes, the state is sovereign: "sovereignty meant absolute power above the law, and states therefore were actually outside the law."[43]

Just as man is faced with uncertainty and danger, a state is faced with continuous insecurity. It is the duty of the *Leviathan* to maintain a high level of security and safety for all within the state. In governing, the *Leviathan* must realize the necessity to follow national interest. It must also be recognized that other states will do the same, for they may even use force when necessary, in a manner that is unrestricted by consideration for other states.[44] Thus, "the powers that wrestle with one another act in a zone that is continuously in danger."[45] Since there is a continuous danger that other states may use force, it is the *Leviathan's* duty to maintain adequate armaments.[46] Because the issue of security is not only

important but also imperative for the existence and functioning of a state, the priority of the *Leviathan* must be to do whatever can be done to undermine the power of other states.[47]

In examining the nature of man, it becomes very clear that it is virtually impossible to obtain a thorough and accurate understanding without prior comprehension of the nature of the state. Even though it is important to examine man in isolation, examining man, as part of a collectivity is far more effective: "Men in the state of nature are a multitude, a collection of particular individuals."[48] The two concepts are intricately inter-linked. The same holds true for a complete understanding of international society. Theories concerning Hobbes' fundamental views on international society cannot be examined in isolation. It is important to keep this is mind when examining Hobbes' philosophy of international relations.

As previously proven, Hobbes' preoccupation with insecurity caused him to postulate that both man and state are submerged in an ever-present, inescapable state of war. It is no surprise that Hobbes carried this insistence further into the international setting. Primarily, it is necessary to clarify what he meant by characterizing international society as being in a "state of war". This state of war in international politics that Hobbes wrote of does not imply an incessant battle, but rather, as stated in the *Leviathan*, "the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary." [49] Perhaps it is in this widely cited quote that Hobbes himself gave a clear depiction of the war that governs international relations:

> But though there have never been any times, wherein particular men were in condition of war against each other; yet in all times, kings, and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators, having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their torts, garrisons and guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms, and continual spies upon their neighbors; which is a posture of war. [50]

What was the explanation that Hobbes offered for the state of war that prevails within international relations? How did he support this claim? Can the state of war be somehow controlled, or lessened in degree, or made more predictable? If so, how did Hobbes propose this be done? How did he view international law, the role of alliances, treaties, and covenants? How did he view security, peace and war? Finally, what are the modern implications of these theories? These are the issues that will be tackled in the following portion of the essay.

It was once noted that the application of Hobbes' conception of the state of nature to international relations yields two main characteristics. These two provide a simplified view, which allows a brief understanding of the international setting. The first application of Hobbes' view of the state of nature to international relations provides an analytical model that helps to prove that wars are a result of the structural properties inherent within relations among states. [51] Because of the absence of a superior power capable of enforcing regulative rules, a conflict arises between international actors, causing a state of war.[52] Secondly, the state of nature provides an explanation for the model of moral justification.[53] Prior to tackling the remainder of Hobbes' theories, it must be realized that the state's compliance with moral rules must appeal to those interests that states hold in common.[54] In a state of war, each international actor has a reason not to comply. This reason is that compliance would cause this actor to be taken advantage of by other actors in the system. Just as the social contract among men makes compliance beneficial only if all men follow a set of cooperative rules, so too will states abide by rules that all other states observe.

Upon comparing Hobbes' theories concerning man with his theories concerning relations among states, it must be noted that there is a logical connection between them. There are certain characteristics that apply to both the individual and the international states of nature. According to author Charles R.

Beitz, there are four main aspects that qualify for both man and the state.[55] The first of these is that in both settings, there are actors of a single kind. Secondly, these actors possess relatively equal power. Thirdly, they, both in the individual and international setting, are independent of each other. Lastly, they hold no reliable expectations of reciprocal compliance in the absence of a common superior. Beitz argued that none of these four similarities holds true in the modern international setting. It is quite clear that there are actors of various kinds including non-state actors, international organizations and mediators, such as the United Nations. Power is not distributed equally among all actors within the international setting. Also, there is a significant degree of interdependence and a fair degree of international reciprocity in the absence of an effective central authoritative figure. [56] Even though Hobbes' theories may have several grave shortcomings when applied directly to the modern world, it would be unreasonable to dismiss them altogether since they provide valuable insight and raise valid questions.

According to Hobbes, what are the fundamental causes for the state of war among nations? This state of war is caused, primarily, by the anarchy that prevails. The anarchy of international relations creates competition.[56] Anarchy, whether it be among individuals or states, leads each actor to fear the worst from others.[57] This fear will cause him to undermine his competitors to ensure his own safety. Thus, relations between states "remain in the natural condition of hostility and war, which justifies states in defending their interests by any means they judge appropriate."[58] If this logic is followed through, it may be observed that all moral duties in international relations are dissolved.[59] This anarchy, or lack of a unitary society among states, may also be viewed differently. States are not subject to the same opportunities for destruction as are individuals and strong states do not fear the weak. For this reason, states have always preferred to ensure their safety by treaties and alliances rather than by a resignation of their sovereignty.[60] Author Howard Warrender provides a clearer explanation of what Hobbes considered to be the cause for the war among nations:

> The chief source of instability and distrust in international relations, as in Hobbes' state of nature, is not that men will act to meet patent danger, but that they will also act to meet hypothetical danger. States do not merely fight when they are actually attacked; but follow what are sometimes called in diplomatic language, abstract principles of precaution. It is with such action designed to meet potential danger, that Hobbes's theory is centrally concerned, and it is these actions which are only conditionally excused in his ethical theory.[61]

Thus, it may be stated: "The international state of nature is a state of war, in which no state has an overriding interest in following moral rules that restrain the pursuit of more immediate interests."[62]

As it may be observed, the rationality of acting on moral rules is one that provides an adequate assurance of the compliance of others. Only a government with power to regard compliance and to punish noncompliance can provide this assurance. Thus, it seems only logical that Hobbes would advocate a world government. This supranational authority, would resolve the state of war. Although it seems like a logical explanation, Hobbes did not advocate or recognize the need for an international *Leviathan*, which is most intriguing. Why did Hobbes not step forward to propose the creation of a *Leviathan* among *Leviathans*? Why did he deny the existence of a universal ruler in relations between states?

Hobbes was adamant in his insistence that "world politics is incapable of erecting an equivalent *Leviathan*," [63] to counteract the 'war of all against all.' Hobbes

> ...was a minimalist about permanent solutions to the problems of anarchy and war. States fought wars and conducted their affairs with a certain prudence and the life of states was not as fearful as the lives of individuals in the state of nature. [64]

Hobbes did not believe that there was the same urgency to establish a social contract among states since their insecurity could never be as great as that of individuals. The absence of government in the

international context does not lead to the same chaotic outcome as it most evidently would for individuals: "Anarchy in its international context is, therefore, not as intolerable as in its domestic context."[65] Thus, it may be concluded that Hobbes had little, if only a glimmer, of hope in the ability of states to cooperate and respect each other. This minimal level of respect and consideration would not be enough for the total elimination of the state of war. The observation of common rules of conduct is, at times, reasonable although states lack what Hobbes viewed as an essential feature of the law: Enforcement. Nonetheless, it is an important element governing international relations:

> Far from being a bleak, unrelenting battle for daily survival, interstate relations are capable of sustaining communal, cooperative endeavors based on reason and mutual respect for law.[66]

On the one hand, the state cushions and protects the individual from the worst consequences by taming and lessening the war within the individual's state of nature. The reason being that the state is strong enough to survive in the international setting, whereas individuals within the domestic setting are not capable of surviving without the social contract.[67] The urgency to institute a social contract between states is eliminated. A central government is no longer a necessity. This was stated most eloquently by author Terry Nardin, "Ironically, states remain in a state of war of all against all at the international level because the state has successfully eliminated that war at the domestic level."[68]

Although Hobbes provided no guidelines for international behaviour, his theories are extensively adopted in international law. While he did not emphasize the importance and efficacy of a set of international rules of conduct, Hobbes did believe that international relations are capable of sustaining a certain level of cooperation. He observed that "International law is substantially weaker than intranational moral bonds precisely because of the absence of supranational political authorities."[69] Since there is no authority to enforce international law, any possibility of its success lies within the decisions of the state: "All order and legal guarantees of the system of international law reside in the concept of the state."[70] Since security exists only in the state, everything outside the state is a "state of nature". Thus, the major challenge of international law is that states face each other in a 'state of nature'. Due to this, there is nothing that can absorb all rationality and legality.[71] Author Martin Hollis clearly illustrated this situation:

> States are judges in their own causes, with their location within a situation of anarchy imposing a security dilemma on them. This means no prospect of completely enforceable international law, or of universal moral code to guide the actions of leaders. [72]

Although creating the conditions necessary for widespread compliance would be difficult, it would not be impossible. In order for officials of states to conform their official actions in international affairs to moral principles, there would have to be a reliable expectation of reciprocal compliance.[73] Only under this condition, does international law not impinge upon the national interests and security of each individual state. Hobbes himself asserted that above all else, states will hold their own benefit in the highest regard:

> In states and commonwealths not dependent on one another, every commonwealth, not every man, has an absolute liberty to do, what it shall judge, that is to say, what that man or assembly that representeth it, shall judge most conducive to their benefit.[74]

What did Thomas Hobbes postulate about the key issue of the balance of power in international relations? Quite clearly, Hobbes resisted the creation of a *Leviathan* among *Leviathans* precisely because he feared this would endanger and distort the balance of power. He viewed the balance of power as, "a pursuit of national interest rather than as a cooperative and mutually beneficial institution of international society."[75] Because each state has taken the law into its own hands, there exists a balance of forces.[76] A balance of power is essential in international relations. Power is the governing force between states: "a thirst for power after power which only ceases in death."[77] Hobbes insisted that the security and

prosperity of a state depends on the security of some or of all other states. A state will be lost if it cannot correctly distinguish between a friend and an enemy. In this balance of power, each must maintain a high level of autonomy, and cannot search for security with another state, for he will become the subject of that state.[78]

War and peace, having always been a fundamental concern between nations, also intrigued Hobbes: "Hobbes was preoccupied with establishing political and legal conditions of peace, even at the risk of war among sovereign states, which he saw as a necessary outcome of the institution of Leviathans, but overall the lesser evil."[79] War is the result of a breaking of the balance of power.[80] It may often be justified if it is used to distribute rights to international actors. Also, war and violence may often be a very rational strategy for survival, which is morally permissible. This is because each individual state has a right to do whatever is necessary for its security. Thus, in this state of nature, nothing can be just or unjust.[81] International law must take this condition into account and must be modified: "What is therefore essential to international law, which governs relations between states is that law that does not distinguish between just and unjust, a nondiscriminatory concept of war."[82] Therefore, it may be concluded that because there is no state above the state, there can be no legal war and no legal peace. This creates "an extralegal state of nature in which tensions among *Leviathans* are governed by insecure covenants."[83]

Hobbes' ideas concerning covenants and treaties, coalitions, alliances and secondary associations demonstrated his thoughts on diplomacy. He allowed for the possibility of coalitions and alliances. However, he argued that they would not be stable. He insisted that these would increase the chances of violence, and that the shared interest, which would lead to their formation, would not be long lasting. He also stated that forming alliances increases the chances of war instead of stabilizing a balance of power and making credible the threat to attack.[84] Treaties, alliances and coalitions and all universal organizations short of a world government are unlikely to be long lasting.[85] Covenants can be made as binding obligations to perform even when performance cannot be shown to be in the interest of the state.[86] Thomas Hobbes provided an analogy to illustrate the inefficiency of covenants:

> Hobbes' discussion of the ransomed soldier, in which he claims that such a soldier, having been released on promise of subsequent payment of a ransom, thereby incurs an obligation to make good on the promise even though there may be no common power to enforce it. [87]

In his work, *On the Citizen*, Hobbes wrote about agreements. They are instrumental to securing peace since, through the agreement, one is agreeing what should or should not be done. Agreements would be useless if one did not stand by them.[88] In *The Leviathan*, Hobbes discussed the relevance of covenants:

> Covenants, without the sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all... If there be no Power erected, or not great enough for our security, every man will, and may lawfully, rely on his own strength and art, for caution against all other men. [89]

Hobbes has been most criticized for his denial of the existence of other actors within international relations. He denied that there are non-state actors that mediate interpersonal conflict, insulate individuals from the competition of others and share risks or encourage the formation of friendly attitudes.[90] Given that it cannot be denied that such coalitions, alliances and secondary associations have existed at various times throughout history, one may need to reject this aspect of Hobbesian thought. Coalitions have persisted throughout history for sufficiently long periods of time to render the Hobbesian claim misleading.[91] Hobbes' insistence that states are the only actors in international relations also "denies the possibility that transnational associations of persons might have common interests that would motivate them to exert pressure for cooperation on their respective national governments."[92] In the modern sense, it must be observed that this is not the case. Since the Second World War, the number, variety and relevance of transnational groups have increased significantly. Economists, labor union leaders and social

activists often bond together to form influential, non-state actors. There are many other downfalls, contradictions and shortcomings that may be encountered upon a careful examination of Hobbes' political philosophy. The ones aforementioned are but a few but to discredit or discard other Hobbesian predictions and postulates due to a few imperfections would not only be unreasonable but also ridiculous. They are far too valuable and insightful to be eliminated altogether.

In conclusion, Thomas Hobbes' theories concerning man and the state hold many implications for international society. Although he never formally composed anything on the subject, many of Hobbes' theories on the nature of man and the nature of the state can be viewed in light of international relations. Thus, through a careful analysis of Hobbes' fundamental theories, the nature of international society may be deduced. Although imperfect in many ways, these theories certainly offer insight for the modern world. For example, where, in the modern world, does one find Hobbes' type of sovereignty in a democracy? One theorist proposed: "The people personally embody sovereignty but they do not actually rule or always possess the greatest power, even in a democratic state."[93] Hobbes' influence continues to be felt throughout the centuries: "Thomas Hobbes' view of the need for an absolute sovereign-this train of thought could become distorted to serve extreme nationalism, totalitarian government, and the glorification of war, an apparently natural development of the XX century."[94] Sadly, Hobbes' theories are often taken out of context, ridiculed and misinterpreted by many. However, the lifetime achievement of this great political philosopher has not gone unnoticed. It continues to exert an incredible influence on our world, even today.

Notes

[1] Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel, eds, *Traditions of International Ethics* (Cambridge: the Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1992) 75.
[2] Ibid, 75.
[3] Carl Schmitt, *The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes - Meaning and Failure of a Political Symbol* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1996) x.
[4] Cathal J. Nolan, *The Greenwood Encyclopedia of International Relations, Volume 2* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2002) 721.
[5] Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel, eds, *Traditions of International Ethics* (Cambridge: the Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1992) 187.
[6] Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorn, *Thomas Hobbes, On the Citizen* (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1998) xv.
[7] Ibid, xv-xviii.
[8] Cathal J. Nolan, *The Greenwood Encyclopedia of International Relations, Volume 2* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2002) 720.
[9] Daniel Warner, *An Ethic of Responsibility in International Relations* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1991) 68.
[10] Cathal J. Nolan, *The Greenwood Encyclopedia of International Relations, Volume 2* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2002) 721.
[11] Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations* (London: Penguin Books, Ltd, 1998) 721.
[12] Cathal J. Nolan, *The Greenwood Encyclopedia of International Relations, Volume 2* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2002) 270.
[13] Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorn, *Thomas Hobbes, On the Citizen* (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1998) 25.
[14] Ibid, 25.
[15] Ibid, 25.
[16] Ibid, 26.
[17] Ibid, 22.
[18] Ibid, 23.
[19] Charles R. Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1979) 29.
[20] Ibid, 29.
[21] Fred Greene, *Dynamics of International Relations - Power, Security and Order* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964) 188.
[22] Ibid, 48
[23] Ibid, 48.
[24] Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorn, *Thomas Hobbes, On the Citizen* (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1998) 27.
[25] Charles R. Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1979) 30.
[26] Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorn, *Thomas Hobbes, On the Citizen* (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1998) 69.
[27] Charles R. Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1979) 30.
[28] Daniel Warner, *An Ethic of Responsibility in International Relations* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1991) 68.
[29] Piotr Hoffman, *Freedom, Equality, Power - The Ontological Consequences of the Political Philosophies of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau,* (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1999) 19.
[30] Cathal J. Nolan, *The Greenwood Encyclopedia of International Relations, Volume 2* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2002) 721.
[31] Ibid, 721.

[32] Ibid, 721.
[33] Ibid, 721.
[34] Fred Greene, *Dynamics of International Relations - Power, Security and Order* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964) 188.
[35] Piotr Hoffman, *Freedom, Equality, Power. The Ontological Consequences of the Political Philosophies of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau*, (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1999) 27.
[36] Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel, eds, *Traditions of International Ethics* (Cambridge: the Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1992) 77.
[37] Ibid. 187.
[38] Ibid, 187.
[39] Fred Greene, *Dynamics of International Relations - Power, Security and Order* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964) 258.
[40] Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel, eds, *Traditions of International Ethics* (Cambridge: the Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1992) 75.
[41] Ibid, 76.
[42] William Molesworth, ed, *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes Volume 4* (London: John Bohn, 1845) 46.
[43] Ibid, 46.
[44] Charles R. Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1979) 27.
[45] Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorn, *Thomas Hobbes, On the Citizen* (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1998) 49.
[46] Fred Greene, *Dynamics of International Relations - Power, Security and Order* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964) 77.
[47] Ibid, 77.
[48] M. M. Goldsmith, *Hobbes's Science of Politics* (New York: Columbia U. Press, 1966) 138.
[49] Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel, eds, *Traditions of International Ethics* (Cambridge: the Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1992) 75.
[50] William Molesworth, ed, *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes Volume 4* (London: John Bohn, 1845) 31.
[51] Charles R. Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1979) 35.
[52] Ibid, 35.
[53] Ibid, 35.
[54] Ibid, 35.
[55] Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel, eds, *Traditions of International Ethics* (Cambridge: the Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1992) 191.
[56] Ibid, 75.
[57] Ibid, 76.
[58] Ibid, 76.
[59] Ibid, 75.
[60] Howard Warrender, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes- His Theory of Obligation,* (London: Oxford U. Press, 1966) 119.
[61] Ibid, 119.
[62] Charles R. Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1979) 14.
[63] Cathal J. Nolan, *The Greenwood Encyclopedia of International Relations, Volume 2* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2002) 72.
[64] Ibid, 72.
[65] Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations* (London: Penguin Books, Ltd, 1998) 4.
[66] Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel, eds, *Traditions of International Ethics* (Cambridge: the Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1992) 188.
[67] Ibid, 188.
[68] Ibid, 188.
[69] Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorn, *Thomas Hobbes, On the Citizen* (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1998) 48.
[70] Carl Schmitt, *The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes - Meaning and Failure of a Political Symbol* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1996) 47.
[71] Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorn, *Thomas Hobbes, On the Citizen* (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1998) 48.
[72] Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) 102.
[73] William Molesworth, ed, *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes Volume 4* (London: John Bohn, 1845) 32.
[74] Ibid, 32.
[75] Cathal J. Nolan, *The Greenwood Encyclopedia of International Relations, Volume 2* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2002) 721.
[76] Charles R. Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1979) 27.
[77] Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) 50.
[78] Charles R. Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1979) 41.
[79] Ibid, 41.
[80] Ibid, 10.
[81] Ibid, 187.
[82] Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorn, *Thomas Hobbes, On the Citizen* (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1998) 48.
[83] Ibid, 49.
[84] Charles R. Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1979) 30.
[85] Ibid, 38.
[86] Ibid, 30.
[87] Ibid, 30.
[88] Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorn, *Thomas Hobbes, On the Citizen* (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1998) 44.
[89] Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) 509.
[90] Charles R. Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1979) 37.
[91] Ibid, 37.
[92] Ibid, 37.
[93] Fred Greene, *Dynamics of International Relations - Power, Security and Order* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964) 258.
[94] Ibid, 366.

Works Cited

Airaksinen, Timo and Martin A. Bertman. Eds. Hobbes. *War Among Nations*. Aldershot: Anthenauem Press, Ltd., 1989.

Beitz, Charles R. *Political Theory and International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1979.

Clark, Ian and Iver B. Neumann. Eds. *Classical Theories of International Relations*. New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1999.

Deutsch, Karl W. *The Analysis of International Relations*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall Inc., 1978.

Evans, Graham and Jeffrey Newnham. *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*. London: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1998.

Greene, Fred. *Dynamics of International Relations - Power, Security and Order*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964.

Goldsmith, M. M. *Hobbes's Science of Politics*. New York: Columbia U. Press, 1966.

Hampton, Jean. *Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1986.

Hoffman, Piotr. *Freedom, Equality, Power. The Ontological Consequences of the Political Philosophies of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau*. New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1999.

Hollis, Martin, and Steve Smith. *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.

Hood, F.C. *The Divine Politics of Thomas Hobbes- An Interpretation of Leviathan*. London: Oxford U. Press, 1964.

Leyden, Von.W. *Hobbes and Locke - The Politics of Freedom and Obligation*. London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1982.

Malnes, Raino. *The Hobbesian Theory of International Conflict*. Oslo: Scandinavian U. Press, 1993.

Molesworth, William. Ed. *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, Volume 4*. London: John Bohn, 1845.

Nardin, Terry and David R. Mapel. *Traditions of International Ethics*. Cambridge: The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1992.

Nolan J, Cathal. *The Greenwood Encyclopedia of International Relations, Volume 2*. Westport: Greenwood Press, 2002.

Schmitt, Carl. *The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes - Meaning and Failure of a Political Symbol*. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1996.

Tuck, Richard and Michael Silverthorn. *Thomas Hobbes On the Citizen*. Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1998.

Warner, Daniel. *An Ethic of Responsibility in International Relations*. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1991.

Warrender, Howard. *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes - His Theory of Obligation*. London: Oxford U. Press, 1966.

Adam Smith's Perspective of International Relations

Alicia Filipowich

By the time of the publication of Adam Smith's greatest book, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*,[1] Britain had triumphed over France and Holland to hold control over international trade from North America to India.[2] In Europe, there was a commercialization of agriculture and a striking growth of manufacturing and commerce, in and between the most economically developed nations.[3] Just before the great textile boom of the late 1700s,[4] this period was the brink of the globalization of trade.[5] Glasgow was already a place of new worlds being discovered;[6] consequently Scottish Enlightenment philosopher Adam Smith (1723-1790)[7] had ample material to feed his ideas[8] and a transcontinental audience with whom to debate them.[9] Smith believed in progress at the international level, sought to influence the conduct of men who had "power and place" and wrote for the "Great World."[10] His conception of international relations focused on gains from international trade, the openness and dynamics of international conflict[11] and the irrationality of war.[12] He also made important statements about the role of man and state in the sphere of international relations.

This paper will look firstly at the importance of the *Wealth of Nations*, the main source of Smith's ideas, before discussing the concept of natural order, a basis of Smith's philosophy. The focus will then turn to the nature of man in relation to the international domain, and the recognition of defence as the most important responsibility of the state. Lastly, before concluding with the contemporary relevance of the philosopher's work, two key international realms, trade and war, will be discussed.

Smith examined international relations in all his works, but the bulk of his international views are contained in the *Wealth of Nations*.[13] It is considered to be one of the most comprehensive analyses of Smith's time.[14] The book's central concern is the natural growth of wealth. A phenomenon Smith attributed to the natural creativity and ingenuity of man.[15] Special properties found only in human animals cause rapid technological progress.[16] This push towards invention is because humans are so poorly supplied in their natural state and nearly all inventions are to improve the material world.[17]

A basis of Smith's philosophy is the concept of an underlying natural order, built upon the unintended consequences of self-interested behaviour, and discoverable through the application of scientific methods to human affairs.[18] Belief in this natural order allows that, in pursuing one's own advantage, each individual is "lead by an invisible hand to promote an end which was not part of his intention."[19] Natural order will arise spontaneously and interference will only do harm. Left undisturbed, such an order will bring a harmony of interests and "the best way to speed development (internationally) is to remove all obstacles to trade at home and abroad."[20] The flaws and contradictions of this natural order derive from man's nature.[21]

Smith's description of the nature of man is two-fold. Man is an imperfect creature,[22] weak,[23] slothful, prone to self-indulgence[24] with a natural preference for his own happiness over others,[25] and given to indolence and dissipation, especially once wealth has been acquired,[26] But he is social,[27] endowed by nature with imagination, the desire for empathy[28] and sympathy for others, even in matters of his own self-interest. Imagination allows him to put himself in the place of others, sympathy allows him to share their emotions and control his own behaviour in accordance with shared social standards.[29] Man places an importance on cooperation, shared feelings and actions.[30] He sees his real self in the attitude others display towards him[31], and has an innate tendency to seek to better himself through competition.[32]

This competitive nature is regulated by natural law that applies equally to civil society and to the society of nations.[33]

Man is set above animals primarily because human passions are uniquely channelled by an instinctive willingness[34] "to give this for that."[35] The passions that guide man cannot be overcome by mere economic interest; for, as Smith attested, man is motivated by a more complex and powerful set of passions.[36] Nevertheless, Smith envisioned people acting irrationally, from the point of view of economic interest.[37] Such irrational behaviour, the philosopher felt, was even more apparent in the actions of nations, often dominated by the passions of national sentiment.[38]

Smith believed the function of man's intellect to be one of counteracting national prejudice and fostering the idea that national welfare comes at the expense of other nations, a premise that, according to the philosopher, will lead inevitably to international conflict.[39] Smith recognized how "love of nation" places geographical limits on sympathy for and love of humankind.[40] People envy and fear wealth and power of neighbouring nations[41] and the more patriotism one feels for their state, the more disdain one has for other states.[42] Because of the depth of national passions, international politics is even more prone, than domestic politics, to the domination of partial interests, making it much more difficult, in international affairs, for the state to obtain the position of an impartial spectator.[43]

According to Smith's system of natural liberty, the state has three general functions: justice, public works and defence[44]. Within the scope of international relations, for Smith, defence is its most important duty and ultimately more important than opulence.[45] The basis of order in any state is the "desire to defend ourselves and our things against the possible 'encroachment' of our neighbours."[46] Smith maintained that all forms of government: democracies, feudal societies, republics and monarchies, can be understood as variations of one theme - the need to prevent violence and disorder in societies, where property is of primary value and inequality of wealth threaten to disrupt the "public quiet."[47]

Smith had a fundamentally realist view of international relations in this matter.[48] He believed there to be irreconcilable conflicts of interest between states that produce a security dilemma for individual nations.[49] Realists believe the only secure way to preserve civilization and liberty is to be well defended.[50] Although a strong opponent of mercantilism, he did not dispute its view that national defence is a primary condition of national wealth, thus requiring an adequate system to protect a nation.[51] For example, in the nineteenth century, the renown of Britain as a trading nation made her navy and merchant marine crucial to national security.[52] Smith also viewed defence as an important factor in keeping the state prosperous:

> ...among neighbouring nations, in a barbarous state there are perpetual wars . . .and tho' private property be secured from the violence of neighbours, it is in danger from hostile invasion – this makes it also next to impossible to accumulate stock. So if they feel they are going to be robbed, there is no reason to be industrious. . .[53]

The Scottish philosopher explained that defence is best achieved with a standing army versus a militia:[54] "as it is only by means of a well-regulated standing army that a civilized country can be defended."[55] An army of professional soldiers can apply specialization to military arts and encourage the qualities of "regularity, order and prompt obedience to command" demanded by modern warfare,[56] further specifying,

> ...where the sovereign himself is the general and the principal nobility . . . the chief officers of the army; where the military force is placed under the command of those who have the greatest interest in the support of civil authority, because they have themselves the greatest share of that authority, a standing army can never be dangerous to liberty.[57]

Nonetheless, protecting society from violence and invasion of other independent nations in the commercial age was, and still remains, a difficult task. The complexity of modern war and the high costs born with firearms[58] is enhanced still further by the expense of exercising and disciplining soldiers in times of peace and employing them in times of war.[59] Thus, it is the "wisdom of the state" that must arrange for the payment and provision of defence.[60] But since defence is a benefit for all, it ought to be "defrayed by the general benefit of the whole society, all different members contributing".[61] Smith explained that it is only the state that can, in its wisdom, induce men to devote themselves fully to military matters, a mentality lacking in societies of the past.[62] In fact, by Smith's time, defensive power had shifted in favour of the wealthier commercial nations from the barbarian nations, who in modern times had found it difficult to defend themselves against the opulent and civilized.[63] The extension of civilization became favourable to permanency,[64] and only enhanced the importance of wealth for purposes of national security.[65]

Smith saw the need for national security to grow along with the success of the division of labour and economic development.[66] According to the philosopher, as a society grows richer, it becomes a more attractive target to its poorer neighbours.[67] But these issues that exacerbate the problem of national defence also provide its potential solution,[68] because the division of labour, on which opulence depends, and man's focus on luxury, leaves many men unfit for military service.[69] Indeed, private citizens are too busy to be violent and it is not in their interest to devote themselves fully to the defence of their country.[70] Therefore, men find it more convenient to follow the ideals of the division of labour and buy off the threat of violence by hiring others to police their borders,[71] specifically sets of men with nothing else to do.[72] Ideally, the state should be like a referee, able to punish or even expel, but remain uninvolved in everyday contests and exchanges.[73] However, Smith acknowledged that lust for domination and power, within the state, is predominant.[74] Thus, although the state should be a strong force, it should also remain restrained.[75]

Smith had even less regard for non-governmental organizations. These 18th century organizations, apprenticeship guilds and corporations, were coercive[76] and even more sinister than the government itself, because they were protected by "public law," yet impervious to public scrutiny.[77] Mercantilists, members of such organizations, held that all nations are taught that their interest consists of beggaring their neighbours.[78] Each nation is made to look with an unenviable eye upon the prosperity of all the nations with which it trades, and to consider their gains as its own loss.[79] Nonetheless, Smith sustained that, "the wealth of neighbours ought to be a matter for national emulation, not of national prejudice or envy."[80] In this objection, he demonstrated a harmony of interests doctrine in international relations. Smith believed that with such improvements all nations ought, not only to endeavour itself to excel, but for the love of mankind, to promote, instead of obstructing, the excellence of their neighbours.[81]

According to the Scottish philosopher, the state's global duty is the concentration of economic power,[82] and the natural aristocracy of every nation is motivated primarily by considerations of their own self-importance, power and prestige.[83] As Smith's natural system of perfect liberty and justice illustrates, national boundaries do not constrain the movement of goods, labour, or capital.[84] Laws against the emigration of skilled workmen are criticized and the mobility of capital is presumed.[85] Conversely, if a nation cannot prosper without the enjoyment of perfect liberty and justice, there is not a nation worldwide that will ever be able to prosper.[86]

Ultimately, Smith considered relations between states as affable and/or hostile. Commerce and international trade are positive factors in an international realm where war is hostile. Both entities are beneficial to states and enable them to afford the defence they will need,[87] since, as previously stated, the wealthier a state becomes, the greater danger it has of being attacked.[88] Smith's international realm was one of unpredictability and danger, where general principles for foreign policy, other than prudence and vigilance, were difficult to formulate.[89] He believed in irreconcilable problems between nations, mainly a

product of political relations.[90] According to Smith, power politics rule international affairs. This is far from the view, common to Liberals, Utopians and Marxists, that economic forces ultimately triumph over politics.[91] Also, he acknowledged the Hobbesian approach: The idea that nations, in international relations, are inspired to cooperate because of fear, especially because of growth of military power in other states.[92]

Smith's political doctrine of international peace is parallel to his economic one, resting upon recognition of common and reciprocal interests, like trade, which extend beyond national frontiers.[93] This peace cannot be ensured by democracy or commerce.[94] Since there is no natural harmony between nations,[95] the tendency towards international conflict is not necessarily improved by the rise of responsible government and commerce.[96] However, international harmony is possible if it is based upon balance of power.[97] He was also sceptical that reforming the institutions of international society would lessen conflict, but fostered the idea that the balance of power and national defence would instil mutual respect between states.[98] He felt that statesmen, by pursuing national interests and balance of power politics, through alliances, could indirectly preserve the independence of states and peace.[99] In fact, free trade contributes to peace only in this case.[100]

Smith specified that a nation that enriches itself by foreign trade is likely to do so when its neighbours are all rich, industrious, commercial nations.[101] Free trade then transforms international commerce from a source of war into the basis for peaceful relations and mutual benefit.[102] The market serves both national and international interests once legislators are guided by the science of political economy, developed by Smith and others, rather than by the partisan advice of mercantilists.[103]

As previously specified, within the mercantile system, international economic relations "constitute a zero sum game where one nation's gain must be another's loss."[104] International trade is conceived as a struggle against rival nations,[105] a struggle that often leads to outright warfare and violence as nations try to secure trade privileges, routes and colonies.[106] Smith wanted to redirect these relations along more cosmopolitan and pacific lines.[107] He also denied the mercantilist claim that beneficial results of trade require frequent interventions by government,[108] instead sustaining that such actions prompt excessive and irrational hostility between states:[109] "commerce ought naturally to be, among nations, as among individuals, a bond of union and friendship . . ."[110] Smith maintained that the contradiction between national economic and political interests is particularly acute for neighbouring countries. For example, 18th century Britain and France could have gained much from removing the mercantile restrictions on their economic intercourse:[111]

> ...but the very same circumstances which would have rendered an open and free commerce between the two countries so advantageous to both, have occasioned the principle obstructions to that commerce. Being neighbours, they are necessarily enemies . . . and what would increase that advantage of national friendship, serves only to inflame the violence of national animosity . . .[112]

In his commercial policy, Smith asked: how do nations gain from international trade and openness?[113] Ultimately, the reply he provided is that countries gain by participating in the widest possible market.[114] As in the domestic economy, the international trade of a country does not require detailed supervision by the sovereign. If, as Smith specified, the sovereign would arrange "the most unbounded freedom of exportation to the dominions of all other princes", peace and external security should follow.[115]

Smith also saw foreign trade as serving as an outlet for surplus goods,[116] for, as an "exchange of surpluses", the extent of a country's foreign trade is limited by the value of the surplus produced by the whole country and of what can be purchased with it.[117] This incorporates the ideas of Absolute Advantage, which states that under free trade, all goods tend to be produced in those countries where their

absolute real costs of production are the lowest.[118] Countries will export goods that can be produced at lower real costs at home than abroad, and import those goods that can be produced at lower real costs abroad.[119] The absolute differences in real cost of production lies in differences in climate, qualities of soil and other natural or acquired advantages.[120] As an example, Smith cited that growing grapes in Scotland can be done, but at a much greater cost than in France.[121] The Scottish philosopher also emphasized the desirability of importing materials, tools and provisions for the employment and maintenance of industrious people, "who reproduce, with a profit, the value of their annual consumption," as opposed to goods which are likely to be consumed by those who produce nothing.[122]

Concerning the mutual benefits of foreign trade, Smith explained,

> ...it carries out that surplus part of the produce of their land and labour for which there is no demand among them and brings back in return for it something else for which there is a demand . . . By opening a more extensive market for whatever part of the produce of their labour may exceed the home consumption . . . to increase the real revenue and wealth of society.[123]

But trade may not always have the same advantage to both partners. Both countries gain equally only if the balance of trade between the two trading countries is equal, and if the exchange consists entirely of native commodities (a direct trade).[124] Nevertheless, if one country exports to the other only native commodities, while the latter exports to the former only foreign commodities (roundabout trade), the former receives the greater benefit from trade.[125] But, since almost all countries exchange with another partly native and partly foreign goods, Smith believed the country "in whose cargoes there is the greatest proportion of native and the least of foreign goods will always be the principal gainer."[126]

He stressed both the greater advantage of trade with neighbouring countries, over trade with the more distant American continent, and of direct over roundabout trade.[127] Smith maintained that a merchant would prefer to deal with domestic rather than foreign suppliers, so as to have the stock of goods compromising his or her mercantile capital move within his or her home country, rather than across national boundaries.[128] Transportation is an important variant because it determines the commodity composition and volume of a country's trade, both foreign and domestic, and is considered a "natural protection" from foreign trade.[129]

Fairly, Smith explained that taxes imposed on domestic industries should also have a parallel import duty on foreign products, to leave competition on the same footing.[130] Indeed, he detested monopolies, thinking they only serve to impoverish their nations. The economic logic of a monopoly is to reduce the quantity of goods made, raise prices nearly in proportion, and, thus, "make a great profit at a less expense of material and labour than can be done when many have the same liberty."[131] Smith also favoured restrictions on foreigners that support industries necessary for national defence, because of his previously described prejudice of defence over opulence.[132] In this way, he supported the Navigation Act of 1660 that required trade between the colonies and Great Britain to be carried out on British ships, and certain classes of commodities to be confined initially to the market of the mother country.[133]

To illustrate how international trade is beneficial, Smith examined the case of 18th century China, and why it was "altogether stationary", when growth was "slow and gradual" in Europe, and "rapidly progressing" in North America.[134] Smith maintained that the Chinese have little respect for foreign trade: "except with Japan, the Chinese carry on, themselves . . . in little or no foreign trade; it is only into one or two ports of their kingdom that they even admit the ships of foreign nations."[135] Smith's view was that without international trade, China had become too bounded and did not benefit from new technology and ideas:[136]

> ...a more extensive foreign trade . . . especially if any considerable part of this trade is carried on Chinese ships, could scarce fail to increase very much the manufacturers of China, and to improve

> very much the productive powers of its manufacturing industry . . . Upon their present plan, they have little opportunity of improving themselves by the example of any other nation.[137]

While the Scottish philosopher thought international trade to be a benefit to all states, he saw war as a foe to all: "a product of ignorance or the folly of statesmen, as it was for others, but more fundamentally a product of the international anarchy."[138] A flaw of international order, international anarchy creates a security dilemma for every state,[139] where "independent and neighbouring nations, having no common superior to decide their disputes (the absence of a world sovereign), all live in continual dread and suspicion of one another."[140] Any imbalance leads to conflicts of war, and, yet, the passions of citizens work to exacerbate this potential for conflict between states: "the mean principle of national prejudice is often found upon the noble one of the love of our country."[141] This accounts for his scepticism that democracy can eliminate war because "international anarchy is the permissive cause of conflict and war, and the passions, the individual's driving force."[142] According to Smith, states cannot even rely on international law, for "in war, not only what are called the laws of nations are frequently violated . . . (they are) laid down with very little regard to the plainest and most obvious rules of justice."[143]

Referring to Smith's *Stages of Man in History*, the gradual evolution of warfare is evident. In the hunting and shepherding societies, man is a warrior and hunter, and the skills needed for civilian pursuits are directly related to the skills for waging war. In the next stage of agricultural societies, the hard physical conditions of civilian life make it easier for men to adapt to soldiering. Wars are fought after seeding and before harvest, when the majority of the able-bodied young men are willing to serve without additional compensation. War is then not a great expense to government. In the most advanced stage, which is commercial society, the likelihood of being attacked, as well as the cost of warfare, increases dramatically.[144] Most men have professions, and time away from that work is a significant loss to family income. Thus, men are more unprepared for war, and there is little time for military exercise:[145] "the great body of the people becomes altogether unwarlike at the time their collective wealth incites invasion by neighbouring states."[146]

Smith thought many of the wars of his day were "unnecessary, ill advised and inimical" to the growth of the wealth of the nation.[147] He believed governments disguise the real cost of war, by borrowing money and adding to the public debt, instead of, as Smith preferred, implementing the likely unpopular policy of raising taxes, in times of war:[148] "the foresight of the heavy and unavoidable burdens of war would hinder the people from wantonly calling for it when there was no real or solid interest to fight for."[149] Smith also considered wars to act as amusement for modern citizens, where individuals far from the battle ground read exploits that hold entertainment value:[150] "this amusement compensates the small difference between the taxes which they pay on account of the war, and those which they have been accustomed to pay in the time of peace."[151]

Smith hoped that warfare would become milder:

> ...a polished nation never undertakes such expeditions, it never makes war but with a design to enlarge or protect its territory; but these people make war either with design to leave their own inhibitions in search of better, or to carry off booty.[152]

Such a change of motive reduces the destructive element in war.[153] This conquest form is also accompanied by a less bloody form of warfare, thanks to modern weapons: "modern armies are less irritated at one another because they fire arms that keep them at a greater distance."[154] But the success of this change in warfare is dependent upon the "enlightenment" and commercialization of neighbouring societies.[155]

In Conclusion, Smith believed that there was a lack of natural harmony between states, and that commerce and a good government cannot necessarily ameliorate conflict. Rather, with commerce exacerbating conflict, it is only the balance of power and a focus on defence that will instil mutual respect.[156] Smith was not close to the liberalism of later liberals and radicals.[157] Instead, he applied the division of labour internationally and recognized its importance in promoting trade and preventing war. He knew the significant connection of wealth and power in international relations. In fact, today, his ideas of "love of nation", which places geographical limits on sympathy for and love of humankind,[158] and where the more patriotism one feels for their state, the more disdain he holds for other nations,[159] can be applied directly to the United States, among others. In addition, Smith's views on the anarchical flaw of international order can be applied to the case of the American spearheaded 2003 conflict against Iraq. Smith explained that a state's security dilemma is the direct product of such a flaw,[160] leading nations to live in suspicion of one another, and potential conflict.[161] As do those individuals who support weapons inspections and a valid reason for war, Smith sustained that all international conflicts, with thorough compromise or arbitration, can be resolved peacefully[162]. He viewed acquisition (oil in the case of the United States versus Iraq), as an undesirable achievement of war,[163] but a positive gain, if done so commercially and peacefully.[164] Although Smith did see war as an acceptable form of defence, he acknowledged that it would never bring success.[165] A view supported today by the substantial number of anti-war campaigners.

Indeed, there is evidence that Smith's ideas have returned to prominence after trial and error, particularly his views on international trade. For much of the 19th century, Smith's belief that free international trade can work for the benefit of all heavily influenced British policy.[166] In addition, his beliefs fostered the recovery of Western Europe and Japan and the rise of many nations from poverty to participation in "universal opulence" which had been Smith's main goal.[167] The world, whether for better or for worse, has returned to the free trade Smith believed would benefit all countries, but, as this text has demonstrated, he should also be revered, for he made important contributions to the arena of international relations theory, which still permeate much of modern scholarly thought.

Notes

[1] Ian Clark, and Iver B. Neumann, eds, *Classical Theories of International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1996) 144.
[2] Jerry Z. Muller, *Adam Smith in his Time and Ours, Designing the Decent Society* (Don Mills: Maxwell McMillan Canada, 1993) 35.
[3] Stephen Copley, & Kathryn Sutherland, eds, *Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995) 146.
[4] Alan Macfarlane, *The Riddle of the Modern World* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000) 76.
[5] Stephen Copley, & Kathryn Sutherland, eds, *Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995) 146.
[6] Jerry Z. Muller, *Adam Smith in his Time and Ours, Designing the Decent Society* (Don Mills: Maxwell McMillan Canada, 1993) 20.
[7] Kenneth W. Thompson, *Fathers of International Thought – The Legacy of Political Theory* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State U. Press, 1994) 84.
[8] Alan Macfarlane, *The Riddle of the Modern World* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000) 75.
[9] Jerry Z. Muller, *Adam Smith in his Time and Ours, Designing the Decent Society* (Don Mills: Maxwell McMillan Canada, 1993) 21.
[10] Richard F. Teichgraeber III, *Free Trade and Moral Philosophy: Rethinking the Sources of Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations* (Durham: Duke U. Press, 1986) 127.
[11] John F. Berdell, "Adam Smith and the Ambiguity of Nations" (*Review of Social Economy* v56 n2 (1998): 175 pars. 11 January 2003 Electronic Lib. Expanded Academic ASAP, Toronto, ON. 11 January 2003 <http://web7.infotrac.galegroup.com/itw/infomark/0/1/1/purl=rc6_EAIM?sw_aep=yorku_main>) 3.
[12] Jerry Z. Muller, *Adam Smith in his Time and Ours, Designing the Decent Society* (Don Mills: Maxwell McMillan Canada, 1993) 145.
[13] Ian Clark and Iver B. Neumann, eds, *Classical Theories of International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1996) 164.
[14] Kenneth W. Thompson, *Fathers of International Thought – The Legacy of Political Theory* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State U. Press, 1994) 86.
[15] Alan Macfarlane, *The Riddle of the Modern World* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000) 91.
[16] Ibid, 93.

[17] Ibid, 91.
[18] Ian Clark and Iver B. Neumann, eds, *Classical Theories of International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1996) 145.
[19] F. Parkinson, *Philosophy of International Relations. A Study in the History of Thought* (Beverly Hills: Sage Productions, 1977) 95.
[20] Ibid, 95.
[21] Ian Clark and Iver B. Neumann, eds, *Classical Theories of International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1996) 146.
[22] Jerry Z. Muller, *Adam Smith in his Time and Ours, Designing the Decent Society* (Don Mills: Maxwell McMillan Canada, 1993) 97.
[23] Ibid, 97.
[24] Ian Clark and Iver B. Neumann, eds, *Classical Theories of International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1996) 164.
[25] Jerry Z. Muller, *Adam Smith in his Time and Ours, Designing the Decent Society* (Don Mills: Maxwell McMillan Canada, 1993) 101.
[26] Ian Clark and Iver B. Neumann, eds, *Classical Theories of International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1996) 146.
[27] Jerry Z. Muller, *Adam Smith in his Time and Ours, Designing the Decent Society* (Don Mills: Maxwell McMillan Canada, 1993) 188.
[28] Kenneth W. Thompson, *Fathers of International Thought – The Legacy of Political Theory* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State U. Press, 1994) 85.
[29] Jerry Z. Muller, *Adam Smith in his Time and Ours, Designing the Decent Society* (Don Mills: Maxwell McMillan Canada, 1993) 188.
[30] Domenico Mazzeo, "Adam Smith" (ILST2200: Theories and Methods of International Studies. Glendon College, Toronto. 6 November 2002).
[31] Kenneth W. Thompson, *Fathers of International Thought – the Legacy of Political Theory* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1994) 85.
[32] Ibid, 87.
[33] Torbjorn L Knutsen, *A History of International Relations Theory* (New York: St. Martin's,1997) 149.
[34] Richard F Teichgraeber III, *Free Trade and Moral Philosophy: Rethinking the Sources of Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations* (Durham: Duke U. Press, 1986) 123.
[35] Ibid, 124.
[36] Ian Clark and Iver B. Neumann, eds, *Classical Theories of International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1996) 156.
[37] Ibid, 156.
[38] Ibid, 156.
[39] Jerry Z Muller, *Adam Smith in his Time and Ours, Designing the Decent Society* (Don Mills: Maxwell McMillan Canada, 1993) 80.
[40] Ian Clark and Iver B. Neumann, eds, *Classical Theories of International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1996) 160.
[41] Ibid, 160.
[42] Kenneth W. Thompson, *Fathers of International Thought – the Legacy of Political Theory* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State U. Press, 1994) 85.
[43] Ian Clark and Iver B. Neumann, eds, *Classical Theories of International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1996) 161.
[44] Ibid, 147.
[45] Andrew S. Skinner, *A System of Social Science, Papers Relating to Adam Smith* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) 219.
[46] Richard F. Teichgraeber III, *Free Trade and Moral Philosophy: Rethinking the Sources of Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations* (Durham: Duke U. Press, 1986) 139.
[47] Ibid, 150.
[48] Ian Clark and Iver B. Neumann, eds, *Classical Theories of International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1996) 149.
[49] Ibid, 149.
[50] Ibid, 159.
[51] Ibid, 148.
[52] Ibid,148.
[53] Alan Macfarlane, *The Riddle of the Modern World* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000) 99.
[54] Jerry Z. Muller, *Adam Smith in his Time and Ours, Designing the Decent Society* (Don Mills: Maxwell McMillan Canada, 1993) 144.
[55] Ian Clark and Iver B. Neumann, eds, *Classical Theories of International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1996) 159.
[56] Ibid, 159.
[57] Andrew S. Skinner, *A System of Social Science, Papers Relating to Adam Smith* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) 213.
[58] Ibid, 213.
[59] Alan Macfarlane, *The Riddle of the Modern World* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000) 142.

[60] Andrew S. Skinner, *A System of Social Science, Papers Relating to Adam Smith* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) 213.
[61] Ibid, 213.
[62] Jerry Z Muller, *Adam Smith in his Time and Ours, Designing the Decent Society* (Don Mills: Maxwell McMillan Canada, 1993) 143.
[63] Alan Macfarlane, *The Riddle of the Modern World* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000) 142.
[64] Ibid, 142.
[65] Ian Clark and Iver B. Neumann, eds, *Classical Theories of International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1996) 159.
[66] Jerry Z. Muller, *Adam Smith in his Time and Ours, Designing the Decent Society* (Don Mills: Maxwell McMillan Canada, 1993) 142.
[67] Ibid, 142.
[68] Ibid, 143.
[69] Ibid, 142.
[70] Alan Macfarlane, *The Riddle of the Modern World* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000) 127.
[71] Ibid, 127.
[72] Ibid, 129.
[73] Ibid, 119.
[74] Ibid,130.
[75] Ibid, 119.
[76] Emma Rothchild, "What is Security? The Quest for World Order" (*Daedalus* v124 n3 (1995): 65 pars. Electronic Lib. Expanded Academic ASAP, Toronto, ON. 11 January 2003 <http://web7.infotrac.galegroup.com/itw/infomark/0/1/1/purl=rc6_EAIM?sw_aep=yorku_main>) 17.
[77] Ibid, 50.
[78] Ian Clark and Iver B. Neumann, eds, *Classical Theories of International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1996) 152.
[79] Ibid, 152.
[80] Ibid, 152.
[81] Ibid, 152.
[82] Domenico Mazzeo, "Adam Smith" (ILST2200: Theories and Methods of International Studies. Glendon College, Toronto. 6 November 2002).
[83] Ian Clark and Iver B. Neumann, eds, *Classical Theories of International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1996) 156.
[84] John F. Berdell, "Adam Smith and the Ambiguity of Nations" (*Review of Social Economy* v56 n2 (1998): 175 pars. 11 January 2003 Electronic Lib. Expanded Academic ASAP, Toronto, ON. 11 January 2003 <http://web7.infotrac.galegroup.com/itw/infomark/0/1/1/purl=rc6_EAIM?sw_aep=yorku_main>) 15.
[85] Ibid, 15.
[86] Andrew S. Skinner, *A System of Social Science, Papers Relating to Adam Smith* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) 235.
[87] Jerry Z. Muller, *Adam Smith in his Time and Ours, Designing the Decent Society* (Don Mills: Maxwell McMillan Canada, 1993) 80.
[88] Ibid, 142.
[89] Ian Clark and Iver B. Neumann, eds, *Classical Theories of International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1996) 163.
[90] Ibid, 163.
[91] Ibid, 162.
[92] Kenneth W. Thompson, *Fathers of International Thought – The Legacy of Political Theory* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State U. Press, 1994) 85.
[93] Ian Clark, and Iver B. Neumann, eds, *Classical Theories of International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1996) 143.
[94] Ibid, 154.
[95] Ibid, 164.
[96] Ibid, 154.
[97] Kenneth W. Thompson, *Fathers of International Thought – The Legacy of Political Theory* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1994) 88.
[98] Ian Clark and Iver B. Neumann, eds, *Classical Theories of International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1996) 164.
[99] Clark & Neumann 160.
[100] Domenico Mazzeo, "Adam Smith" (ILST2200: Theories and Methods of International Studies. Glendon College, Toronto. 6 November 2002).
[101] Ibid, 80.
[102] Ibid, 80.
[103] Ibid, 80.
[104] Ibid, 79.
[105] Ibid, 79.
[106] Ibid, 80.
[107] Ibid, 80.
[108] James E Alvey, "Adam Smith's Higher Vision of Capitalism" (Diss. U of T. 1996)

[109] Ian Clark and Iver B. Neumann, eds, *Classical Theories of International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1996) 150.
[110] Ibid, 152.
[111] Ibid, 152.
[112] Ibid,152.
[113] John F Berdell, "Adam Smith and the Ambiguity of Nations" (*Review of Social Economy* v56 n2 (1998): 175 pars. 11 January 2003 Electronic Lib. Expanded Academic ASAP, Toronto, ON. 11 January 2003 <http://web7.infotrac.galegroup.com/itw/infomark/0/1/1/purl=rc6_EAIM?sw_aep=yorku_main>) 1.
[114] Ibid, 10.
[115] James E Alvey, "Adam Smith's Higher Vision of Capitalism" (Diss. U of T. 1996) 46.
[116] Skinner, Andrew S. & Thomas Wilson, eds, *Essays on Adam Smith* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975) 460.
[117] Ibid, 460.
[118] Ibid, 457.
[119] Ibid, 457.
[120] Ibid, 458.
[121] Ibid, 458.
[122] Ibid, 467.
[123] Ibid, 468.
[124] Ibid, 473.
[125] Ibid, 473.
[126] Ibid, 473.
[127] Ibid, 464.
[128] Ibid, 463.
[129] Ibid, 465.
[130] Ibid, 475.
[131] Richard F. Teichgraeber III, *Free Trade and Moral Philosophy: Rethinking the Sources of Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations* (Durham: Duke U. Press, 1986) 153.
[132] Andrew S Skinner & Thomas Wilson, eds, *Essays on Adam Smith* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975) 474.
[133] Andrew S Skinner, *A System of Social Science, Papers Relating to Adam Smith* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) 186.
[134] Alan Macfarlane, *The Riddle of the Modern World* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000)102.
[135] Ibid, 103.
[136] Ibid, 104.
[137] Ibid, 104.
[138] Ian Clark, and Iver B. Neumann, eds, *Classical Theories of International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1996) 150.
[139] Ibid, 157.
[140] Ibid, 157.
[141] Ibid, 157.
[142] Ibid, 157.
[143] Alan Macfarlane, *The Riddle of the Modern World* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000) 131.
[144] Jerry Z. Muller, *Adam Smith in his Time and Ours, Designing the Decent Society* (Don Mills: Maxwell McMillan Canada, 1993) 142.
[145] Ibid, 143.
[146] Ibid, 143.
[147] Ibid, 145.
[148] Ibid, 145.
[149] Ian Clark and Iver B. Neumann, eds, *Classical Theories of International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1996) 157.
[150] Ibid, 154.
[151] Ibid, 154.
[152] Alan Macfarlane, *The Riddle of the Modern World* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000) 131.
[153] Ibid, 131.
[154] Ibid, 132.
[155] Ibid, 132.
[156] Ian Clark and Iver B. Neumann, eds, *Classical Theories of International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1996) 164.
[157] Ibid, 166.
[158] Ibid, 160.
[159] Kenneth W. Thompson, *Fathers of International Thought – The Legacy of Political Theory* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State U. Press, 1994) 85.
[160] Ian Clark, and Iver B. Neumann, eds, *Classical Theories of International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1996) 157.
[161] Kenneth W. Thompson, *Fathers of International Thought – the Legacy of Political Theory* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State U. Press, 1994) 85.
[162] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations, the Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1985) 43.
[163] James E. Alvey, "Adam Smith's Higher Vision of Capitalism" (Diss. U of T. 1996) 47.

[164] Ibid, 47.
[165] Ibid, 47.
[166] Jerry Z. Muller, *Adam Smith in his Time and Ours, Designing the Decent Society* (Don Mills: Maxwell McMillan Canada, 1993) 183.
[167] Ibid, 184.

Works Cited

Alvey, James E. *Adam Smith's Higher Vision of Capitalism*. Diss. U of T, 1996.

Clark, Ian and Iver B. Neumann. Eds. *Classical Theories of Internatioanl Relations*. New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1996.

Macfarlane, Alan. *The Riddle of the Modern World*. New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 2000.

Muller, Jerry Z. *Adam Smith in his Time and Ours, Designing the Decent Society*. Don Mills: Maxwell McMillan Canada, 1993

Skinner, Andrew S. *A System of Social Science, Papers Relating to Adam Smith*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979.

Skinner, Andrew S. and Thomas Wilson. Eds. *Essays on Adam Smith*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.

Teichgraeber III, Richard F. *Free Trade and Moral Philosophy: Rethinking the Sourcces of Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations*. Durham: Duke U. Press, 1986.

Kant's Conviction of the Inevitability of Perpetual Peace

Paulina Ninkovic

European thinkers, among others, have long reflected on the causes of people's tendency to group themselves into organized communities and on the nature of interactions both within and between those communities. While discussing the European philosophers, contemporary scholars recognized three major trends of thought in political philosophy that deal with the aforementioned issues: liberalism, realism and marxism. Nonetheless, Immanuel Kant is an example of a philosopher who cannot be labelled as a representative of any of these trends, as he did not follow any stream but his own, creating a unique philosophical model. His influence on the shaping of the doctrine of Rechtsstaat – the state governed according to the rule of law – was profound. In fact, Kant is considered to be the father of modern German political thought. Through Hegel's writings, Kant influenced Marx, whose impact on modern political thinking was enormous.[1]

Nonetheless, for many years Kant's political philosophy, claiming that lasting peace on earth is possible and actually inevitable, was unrecognized and did not attract much attention. This was due to two facts. Firstly, Kant's most brilliant works developed problems of morality and metaphysics. Appearing late in his life, and never reaching the level of sophistication of his previous works, these writings were summed up by one final philosophical model. Secondly, although lasting peace may be a condition of international relations desired by most, often the concept of lasting peace is regarded as a mere utopia. Consequently, Kant was given the label of 'utopian political philosopher', which was enough to draw the critics' attention away from his works on the subject of politics.[2]

Nevertheless, Kant was neither a dreamer who insisted on the possibility of establishing perpetual peace immediately, nor was he a moralist who believed that only perfectly moral people could ensure a perfect system. However, to understand Kant's justification for the infallibility and importance of the emergence of the state of lasting peace on earth, it is essential to place his thoughts into the historical context of his time, and to elaborate on the linear process proposed by the philosopher that, starting from the state of nature, inevitably leads humanity to perpetual peace.[3]

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) was born in Konigsburg, Eastern Prussia. At the University of Konigsburg, he studied philosophy, mathematics and physics. He lived at the end of the Enlightenment. However, contrary to the representatives of this era, Kant saw the Enlightenment not as static, but as a dynamic process leading to the individual's self-emancipation. In his opinion, the time-period in which he lived was not yet enlightened, but merely in the process of becoming so.[4]

Having devoted himself to teaching, Kant started publishing his philosophical works late in his life. He commenced with *Critique of Reason* in 1781, and then followed with: 1) *Idea of the Universal History* in 1784; 2) *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals* in 1785; 3) *Critique of Pure Reason*; 4) *Critique of Practical Reason* in 1787; and 5) *Metaphysics of Ethics* in 1797. Among his works on political philosophy, the first, a political essay, was published when he was sixty years old. After its publication, the following were published: 1) *Theory and Practice* in 1792; 2) *Perpetual Peace* in 1795; 3) *The Metaphysical Elements of Right* in 1797; 4) *The Contest of the Faculties* in 1798, and 5) *Critique of Judgement* in 1790.[5] Two historical events triggered the appearance of political thought in Kant's philosophy, namely the American Revolution and, most importantly, the French Revolution, which established a people's government and abolished the monarchy. Even though Kant did not approve of the revolution as a method of bringing about a better political order, he, who still lived under a monarchic

order where the bourgeoisie was under the dominance of the aristocracy, agreed with its aims of "freedom, equality and fraternity". This was the beginning of Kant's preoccupation with the problem of establishing a "just and lasting international order and world peace" [6], the basis for which would be universal freedom, equality and fraternity.[7]

Kant's label as a 'utopian philosopher' was rooted in the fact that the definitions proposed by him were independent of personal experience. This was caused by Kant's division of the world into 'noumena' – things as they really are – and 'phenomena' – things as they appear to be to the human senses. Kant directed his interest towards the true nature of things, the 'noumena': Things only reasonably, not empirically penetrable. As both entities are connected, he sought, nonetheless to establish a set of principles that would be universal and logically independent of sense experience in order to understand the external world and moral conduct.[8]

For Kant, the individual and the primary conditions of his or her existence constitute the basic elements of his thoughts on the emergence of perpetual peace. According to Kant, man has two intrinsic values: Freedom and reason. However, as man possesses a dual character of 'phenomena' and 'noumena', the nature of his freedom is also two-fold: "Man as a phenomenal being is casually determined, but as a noumenal being he is free".[9] This implies that man, when placed in reality, while performing a civil function, is not entirely free, but must be subordinated to the rules of his surroundings. Thus, as an officer, for example, he should follow the rule of law regardless of his opinion of it. However, as a noumenal being, independent of the material world, every man is free, thus he is permitted to use his mind unrestrictedly to form statements as he considers it appropriate. Moreover, man is entitled to express his opinion as a private person. It is the reason, the second natural possession of man that enables him to do this. Furthermore, Kant claims that man is obliged to use his mind, because it is the only way he can proceed on his way to becoming enlightened and to gain "courage to use [his brain] without the guidance of another". [10] Indeed, Kant's motto was "*Sapere aude!* Have courage to use your *own* understanding!"[11] The philosopher was convinced that individuals, such as political or spiritual leaders, serve people as guardians and guides and should recognize the growing maturity of men by granting them public and political freedoms and rights.[12]

However, there is one value that is not natural to man but which is, as Kant believed, of fundamental importance and should be developed by all individuals: Morality. Kant suggested two propositions aiming to help determine whether or not a person's maxim, being the foundation of action, is grounded in morality. He argued that a person's maxim is moral if it conforms to the moral law. This categorical imperative may be derived as the maxim of any action. Fundamentally, the action is moral if "you can wish your maxim to become a universal law", [13] regardless of the end result, and when you "act in such a way that you treat humanity both in your own person and in the person of all others, never as a means only but always equally as an end".[14] Therefore, although man should be his own law-giver to preserve his freedom, he must not violate the intrinsic value of humanity that all people hold. The first moral law also brings about the assumption that all people are universally equal, thus humanity in all people should be honoured and equal laws should applied to all.[15] Ultimately, the categorical imperative in Kant's philosophy became a guideline not only for the acts of individuals, but also for those governing rulers in the internal affairs of states and for state conduct at the international level.

However, in the primary state of nature, where no external restrictions are imposed on man, freedom and equality are the main reasons of insecurity. This is embedded in the fact that, as proposed by Kant, the main expression of human freedom is the right to acquire and possess property. The rule of equality grants this privilege to everyone, hence, all individuals are aiming to possess as much as possible. Consequently, their interests start to collide and rivalry introduces restrictions on the freedom of the weakest. Moreover, the fact that men cannot be constantly physically present to defend their possessions caused a feeling of insecurity, as the goods and properties left unprotected could easily fall

victim to anyone's drive for acquiring possessions. This situation leads men to exit the state of nature and enter civil society, "in order to distinguish [one's] possession from that of others, it is necessary that the choice of others should agree with [one's] own". [16] Nonetheless, this move is not dictated by morality but rather by a need for self-preservation and the sheer awareness that, as all men want to rise above the others, only by entering a social contract and agreeing to restrict one's own freedom may one be certain that others will voluntarily restrict their liberty. Thus by entering civil society, all individuals agree to voluntarily limit their freedom for the good of all. They also give the state a right to coerce those who would refuse to conform and try to expand their freedom at the expense of others. Consequently, the coercive nature of the state does not stand contrary to the idea of the intrinsic freedom of all men, but instead it safeguards its equal distribution so that the freedom of one individual can co-exist with the freedom of all people.[17]

The state's role is understood, as to "prevent competitive rivalry from degenerating into social chaos and anarchy, to set the limits for the permissible pursuit of self-interest and to maintain the juridical structure necessary for cultural development". [18] However, the power of law and coercion, according to Kant, cannot reach as far as an individual's inner life, for as "men we are free" [19]. He claimed that "so long as he sees to it that all true or imagined improvements are compatible with the civil order, [a monarch] can otherwise leave his subjects to do whatever they find necessary for their salvation, which is none of his business".[20] Therefore, Kant denied the legality of, among other things, the rule *Cujus regio, ejus religio*: subjects are to accept the religion of their ruler. Kant considered a prince that would not conform to this requirement, which was rare in XVIII century, an enlightened one.[21]

As mentioned previously, Kant only prescribed morality. He did not claim that people must be moral to enter civil society, as they can be simply compelled by others to carry out this civil duty. Also, "all the culture and art which adorn mankind and the finest social order man creates are fruits of his unsociability".[22] What made Kant believe that depraved human nature can establish future lasting peace? For Kant, it was the same force that made people enter the stage of civil society. He reasoned that "if man by nature were so constructed that they must inevitably war among themselves through all time, then the only perpetual peace would be that of a great burial ground of humanity, and the moral law". [23] However, Kant believed that the future was not so dim, for to understand history, through which one can also predict the future, Kant resorted to "an Idea, such as the one that nature has a purpose in history. This Idea cannot be proved or disproved by scientific inquiry, but without it, we cannot understand history at all".[24] He believed that the plan of nature is to educate man to the state of freedom and rationalism, which, in turn, will equip man with reason.[25]. This thinking made human history into a linear process that would lead to peace, as a natural outcome of reasonable thinking.

According to Kant, even war was not in opposition to nature's plan, because through this sad experience men would learn to value and seek out peace. Moreover, through men's "unsocial sociability",[26] which, as they desire honour, power or property, "drives them to seek status among their fellows, whom they cannot *bear* yet cannot *bear to leave*",[27] they must finally establish the order regulated by law. Still, peace is something that should be worked out by humans through their intellectual labour to become enlightened; it was "a stern moral task, not a shore reached by simply riding on a historical wave".[28] Thus, to advance the spread of rationality is a moral obligation necessary to fulfill the nature of man. As enlightenment gradually occurs, "the history of the human race as a whole can be regarded as the realisation of a hidden plan of nature to bring about an internally – and for this purpose also externally – perfect political constitution as the only possible state within which all natural capacities of mankind can be developed completely".[29] This belief stands also as an explanation of why, according to Kant, men should pursue the path given to them by nature.[30]

As previously mentioned, the formation of civil society is the first step that man takes to exit the state of nature. A unified group of men, under laws, form a state that consequently will become more

complex in its ability to reach the stage of a two-fold model consisting of those who govern and those who are governed. This stage introduces the idea of politics to Kant's philosophical model. However, for Kant, politics did not mean a divorce from morality. He argued that, since politics deals with "what we ought to do" and seeks laws, it is indeed inseparable from morality. Therefore, he believed that "in *objective* or theoretical terms, there is no conflict whatsoever between morality and politics. In a *subjective* sense, however, ...this conflict will and ought to remain active, since it serves as a whetstone of virtue".[31] But Kant claimed that for the political practice to be coherent and supportive of justice, it "must be subordinate as much as possible to formal principles that are derived from reason rather than from experience".[32] Thus, the first question of a political action should be "is it right?" rather than "is it feasible?" As ethics is not empirically derived, it may only be the basis for action, but cannot be based on the action itself.[33] To judge the rightness or wrongness of a political maxim, Kant came up with the criterion of publicity or transparency: An application of the moral laws to the reality of politics. It follows that

> ...actions whose maxims cannot be publicly exposed without thwarting the purpose of the action itself are not responsive to the rights of others, and are therefore immoral. Actions are right if they can be fully effective only when their maxim is known to those touched by the action, for in these actions the person is treated as end in himself. These are actions which the person affected could himself have willed. Where such actions are willed, the persons are equal, lawgiving members of a realm of ends. [34]

where the government is by the consent of the governed.[35]

Kant's idea of an appropriate political system is one in which state organizes and serves the principles of universal freedom and equality. He did not support a democracy, as he saw it as a rule of the majority, which implied an oppressed minority.[36] However, he supported the authoritarian regime even less. For Kant, the realm of ends was a republic: A rule of all citizens. However, in this point Kant went against his modernizing spirit, calling for the honouring of all human rights. Furthermore, Kant betrayed his ideal of universal equality independent of the material world, as he divided citizens into the 'active' and the 'passive'. He defined the 'active' citizens as ones that are economically independent, whereas 'passive' citizens – such as servants, women or employees – are those who cannot support themselves without the help of another person. Kant only gave the right to participate in law making to the first group. Concerning how law making should be carried out, Kant proposed two options: Either every active citizen participates by submitting one vote, or the legislative power is represented in the sovereign.

As the sovereign's role is to maintain peace, he is responsible for coercing his subjects to abide by the law. Nonetheless, his duty is not to abuse his power, but to create a constitution that would provide laws that are just and equal for everybody and would allow "the greatest possible human freedom in accordance with laws which ensure that the freedom of each can coexist with the freedom of all the others".[37] However each man "desires a law to impose limits on the freedom of all, he is still misled by his self-seeking animal inclinations into exempting himself from the law where he can. He thus requires a *master*".[38] Kant viewed the obligations of a ruler, not as a legal but a moral duty, denying the citizens any right to punish the sovereign. That such a sovereign would also be human and therefore possess the universal characteristics of man; he would need to be constrained such as "an animal who needs a master. Thus while man may try as he will, it is hard to see how he can obtain for public justice a supreme authority which would itself be just". [39] No man is infallible therefore; power has the ability to corrupt any one man, no matter how moral his initial position. In such a situation, Kant denied the subjects the right to rebel, in favour of the more important purpose of establishing peace. He believed that all the reforms should be performed in accordance with the law, as a revolution poses a danger of falling back into the state of nature. Nevertheless, once the revolution has taken place, it would be equally wrong to try to undo it, for it is man's duty to obey, as citizens.[40] Kant believed that a well-organized state would force man to be a good citizen, even without being a morally good person.[41]

Moreover, to avoid despotic rule, Kant proposed a division of power, indicating his understanding of a state as an institution rather than a particular ruler. As the sovereign was to be the legislator, the executive power was to be given to the ruler or the government, while the judicial power would be in the hands of a court of law or a jury of representatives of people.

> The three powers in the state would be related to one another in the following ways. Firstly, ...each would be complementary to the others in forming the complete constitution of the state. But secondly, they would also be *subordinate* to one another, so that the one cannot usurp any function of the others to which it ministers; for each would have its own principle, so that although it would issue orders in the quality of a distinct person, it would be doing so under the condition of a superior power's will. [42]

Moreover, all citizens, including the ones in power, should have respect for and be equal in front of the law. But Kant did "not specify in detail how the representatives of the people ought to exercise their power, nor does he say accordingly to what principle they should be chosen".[43] However, the supremacy of power should be, according to Kant, so overwhelming that to rebel against it would be absolutely forbidden, as "a law permitting violation of the constitution and thus of the system of laws itself would amount to a law contradicting itself, which is absurd".[44] Nonetheless, to enable citizens the freedom to express their dissatisfaction, they should be granted the freedom of speech and public criticism.[45]

Concerning relations among states, Kant argued that there are necessary preconditions that must be first fulfilled to make a lasting peace *possible* in the future, as he posits in his essay *Perpetual Peace.* Firstly, "no conclusion of peace shall be held valid as such if it was made with a secret reservation of the material for a future war".[46] However, according the Kant, all peace treaties were not considered definite, because each was signed only as a means to halt the fighting for some undefined time period and that none of the signatories believed that the accords would put an end to the hostilities. Secondly, "no independently existing state ... may be acquired by another state by inheritance, exchange, purchase or gift",[47] as this would be in opposition to the rule of freedom of its citizens. Such an acquisition would result, most probably, in an open conflict and opposition. Thirdly, "standing armies will gradually be abolished altogether",[48] as they pose a threat to neighbouring countries and create a sense of military competition, to which there are no limits. Fourthly, maintaining such an army in peace becomes so oppressive that this burden is released in war. Rather, a standing army should be replaced by periodic exercises of citizens to enable then to defend their country, if necessary.

Furthermore, "no national debt shall be contracted with the external affairs of the state",[49] and "no state shall forcibly interfere in the constitution and government of another state",[50] as states as actors are free and equal and such an interference would violate this rule and lead to an opposition of a disturbed state. As Kant believed, only after a revolution when there would be a state of anarchy, which would break a state into two hostile camps, would an external interference be allowed and not violate the state's constitution. Finally, "no state at war with another shall permit such acts of hostility as would make mutual confidence impossible during a future time of peace. Such acts would include the employment of *assassins...or poisoners.., breach of agreements, the instigation of treason...*within the enemy state, etc".[51] There must remain some confidence in the character of the enemy to make future peace feasible and not turn the war into a war of extermination. Also, these rules, including the ban on the use of spies, should be equally valid during the time of peace, in order to not inflict war.

Thus, the necessary preconditions that should be met, as early as possible, are those that would make war less probable for material reasons, as well as those that would prevent distrust between nations. Nonetheless, "the first step [towards establishing perpetual peace] must be taken by imperfect, warlike, perhaps despotic, rulers of states".[52] Slight changes should reinforce the opinion that peace can actually be

worked out with the help of diplomacy. Furthermore, an establishment of the republican rule would be a great step forward towards international peace. Kant argued that when it is the ruler's decision to declare war, he treats his subjects as things to be used, not as persons.[53] However, if it was left to the people, as it would be in a republic, to decide whether to start a war or not, they would most probably vote against it, afraid of putting their lives and possessions at risk.[54]

Right and peace, however, cannot prevail in any state that is threatened by the actions of other states. Such a situation would resemble a state of nature where each state would be in a position of unrestricted freedom in its external relations.[55] Thus, a paradox occurs when the internal sovereignty of every state creates an international anarchy.[56] However, as Kant believed, the devastating effects of war would finally convince states

> ...to take the steps which reason could have suggested to them even without so many sad experiences – that of abandoning the lawless state of savagery and entering a federation of peoples in which every state, even the smallest, could expect to derive its security and rights not from its own power or its own legal judgement, but solely from this great federation, from a united power and the law-governed decisions of a united will.[57]

For, as states are governed by the same rules of reason as individuals, "this distress [i.e. war] must force the states to make exactly the same decision, however difficult it may be for them, as that which man was forced to make, equally unwillingly, in his savage state – the decision to renounce his brutish freedom and seek calm and security within a law-governed constitution" [58].

Moreover, as Kant predicted, with the development of an economy, the spirit of commerce, which requires peace, would win over the spirit of war.[59] However, first the rule of law, embodied by the republic, should prevail in all states, then reforms at the international level should take place in order to enable the final emergence of an international lasting peace based on the unwillingness of citizens and rulers to engage in war and "relations penetrating through and shared between states". [60]

Even though the best guarantor of peace would be the world state, according the Kant, the international arena is composed of numerous nations that cannot be equalized and are unlikely to agree to surrender completely their sovereignty to a supreme authority. Such allied nations would be in constant peril of breaking down. Also, such a huge dominion would be administratively unworkable. Therefore, Kant said, man can only approach such a utopian ideal of a peaceful world state by creating a federation of free states opposed to any war, a "pacific federation",[62] in which peace would be less certain then in the world state, but more liberty would be secured from universal despotism.[63] Such a league of nations would be similar to the civil constitution, entered for the same reason of security, and governed according to the adjusted rule of the categorical imperative and the maxim of publicity.[64] Such a federation would be a "counterbalance to the intrinsically healthy resistance of many states against each other, resulting from their freedom, a united power which would give support to this balance".[65] The federation of states would be interested solely in preserving peace, security and freedom for all, and it would not limit any state[66] as the incorporated nations would be interested in preserving peace, they would obey international law voluntarily [67].

However, the federation of states would not mean free flows of citizens from one state to another. World citizenship would be limited, meaning only the right for universal hospitality: A "universal right of humanity".[68] The stranger would not be treated as an enemy when he arrives at the land of another, even though the owner of the land may refuse to accept him. At the same time, world citizenship would not give anyone the right to become a permanent visitor. In fact, the idea of world citizenship is unavoidable, if the freedom of the individual is to be preserved in the world where different groups of people live close

to one another and are connected by various bonds.[69] These simple rules of universal freedom and equality would be the only ones governing and granting perpetual peace on earth.

Following Kant's reasoning, "even a race of devils, granted only that they are intelligent, would find it possible and necessary to cooperate and establish civil society; and states governed by intelligent devils would themselves in time find it to their interest to form leagues and alliances, to make treaties and fulfill them".[70] This shows that, as Kant saw men as reasonable creatures, he was convinced that pure practical reason, not pure morality, must finally lead them to establishing a state of perpetual peace based on universal rules. These rules may be called moral, but are most of all rational as they primarily ensure the rights of the one that agreed to obey them. Therefore, "Kant was not a blinkered visionary, nor was he even an unpractical utopian dreamer. As a scientist, he had learnt to respect fact. His own philosophical polemics and his attitude to the government of the day [a monarchy] reveal a keen awareness of the needs of the actual situation".[71] Using his mind, not facts, Kant came to the conclusion that a world lasting peaceful order is necessary to bring security and prosperity – the two basic things that every individual searches for. He then concluded that, since all men have reason, they must inevitably come, even if not fully consciously, to a similar conclusion and thus pursue the goal of establishing international peace based on freedom and understanding. These being the only things, coupled with the coercion of those who have not yet reached full understanding, which can really guarantee its perpetuality. Moreover, this longing for security and prosperity makes the labour to achieve it a duty, as only in this way can human nature be fulfilled.

As can be seen in the contemporary world, Kant's reasoning was in many aspects correct, as demonstrated by the existence of the United Nations devoted to guarding world peace, as well as the European Union governing the European economy, thus enhancing the nexus between member-countries. It may also be said that he "established a theoretical ground" [72] for the emergence of world peace based on the attention for the individual human being and his rights. However, more than two centuries after the ideas of this philosopher were presented, humanity is still in the process of becoming enlightened as, even though most of the people understand the importance of sustaining peace and know that the means to it is cooperation, neither the understanding of universal freedom and equality nor the stage of perpetual peace has yet been achieved.

Notes

[1] Hans Reiss, Introduction, *Kant: Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1970) 11-12.
[2] Allen D. Rosen, *Kant's Theory of Justice* (Ithaca & London: Cornell U. Press, 1993) 210.
[3] Hans Reiss, Introduction, *Kant: Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1970) 1-15.
[4] Ibid, 1-7.
[5] Ibid, 15.
[6] Ibid, 4.
[7] Lewis White Beck, Introduction, *Perpetual Peace* (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1957) ix-xii.
[8] Hans Reiss, Introduction, *Kant: Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1970) 1-18.
[9] Gunnar Beck, "Autonomy, History and Political Freedom in Kant's Political Pholosophy", *History of European Idea*, 25 (1999) 224.
[10] Immanuel Kant, *Political Writings*, H.B. Nisbet, ed, (Melbourne & Sydney: Cambridge U. Press, 1991) 54.
[11] Ibid, 54.
[12] Gunnar Beck, "Autonomy, History and Political Freedom in Kant's Political Philosophy", *History of European Ideas*, 25 (1999): 224-226.
[13] Immanuel Kant, *Political Writings*, H.B. Nisbet, ed, (Melbourne & Sydney: Cambridge U. Press, 1991) 122.
[14] Hans Reiss, Introduction, *Kant: Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1970) 26.
[15] Ibid, 18-26.
[16] Ibid, 22.
[17] Ibid, 22-28.
[18] Gunnar Beck, "Autonomy, History and Political Freedom in Kant's Political Philosophy", *History of European Ideas*. 25 (1999) 228.
[19] Hans Reiss, Introduction, *Kant: Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1970) 22.
[20] Immanuel Kant, *Political Writings*, H.B. Nisbet, ed, (Melbourne & Sydney: Cambridge U. Press, 1991) 58.
[21] Patrick Riley, "On Kant as the Most Adequate of the Social Contract Theorists", *Political Theory*. 1, 4 (Nov., 1973)

453-468.
[22] Immanuel Kant, *Political Writings,* H.B. Nisbet, ed, (Melbourne & Sydney: Cambridge U. Press, 1991) 46.
[23] Lewis White Beck, Introduction, *Perpetual Peace* (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1957) xi.
[24] Hans Reiss, Introduction, *Kant: Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1970) 36.
[25] Immanuel Kant, *Political Writings,* H.B. Nisbet, ed, (Melbourne & Sydney: Cambridge U. Press, 1991) 42-43.
[26] Ibid, 44.
[27] Immanuel Kant, *Political Writings,* H.B. Nisbet, ed, (Melbourne & Sydney: Cambridge U. Press, 1991) 44.
[28] Lewis White Beck, Introduction, *Perpetual Peace* (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1957) x.
[29] Immanuel Kant, *Political Writings,* H.B. Nisbet, ed, (Melbourne & Sydney: Cambridge U. Press, 1991) 50.
[30] Hans Reiss, Introduction, *Kant: Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1970) 22-38.
[31] Immanuel Kant, *Political Writings,* H.B. Nisbet, ed, (Melbourne & Sydney: Cambridge U Press, 1991) 124.
[32] Antonio Franceschet, *Kant and Liberal Internationalism: Sovereignty, Justice, and Global Reform* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) 54.
[33] Hans Reiss, Introduction, *Kant: Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1970) 20-21.
[34] Lewis White Beck, Introduction, *Perpetual Peace* (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1957) xii.
[35] Ibid, x-xii.
[36] Immanuel Kant, *Political Writings,* H.B. Nisbet, ed, (Melbourne & Sydney: Cambridge U. Press, 1991) 100-101.
[37] Gunnar Beck, "Autonomy, History and Political Freedom in Kant's Political Philosophy", *History of European Ideas,* 25 (1999) 220.
[38] Immanuel Kant, *Political Writings,* H.B. Nisbet, ed, (Melbourne & Sydney: Cambridge U. Press, 1991) 46.
[39] Ibid, 46.
[40] Hans Reiss, Introduction, *Kant: Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1970) 20-47.
[41] Immanuel Kant, *Political Writings,* H.B. Nisbet, ed, (Melbourne & Sydney: Cambridge U. Press, 1991) 112-113.
[42] Ibid, 141.
[43] Hans Reiss, Introduction, *Kant: Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1970. 29.
[44] Ibid, 32.
[45] Mark F. Franke, *Global Limits: Immanuel Kant, International Relations, and Critique of World Politics* (N. Y: State U. of New York Press, 2001) 44-45.
[46] Immanuel Kant, *Political Writings,* H.B. Nisbet, ed, (Melbourne & Sydney: Cambridge U. Press, 1991) 93.
[47] Ibid, 94.
[48] Ibid, 94.
[49] Ibid, 95.
[50] Ibid, 96.
[51] Ibid, 96.
[52] Lewis White Beck, Introduction, *Perpetual Peace* (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1957) xiii.
[53] Ibid, xii.
[54] Immanuel Kant, *Political Writings,* H.B. Nisbet, ed, (Melbourne & Sydney: Cambridge U. Press, 1991) 100.
[55] Ibid, 47.
[56] Antonio Franceschet, *Kant and Liberal Internationalism: Sovereignty, Justice, and Global Reform* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) 43-53.
[57] Immanuel Kant. *Political Writings.* H.B. Nisbet, ed, (Melbourne & Sydney: Cambridge U. Press, 1991) 47.
[58] Ibid, 48.
[59] Ibid, 113-114.
[60] Mark F. Franke, *Global Limits: Immanuel Kant, International Relations, and Critique of World Politics* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2001) 45.
[61] Patrick Riley, *Kant's Political Philosophy* (New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1983) 115.
[62] Ibid, 115.
[63] Ibid, 34-117.
[64] Immanuel Kant, *Political Writings,* H.B. Nisbet, ed, (Melbourne & Sydney: Cambridge U. Press, 1991) 102-105.
[65] Ibid, 49.
[66] Hans Reiss, Introduction, *Kant: Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1970) 46-51.
[67] Patrick Riley, *Kant's Political Philosophy* (New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1983) 116-117.
[68] Immanuel Kant, *Political Writings,* H.B. Nisbet, ed, (Melbourne & Sydney: Cambridge U. Press, 1991) 108.
[69] Ibid, 105-108.
[70] Hans Reiss, Introduction, *Kant: Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1970) 29.
[71] Ibid, 39.
[72] Mark F. Franke, *Global Limits: Immanuel Kant, International Relations, and Critique of World Politics* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2001) 52.

Works Cited:

Beck,Gunnar. "Autonomy, History and Political Freedom in Kant's Political Philosophy". *History of European Ideas,* 25 (1999) 217-241.

Beck, Lewis White. Introduction. *Perpetual Peace.* By Immanuel Kant. Ed. Beck. New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1957. vii-xiv.

Bernd, Ludwig. "'The Right of a State' in Immanuel Kant's *Doctrine of Right*". *Journal of the History of Philosophy,* 28, 3 (1990) 403-415.

Franceschet, Antonio. *Kant and Liberal Internationalism: Sovereignty, Justice, and Global Reform.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.

Franke, Mark F. *Global Limits: Immanuel Kant, International Relations, and Critique of World Politics.* New York: State University of New York Press, 2001.

Guyer, Paul. "Kant, Immanuel". Vol. 5. *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Ed. Edward Craig. London & New York: Routledge, 1998. 177-204.

Kant, Immanuel. *Political Writings.* Trans. H.B. Nisbet. Ed. Patrick Riley. Second edition. Cambridge & New York & Port Chester & Melbourne & Sydney: Cambridge U. Press, 1991.

Orend, Brian. "Kant's Just War Theory." *Journal of the History of Philosophy,* 37, 2(1999): 323-353.

Reiss, Hans. Introduction. *Kant: Political Writings.* By Immanuel Kant. Trans. H.B. Nisbet. Ed. Hans Reiss. Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1970. 1-50.

Riley, Patrick. *Kant's Political Philosophy.* New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1983.

Riley, Patrick. "On Kant as the Most Adequate of the Social Contract Theorists." *Political Theory,* 1, 4 (Nov., 1973): 450-471.

Rosen, Allen D. *Kant's Theory of Justice.* Ithaca & London: Cornell U. Press, 1993.

Thompson, Kevin. "Kant's Transcendental Deduction of Political Authority." *Kant Studien: Philosophische Zeitschrift der Kant Gesellschaft,* 92, 1 (2001): 63-78.

Williams, Howard and Ken Booth. "Kant: Theorist beyond Limits." *Classical Theories of International Relations,* Oxford: St Anthony's College, 1999. 71-99.

Williams, Howard Lloyd, ed. *Essays on Kant's Political Philosophy.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992.

Karl Marx's Conception of International Relations

Regina Buecker

Even though Marx was not widely read during his own time and Marxism, as a political system may be outdated, at least from the present perspective, Karl Marx remains an iconic figure of the 19th century. One of its most influential and controversial philosophers, his thinking has influenced not only the ideology of former and present communist countries, but also the international system as a whole. His theories have had a deep impact on academic studies, and while he did not address the field of international relations directly, much may be derived from his writings on certain phenomena, such as colonialism and nationalism, which are crucial in international relations. The purpose of this paper is to provide a better understanding of Marx's notions of international society. In the following essay, a short overview of Marx's world, concept of man, the state, class and international relations will be given. Finally, the relevance and contributions of Marx's thought to the theory and practice of international relations is analyzed.

Historical Context

Europe, during Marx's life, was a place "of tremendous social, political and economic change".[1] Until Bismark declared on "18th January 1871...the foundation of the German Empire..." Germany was divided into 38 states of different size and power, and was economically underdeveloped. Almost within one generation, Germany overtook Britain, with respect to 'dynamic development'. The Prussian government, the major political and military unit in Germany, in Marx's time, was conservative and opposed to most reforms.[2]

Marx was born in 1818 in Trier, a Prussian city near the French border. He studied law and philosophy in Bonn and Berlin. According to scholar Richard P. Appelbaum, Marx enjoyed a dismal reputation, during his time as a student. This and his connection with Bruno Bauer, then Marx's "friend and mentor", made it impossible for Marx to find employment as an assistant professor. Throughout his life, Marx never had a steady income or a permanent job and was therefore dependent upon the support of relatives and friends, such as Friedrich Engels, Marx's life-long friend and work-companion. In fact, due to Marx's radical views and his emphasis on the right to free speech, Marx was expelled from France, Belgium and Germany. Finally, in 1849, he went into exile, in London, where he died as a stateless person.[3]

According to Appelbaum, in his youth, Marx was surrounded by liberal thinkers. For example, his father "was a student of the Enlightenment", and had to convert from Judaism to Christianity in order to continue to practice law. Marx was even christened as a boy. Indeed, early Christianity influenced him with visions of paradise and a strong sense of community. Such influences can be found, for example, in his understanding of a communist society. The teachings of Epicurus also affected Marx's thoughts. He wrote his "doctoral dissertation on 'The Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature' [that] reflects his lifelong concern with the conflict between freedom and determinism." Additionally, the German philosophers Hegel and Feuerbach impinged on Marx's notions, from whom Marx took the ideas of the dialectic and materialism and to whom he owes his title, "Modern Father of Dialectical Materialism".[4]

Marx's Concept of Man

According to academic Erich Fromm, Marx's concept of man is based upon Hegel. In order to better understand Marx's view of human nature, it is important to mention that in Hegel's view a

dialectical thinker must distinguish between appearance (earthy) and essence (heavenly). Once man gains self-consciousness, he will discover the absolute truth about himself and his world. Hegel believes that man attempts to put this truth into practice. For Hegel and likewise for Marx, man only makes sense of his life when he is productive.[5]

Man, according to writer Gajo Petrovic, is for Marx, a "being of praxis." He dismisses the traditional concept of human nature that views "man as a rational animal", because Marx does not believe that reason or any form of activity can be the essence of man. Man is a human being because of the form his relationship takes in regard to his environment and himself. This relationship is what Marx calls praxis. Furthermore, consciousness distinguishes human activity from animal activity. Thus, praxis may be defined as "conscious [human] life activity". Nonetheless, to distance Marx's concept of man from the traditional notion, and because man develops and transforms himself in the cause of history, Petrovic suggests defining praxis as "a universal-creative self-creative activity [that] contains its determination as a free, conscious activity".[6]

As man purposefully changes himself and the world he lives in, only man has a history. Therefore, Fromm explains that human nature first needs to be regarded "in general, and then with human nature as modified in each historical epoch".[7] In this sense Marx discerns two drives of human nature: man's constant drives, such as hunger and sexual urge, which are essential parts of the individual that do not change, and man's 'relative' drives, which, on the other hand, are based on the respective predominant social structure. For example, in a capitalistic society the demand for money is relative drive; man is calculating and greedy, he is alienated. Thus, man's potential is predetermined by the contemporary prevailing social structure. Fromm further clarifies that "[y]et, man does change in the course of history; he develops himself; he transforms himself, he is the product of history; since he makes his history, he is his own product".[8] Marx writes that although man makes history, the past determines the conditions for this end.[9]

Therefore, Petrovic suggests that, as man has a history and is a 'being of praxis', man also has a future. Marx believes in the ability of man to realize his possibilities and to liberate himself. Here Marx's concept of man differs from Hegel's. Unlike Marx's conception of human nature, which cannot be completed because man changes throughout history, the individual who gains absolute self-knowledge is in Hegel's view, completed and therefore fully definable. For Marx, man is, in the first place, what he can and "ought to be" (essence); therefore, his concept of man is more than a mere conception. Marx, among other things, criticizes man for not seeing his possibilities to emancipate himself from alienation.[10]

Marx's concept of man, according to Fromm, can only be completely comprehended by understanding his concept of alienation. Man is alienated when he experiences himself and his environment in a passive way. Marx claims that "the process of alienation is expressed in work and in the division of labor" and that "work is for him the active relatedness of man to nature, the creation of a new world, including the creation of man himself".[11] Because work is no longer included in the nature of the workingman, labor is alienated. As a result, man is not able to "develop freely". The alienated man of a capitalist society is related to his environment only by consumption. Marx pointed out the proletariat as the most estranged and in need to start the emancipatory process, in order to gain freedom from alienation.[12]

Marx's Conception of the State

Ralph Miliband writes in his essay *Marx and the State* that Marx never tried to analyze the state methodically; nevertheless his concept of the state is essential. Particularly in his early writings, including *The Class Struggles in France, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* and *Critique of the Hegelian Philosophy of Right,* his major concern was "the nature of the state and its relation to society".[13] To a

large extent, Marx finally liberated himself from Hegel's notion through his analysis of the Hegelian philosophy of right and the state. Marx then developed his point of view and answers to some of the challenges he had come across. Analysis of Hegel's thoughts appeared repeatedly in his later work.[14]

In the *Communist Manifesto,* Marx described the evolution of the state, beginning with the early epochs of our history, in which society was almost completely structured in different ranks. Ancient Rome, for example, was divided into patricians, knights and slaves.[15] With the need of a work force, due to the development of agriculture, the creation of states, so as to maintain a slave class, became necessary. This marked the metamorphosis of a tribal society, which did not need a state to ensure its existence, to an ancient state system. This gave way to the feudal society, which was a structure determined by subject-kinship relations. The class structure was, therefore, extremely developed. With the expansion of trade, the bourgeoisie developed and edged out all the classes that remained from the Middle Ages.[16] Marx wrote that the structure of the bourgeoisie epoch is simplified. Only two antagonistic classes face each other: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.[17]

The ideal form of the bourgeois state, according to Marx, is a 'democratic representative state' because of the absence of feudal obligations and enforcements on the state's population. As quoted by Miliband, Marx's view of the state is that of a "great organism in which must be realized juridical, moral and political freedom and where the individual citizen, in obeying the laws of the state only obeys the natural laws of his own reason, of human reason".[18] However, the actual behavior of states, according to Marx, differs from this end. In reality, according to Marx, the ruling class uses the state to put its own interests into practice, to strengthen its own position in the system and to exploit the working class. Marx criticized Bruno Bauer, a prominent Austrian member of the Young Hegelians, for having confounded political emancipation with human emancipation. For Marx, political emancipation is of major importance, but it is not synonymous with human emancipation, as "the state may well free itself from some constraint, without man himself being really freed from it".[19] Human emancipation can only be realized by transforming bourgeois society: the abolishment of private property, an entity that alienates human beings.[20]

Marx and Engels wrote in the *Critique of the Gotha Programme* that capitalism can be transformed by revolution to communism, and the state, in this period of change, would be headed by the "dictatorship of the proletariat". According to Marx, the workers' state would provide free health care, and its educational institutions would be free of church and state interference.[21] The task of the dictatorship of the proletariat would be the nationalization of the means of production and the establishment of a true democracy, which in no respect resembles liberal or populist democracy. According to Marx, "Universal suffrage, direct elections, multiparty campaigning, or parliamentary institutions" would only create "unfreedom". Unlike capitalist democracy that excludes women and imposes residential qualifications, a true democracy would be for the majority, representing "a community in which the free development of each provides the basis for the free development of all".[22]

By nationalizing the means of production, all class distinctions are abolished and the existence of a state is unnecessary. The succession from this is communist society. Marx, not a prophet, left it up to future revolutionaries to determine how a communist society would function in practice.[23] He believed that the future would be formed by "the dialectics of structure and action", thus, only theory could not foresee the outcome of this process. For this reason, Marx concentrated more on examining events of his own time, for example, the Revolution of 1848.[24] McLellan cites Marx in a paragraph written in *The German Ideology,* to illustrate Marx's view of a communist society:

> In communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the

> afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have in mind, without ever becoming hunter, sheppard or critic.[25]

More can only be inferred on Marx's views of the state, from his concepts of alienation, inequality and private property.[26]

Marx's Concept of International Relations

Marx attached much importance to his concept of class, which is, in his view, the dominant actor in the international system. In this sense, the international system clashes not because of its anarchical structure but because of class conflicts. For Marx, two particular features characterize a class: members of society that share the same relations to the means of production and class-consciousness.[27] According to Marx, the "economic conditions" turned the majority of society into a workforce whose "common situation and common interests" are formed by "the domination of capital." He maintained that this workforce "is already a class in relation to capital, but not yet a class for itself." This end, however, is accomplished by a "struggle" in which the workers unite and eventually become "a class for itself".[28] Marx discerned two main classes regarding the placement "of a group in the mode of production." These were the bourgeoisie that owns the means of production and the proletariat, which provides wage-labor and is employed by the bourgeoisie.[29] This implies that, in capitalist society, the bourgeoisie, which is basically nationally organized and controls different governmental systems, and a growing international proletariat, are facing one another in hostility.[30] Marx denoted the proletariat and the bourgeoisie as modern classes. Since the peasantry lacks class-consciousness and relations amongst themselves, Marx did not regard it as a modern class but as a traditional class. Marx signified the modern classes as final classes, because he viewed capitalism as the last adverse stage before a communist society.[31]

According to scholar Andrew Linklater, Marx wrote in the mid 1840s that capitalism would spread around the world and eventually destroy the divisions that set nation-states apart, thus creating a world capitalist society that would replace the international state-system. Colonialism is, for Marx, historically important because it helps capitalism to establish itself in non-capitalist societies. Therefore, Marx views capitalism, which causes the spread of industrial development throughout the whole world, as a precondition for forming a socialist society.[32] Marx noted that private property plays the key role in the transformation process from a traditional into a capitalist and finally into a communist society. Colonizing traditional societies, according to Marx, advances the conditions for an international socialist revolution because only when private property, which comes along with capitalism, exists in a society can it be abolished, and only with its abolition, can man emancipate himself from his alienated existence. This is why Marx, even though he criticized colonialism, vindicated the very same.[33] In practice, Marx had examined "the effects of colonialism on Indian society", which led him to criticize British imperialism, as it oppressively destroyed the Indian textile industry. On the other hand, Marx believed that "colonial rule is beneficial" for the above, mentioned reasons.[34]

Linklater writes that Marx failed to understand the immense consequences of nationalism. Marx believed that differences between societies would be reduced through capitalism.[35] The fact that Marx was an immigrant and therefore lacking in patriotic zeal may explain this misjudgment.[36] Erica L. Brenner, in *Marx and Engels on Nationalism and National Identity: A Reappraisal*, suggests examining the "class reductionist" thesis in this regard. This thesis places class in the center of its analysis and blames class struggles for national conflicts. Moreover, Marx believed that the infrastructure (the economic basis of society) and the division of labor would influence the superstructure and the behavior of classes and states, rather than national consciousness. However, Marx had to deal with different types of nationalism: working class patriotism, bourgeois nationalism, romantic nationalism, and separatist and anti-colonial nationalism. In the mid 19th century, the English and the Irish proletariat faced each other as adversaries.[37] This contradicted Marx's assumption that nationalism could not flourish in a majority of

proletariat organizations.[38] In Marx's view, bourgeois nationalism is hostile "towards the majority within each 'nation' [and] not up on any core set of class neutral 'national' interests".[39] Romantic nationalism, which vindicates politics of national identity[40], according to Marx, may not be better than oppression by a foreign power. Brenner quotes Marx:

> If the Russian autocrat were to be replaced by Polish aristocrats, then despotism would merely have taken out naturalization papers ... Though the Polish lord would no longer have a Russian lord over him, the Polish peasant would still have a lord over him – only a lord who was free rather than one who was a slave. This particular political change involves no social change at all.[41]

Marx distinguishes separatist and anti-colonial nationalist movements according to whether or not they contribute to the transformation towards communism. Here, Marx also distinguishes historical nations who possess the historical right to exist from "historyless" nations, such as Czechs or Slovenes whom Marx believed to be too small and inherently inefficient to exist on their own. With this in mind, Marx favoured the unification of both Italy and Germany. Politically and economically united, these nations would be stronger and more able to dispose of Tsarist and Habsburg influences.[42] Marx also supported Poland's independence. In fact, Marx declared, in 1875, at a meeting of the International Working Men's Association, that the request of the international workers' party for "the creation of an independent Polish nation" was not a contradiction, because, during a time of foreign oppression, the nation aspiring for autonomy would use all its strength towards this end, instead of striving for emancipation of its alienated entity. Therefore, according to Marx, nationalism could serve as an important factor on the road to social emancipation.[43]

Marx thought of history as a sequence of epochs that are at a time founded on a mode of production. Through revolution, the next epoch can be attained.[44] The realization of communism is dependent upon how capitalism develops. The attainment of communism is a dialectical process. The predecessor of communism is capitalism. Capitalism has created desires unable to be satisfied by its own means and consequently would cause its own destruction.[45] Marx distinguished two major types of revolution: the bourgeois democratic revolution and the proletarian or communistic revolution. He concluded from his study of the English, French, and American revolutions that these were all bourgeois revolutions, whose driving force was the middle-class, motivated by the urge for capitalistic expansion.[46] Marx called this form of revolution, 'political revolution', because it only eliminates the old political system. A social revolution, however, removes not only the old power but emancipates also the proletariat.[47] The bourgeoisie tries to conclude a revolution as soon as possible, whereas the proletariat's interest is a lasting revolution so as to unite the working classes in all major world states to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat and to concentrate eventually the productive forces under proletarian supervision.[48] As in Marx's concept of man, the previously discussed praxis is also important in his concept of revolution. Revolution, for Marx, has a "character of praxis." His theory of revolution and its realization through praxis requires a passive (objective) element. This objective element is the "material basis" and its influence is "human need." Human needs, however, are not the cause of revolution, but "they make them possible".[49] In sum, the time is ripe for a proletarian revolution when capitalism has created the necessary conditions for the transformation, and when the proletariat is internationally united through class-consciousness.

The issue of peace and war is connected by different concepts of Marx's thought, including historical materialism, class struggle and communism. According to Marx, universal peace can only be realized when states disappear in the international structure. When a large majority of the world's societies participate in global solidarity and joint action, a world socialist society can come into being.[50] In such a communist society, as Engels explained in his Speeches in Elberfeld, "it will not occur to anyone to disturb internal peace", nor would a communist society fight an aggressive war, as they know "that in war it will only lose men and capital", thereby exceeding the gains of possible territorial

occupations. From this it follows that the only war a communist society would fight, is a defensive war.[51] As Marx and Engles worked closely together, it can be assumed that this is also Marx's view. Peace was prevalent in Europe during Marx's childhood and early adulthood. Hence, it can be assumed that Marx, therefore, did not ascribe too much attention to war. Nevertheless, this did not make him a pacifist. However, he did appeal to the proletariat, in 1864, to oppose their governments' diplomatic trickery so as to defend morality and justice on the international level, as the outbreak of war could be destructive for the class of industrial workers. On the other hand, war could be the promoter of revolution. Marx never formulated binding rules that would suggest the reaction to threats of war.[52] He pointed out that war is related to economics. In this regard, Marx distinguished war in early capitalism from war in modern capitalism. War in early capitalism was a frequent form of interaction between states for colonies and trade competition. Modern or industrial capitalism, according to Marx, was characterized by the drive for peace, as military action could have a disastrous impact on "the stock market." The real cause of war, therefore, is not an economic crisis but a political crisis.[53] According to Marx, "wars of national liberation were entitled to the support of socialists" and could therefore be justified.[54] Frederick Engels described, in his Speeches in Elberfeld, the standing army as "one of the most expensive institutions...by which the nation is deprived of the most vigorous and useful section of the population...".[55] Moreover, Marx and Engels suggested the "abolition of regular armies and their replacement, not by middle-class militias on the model of the National Guard in France, but by a more democratic arming of the people.[56]

Evolution and Relevance of Marx's Thought for International Relations Theory

According to F. Parkinson, most imperialist theories of our day are based on or have grown out of Marx's thought and that of his disciples. Classical Marxism, mainly formed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, was greatly influenced by the emergence of capitalism, an economic system based on competition and on the notions of Adam Smith and David Ricardo. Ricardo and classical Marxists share three fundamental assumptions: (1) the expansion of capitalism (production and trade) occurs "under the stimulus of a homogeneous world market"[57]; (2) governments initially realize the interests of the ruling class; and (3) borders are unimportant because of the assumption that competitive trade is not only transboundary but also universal. In the final analysis, "classical political economists" and classical Marxists differ greatly. The latter view "the contradictions in the capitalist system as both innate and irremediable" and emphasize the self-destroying mechanism of capitalism. Their concern is who will gain the definite "control of the world economic system" – the proletariat or the bourgeoisie.[58] Due to the unequal distribution of capital between core and periphery, neo-Marxist thought emerged and followers of this school came to the conclusion that "the economic subsystems", such as Britain and France, dominate "the world economic system", thereby contradicting classical Marxist assumption. Neo-Marxists believe that capitalism can cause severe conflicts, on the international level, and that imperialism is rooted in "insufficient domestic demand", so that "capital [is] compelled to seek outlets abroad" and, if needed, with the use of force.[59] Out of this debate, two groups emerged: the reformist group, with Karl Kautsky and Joseph Schumpeter, and the revolutionists, with Rosa Luxemburg, N.I. Bukharin and V.I. Lenin. Lenin wrote *Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism*. Published in 1916, this work illustrates his beliefs that imperialism is the unavoidable consequence of capitalism. Lenin also stressed the unequal distribution of capital and the limitation of sources and markets, which would increase economic tensions at the international level.[60]

The next step in the evolution of Marx's notion, according to Parkinson, was development theory. This new approach was made possible when many less developed states became autonomous and "a sustained debate on their place in the international system and the nature of the relationship between developed and undeveloped countries" grew out of this new situation.[61] Current theorists are concerned that less developed countries will remain underprivileged and work to find ways out of this dilemma. The most sophisticated of this approach came from Latin America. The Argentine economist, Raul Prebish, introduced the terms "core" and "periphery". The former is "composed of fully developed industrialized

countries" that are the beneficiaries of the conditions of trade, and the latter contains the less developed countries that can only change their destiny by industrializing.[62]

Critical theory "subscribe[s] to the Marxist view that the basic task is not to interpret the world, but rather to change it".[63] This theory is, according to academic Tom Travis, connected with the Frankfurt School, in particular with the notion of Juergen Habermas. According to Travis, its central claim is that history and politics form the foundation of all knowledge. This approach was adopted in the 1980s to challenge neo-realism and neo-liberalism, with regard to international behavior in particular. Most Marxists agree that capitalism is the source of international behavior and that its expansion forces core states to create tremendous military power, in order to suppress the uprisings of peripheral states, which try to liberate themselves from such dominant core countries and the prevailing capitalist system. The fact that many of the "nonstate actors" come from the financial arena shows the predominance of economical factors in international society. Even wars that are fought on behalf of security issues have as their source economical matters, such as oil resources. The Persian Gulf War in 1990/91 is an example of such a war.[64]

According to writer Kenneth W. Thompson, Marx's philosophy is blamed for the cruelty perpetrated by countries whose official state ideology claims to be Marxist. For example, the Soviet Union justified the oppression of political opposition and the persecution of certain groups of the population through Marxist rhetoric of the eventual creation of a true communist state.[65] Gamble points out that it is, however, important to distinguish between Marxism-Leninism, which formed the acknowledged ideology of the former Soviet Union, and Marxism, which is "a distinct theoretical perspective, a particular approach in the social sciences, and an independent critical theory".[66] Particularly, Western Marxism criticizes the doctrine and behavioral pattern of the Soviet Union. There are two opposing views of whether Marxism is of relevance in the present international system. The first views Marxism as a dead political practice and ideological doctrine[67] while the second believes that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Marxism is now finally free of its false connection to a state and can begin again to objectively examine the strength that determines the worldwide economy and the behavior of states. Indeed, "Marxist analysis...points to the urgent need for new systems of multilevel governance in the global economy to identify, manage and steer" our contemporary problems of capital concentration (North-South partition) and increased interdependence that may lead to a financial crisis with serious consequences for the political and economical system.[68]

Conclusion

Although this essay has sought to give a better understanding of certain terms with regard to international society, it is beyond the scope and extent of this work to capture all of the relevant issues of Marx's thought. Most importantly, however, Marx attached great value to the terms 'freedom' and 'universalism', emphasizing class struggle and the predominance of economic factors in the international system. Nonetheless, he neglected or underestimated the role of the state as well as important political elements of international relations, such as diplomacy, the balance of power, nationalism and war. This has led to profound criticism of Marx's ideas. However, Marx's thought forms the foundation of social theory, whereupon, to a large extent, critical international theory was developed in the 1980s. For most Marxists, marking the total collapse of the capitalistic system as a result of the stock market-crash of 1929 validated Marx's ideas. Ultimately, disregarding its perceptible weaknesses, Marx's thought and Marxism in general, serves, for realist theories – which assume that world politics is mainly determined by the struggle for security and military might – as an important counterbalance.

Notes

[1] Richard P. Appelbaum, *Karl Marx: Masters of Social Theory Volume 7* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc., 1988) 19.
[2] Erich Eyck, *Bismarck and The German Empire* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1958) 10-12.
[3] Richard P. Appelbaum, *Karl Marx: Masters of Social Theory Volume 7* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc., 1988) 20-29.
[4] Ibid, 19-33.
[5] Erich Fromm, *Marx's Concept of Man* (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1966) 26-29.
[6] Gajo Petrovic, "Marx's Concept of Man", in Tom Bottomore, ed, *Interpretations of Marx* (N.Y: Blackwell, 1988) 143-144.
[7] Erich Fromm, *Marx's Concept of Man* (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1966) 25.
[8] Ibid, 25-26.
[9] David McLellan, *The Thought of Karl Marx* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1980) 234.
[10] Gajo Petrovic, "Marx's Concept of Man", in Tom Bottomore, ed, *Interpretations of Marx* (New York: Blackwell, 1988) 145.
[11] Erich Fromm, *Marx's Concept of Man* (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1966) 47.
[12] Ibid, 44-58.
[13] Ralph Miliband, "Marx and the State", in Tom Bottomore, ed, *Interpretations of Marx* (New York: Blackwell, 1988) 272.
[14] Ibid, 271-272.
[15] Karl Marx, "Communist Manifesto", in Siegried Landshut, ed, *Die Frueschriften* (Stuttgart: Kroener, 1953) 525-526.
[16] "State", www.marxist.org online, 4 January, 2003.
[17] Karl Marx, "Communist Manifesto", in Siegried Landshut, ed, *Die Frueschriften* (Stuttgart: Kroener, 1953) 526.
[18] Miliband, Ralph, "Marx and the State", in Tom Bottomore, ed, *Interpretations of Marx* (New York: Blackwell, 1988) 272.
[19] Ibid, 275.
[20] Ibid, 272-280.
[21] Richard P. Appelbaum, *Karl Marx: Masters of Social Theory Volume 7* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc., 1988) 130-135.
[22] Kenneth W. Thompson, *Fathers of International Thought: The Legacy of Political Theory* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State U. Press, 1994) 123.
[23] Andrew Linklater, "Marxism", in Scott Burchill, ed, *Theories of International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996) 147.
[24] Richard P. Appelbaum, *Karl Marx: Masters of Social Theory Volume 7* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc., 1988) 129.
[25] David McLellan, *The Thought of Karl Marx* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1980) 245.
[26] Anon. "Marx After Communism" *The Economist* 21 Dec. 2002 17-19.
[27] Tom Bottomore, ed, Introduction, *Interpretations of Marx* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988) 16-17.
[28] Ibid, 17.
[29] David McLellan, *The Thought of Karl Marx* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1980) 178-180.
[30] Andrew Linklater, "Marxism", in Burchill, Scott, ed, *Theories of International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996) 129.
[31] Tom Bottomore, ed, Introduction, *Interpretations of Marx*, (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988) 17-18
[32] Andrew Linklater, "Marxism", in Burchill, Scott, ed, *Theories of International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996) 129-131.
[33] Shlomo Avineri, *The Social and Political Thought of Karl* Marx (London: Cambridge U. Press, 1968) 169.
[34] Tom Bottomore, Laurence Harris, V.G. Kiernan and Ralph Miliband, ed, *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought.* (Cambridge: Harvard, 1983) 84.
[35] Andrew Linklater, "Marxism", in Burchill, Scott, ed, *Theories of International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996) 131.
[36] Tom Bottomore, Laurence Harris, V.G. Kiernan and Ralph Miliband, eds, *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought.* (Cambridge: Harvard, 1983) 346.

[37] Erica L Brenner, "Marx and Engels on Nationalism and National Identity: A Reappraisal" *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* (1988) 2-9.
[38] Andrew Linklater, "Marxism", in Burchill, Scott, ed, *Theories of International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996) 131.
[39] Erica L Brenner, "Marx and Engels on Nationalism and National Identity: A Reappraisal" *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* (1988)16.
[40] Roger Scruton, *A Dictionary of Political Thought* (MacMillan, London: 1996)
[41] Erica L Brenner, "Marx and Engels on Nationalism and National Identity: A Reappraisal", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* (1988) 10.
[42] Ibid, 10-12.
[43] Ibid, 8.
[44] Tom Bottomore, Laurence Harris, V.G. Kiernan and Ralph Miliband, eds, *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought.*

(Cambridge: Harvard, 1983) 425.
[45] Shlomo Avineri, *The Social and Political Thought of Karl* Marx (London: Cambridge U. Press, 1968) 150-151.
[46] Tom Bottomore, Laurence Harris, V.G. Kiernan and Ralph Miliband, eds, *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought.* (Cambridge: Harvard, 1983) 425.
[47] David McLellan, *The Thought of Karl Marx* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1980) 224-225.
[48] Miliband, Ralph. "Marx and the State", in Bottomore, Tom, ed, *Interpretations of Marx* (New York: Blackwell, 1988) 284.
[49] Shlomo Avineri, *The Social and Political Thought of Karl* Marx (London: Cambridge U. Press, 1968) 138-139.
[50] Andrew Linklater, "Marxism", in Burchill, Scott, ed, *Theories of International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996) 134.
[51] Marx and Engels, "Speeches in Elberfeld", in Progress Publishers et al, vol. 4, ed, *Collected Work: 1844-45* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975) 249.
[52] David Kirby, *War, Peace, and Revolution* (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc, 1986) 2.
[53] Tom Bottomore, Laurence Harris, V.G. Kiernan and Ralph Miliband, eds, *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought.* (Cambridge: Harvard, 1983) 519.
[54] Ibid, 347.
[55] Marx and Engels, "Speeches in Elberfeld", in Progress Publishers et al, vol. 4, ed, *Collected Work: 1844-45* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975) 249.
[56] Tom Bottomore, Laurence Harris, V.G. Kiernan and Ralph Miliband, eds, *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought.* (Cambridge: Harvard, 1983) 520.
[57] F. Parkinson, *The Philosophy of International Relations: a Study in the History of Thought* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1977) 112.
[58] Ibid, 111-112.
[59] Ibid, 115.
[60] Ibid, 111-115.
[61] Ibid, 122.
[62] Ibid, 115-127.
[63] Evans and Newnham, The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1998.
[64] Tom Travis, "Usefulness of Four Theories of International Relations in Understanding the Emerging World Order", *International Studies* 31.3 (1994): 256-259.
[65] Kenneth W. Thompson, *Fathers of International Thought: The Legacy of Political Theory* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State U. Press, 1994) 126.
[66] Andrew Gamble, "Marxism after Communism: Beyond Realism and Historicism" *Review of International Studies* 25 (Special Issue) Dec. (1999) 127.
[67] Ibid, 130.
[68] Ibid, 127-130, 144.

Works Cited

Anon. "Marx After Communism" *The Economist* 21 Dec. 2002.

Appelbaum, Richard P. *Karl Marx: Masters of Social Theory Volume 7.* Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc., 1988.

Avineri, Shlomo. *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx.* London: Cambridge U. Press, 1968.

Bottomore, Tom. Ed. Introduction. *Interpretations of Marx.* New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988.

Bottomore, Tom, Laurence Harris, V.G. Kiernan and Ralph Miliband, Eds. *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought.* Cambridge: Harvard, 1983.

Brenner, Erica L. "Marx and Engels on Nationalism and National Identity: A Reappraisal". *Millennium: Journal of International Studies,* 1988.

Evans and Newnham. *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations.* Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1998.

Eyck, Erich. *Bismarck and The German Empire.* London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1958.

Fromm, Erich. *Marx's Concept of Man.* New York: Frederick Ungar, 1966.

Gamble, Andrew. "Marxism after Communism: Beyond Realism and Historicism". *Review of International Studies* 25 (Special Issue) Dec. 1999.

Kirby, David. *War, Peace, and Revolution.* New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1986.

Linklater, Andrew. "Marxism". *Theories of International Relations.* Ed. Scott Burchill. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996.

Marx, Karl. "Communist Manifesto". *Die Frueschriften*. Ed. Siegried Landshut. Stuttgart: Kroener, 1953.

Marx and Engels. "Speeches in Elberfeld". *Collected Work: 1844-45*. Ed. Progress Publishers et al. Vol. 4. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975.

McLellan, David. *The Thought of Karl Marx*. London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1980.

Miliband, Ralph. "Marx and the State". *Interpretations of Marx*. Ed. Tom Bottomore. New York: Blackwell, 1988.

Parkinson, F. *The Philosophy of International Relations: A Study in the History of Thought*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1977.

Petrovic, Gajo. "Marx's Concept of Man". *Interpretations of Marx*. Ed. Tom Bottomore. New York: Blackwell, 1988.

"State." www.marxist.org. Online. 4 January. 2003.

Thompson Kenneth, W. *Fathers of International Thought: The Legacy of Political Theory*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State U. Press, 1994.

Travis, Tom. "Usefulness of Four Theories of International Relations in Understanding the Emerging World Order". *International Studies* 31 (3) 1994.

Théories marxistes classiques de l'impérialisme

Myriam Larose

De tout temps, les nations ont tenté de s'étendre et d'augmenter leur pouvoir. Les pratiques qui traduisent la volonté de dominer une autre nation forment l'impérialisme. Étudié depuis longtemps, celui-ci a toutefois fait l'objet d'une attention particulière avec l'arrivée du marxisme. Bien que Marx n'ait pas explicitement fait référence à l'impérialisme, il a néanmoins semé les notions qui ont inspiré plus tard certains théoriciens marxistes classiques (Hilferding, Luxembourg, Boukharine, Lénine) et néo-marxistes (Baran, Emmanuel, Amin). En ce sens, la présente vise en un premier temps à présenter les notions fondamentales de la philosophie marxiste concernant la nature humaine et le capitalisme. Ensuite, deux perspectives de l'impérialisme seront abordées, celle de Marx et celle de Lénine. Finalement, ce texte s'achèvera par un court survol présentant l'évolution des théories marxistes de l'impérialisme au cours de la deuxième moitié du vingtième siècle.

Conception Marxiste de la Nature humaine

La base de toute philosophie repose souvent sur une certaine conception de la nature humaine. D'après l'opinion générale, Marx rejette le concept de nature humaine[1]. Cependant, Norman Geras, dans « *Marx and Human Nature* », affirme le contraire. Cet auteur soutient que lorsque Marx affirme que les humains entretiennent des relations de production, il énonce ainsi les caractéristiques fondamentales et invariables, soit les besoins de bases[2]. Que Marx croit ou non en l'existence de la nature humaine, il en précise néanmoins les caractéristiques et ce principalement à travers les relations de production.

Marx soutient que les relations de production affectent la nature de l'être humain : ce type de relation crée des classes. Marx perçoit l'homme comme étant *actif* dans son développement. Contrairement aux animaux, l'homme adapte son environnement pour satisfaire ses besoins. Cependant, lorsque l'homme ne contrôle pas les moyens de production (le cas du prolétariat), il est dégradé au niveau d'animal. Les objets qu'il produit étant la propriété de ses employeurs, l'employé devient donc dépendant du capital. Ce faisant, la distance sociale entre les capitalistes et les prolétaires s'accroît. Le capitaliste, pour faire du profit, exploite le prolétaire et en arrive à ne plus le considérer comme un être humain, mais plutôt comme un moyen de parvenir à ses fins. L'homme n'est plus une fin en soi, mais un moyen. Toutefois, aussi difficiles que soient ses conditions, l'homme ne perd pas son humanité. Contrairement à l'animal, qui, sous des conditions difficiles, devient malheureux ou meurt, l'homme, lui, se révolte[3]. D'où la lutte des classes et la conception Marxiste de l'évolution de l'histoire et de modes de production.

Conception Marxiste du capitalisme

Le marxisme se définit comme une tradition de pensée et de pratique fondée par Karl Marx[4]. Les théories marxistes reposent sur l'analyse matérialiste dialectique de l'histoire et surtout des modes et relations de productions. Le matérialisme est une doctrine selon laquelle les événements doivent être expliqués en référence aux causes matérielles, surtout de nature économiques[5]. L'analyse marxiste repose donc sur l'existence sociale des individus plutôt que sur le monde des idées. Par conséquent, les activités économiques jouent, selon Marx, un rôle prépondérant dans le façonnement des individus et sociétés[6].

La structure de la société est interprétée sous deux angles : celui de la sous-structure et celui de la super-structure. Alors que la sous-structure est constituée par les modes de production et les conditions matérielles de la production[7], la super-structure est composée de l'État, de la loi, de l'idéologie, de la religion, de la philosophie, des arts et de la moralité[8]. Les relations de production sont également

importantes : ce sont les relations sociales qui surviennent lors du processus de production[9]. Elles sont définies en terme de contrôle des modes de production. La classe dominante, les non-producteurs, contrôlent le surplus social, soit une portion de ce qui est produit par les producteurs[10].

D'autre part, la vision marxiste de l'histoire s'avère également essentielle pour la compréhension de l'impérialisme. Marx entrevoit l'histoire comme une suite de différents modes de production, chacun étant un développement économique par rapport à l'ancien. Chaque mode de production est porteur de forces antagonistes, à cause d'intérêts de classe divergents. Les conflits entre les classes représentent le moteur de changement de l'histoire et permettent d'avancer à un niveau ultérieur. Marx soutient que la phase des relations de production bourgeoises serait la dernière porteuse d'antagonisme et qu'elle serait remplacée par un mode de production où les intérêts des individus coïncident : le socialisme[11].

De plus, Marx a tenté de cerner les dynamiques du capitalisme et est arrivé à plusieurs constats. La production capitaliste est caractérisée par le fait qu'elle est destinée à être échangée plutôt qu'à être utilisée par les producteurs[12]. La dynamique principale est l'expansion du capital, qui repose sur l'exploitation du prolétariat et sur la production de plus-value. Le capitalisme a besoin d'attirer le plus de capital et s'étend donc à travers le monde. Les résultats sont une concentration et une centralisation du capital, un développement inégal et des crises économiques. Ce sont de telles contradictions qui nourriront le mouvement socialiste et amèneront la prochaine phase[13] de l'évolution de l'économie et de l'histoire.

Conception Marxiste de l'Impérialisme : la perspective de Karl Marx

Marx n'a jamais abordé directement la question de l'impérialisme. Cependant, ses descriptions du capitalisme et ses études des cas de l'Irlande et de l'Inde font qu'indirectement il traite ce concept. Par ailleurs, sa vision de l'expansion du capitalisme et des résultats qu'il en prévoyait vont en ce même sens.

Marx a écrit à une époque où plusieurs philosophes bourgeois croyaient que le capitalisme devait éventuellement arriver à un état stationnaire. Cependant, l'opinion générale voulait que le colonialisme (ou l'impérialisme) puisse faire reculer la date de cette stagnation, idée que Marx partageait[14]. En étudiant la nature du capitalisme, Marx est arrivé à la conclusion que le capitalisme était par nature expansionniste : il cherche à transformer le monde à son image[15]. Une fois que le capitalisme est établit dans un pays, les compétiteurs veulent trouver de nouveaux moyens de gagner la concurrence en augmentant leur productivité et en abaissant leurs coûts de production. Cela les amènent à contrôler des marchés étrangers[16].

L'expansion dans les marchés étrangers est un élément important pour le capitalisme, mais il n'est pas nécessaire pour son apparition. La recherche des marchés étrangers est une conséquence de la baisse du taux de profit moyen[17] au niveau national. Les marchés internationaux, eux, font monter le taux de profit, car ils apportent des matières premières moins chères et une baisse du prix des commodités de base[18]. Ces marchés aident donc à retarder les crises économiques[19]. Les pays avancés trouvent leur profit de deux manières principales. Premièrement, ils peuvent vendre des biens aux marchés étrangers à une valeur supérieure à celle de leur propre pays, mais plus bas que dans le pays sous-développé. Cela résulte en une augmentation du profit. Deuxièmement, les pays avancés peuvent augmenter leur profit en utilisant du travail forcé. Le coût de cette main-d'œuvre est inférieur à celui des pays avancés, où le prolétariat s'est organisé et est plus résistant[20].

Marx distingue trois phases lors de l'expansion capitaliste. La première est le pillage et la seconde, l'exploitation à travers le commerce et les taxes. Ces deux stages augmentent les richesses matérielles dans les pays avancés, mais ne changent pas radicalement les modes de production dans les pays sous-développés. La dernière phase, celle de l'investissement dans l'industrie, change le mode de

production. Les pays industrialisés investissent du capital dans les pays sous-développés. En établissant du capital industriel plutôt que marchand, le pays sous-développé adopte le mode de production capitaliste, permettant ainsi au modèle capitaliste de se reproduire[21].

Le combat de la bourgeoisie pour la conquête du marché provoque des avancées technologiques et par conséquent l'expansion du capitalisme. À ce moment, le pays sous-développé passe d'un mode de production pré-capitaliste à un mode de production capitaliste[22]. Marx voit en cette expansion une force progressive et non régressive : l'avancement du capitalisme dans le monde pose les bases pour l'avancement futur vers un ordre socialiste[23].

Pour Marx, les acteurs internationaux sont les classes dirigeantes, qui étendent leur modèle au reste du monde afin d'augmenter leur profit, affectant ainsi les nations pré-capitalistes. L'État n'est acteur qu'en tant qu'instrument des classes bourgeoises. Le système international est donc conditionné par des motifs purement économiques où chaque groupe capitaliste tente de tirer son profit.

Conception Marxiste de l'Impérialisme : la perspective de Lénine

Depuis Marx, plusieurs théoriciens se sont penchés sur la question de l'impérialisme, tels que Hilferding, Luxembourg, Hobson ou Boukharine. Cependant, la théorie considérée comme définitive parmi les théories marxistes classiques est celle de V.I. Lénine, présentée dans son pamphlet « L'impérialisme, stade suprême du capitalisme. »[24] La théorie de Lénine est fortement influencée par celles de Hobson, Hilferding et est très similaire à celle de Boukharine. En écrivant ce livre, Lénine avait l'intention d'expliquer au prolétariat l'idée générale de l'impérialisme. En effet, il y détaille les causes et des effets de l'impérialisme. Il y propose également une vision claire du système international et de ses acteurs.

Tout d'abord, Lénine croyait que le tournant du 20ième siècle représentait le stade suprême du capitalisme. En effet, il y voyait une manifestation évidente des contradictions du capitalisme, ses caractéristiques principales commençant à se transformer en leur opposé. Par exemple, la concurrence libre, caractéristique fondamentale du capitalisme, commençait à se transformer en monopoles[25]. Le capitalisme est ainsi déjà en transition vers le socialisme. Lénine dénote aussi l'émergence du capital financier à cette époque : les relations entre les banques et le capital industriel sont tellement fortes qu'on assiste à la naissance d'une nouvelle catégorie : le capital financier.[26]

Selon Lénine, l'impérialisme apparaît lorsque les monopoles et la hausse du capital financier augmentent la compétition.[27] Lénine indique très clairement dans son livre les points fondamentaux de l'impérialisme :

> *« [...] we must give a definition of imperialism that will include the following five essential features :*
> 1. *The concentration of production and capital, developed to such a high stage that it has created monopolies which play a decisive r[o]le in economic life.*
> 2. *The merging of bank capital with industrial capital and the creation, on the basis of this "finance capital", of a financial oligarchy.*
> 3. *The export of capital, as distinguished from the export of commodities, becomes of particularly great importance.*
> 4. *International monopoly combines of capitalists are formed which divide up the world.*
> 5. *The territorial division of the world by the great capitalist powers is completed. [28]»*

Il y a ainsi formation de trusts internationaux qui intensifie les inégalités et les contradictions inhérentes à l'économie mondiale[29]. Ces acteurs veulent s'assurer le contrôle des colonies, car ce sont des régions

vitales pour les monopoles nationaux.[30] L'impérialisme est donc une phase de conflits à l'intérieur même du camp capitaliste[31].

Le processus commence par la nécessité d'exporter. Cependant, contrairement aux phases précédentes, le stade de l'impérialisme est caractérisé par l'exportation de capital, et non plus de commodités. Cela est dû au fait que l'accumulation de capital dans les pays avancés est si grande, qu'il y a « surabondance de capital.» Il n'est pas profitable pour les capitalistes d'investir dans leur propre pays, à cause du mauvais état de l'agriculture et des conditions de vie des masses. Investir dans ces domaines diminuerait leurs profits, alors les capitalistes exportent leur capital dans les pays sous-développés. Le taux de profit y est plus élevé, parce que le capital y est rare, les prix de terrains, les salaires et le prix des matières premières y sont plus bas[32].

Dans la perspective marxiste-léniniste, les effets de l'impérialisme sont vus de manière positive par rapport à la future révolution socialiste. Premièrement, il accélère le développement dans les pays sous-développés, tout en ralentissant quelque peu celui des pays exportateurs[33]. Dans les pays avancés, l'impérialisme profite à la bourgeoisie, mais aussi à l'aristocratie des travailleurs. Cette dernière classe est formée de la strate supérieure des travailleurs qui s'allient avec la bourgeoisie, celle-ci réalisant suffisamment de profits pour pouvoir en donner une partie à ce groupe[34]. De plus, il y a montée de la « strate rentière », séparée de la production. Cette classe vit, dans un style de vie parasite, de l'exploitation du labeur des pays et des colonies d'outre-mer[35].

Lénine analyse surtout les dimensions économiques. Cependant, il mentionne également qu'il se crée, dans la super-structure économique, une politique et une idéologie qui stimulent la conquête coloniale[36].

La configuration du système international est claire dans le texte de Lénine. Le monde est divisé en trusts capitalistes, qui, après s'être séparé le marché interne d'un pays, se séparent le reste du monde :

> « The monopoly combines of the capitalists—cartels, syndicates, trusts—divide among themselves first of all the domestic market of a country, and more or less completely seize control of the country's production. But under capitalism the home market is inevitably bound up with the foreign market. Capitalism long ago created a world market. In proportion as the export of capital increased, and as all the foreign and colonial relations, the "spheres of influence" of the biggest monopolist combines, expanded, things tended "naturally" towards an international agreement among them, and towards the formation of international cartels.[37] »

Les acteurs internationaux sont, comme l'avait observé Marx, les classes dirigeantes. En effet, d'après Lénine, l'exportation de capital constitue une base solide pour l'oppression et l'exploitation de la plupart des nations par quelques États riches. En utilisant des méthodes monopolistiques, le capital financier peut établir des relations partout, étendant son filet sur le monde entier. Les banques jouent un rôle important dans ce processus [38]. Puisque la compétition entre capitalistes s'étend au niveau international, les luttes entre organisations monopolistiques se transforment aussi en luttes entre États développés, qui sont acteurs mais en tant qu'instruments de la bourgeoisie. Les colonies, elles, ne sont pas vraiment des acteurs, car elles sont simplement utilisées par les pays avancés. Leur rôle est tout simplement de protéger les monopoles de la compétition. Ainsi, plus le capitalisme est développé, plus la compétition pour les matières premières se fait sentir et plus la lutte pour les colonies est féroce[39].

Lénine analyse également les causes de la guerre. Il réfute l'idée de Kautsky selon laquelle il est possible, grâce à l'« ultra-impérialisme », de créer une ère de paix à l'intérieur du système capitaliste. Pour Lénine, le capitalisme mène nécessairement à la violence et à la conquête[40]. Une fois la division du monde faite entre les cartels capitalistes, il est encore possible de changer la configuration de ce partage. Cela peut être le résultat d'un développement inégal, de guerres ou de banqueroutes[41]. Par exemple, la

Première Guerre Mondiale est, selon Lénine, le résultat du désir de l'Allemagne de changer la configuration mondiale[42]. Ainsi, une fois le globe partagé, les capitalistes ne peuvent que se tourner l'un vers l'autre[43].

Conception Marxiste de l'Impérialisme dès Lénine à nos jours

Après la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale, les théories marxistes de l'impérialisme ont connu des changements majeurs. L'emphase mise sur les rivalités et les guerres a fait place à la centralité de la domination américaine. Les théories de Baran et Sweezy dans les années soixante ont marqué un tournant. Selon eux, les monopoles causent la stagnation autant dans les pays développés que dans les pays sous-développés.[44] Cela est causé par le fait que les surplus sont utilisés dans des buts peu rentables. Les pays sous-développés sont dominés par le capital étranger, la bourgeoisie locale, et par des intérêts mercantiles. Ceux-ci s'opposent au développement.[45]

Dans les années soixante et soixante-dix, ce sont les théories de la dépendance qui ont dominé la pensée marxiste. Ces théories divisent le système capitaliste mondial entre centre et périphérie. Le centre se développe aux dépends de la périphérie et la périphérie devient dépendante du centre. Les théoriciens marxistes qui ont travaillé sur la dépendance sont Andre Gunder Frank, Immanuel Wallerstein et Samir Amin.[46] Ces théoriciens prédisaient que les États-Unis continueraient à dominer. Il y a peu de chances que le Tiers-Monde puisse se développer sans faire une cassure nette avec le système capitaliste mondial[47]. Dans les années soixante-dix et quatre-vingt, le point de vue marxiste classique a connu aussi un regain de popularité[48].

Pertinence de la théorie Marxiste de l'Impérialisme

Bien qu'elles aient été critiquées et reformulées maintes fois, les théories marxistes classiques de l'impérialisme sont encore utiles pour analyser la situation mondiale actuelle. Un des exemples est celui des multinationales, qui sont présentes depuis quelques siècles. Ces multinationales résultent de la concentration et de la centralisation du capital à l'échelle mondiale. Bien qu'elles opèrent dans plusieurs États, la majorité de ces compagnies ont une base nationale où se trouve les racines historiques et où sont recrutée la majorité des cadres. Le capital a encore besoin du support de cet État de base pour protéger ses intérêts. La protection de la propriété ou le respect des contrats, droits garantis par l'État au niveau national, le sont aussi au niveau international à travers des accords entre États. Les États sont ainsi amenés à utiliser de leurs relations diplomatiques dans l'intérêt des multinationales, ce qui peut se traduire par l'impérialisme. [49]

Dans un même ordre d'idée, les crises au Moyen-Orient peuvent être interprétées selon la perspective Marxiste de l'impérialisme. Berch Berberoglu, dans son livre « Turmoil in the Middle East : Imperialism, War, and Political Instability, » attribue la Guerre du Golfe à une lutte entre les puissances mondiales que sont les États-Unis, l'Allemagne et le Japon. Selon lui, les États-Unis chercheraient à punir l'Irak pour avoir entretenu des relations économiques et géopolitiques avec les rivaux des américains concernant l'accès et le contrôle du pétrole au Moyen-Orient.[50] Que cette hypothèse soit vraie ou non vraie, il est évident que les diverses opérations américaines au Moyen-Orient ont pour but de s'assurer le monopole sur la région et ses ressources pétrolières.

Conclusion

En résumé, les théories marxistes classiques de l'impérialisme sont fidèles aux notions de base du marxisme. Elles élaborent sur le concept d'expansion du capitalisme pour montrer que l'impérialisme est une étape précédant la venue du socialisme. Il accélère le développement capitaliste de la planète entière, ce qui mènera le capitalisme à sa fin, car il ne pourra plus s'étendre. Marx et Lénine voyaient donc l'impérialisme comme un mal nécessaire. Pour ces derniers, le système international est un échiquier où

s'étendent les trusts capitalistes afin de mettre la main sur les matières premières et augmenter leur profit. Les perspectives de Marx et Lénine seront remises en question après la seconde Guerre Mondiale, car il fallait réinterpréter le sous-développement du Tiers-Monde. Cependant, en changeant les théories de l'impérialisme, les nouveaux théoriciens ont changé en partie ou en tout les notions fondamentales du marxisme. Ils ont également mis plus d'emphase sur les relations d'exploitation et d'oppression.

Notes

[1] Kevin Waddington, *Outlines of Marxist philosophy*, (London : Lawrence and Wishart, 1974) 12.
[2] Norman Geras, *Marx and human nature: refutation of a legend*, (London : NLB, 1983) 67.
[3] Kevin Waddington, *Outlines of Marxist philosophy*, (London : Lawrence and Wishart, 1974) 17-20.
[4] George Henry Radcliffe Parkinson et al., *Marx and Marxisms*, (Cambridge; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1982) 21.
[5] Kevin Waddington, *Outlines of Marxist philosophy*, (London : Lawrence and Wishart, 1974) 22.
[6] Charles A. Barone, *Marxist thought on imperialism : survey and critique*, (Armonk, N.Y. : M.E. Sharpe, 1985) 6.
[7] Kevin Waddington, *Outlines of Marxist philosophy*, (London : Lawrence and Wishart, 1974) 11.
[8] Marx, Karl Heinrich" in John Eatwell et al., ed, *The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics*, (The MacMillan Press Limited, 1987) 369.
[9] Kevin Waddington, *Outlines of Marxist philosophy*, (London : Lawrence and Wishart, 1974) 11.
[10] Charles A. Barone, *Marxist thought on imperialism : survey and critique*, (Armonk, N.Y. : M.E. Sharpe, 1985) 6.
[11] Ibid,7.
[12] Ibid, 8.
[13] Ibid,12-13.
[14] Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *Theories of imperialism*, (New York : Random House, 1980) 31.
[15] Charles A. Barone, *Marxist thought on imperialism : survey and critique*, (Armonk, N.Y. : M.E. Sharpe, 1985) 11.
[16] Anthony Brewer, *Marxist theories of imperialism : a critical survey*, (London; New York : Routledge, 1990) 42.
[17] Chronis Polychroniou, *Marxist perspectives on imperialism : a theoretical analysis*, (New York : Praeger, 1991) 36.
[18] Charles A. Barone, *Marxist thought on imperialism : survey and critique*, (Armonk, N.Y. : M.E. Sharpe, 1985) 11.
[19] Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *Theories of imperialism*, (New York : Random House, 1980) 32.
[20] Charles A. Barone, *Marxist thought on imperialism : survey and critique*, (Armonk, N.Y. : M.E. Sharpe, 1985) 11-12.
[21] Chronis Polychroniou, *Marxist perspectives on imperialism : a theoretical analysis*, (New York : Praeger, 1991) 34-35.
[22] Charles A. Barone, *Marxist thought on imperialism : survey and critique*, (Armonk, N.Y. : M.E. Sharpe, 1985) 13.
[23] Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *Theories of imperialism*, (New York : Random House, 1980) 32.
[24] Chronis Polychroniou, *Marxist perspectives on imperialism : a theoretical analysis*, (New York : Praeger, 1991) 72.
[25] Charles A. Barone, *Marxist thought on imperialism : survey and critique*, (Armonk, N.Y. : M.E. Sharpe, 1985) 46.
[26] Chronis Polychroniou, *Marxist perspectives on imperialism : a theoretical analysis*, (New York : Praeger, 1991) 72-75.
[27] Charles A. Barone, *Marxist thought on imperialism : survey and critique*, (Armonk, N.Y. : M.E. Sharpe, 1985) 46.
[28] Vladimir Il'ich Lénine, *Imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism : a popular outline*, (New York : International Pub., 1972) 81.
[29] Charles A. Barone, *Marxist thought on imperialism : survey and critique*, (Armonk, N.Y. : M.E. Sharpe, 1985) 48.
[30] Chronis Polychroniou, *Marxist perspectives on imperialism : a theoretical analysis*, (New York : Praeger, 1991) 79.
[31] Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *Theories of imperialism*, (New York : Random House, 1980) 49.
[32] Charles A. Barone, *Marxist thought on imperialism : survey and critique*, (Armonk, N.Y. : M.E. Sharpe, 1985) 49.
[33] Ibid, 50.
[34] Chronis Polychroniou, *Marxist perspectives on imperialism : a theoretical analysis*, (New York : Praeger, 1991) 81-82.
[35] Victor Gordon Kiernan, *Marxism and imperialism : studies*, (New York : St. Martin's Press, 1975) 47.
[36] Charles A. Barone, *Marxist thought on imperialism : survey and critique*, (Armonk, N.Y. : M.E. Sharpe, 1985) 51.
[37] Vladimir Il'ich Lénine, *Imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism : a popular outline*, (New York : International Pub., 1972) 62.
[38] Charles A. Barone, *Marxist thought on imperialism : survey and critique*, (Armonk, N.Y. : M.E. Sharpe, 1985) 50-51.
[39] Ibid, 51.
[40] Victor Gordon Kiernan, *Marxism and imperialism : studies*, (New York : St. Martin's Press, 1975) 49.
[41] Charles A. Barone, *Marxist thought on imperialism : survey and critique*, (Armonk, N.Y. : M.E. Sharpe, 1985) 51.
[42] Chronis Polychroniou, *Marxist perspectives on imperialism : a theoretical analysis*, (New York : Praeger, 1991) 79-80.
[43] Kevin Anderson, "Lenin, Bukharin, and the Marxian Concepts of Dialectics and Imperialism : A Study in Contrasts". *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 15 (1987): 206.
[44] Anthony Brewer, *Marxist theories of imperialism : a critical survey*, (London; New York : Routledge, 1990) 137.
[45] Ibid, 160.
[46] Ibid, 161-162.
[47] Ibid, 283-284.
[48] Ibid, 260.
[49] Ibid, 261-266.
[50] Berch Berberoglu, *Turmoil in the Middle East: Imperialism, War, and Political Instability*, (New York: State University of New York Press, 1999) 111.

Bibliographie

Anderson, Kevin. « Lenin, Bukharin, and the Marxian Concepts of Dialectics and Imperialism : A Study in Contrasts. » *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, 15, 2. 1987. 197-213.

Barone, Charles A. *Marxist thought on imperialism : survey and critique*. Armonk, N.Y. : M.E. Sharpe, 1985.

Berberoglu, Berch. *Turmoil in the Middle East: Imperialism, War, and Political Instability*. New York: State University of New York Press, 1999.

Brewer, Anthony. *Marxist theories of imperialism : a critical survey*. London; New York : Routledge, 1990.

Geras, Norman. *Marx and human nature: refutation of a legend*. London : NLB, 1983.

Kiernan, Victor Gordon. *Marxism and imperialism : studies*. New York : St. Martin's Press, 1975.

Lénine, Vladimir Il'ich. *Imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism : a popular outline*. New York : International Pub., 1972.

"Marx, Karl Heinrich." *The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics*, Ed. John Eatwell et al. 4 vols. The MacMillan Press Limited, 1987.

Mommsen, Wolfgang J. *Theories of imperialism*. New York : Random House, 1980.

Parkinson, George Henry Radcliffe et al. *Marx and Marxisms*. Cambridge; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1982.

Polychroniou, Chronis. *Marxist perspectives on imperialism : a theoretical analysis*. New York : Praeger, 1991.

Waddington, Kevin. *Outlines of Marxist philosophy*. London : Lawrence and Wishart, 1974.

Vision Gandhienne de la société internationale

Julie Hautin & Amélie Morel

Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi est principalement connu pour sa participation et l'aide qu'il a déployées afin de mener l'Inde à l'indépendance. Cependant, ce qu'il a légué à l'humanité dépasse de loin le soutien qu'il a accordé à son pays car il est sans contredit l'un des personnages les plus important du 20e siècle. Certes, il est un politicien et un philosophe innovateur ; sa vision ainsi que les méthodes non-violentes qu'il a mises de l'avant ont influencé le déroulement de l'histoire mondiale. Non seulement il a prôné de nouvelles idéologies politiques mais il a aussi pratiqué ces techniques novatrices dans le quotidien. Sa vie est devenue un outil pour livrer son message et sa pensée est allée au-delà de l'analyse politique, elle fut un mode de vie.

À notre époque plutôt agitée, il serait bien utile d'approfondir l'idéologie gandhienne afin de considérer d'autres alternatives que la guerre afin de parvenir à la paix. À travers cet essai nous tenterons d'éclairer les propos et messages de Gandhi. Nous débuterons par un bref historique de sa vie et de son époque et nous analyserons sa vision de la nature humaine et de l'État. Nous porterons ensuite une attention particulière à son concept de la non-violence et à sa vision de la société internationale. Nous terminerons en tentant de faire ressortir les éléments pertinents pour le 21e siècle en études internationales.

Contextualisation

Mohandas Gandhi était le benjamin d'une famille de 6 enfants. Il est né le 12 octobre 1869 dans la petite ville de Porbandar en Inde. Il grandit au sein d'une famille de marchands dans un environnement traditionnel au moment où l'Inde était sous domination coloniale Britannique. À 13 ans ses parents le marièrent à Kasturbai, une jeune fille de son âge à laquelle il resta uni tout au long de sa vie. Sa famille étant ouverte d'esprit, lui permit de poursuivre ses études en droit à Londres, ce qui pour l'époque, était non-conventionnel[1].

Il quitta Londres en 1891, en possession du titre d'avocat, afin de regagner l'Inde pour s'établir et y débuter sa carrière. Le début de celle-ci n'obtint pas le succès escompté. Cependant, on lui proposa de défendre les intérêts d'une entreprise indienne en Afrique du Sud et il accepta. Son passage en Afrique devait durer seulement un an, mais il y demeura finalement pour plus d'une vingtaine d'années. La discrimination de haut niveau ainsi que le régime de l'Apartheid l'amenèrent à développer une conscience profonde des injustices. Cette même conscience le mena, quelques années plus tard, à lutter pour l'indépendance de son pays natal[2]. C'est également à cette époque qu'il découvrit certains auteurs comme *Ruskin* et *Tolstoi*. Ce dernier a grandement influencé[3] Gandhi tant dans la façon de mener sa vie personnelle que dans l'écriture de son oeuvre la plus importante *Kingdom of God is whithin you* ; de même que par l'élaboration de son concept de la résistance passive. C'est en terre africaine que Gandhi fit ses premiers pas en tant qu'activiste afin de défendre et de faire connaître la cause des Indiens d'Afrique du Sud. Cette période a fait en sorte qu'il devint peu à peu un personnage public important. De plus, c'est à ce moment qu'on lui attribua le statut de Saint, d'où provient le nom de Mahatma « grande âme »[4]. Ces années passées en terre africaine furent une étape déterminante dans la vie de Gandhi.

En 1915, lors de son retour en Inde, il devint un leader nationaliste important. Gandhi fut témoin de la première Guerre Mondiale et de la participation de plus d'un million de soldats indiens en Europe sous les commandements du régime britannique[5]. Il fut également témoin des nombreuses difficultés

économiques vécues par le peuple suite à la guerre. En effet, les Anglais ayant eu de grandes difficultés pour le ravitaillement de la colonie, près de 13 millions d'entre eux moururent de famine[6]. À la suite de ces évènements tragiques et sous l'inspiration de Gandhi, les populations paysannes créèrent un mouvement nationaliste hindou et boycottèrent tous les produits provenant de la métropole. Ce fut ainsi l'une des premières fois que le peuple indien appuyait des mécanismes de résistances passives de Gandhi. Par ailleurs, de par ces nombreuses activités controversées, Gandhi aura eu une vie ponctuée de plusieurs séjours en prison.

Lors de la guerre de 1939-1945, le Royaume-Uni promit l'indépendance au peuple Indiens moyennant leur appui pour les efforts de guerre contre les Japonais. Toutefois, quand vint le moment d'en négocier les termes, une question de division du territoire indien entre Hindous et Musulmans ralentit les pourparlers[7]. Malgré de fortes réticences de la part de la Grande-Bretagne, celle-ci accorda l'indépendance le 15 août 1947. De ce fait, le Pakistan - territoire Islamique, et l'Union Indienne - zone Hindous, devinrent deux pays faisant partie du Commonwealth Britannique[8]. Malheureusement, une guerre civile sanglante éclata au sujet de la délimitation exacte de ces territoires, 17 millions de personnes furent jetées à la rue et de nombreux massacres eurent lieu[9]. L'indépendance de l'Inde amena ainsi son lot de violence, ce qui allait complètement dans le sens inverse des désirs de Gandhi.

Vision Gandhienne sur la nature humaine

La vision Gandhienne de la nature humaine est essentiellement humaniste. Elle prend racine au sein des traditions parmi lesquelles il a grandi, c'est-à-dire l'hindouisme. Il ne s'agit donc pas d'une vision humaniste typiquement occidentale. Le Mahatma avait foi en la personne humaine, il se qualifiait lui-même d'optimiste irrépressible[10]. Selon lui on ne doit jamais désespérer face au destin de la personne humaine, car elle a le pouvoir de s'améliorer. Il croyait que chaque être humain détenait en lui quelque chose de divin. Il était autant concerné par l'humain à l'état actuel des choses que par son dessein puisque selon lui, le destin de l'humanité pouvait être remodelé. Sa vision ne mettait pas l'emphase sur le droit de l'individu mais plutôt sur les communautés[11]. Selon lui, le but ultime de la vie était la recherche de la vérité. Il voyait l'humain comme étant une entité spirituelle[12]. Aussi, il considérait que l'humain pouvait se réaliser dans une vie simple et considérait que l'accumulation des biens n'amenait rien de favorable. La nature de l'homme n'étant pas essentiellement mauvaise, il croyait cependant que tous les humains étaient en fait un mélange de bien et de mal. Par contre, contrairement à la bête, l'être humain possède une âme et il trouve son Salut en obéissant à l'appel de la loi supérieure (Dieu). L'humain peut ainsi aller au-delà de sa tendance à l'égoïsme et à la violence, car il est plus naturel pour les humains d'être bon que d'être mauvais.

> ''Nul être humain n'est trop mauvais pour être sauvé. Nul être humain n'est assez parfait pour avoir le droit de tuer celui qu'il considère à tort comme entièrement mauvais[13]''

Il croyait fermement que les humains étaient en mesure de développer la non-violence[14]. En fait, Mohandas Gandhi croyait que plus la personne humaine développait le bien en elle-même, plus le bien se répandrait à travers le monde par une sorte de contagion. De plus, il distinguait fermement l'être humain des institutions qu'il crée car l'être humain est supérieur aux institutions qu'il invente[15]. Finalement l'être humain selon Gandhi a le potentiel et le désir de réaliser la paix.

Vision Gandhienne du rôle de l'État :

Selon Mohandas Gandhi, l'État « conventionnel » évoque la violence sous forme concentrée et organisée. Le principe de l'obligation et de l'uniformité qu'il engendre diminue, voire même détruit, l'esprit d'initiative et la confiance de l'individu[16]. Pour Gandhi, il est primordial que l'État soit structuré de façon à réduire au minimum les moyens de coercition. À cet effet, Mohandas Gandhi prônait la

société libérale où l'État non-violent appliquerait une démocratie directe et la décentralisation du pouvoir. Cet État serait divisé en de nombreuses petites communautés où le sens de la nationalité, l'auto-gouvernance et l'autonomie seraient grandement défendues en s'appuyant sur des principes moraux et sociaux[17]. Plusieurs petites communautés permettraient non seulement l'épanouissement de la sagesse et de l'équilibre, mais constitueraient également un terrain propice au développement de la doctrine de la non-violence[18].

D'après Gandhi, l'État a deux fonctions principales : contrôler l'injustice économique et l'injustice sociale. L'État nation devait réduire au maximum l'exploitation sous toutes ses formes et favoriser l'égalité et la liberté de tous selon le principe de l'universalité. Gandhi estimait que les nantis devaient changer leur cœur et accepter de partager de plein gré leurs avoirs avec les plus démunis[19] et ainsi répartir plus équitablement les richesses. Pour Gandhi l'accumulation des richesses est un péché contre l'humanité lorsque d'autres ne parviennent pas à subvenir à leurs besoins essentiels. Une meilleure distribution des richesses contribuerait au développement de l'humain et conduirait plus facilement vers la paix nationale et internationale.

Cette vision de partage, de paix et d'égalité est étroitement liée au principe selon lequel l'intemporel et le temporel sont intimement liés, c'est-à-dire que pour Gandhi la religion ne devait pas être séparée de la politique, mais bien au contraire, guider toute action politique, sociale et économique[20]. Il illustra ce concept comme suit : « La politique sans religion est ''saleté absolue'' ». Ceci constitue à la fois un concept religieux et une méthode d'action politique et sociale, qui doit régir toutes les relations entre les êtres humains mais aussi celles qu'il entretient avec la nature[21].

La démocratie est explicitement un aspect qui lui tient à cœur. Le Mahatma définit la démocratie comme un système politique reposant sur le fait que les humains possèdent la raison morale, de laquelle ils doivent se servir pour administrer leurs affaires personnelles et collectives[22]. De plus, l'administration publique se devait d'être divisée en trois pouvoirs: le pouvoir législatif, le pouvoir exécutif et le pouvoir juridique[23]. Ainsi fragmentée, elle favoriserait l'équilibre, en préconisant et en préservant le sens éthique et moral du pouvoir politique. De plus, Gandhi défendait l'opinion que les lois sont sujettes aux changements puisque la société elle-même est en constante évolution[24].

Pour Gandhi, un État démocratique n'a pas besoin d'un ministère de défense et aucun budget ne devrait être alloué à des objectifs militaires. Des ressources équivalentes, par contre, devraient être destinées à l'éducation de la non-violence[25]. L'enseignement de la non violence favoriserait l'épanouissement individuel, mais également sensibiliserait l'être humain au bien commun de la société. En effet, ce dernier apprendrait à mieux se maîtriser et deviendrait un être plus équilibré et respectueux. De plus, un système de corps policiers devrait exister uniquement dans l'optique d'assistant social afin d'instaurer la confiance, l'harmonie et la paix au sein de la population. D'ailleurs, Gandhi souligne que le crime serait dès lors traité comme une maladie et soigné via l'aide et la compréhension de ses pairs plutôt que par un système de punition[26].

L'économie selon Gandhi est basée sur deux principes: tous les humains doivent posséder les moyens pour travailler et la vie économique est subordonnée et régularisée par la morale humaine et la spiritualité. Gandhi ne favorisait aucunement l'industrie lourde et rejetait l'aspect de la division du travail (fordisme). Il prônait l'égalité ainsi que l'épanouissement de l'humain via le labeur. Selon le Mahatma, l'artisan et le paysan étaient les pilons de l'économie[27]. Tous doivent contribuer au bénéfice de la communauté : « Dieu a créé l'Homme pour le travail »[28] ; toute personne ne participant pas à la production économique du pays était considérée comme un voleur à ses yeux[29].

L'industrie a sa place uniquement en région urbaine et sa production devait combler exclusivement les lacunes et les produits que le paysan et l'artisan ne pouvaient pas produire. De plus,

cette production devrait être limitée à la consommation nationale[30] et il préconisait le fait que toutes les industries qui sont de première nécessitée devaient être gérées et administrées par l'État. D'après Gandhi, la vie économique devait être basée essentiellement sur la satisfaction des besoins de base (nourriture, logis et vêtements). Il rejetait l'idéologie matérialiste et celle de la consommation excessive[31]. D'ailleurs, ces méthodes de consommation étaient un des reproches les plus fréquemment faits aux occidentaux par Mohandas Gandhi.

La non-violence et la résolution des conflits :

Satyâgraha (*satya* : vérité et *âgraha* : emprise) est le nom que Gandhi donna à la technique de résistance non-violente pour l'établissement de la vérité morale et politique. Il est difficile d'obtenir une définition exacte du concept de la non-violence. Il écrivit plusieurs livres et articles prônant cette notion sans la définir explicitement. Cependant les philosophes, historiens et politiciens s'entendent sur celle-ci : « Doctrine préconisant l'abstention de toute violence ou l'ensemble des moyens par lesquels, dans des situations de conflits, un ou plusieurs acteurs exercent des forces de persuasion ou de contrainte ne portant atteinte ni à la vie ni à la dignité des personnes »[32]. Plusieurs techniques furent élaborées par le Mohatma afin d'atteindre ces objectifs par la non-violence. Par exemple il utilisait souvent la non-coopération en boycottant les écoles, les tribunaux et les textiles anglais. De plus, il employait la désobéissance civile, entre autres en défiant les Anglais lors de sa célèbre marche à travers l'Inde jusqu'au rive de la mer afin d'y fabriquer illégalement du sel. Cependant, un élément important à souligner est que Gandhi accordait autant d'importance aux moyens utilisés qu'aux buts souhaités; les moyens employés devaient refléter les buts à atteindre.

Mohandas Gandhi proposait la doctrine de la non-violence comme étant « une règle de conduite nécessaire pour vivre en société, car elle assurait le respect de la dignité humaine et permettait de faire avancer la cause de la paix, selon les vœux les plus chers de l'humanité »[33]. La doctrine de la non-violence fut fortement influencée par la bible, en particulier le passage du sermon sur la montagne ainsi que par la Gita (livre sacré des hindous)[34].

Selon le Mahatma, la résolution de conflits et l'application de la non-violence débutent au moment où l'on aime ceux qui nous haïssent[35]. D'après lui, l'aboutissement de la non-violence était déclaré un succès lorsque nos ennemis obtiennent une place durable et respectueuse dans nos relations amicales[36]. Un État qui pratiquait la doctrine de la non-violence contribuait à l'humanité toute entière, puisqu'un État non-violent n'était l'ennemi de personne et donc encourageait la paix plutôt que la guerre. Tenant compte de ce principe, la non-violence privilégiait l'amitié et le commun accord entre tous les États-nations de la société internationale.

Ce qui intéressait Gandhi n'était pas de refuser la guerre à tout prix, mais plutôt de régler les racines des problèmes qui mènent inévitablement à des conflits. Il désirait créer un nouvel ordre social au niveau national et international [37]. Contrairement aux pacifistes, le point de départ des idées de Gandhi n'était pas la guerre mais bien la dignité humaine. Le Mahatma était convaincu, tout comme Karl Marx, que la violence moderne tant au niveau individuel qu'étatique était fondamentalement due aux systèmes économiques et aux intérêts capitalistes. Voilà donc pourquoi il préconisait la redistribution des avoirs, non seulement entre les citoyens, mais aussi entre les États- nations.

Gandhi désirait plus que simplement arrêter la guerre, il voulait un changement social. Selon lui un nouvel ordre social plus juste et équitable anéantirait les possibilités de guerre. Surtout, la non-violence qu'il prônait ne constituait pas une résistance passive, Gandhi était un homme d'action. Pour lui, s'opposer à la guerre en refusant simplement d'aller sur les champs de batailles n'était pas une solution, car cela consistait à rester inactif devant une situation à laquelle nous nous opposons. La non-violence n'a pas non plus la même approche que le pacifisme, si l'on considère le pacifisme comme étant

principalement le refus de la guerre. Selon Mohandas Gandhi, « la violence ne libère pas de la peur, mais cherche à combattre la cause de la peur. Au contraire, poursuit-il, la non-violence doit se préparer aux sacrifices les plus exigeants pour s'affranchir de la crainte »[38]. Il soumettait que les partisans de la non-violence « doivent être prêts à souffrir sans jamais manifester leur propre colère »[39]. Gandhi encourageait le dialogue, l'empathie, le respect mutuel et la maîtrise de la fermeté afin de gérer les situations de crise. En contrepartie, face aux armes de l'adversaire, il soutenait le courage, l'audace, la fierté et le sacrifice silencieux ainsi que la résistance non physique. Subséquemment, il garantissait que le rival ne serait que déconcerté et laisserait libre court à la paix[40]. Il maintenait qu'il n'y aurait pas davantage de perte de vies humaines qu'en utilisant la force.

Sans contredit, le but majeur de la doctrine gandhienne de la non-violence est d'appliquer les principes d'amour, de respect mutuel et de dialogue, et ce, dans tous les domaines de la vie. Il écrit dans l'un de ses articles : « Elle (la non-violence) est destinée à tout le monde. La non-violence est la loi de notre espèce au même titre que la violence est la loi des brutes »[41]. Bref, Gandhi proposait la non-violence non seulement comme une méthode afin de contrer l'adversaire, mais bien comme un mode de vie. Elle devrait être employée et intégrée dans tout échange et relation entre les humains. Il insiste sur le fait que les humains détenant la raison, ont le devoir de l'utiliser convenablement.

Le Mahatma n'approuvait pas la guerre en tant qu'institution dans le but de résoudre les conflits nationaux ou internationaux. Pour lui, toutes les guerres étaient répugnantes. Cependant il ne croyait point éviter complètement toute forme de violence. Ainsi il pensait que certaines guerres pouvaient être justifiées[42], du moins pendant une certaine période de sa vie. Il tolérait certaines guerres dans les cas d'autodéfense quand tout avait échoué ou encore lorsque les parties en conflit ne maîtrisaient pas les techniques de la non-violence. Selon lui, l'injustice doit être combattue et résistée d'une façon non-violente mais il faut prendre ses responsabilités car la peur et la lâcheté ne sont pas les alliées de la non-violence. Cela ne demande pas de force physique mais plutôt le sacrifice de soi. Résister face à l'adversaire d'une façon non-violente demandait de s'infliger de la souffrance à soi plutôt qu'à l'autre[43]. Toutefois, il admettait qu'il « aimait mieux voir une nation entière prendre les armes plutôt que la voir assister lâchement et sans se défendre à sa propre défaite »[44]. D'ailleurs sa vision ne permet pas d'accepter les opinions et les actions que l'on juge malsaines sans argumenter, il faut tenter de convaincre le tyran afin de contrer ses visées[45].

> «Courage took precedence over fear, and violence over cowardice; justice became more than mere abstention from violence, and courage went far beyond mere participation in war»[46].

Aux premiers abords, certains de ses écrits peuvent sembler contradictoires car sa philosophie était évolutive et certains évènements ainsi que des situations particulières ont coloré son discours. Par exemple, Gandhi était dans certaines circonstances favorable à ce que les jeunes s'enrôlent dans l'armée[47]. À un moment de sa vie, il a aussi cru qu'afin de comprendre et d'appliquer le concept de non-violence l'humain devait d'abord connaître la violence[48]. Cependant, plus tard dans sa vie et surtout après les atrocités de la deuxième guerre mondiale, il rectifia sa position. Il devint tout à fait horrifié par celle-ci. Selon lui, la guerre n'avait plus rien à voir avec le courage. Elle était de plus en plus associée aux moyens financiers et les développements technologiques la rendaient plus dangereuse que jamais. Aussi, selon lui, les concepts de la non-violence s'adaptaient au monde entier. Cette philosophie était enracinée dans la conviction que l'utilisation des méthodes reliées à la non-violence a le pouvoir de convertir son adversaire[49]. De plus, on devait attaquer les systèmes et non pas leurs auteurs car cela reviendrait à attaquer sa propre personne[50].

Vision Gandhienne de la société internationale

Gandhi désirait créer un nouvel ordre social au niveau national et international. Selon lui, le salut du monde ne pouvait pas passer par la violence[51]. Le but ultime de Gandhi au niveau international était la promotion de la paix par les techniques de la non-violence[52], car elles s'adaptent à tous les peuples. Il voulait faire de l'indépendance de l'Inde un exemple pour le monde entier, surtout auprès des nations exploitées. Il désirait que cela serve au bien de l'humanité, il ne voulait pas que cela nuise en aucune façon aux autres peuples[53]. Selon lui, la course vers l'exploitation des plus faibles de la terre est la première cause des guerres[54]. De plus, afin d'obtenir une paix durable, il faudrait que les pays renoncent sans réserve à l'utilisation des engins de destruction dont ils avaient le contrôle. Il va de soi que cela serait possible si conjointement ils abandonnaient leurs visées impérialistes[55]. Ce qui sous-entend aussi que pour anéantir l'exploitation et la concurrence entre les nations, il faut que les grandes puissances cessent de multiplier leurs besoins et d'accroître leurs possessions matérielles[56].

Mohandas Gandhi ne croyait pas en l'utilité des traités de paix car la paix conclue par la guerre n'était pas vraiment la réalisation de la paix[57]. Selon lui, il s'agissait d'instruments de mauvais goût, motivés par un désir de revanche ou basés sur des postulats hypocrites; conséquemment, ils constituaient certainement des solutions temporaires[58]. D'ailleurs, l'opinion qu'il avait du Traité de Versailles était bien basse. Selon lui, il s'agissait d'un traité de revanche contre l'Allemagne, qui sans doute avait influencé l'avènement du Nazisme et du fascisme ainsi que la 2^{e} guerre mondiale[59]. De plus, il avait une bien piètre opinion des organisations internationales soi-disant élaborées afin de promouvoir la paix. Il avait de sérieux doutes en ce qui concernait la Société des Nations. Il dira qu'elle était dirigée par la France et l'Angleterre afin de promouvoir les intérêts des grandes puissances et qu'il y avait un manque de bon vouloir flagrant en ce qui concernait les objectifs de paix[60]. Il n'avait pas une meilleure opinion des Nations Unies qui, tout comme les traités, sont le produit de la guerre et ne sont pas nées à partir d'un souhait de promouvoir la paix[61]. Selon lui, il fallait avant tout se préoccuper des causes de la guerre. La seule agence des Nations Unies en laquelle il avait confiance était l'UNESCO. Il croyait que cette agence serait en mesure d'apporter une contribution à la paix puisqu'elle fait la promotion de l'éducation et de la culture comme moyen d'augmenter la collaboration entre les nations[62]. Par ailleurs, Gandhi était en faveur de la création d'une fédération et d'un gouvernement mondial qui seraient créés volontairement et où toutes les nations, grandes et petites, auraient le même poids et respect[63].

Pour le Mohatma, la paix n'est pas une fin en soi, mais un moyen d'obtenir un ordre mondial plus juste[64]. D'après lui, l'humanité n'a jamais analysé sérieusement les moyens qui devraient être mis en œuvre afin d'obtenir une paix durable[65]. Pour Gandhi, la paix pouvait être atteinte par la non-violence mais aussi par « *l'universal brotherhood* », l'internationalisme, la promotion d'un gouvernement mondial, la nécessité absolue d'un désarmement unilatéral total.

En somme, « La démocratie et la violence s'accordent mal »[66], encore faut-il que ce soit de vraies démocraties[67]. Le vrai démocrate est celui, qui va défendre la liberté de son pays ainsi que celle de l'humanité entière avec des méthodes exclusivement non-violentes, avait exprimé Gandhi dans l'un de ses ouvrages[68]. La doctrine de la non-violence se doit d'être la politique de tout pays se disant démocratique. Cette pratique doit être faite au niveau national mais aussi international. Les diplomates se doivent d'accueillir leurs ennemis comme des invités de marque et les rencontrer sur des estrades neutres lors des discussions. Ces mêmes diplomates doivent écouter, respecter et tolérer les différentes demandes et attitudes adoptées par chaque partie.

La pertinence de Gandhi au 21^{e} siècle :

Comme nous l'avons vu auparavant, l'exploitation des plus faibles est selon Gandhi l'une des causes majeures des guerres. Il semble que cette dynamique soit toujours vivante de nos jours. Il s'agit encore aujourd'hui d'un point chaud qui a beaucoup d'impact sur l'ordre mondial. Si on analyse plusieurs conflits modernes, on s'aperçoit que les visées économiques de certaines puissances sont reliées

de très près aux enjeux des conflits. Ce désir insatiable d'accumuler des biens préoccupait beaucoup Mohandas Gandhi. On peut donc se demander jusqu'à quelle limite l'exploitation ou l'accumulation des richesses peut aller? Le Mohatma avec déjà cerné ces problèmes il y a plus de 50 ans. Même si plusieurs nations ont obtenu leur indépendance pendant le siècle dernier, le cycle de l'exploitation ne s'est pas arrêté, ce sont plutôt les méthodes pour arriver à cette fin qui ont changées. Maintenant on utilise les multinationales et/ou les organisations internationales afin de contrôler certaines richesses appartenant à ces nations. Alors le problème que Gandhi a souligné est toujours bien palpable, il a simplement été transféré de façon à ce que les grandes puissances obtiennent toujours les mêmes résultats mais de façon détournée.

Un autre point important articulé par Gandhi afin d'accéder à la paix internationale est l'importance de l'autarcie. Cette notion est actuellement contrastée par le phénomène de la mondialisation, bien que ce phénomène ne soit pas sans opposition. En effet, plusieurs groupes sont conscients des effets négatifs de la mondialisation sur les pays en développement car, tout comme le Mohatma, plusieurs croient que cela mène à une compétition de plus en plus féroce. En contrepartie, certains mouvements se formèrent afin de répondre à un besoin d'entraide et de protection, par exemple l'Union Européenne et la Communauté Économique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest. Certes, ce n'est pas exactement ce que Gandhi prônait, mais nous pouvons y voir un certain rapprochement avec ses idées maîtresses, c'est-à-dire par le regroupement de plusieurs communautés qui sont rassemblées par un gouvernement démocratique libéral à pouvoir décentralisé.

Dans une perspective historique, d'autres militants ont utilisé les méthodes de la non-violence afin d'arriver à leurs objectifs. Entre autres pensons à Martin Luther King, qui a livré une lutte difficile afin de délivrer la population noire de l'oppression. Il y a aussi Nelson Mandela, qui toute sa vie s'est battu pour la libéralisation de l'Afrique du Sud. Ces deux activistes ont réussi à répandre la philosophie gandhienne de la non-violence en démontrant qu'il était possible d'atteindre ses objectifs sans avoir recours à des méthodes agressives.

Par ailleurs, certains se questionnent face à la pertinence de ces méthodes pour régler les conflits actuels et futurs. Cependant si plusieurs doutes persistent quant au réalisme de cette philosophie, nous sommes d'avis que, si un nombre important d'individus se mobilisaient afin de mettre de l'avant les méthodes gandhiennes, cela ne se ferait pas en vain. En effet, un élément important qui permet à cette philosophie de parvenir à ses fins est le nombre de partisans qui l'appliquent. Imaginons l'impact qu'aurait des millions de personnes engagées dans une lutte non-violente dans les capitales nationales des pays dominants: les gouvernements ne pourraient rester insensibles à ces mouvements.

Conclusion

En résumé, la vision de l'Homme humaniste de Gandhi était un mélange de bien et de mal où le bien domine. Cette conception nous permet de comprendre la vision de celui-ci face à l'État. L'homme était destiné à évoluer dans une société démocratique libérale et décentralisée car il possédait les compétences pour se gérer d'une façon autonome et responsable. Les méthodes de gestion de l'État devaient être non-violentes et appliquées sans diviser le temporel de l'intemporel. Selon le Mahatma le rôle de l'État était de voir à la redistribution des richesses afin de permettre à tous de bien progresser dans la société. La doctrine de la non-violence appliquée par les États, les individus et les groupes se devaient d'être perçue par ceux-ci comme étant une résistance active et non passive, où le dialogue, l'empathie, le respect, la fermeté et au besoin le sacrifice de soi seraient privilégiés. Toutefois ces concepts de la non-violence seraient difficilement applicables par les organisations internationales, puisque selon le Mahatma, celles-ci ne contribueraient point à promouvoir la paix, puisqu'elles étaient nés suite à des guerres et étaient dirigées par des pays dominants.

Bien que cette volonté de paix internationale existe et se fait sentir, les hommes par leurs comportements semblent être de plus en plus loin de la théorie gandhienne. L'utilisation d'armes à technologie avancée et l'ampleur des conflits actuels ne fait que nous éloigner de jour en jour de ce concept de non-violence. En revanche, peut-être seul un soulèvement mondial pacifique de la population laisserait savoir aux nations dominantes que des millions de gens sont en désaccord face à certaines décisions politiques. On peut, toutefois, se demander si la mondialisation et ses effets pervers d'individualisme et de compétition ne seront justement pas un frein à ces mouvements ou, au contraire, si elle contribuera, par l'ouverture des frontières, à la coalition des peuples afin de promouvoir la paix et la coopération internationale. Seul le temps et les évènements nous le diront. À plus forte raison, il serait intéressant de continuer à analyser l'efficacité des méthodes non-violentes par rapport aux différentes cultures, différents types de gouvernement et aussi selon les différents types de conflits.

Notes

[1] Deliège Robert, « Gandhi ». Presses universitaires de France (Paris, 1999) 10.
[2] Langlois George, « Histoire du XXe siècle ». 2e Édition, Étidion Beauchemin (Laval, 1999) 281.
[3] Puri Rashmi-Sudha, « Gandhi on war and peace ». Édition Praeger (New York, 1987) 4-5.
[4] Deliège Robert, « Gandhi ». Presses universitaires de France (Paris, 1999) 22.
[5] Langlois George, « Histoire du XXe siècle ». 2e Édition, Étidion Beauchemin (Laval, 1999) 85.
[6] Ibid., p. 85.
[7] Ibid., p. 276.
[8] Ibid., p. 276.
[9] Ibid., p. 276.
[10] Bhattacharyya Buddhadeva, « Evolution of the political philosophy of Gandhi ». Édition Calcutta Book House (Calcutta 1969) 110.
[11] Parel Anthony. J, « Gandhi, freedom, and self-rule ». Lanham, MD, Lexington Books, (2000) 88.
[12] Bhattacharyya Buddhadeva, « Evolution of the political philosophy of Gandhi ». Édition Calcutta Book House (Calcutta 1969) 106.
[13] Journal indiens : La jeune Inde
[14] La signification de la non-violence selon Gandhi sera expliciter plus loin.
[15] Bhattacharyya Buddhadeva, « Evolution of the political philosophy of Gandhi ». Édition Calcutta Book House (Calcutta, 1969) 110.
[16] Gandhi. Mahatma., « Gandhi tous les Hommes sont frères ». Collection Folio essais, Éditions Gallimard, (France, 1969) 246.
[17] Parekh Bhikhu, « Gandhi's Political Philosophy ». The Macmillan Press (1989) 113.
[18] Deliège Robert, « Gandhi ». Collection Que sais-je?, Édition Puf, (Paris, 1999) 104.
[19] Ibid., 101.
[20] Ibid., 86.
[21] Ibid., 86.
[22] Parekh Bhikhu, « Gandhi's Political Philosophy ». The Macmillan Press (1989) 117.
[23] Ibid., 114.
[24] Ibid., 124.
[25] Ibid., 115.
[26] Kermarec Joël, « Gandhi », Corpus 10, Encyclopédie Universalis, Édition Encyclopeadia Universalil, (Paris, 1989) 77.
[27] Deliège Robert, « Gandhi ». Collection Que sais-je?, Édition Puf, (Paris, 1999) 101.
[28] Ibid., 101.
[29] Ibid., 101.
[30] Parekh Bhikhu, « Gandhi's Political Philosophy ». The Macmillan Press (1989) 137.
[31] Ibid., 102.
[32] Université de Brussel, « Anarchie vs la non-violence », http://student.ulb.be/~xbekaert£Anarch/Anarchie.htm
[33] Gandhi Mathma, « Gandhi tous les Hommes sont frères ». Collection Folio essais, Éditions Gallimard, (France, 1969) 161.
[34] Puri, Rashmi-Sudha, « Gandhi on war and peace ». Édition Praeger, (New York, 1987) 23.
[35] Gandhi Mathma, « Gandhi tous les Hommes sont frères ». Collection Folio essais, Éditions Gallimard, (France, 1969) 153.
[36] Ibid., 169.
[37] Puri Rashmi-Sudha, « Gandhi on war and peace ». Édition Praeger, (New York, 1987) 84.
[38] Gandhi Mathma, « Gandhi tous les Hommes sont frères ». Collection Folio essais, Éditions Gallimard, (France, 1969) 153.
[39] Deliège Robert, « Gandhi ». Collection Que sais-je, Édition Puf, (Paris, 1999) 2.
[40] Lassier Suzanne, « Gandhi et la non-violence ». Collection Maître Spirituels, Édition du Seuil, (France,1970) 142.
[41] Gandhi Mathma, « Gandhi tous les Hommes sont frères ». Collection Folio essais, Éditions Gallimard, (France, 1969) 184.
[42] Puri Rashmi-Sudha, « Gandhi on war and peace ». Édition Praeger, (New York, 1987) 75.
[43] Ibid., 84 et 141.
[44]Gandhi Mathma, « Gandhi tous les Hommes sont frères ». Collection Folio essais, Éditions Gallimard, (France, 1969) 161.
[45] Puri Rashmi-Sudha, « Gandhi on war and peace ». Édition Praeger, (New York, 1987) 84.
[46] Ibid., 84.
[47] Deliège Robert, « Gandhi », Collection Que sais-je?, Édition Puf, (Paris, 1999) 88.
[48] Ibid., 88.
[49] Bhattacharyya Buddhadeva, « Evolution of the political philosophy of Gandhi ». Édition Calcutta Book House (Calcutta 1969) 110.
[50] Ibid., 110.
[51] Gandhi Mathma, « Gandhi tous les Hommes sont frères ». Collection Folio essais, Éditions Gallimard, (France, 1969) 185.

[52] Puri Rashmi-Sudha, « Gandhi on war and peace ». Édition Praeger, (New York, 1987) 80.
[53] Gandhi Mathma, « Gandhi tous les Hommes sont frères ». Collection Folio essais, Éditions Gallimard, (France, 1969) 207.
[54] Puri Rashmi-Sudha, « Gandhi on war and peace ». Édition Praeger, (New York, 1987) 85.
[55] Gandhi Mathma, « Gandhi tous les Hommes sont frères ». Collection Folio essais, Éditions Gallimard, (France, 1969) 210-211.
[56] Ibid., 211.
[57] Puri Rashmi-Sudha, « Gandhi on war and peace ». Édition Praeger, (New York, 1987) 167.
[58] Ibid., 167.
[59] Ibid., 161.
[60] Ibid., 171.
[61] Ibid., 173.
[62] Puri Rashmi-Sudha, « Gandhi on war and peace ». Édition Praeger, (New York, 1987) 197.
[63] Ibid., 198.
[64] Ibid., 165.
[65] Ibid., 196.
[66] Gandhi Mathma« Gandhi tous les Hommes sont frères ». Collection Folio essais, Éditions Gallimard, (France, 1969) 248.
[67] Puri Rashmi-Sudha« Gandhi on war and peace ». Édition Praeger, (New York, 1987) 197.
[68] Gandhi Mathma, « Gandhi tous les Hommes sont frères ». Collection Folio essais, Éditions Gallimard, (France, 1969) 248.

Bibliographie

Baum Gregory, *Le Nationalisme perspectives éthiques et religieuses*, Édition Bellarmin, Québec, 1998.

Belmont Georges, *Gandhi, Autobiographie ou mes expériences de vérité*, Presse universitaire de France, France, 1950.

Bhattacharyya Buddhadeva, *Evolution of the Political Philosophy of Gandhi*, P.C. Bhowal Calcutta Book, Calcutta, 1969.

Deliège, *Gandhi*, Collection Que sais-je, Édition Puf, Paris, 1999.

Gandhi Mahatma, *Gandhi, Tous les sommes sont des frères*, Collection folio essais, Édition Gallimard, France, 1969.

Kermarec Joël, "*Gandhi*", Corpus 10, Encyclopédie Universalis, Paris, Éditions Encyclopeadia Universalil, 1989, p. 75-77.

Langlois Gorge, *Histoire du XXe siècle*, 2e Édition, Édition Beauchemin, Laval, 1999.

Lassier Suzanne, *Gandhi et la non-violence*, Collection Maîtres Spirituels, Édition du Seuil, France, 1970.

Parekh Bhikhu, *Gandhi's Political Philosophy*, The Macmillan Press, 1989.

Parel Anthony J, *Gandhi, Freedom and Self-Rule*, Lexington Books, Lanham, 2000.

Puri Rashmi-Sudha, *Gandhi on War and Peace*, Praeger Publishers, New-York,1987.

Université de Brussel, « Anarchie vs la non-violence »,
http://student.ulb.be/~xbekaert£Anarch/Anarchie.htm

Deep Ecology: An Environmentalist Conception of International Society

Megan Forsythe

There exists today a wide scope of thought in international relations theory. This array of philosophical worldviews, as well as the broad exchange of ideas, both recent and from the past, is essential, if we are to successfully carry out a vibrant and just global society. This essay will examine one philosophy within this scope of theories: That of environmentalism. However, the discussion will focus on Deep Ecology, which is one particular stream of thought within the philosophy. This discourse will seek to prove that Deep Ecology presents a contemporary, relevant perspective in current and in future international relations theory, while offering an important alternative to human-centric worldviews. This essay will begin by outlining the origins and foundations of Deep Ecology, as well as the spiritual and political traditions that influenced its conception. It will study the general tenets that the viewpoint advocates, and briefly touch upon the similar, yet differently motivated, philosophy of Shallow Ecology. After the general perspective of Deep Ecology is established, attention will shift to focus on more specific issues within the philosophy, examining what Deep Ecologists believe in regards to man-environment relations, the nature of man, the nature of state, and the nature of international society. The segment written on the latter subject will stress the questions of international law and organization, international trade and investment, and war and peace. Finally, this essay will conclude by analyzing the evolution of the Deep Ecology philosophy and activist movement, while focusing on what the stance has contributed to international relations theory, and the impact that it has had on our current global society.

Origins and Foundations of Deep Ecology

Deep Ecology originated with a Norwegian philosophy professor named Arne Naess. Naess, who was born in 1912, was appointed to the Chair of Philosophy at the University of Oslo in 1939, and he proceeded to become a renowned scholar. He retired in 1969, in order to focus his attention on developing a new, jointly ecological and philosophical, worldview.[1] In 1973, a five-page paper was published entitled *The Shallow and the Deep, Long Range Ecology Movements: A Summary*, which was the inaugural document of the philosophy, releasing for the first time Naess' principles of Deep Ecology.[2] The principles were as follows:

(1) A metaphysic of interrelatedness
(2) An ethos of biospherical egalitarianism
(3) Values of diversity and symbiosis
(4) An anti-class posture
(5) An opposition to pollution and ozone depletion
(6) Value of complexity
(7) Emphasis on local autonomy and decentralization[3]

Clearly, these principles point to a philosophy that, unlike human-centric positions, acknowledges all living things on earth as equal. This radical idea places Deep Ecology in a new realm of international relations theory, for instead of solely considering relations between man, between states and between nations as important, Deep Ecology advocates the relations between all living things as equally significant. Principles one through four, as well as principle six, stress the idea of all plants, animals and man being equal and interrelated. Naess emphasized that principle five, encouraging opposition to pollution and resource depletion, although important, should not hold priority over the others. He gave the example that pollution should not be fought in a way that would cause class differences to widen.[4] Principle seven, emphasizing local autonomy and decentralization, is the most political, and like principle

six, is a plea for change within the system. It demonstrates that Deep Ecology is not exclusively philosophical, but also exists to inspire ecological and political activism.

Along with presenting these principles that served as the basis of the values of Deep Ecology, Naess proposed that each individual should search for their own, personal ecological worldview. He coined this type of worldview, "Ecosophy;" the "eco" stressing the focus on an environmental viewpoint, and the "sophy" stressing the achievement of such a viewpoint to be realized through means of wisdom rather than through means of science and information.[5] He named his own worldview "Ecosophy T" (the 'T' is in reference to a cabin he owns on a mountain in Norway, that he calls Tvergastein[7]), allowing others to create and name their own Ecosophy worldview, such as an "Ecosophy A", or "Ecosophy X."[6] Ecosophy T focuses on the need for each person to strive for an ecological self-realization. The worldview asserts that, with the accomplishment of such a realization, an individual would recognize that to act on behalf of nature benefits everyone, since the nature that surrounds he or she is just as much a part of his or her self-identity as his or her family, friends, culture and community. Thus, helping the environment is in fact helping to preserve a person's own self-identity.[8] Nevertheless, as important as Naess believed this self-realization to be, he insisted that one does not have to agree with this particular worldview to support the other principles of Deep Ecology.[9] The existence of Ecosophy T reinforces that Deep Ecology is not a uniform doctrine, but a way of thinking that is open to various interpretations.

In 1984, Naess and philosopher George Sessions created a new set of principles for Deep Ecologists. These principles shifted the idea of biospherical egalitarianism that dominated the previous principles, to the concept of both human and non-human life having inherent value. The new principles were based on the platform that "the flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth has intrinsic value. The value of non-human life forms is independent of the usefulness these may have for narrow human purposes."[10] Thus, the belief changed from all living things being equal, to all living things instead having intrinsic value. This new stance was fundamentally a non-anthropocentric one. Naess acknowledged that egalitarianism only works in principle, and that humans cannot be expected to treat everything as equal, although they can be expected to appreciate everything's inherent value, and not just the value that it offers to man.[11] These new principles also claimed "present human interference with the nonhuman world is excessive," and that the flourishing of non-human life requires a substantial decrease of the human population.[12] Finally, Naess and Sessions encouraged activism among followers, to try to implement changes in policies affecting economic and technological structures, as well as an ideological change that would discourage adhering to an increasingly higher standard of living.[13] This new set of principles set the foundation for what the Deep Ecology movement of today is based on.

The principles, both the original and the updated, of Deep Ecology had many diverse spiritual and political influences. These influences ranged from Eastern religion, such as Taoism and Buddhism, to Western academic philosophy, such as the writings of Spinoza and Whitehead, to conservationist and wilderness thinking, such as that of Henry David Thoreau. Deep Ecology also possesses some similarities to notions of eighteenth century romanticism, and nineteenth and twentieth century anarchism. In addition, it is reasonable to assume that, especially since Deep Ecology originated in the early 1970s, some inspiration was drawn from the radical political consciousness and New Age thinking of the 1960s.[14] Finally, Naess himself acknowledged, many times, significant influences from the teachings and practices of Mahatma Ghandi[15].

Naess named his ecological philosophy Deep Ecology, with the 'deep' signifying the level of thought he wished its followers to strive for. As opposed to Ecologists, who solely examine the systems as they exist, Naess wanted Deep Ecologists to ask more meaningful questions such as why, and how these systems exist the way they do, and how they can be improved. He pushed for not only the examination of society as it exists, but for the further questioning of "what kind of society would be the best for maintaining a system."[16] Essentially, the viewpoint is associated with having philosophical

foundations and roots. However, even from the beginning of Deep Ecology's conceptions, Naess recognized that the existence of a movement of people whose concern for issues of pollution and resource conservation was based solely on the way that these phenomena impacted the interests of people in developed countries.[17] He termed this way of thinking 'Shallow Ecology', for even though its followers want to help the environment, they want to do so only because of its extrinsic value and usefulness to humans.[18] Therefore, even though this movement may be more influential politically, for it advocates economic growth and environmental protection with the aid of technological and scientific advances, it, unlike Deep Ecology, "avoids serious fundamental questions about our values and worldviews, and does not examine our socio-cultural institutions and our personal lifestyles."[19]

Relations between Man and the Environment

As it would be assumed to be for any environmentalist philosophy, man-environment relations are considered very important by Deep Ecologists. As man-environment relations are just as much two elements of the same global society, they are considered to be as important as man-man relations, man-state relations, and/or state-nation relations. As aforementioned, the environment that surrounds us should be treated as just as much an integral part of our identity as our family, community and our culture. Thus, it should not be a moral duty that drives the individual to protect the environment, but rather, he or she should be naturally inclined to do so, because a defence of nature should develop from a desire for self-defence.[20] Deep Ecologists want to eliminate the division that exists between humans and nature, and instead encourage humans to accept that they are a part of nature, just like animals and plants. Rather individuals can only be set apart because of their potential for power that grants them more responsibility towards the Earth than other species have.[21] Hence, humans are not more important than other parts of the Earth, and so individuals should not dominate over them. Nevertheless, even Deep Ecologists recognize that, for both humans and animals, the killing of some other living beings is sometimes necessary for survival. Supporters do not condemn such practices, if they are truly necessary, but Deep Ecologists do express the need for individuals to appreciate and acknowledge the gravity of such killings through rituals and/or ceremonies.[22] Moreover, humans should strive for a minimization of interference with the natural world, and where humans only take from nature what is necessary in order to sustain a "culturally rich, materially simple" life.[23]

Nature of Man

Deep Ecology refers to man most frequently, notably when discussing the concept of self. Because of the close association between Naess' "Ecosophy T" and Deep Ecology, many Deep Ecologists also believe in the importance of self-realization that Ecosophy advocates. Supporters believe in the importance of everything with which an individual identifies, whether it be his or her body, mind, family, friends, natural environment, nation and/or culture.[24] The amount of relationships between the individual and his or her surrounding entities is endless. However, Deep Ecologists warn that humans are increasingly identifying themselves with human-built environments, such as corporations and cities.[25]

As for the natural characteristics of the individual, Deep Ecology maintains that an individual is often cruel, as well as "careless, self-serving, destructive, hostile to and undermining of non-human nature."[26] However, most Deep Ecologists do not believe that humans have to be this way, and claim that through self-realization, they can come to appreciate and respect non-human life for its intrinsic value, and learn to possess a non-anthropocentric stance.[27] Therefore, Deep Ecologists believe that the individual has fundamental choices, which, through self-realization, enable he or she to strive towards attaining venerable characteristics.

Finally, just as Deep Ecology emphasizes the value of the natural world, it also equally acknowledges the value of the individual in the global society. Although it never claims humans are more

valuable than other elements of society, such as animals and plant life, as aforesaid, the viewpoint does recognize that humans hold more responsibility towards the upholding of a just social order, because of their potential for power.[28]

Nature of State

Deep Ecology recognizes that the nature of the state, and its relationship to man, as well as to all other living things, is very important in determining whether or not practices compatible with the worldview's principles will flourish. It advocates a state system that differs greatly from the systems in place around the world today. To gain a better understanding of what type of system Deep Ecology encourages, it is helpful to remember that the belief-system originated with anarchical influences. Essentially, it promotes a decentralization of the current systems, and a creation of non-hierarchical structures.[29] The idea of a few powerful people dominating over the majority of the population is contradictory to Deep Ecology's beliefs, since, just as it disapproves of man dominating over nature, it equally disapproves of man dominating over man. To achieve this decentralization, Deep Ecology recommends the implementation of local autonomy in small-scale communities, while taking into account the broader definition of communities, which would include all living beings.[30] These small-scale communities would allow for a greater degree of self-responsibility and self-regulation, which ideally would lead to the realization of an effective direct democracy.[31] Within a system of local communities practicing direct democracy, a division between classes could be reduced, and each individual could have a more significant say on how to run the state. Overall, this would emphasize the intrinsic value of each individual and his or her opinion.

Beyond stressing the importance of the state, as a means for humans to be locally organized and autonomous, Naess insists on the necessary existence of political activity, in order to enforce and realize the proper valuation of non-human life.[32] He believes that it is through the policies of the state that some principles of the Deep Ecology platform can be achieved. For example, the state can create regulations that would restrain human interference with the natural world, and the state can influentially encourage and take measures to impose a decrease in birth rate. In addition, it is the state that can implement changes in policies that would improve economic and technological structures, making them less capitalistic, materialistic, and less focused on creating increasingly higher standards of living through modernization, industrialization and urbanization.[33] Instead, these changes would encourage more simplistic lives, based on acquiring only those material items that satisfy an individual's needs, rather than all of his or her wants. Nonetheless, Naess also acknowledges, that "the influence of democratic institutions in our time is gradually decreasing because of powerful pressure groups taking over much of the influence of the decisions."[34] Consequently, although he maintains that the state is important, and necessary, Naess is aware of the economical and social power that is increasingly being demonstrated by multinational corporations, and other non-democratic organizations.[35]

Nature of International Society

Given that the global community, for Deep Ecologists, consists not only of human beings, but also of animals, plants and all other living entities, even this worldview's belief on what constitutes international society is fundamentally different from that of human-centric worldviews. Unlike human-centric views that focus solely on the relations in our global society between humans, whether they be in a regional, national or international context, the eco-centric view of Deep Ecology examines inter-nations, inter-species, inter-genera and inter-kingdoms relations. Deep Ecologists promote the idea that all living things have the right to live, and to interact with each other. Supporters also believe that through self-realization and identification, unities between people, communities, races, humanity, and all life in the global society can be increased.[36]

Another significant contribution of Deep Ecology philosophy to international relations theory is its emphasis on the previously discussed local community. The worldview promotes a shift from a focus on national identity, to one on local identity. This corresponds to the aforementioned idea of self-regulation and local autonomy of relatively small communities. Consequently, relations between human beings would be largely centred on inter-local communications, rather than inter-nations communications.[37] To accomplish this shift, Deep Ecologists advocate replacing the present excessive role of national and international structures with local participatory arrangements.[38] Supporters believe that strengthening local communities is ultimately what fortifies a strong international society.[39] The benefits of having a strong local community, even translated onto a global scale, are numerous. Some of these benefits include increased support of small units in the economy, enhanced cultural diversity and independence, and more effective practices of direct democracy. In addition, Deep Ecologists believe that obtaining a high level of economic self-reliance can establish smaller differences in income and wealth.[40]

Nevertheless, Naess concedes that there are obstacles to creating a strong international society through the formation of autarkic local communities. Economic difficulties may arise from both the lethargy of heavily centralized national economic policies and because of the uncompetitive potential of self-reliant technology in the international market.[41]

Furthermore, even if a local community can successfully decrease differences in income and wealth among its population, this decrease will not automatically exist worldwide. Yet, an important goal of Deep Ecologists is the elimination of classes regionally, nationally and globally.[42] To achieve this goal, Naess has stated that inhabitants of developed countries should avoid the pressures to have increasingly higher standards of living.[43] Rather, he articulates the need for "an appreciation of lifestyles that are universalizable, which are not blatantly impossible to sustain without injustice towards fellow humans or other species."[44] In addition, it is also the responsibility of richer industrial societies to help poorer societies, while still avoiding undue exploitation of threatened species, populations and ecosystems.[45] Thus, the decentralization and conversion to local power that Deep Ecology advocates does not mean a lesser degree of global cooperation.

Considering Deep Ecology's focus on self-autonomy and self-regulation, international law and organization is not a major focus for the philosophy. Supporters believe that international politics should be organized in such a way that the system is decentralized, non-hierarchical and non-polarized. This kind of organization, as outlined earlier, would be predominantly local. Naess does recognize the power of the countless non-governmental organizations, rather than viewing these entities solely as a threat, he asserts that NGOs can be used to facilitate inter-local contact, by working at a more local level.[46] Therefore, Deep Ecology does not wish to eradicate worldwide institutions, but instead desires that they become organized in a more egalitarian and less hierarchical manner.[47]

International trade and investment is another subject matter that Deep Ecology does not condemn. Instead, the worldview deplores the manner in which global trade and investment is organized and carried out. Deep Ecologists are against pursuing economic growth in the national and international market, because of the tendency of such growth to support resource consumption and global pollution.[48] In fact, Naess also claims that such economic growth has only negative influences on the contemporary quality of life.[49] Therefore, rather than focusing on Gross National Product, Deep Ecology promotes "Economic Welfare Theory": A theory concerned primarily with satisfying needs versus satisfying wants and profitability goals.[50] Simply put, the focus on consumption, and quantity of production, rather than the contribution of economic growth to life quality, that is so frequently practiced in international trade and investment practices, is unecological.[51] Such a focus also impedes any appreciation of the intrinsic value of life on Earth, and the practice of voluntary simplicity.[52]

The idea of principally satisfying needs, when managing international trade, is supported through the practice of inter-local trade. Deep Ecologists promote trading choices to be based on nearness, where ideal trading partners are defined by their geographic proximity and vitality, and everyone's essential needs, human and non-human, are met before non-essential ones.[53] Basic needs should not be met with international trade, if they can be met adequately using local resources and enterprise.[54] Additionally, meeting the vital interests of a community as a whole, including all life within this community, should take priority over satisfying the vital interests of the individual.[55] Thus, Deep Ecologists do not completely rule out international trade. In fact, Naess acknowledges that foreign trade can contribute to enhancing cultural diversity, but he also claims that such trade adversely affects a society's lifestyle and entertainment.[56] These costs come when a community, whether it is found at the local, regional and/or national level, becomes dependent upon imports, and, as a result, becomes dependent upon international economic fluctuations, which leads to "uniformity, passivity, more consumption and less creativity."[57] Therefore, in appropriate and non-exploitative situations, Deep Ecologists do not denounce international trade, within an international society, but they do criticize dependence and discourage an unrestrained world market.

Deep Ecologists are very passionate about issues concerning war and peace. Supporters believe that anti-violence is an essential factor for the achievement of a successful global society. The philosophy advocates never to use violence on your opponent, not even as a means to an end. To achieve this, cooperation is stressed, as well as the elimination of both secrecy and the provocation of an opponent. Perhaps, most importantly, Deep Ecology emphasizes the need for trust between players, if peace is to be assured.[58] Additionally, militarization is seen as a threat because it represents further domination of centralization.[59] Once again, though, it is imperative to recognize that war is not only possible between human beings, but between humans and all other species and living entities on Earth. To illustrate this idea, Naess points out that although nuclear war would be an ecological catastrophe, millions of animals already die or are tortured, as they are constantly being used in nuclear radiation experiments.[60] Consequently then, Deep Ecology emphasizes not only the need to avoid war, but to avoid any causing of unnecessary harm and suffering, for doing so contradicts appreciating every entity for its intrinsic value, and respecting its right to live.[61]

Conclusion

Seeing as Deep Ecology is still a relatively modern and recently formulated philosophy, it is still evolving, and gaining followers. Originally an "alternative metaphysical paradigm," the worldview did not gain followers in North America until the mid-1980s.[62] It was in this period that Deep Ecology changed its focus to a primarily non-anthropocentric stance, seeing every living entity as having an intrinsic value in life. It has been argued that this shift in underlying principles was created to widen the support base of the philosophy, to accommodate what was increasingly becoming an activist movement for eco-political change.[63] This movement included the conception of the Green Party, a political party that exists worldwide, and whose platforms correlate with those of Deep Ecology.

Deep Ecology philosophy has proven to be relevant to contemporary global society. Christopher Belshaw reasons that the theory has "succeeded in changing both government policy and wider public consciousness on a range of environmental issues,"[64] including the biochemical industry, nuclear weapons and power. In addition, supporters have pushed for the gradual introduction of anti-nuclear and pro-non-violent proposals within NATO, as well as helped shape resistance to institutions deemed to be anti-environmental, like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Finally, Deep Ecology has helped spawn countless activist groups, including Greenpeace International. Surely, these accomplishments are at least partly due to the issues that the worldview directly attacks, and continues to expand on, which are the issues that today's society deals with firsthand. Ultimately, the eco-centric basis of the worldview has made its conceptions on the nature

of man-environment relations, man, the state, and international society applicable to the environment: An entity that will always be a part of our global society, and an integral factor on how local, national and international communities are managed. Therefore, environmentalist theories, whether they be in the form of Deep Ecology or not, are here to stay, and to be heard.

Notes

[1] Alan Drengson and Yuichi Inoue, eds, *The Deep Ecology Movement: An Introductory Anthology* (Berkeley: North Atlantic Books, 1995) xvii.
[2] Don E. Marietta Jr. and Lester Embree, eds, *Environmental Philosophy and Environmental Activism* (London: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 1995) 110.
[3] Arne Naess, "Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movements: A Summary", in Sessions, George, ed, *Deep Ecology for the 21st Century* (Boston: Random House, 1995) 151-154.
[4] Kent A. Peacock, *Living With the Earth: An Introduction to Environmental Philosophy* (Toronto: Harcourt Brace & Company Canada Ltd., 1996) 256.
[5] Ibid, 256.
[6] Freya Matthews, "Deep Ecology" in Dale Jamieson, ed, *A Companion to Environmental Philosophy* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2001) 221.
[7] Ibid, 220.
[8] Alan Drengson and Yuichi Inoue, eds, *The Deep Ecology Movement: An Introductory Anthology* (Berkeley: North Atlantic Books, 1995) xxiii.
[9] Arne Naess, *Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy*, trans, David Rothenberg (Cambridge: Cambridge U Press, 1989) 29.
[10] Christopher Belshaw, *Environmental Philosophy* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's U. Press, 2001) 201.
[11] Arne Naess, *Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy*, trans, David Rothenberg (Cambridge: Cambridge U Press, 1989) 29.
[12] Ibid, 29.
[13] Christopher Belshaw, *Environmental Philosophy* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's U. Press, 2001) 182.
[14] Arne Naess, *Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy*, trans, David Rothenberg (Cambridge: Cambridge U Press, 1989) 101.
[15] Freya Matthews, "Deep Ecology" in Dale Jamieson, ed, *A Companion to Environmental Philosophy* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2001) 224.
[16] Ibid, 218.
[17] Kent A. Peacock, *Living With the Earth: An Introduction to Environmental Philosophy* (Toronto: Harcourt Brace & Company Canada Ltd., 1996) 254.
[18] Alan Drengson and Yuichi Inoue, eds, *The Deep Ecology Movement: An Introductory Anthology* (Berkeley: North Atlantic Books, 1995) xix.
[19] Freya Matthews, "Deep Ecology" in Dale Jamieson, ed, *A Companion to Environmental Philosophy* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2001) 221.
[20] David Rothenberg, "A Platform of Deep Ecology" in Drengson, Alan and Yuichi Inoue, eds, *Deep Ecology Movement: An Introductory Anthology* (Berkeley: North Atlantic Books, 1995) 158.
[21] Kent A. Peacock, *Living With the Earth: An Introduction to Environmental Philosophy* (Toronto: Harcourt Brace & Company Canada Ltd., 1996) 260.
[22] Freya Matthews, "Deep Ecology" in Dale Jamieson, ed, *A Companion to Environmental Philosophy* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2001) 223.
[23] Ibid, 221.
[24] Devall, Bill, "The Ecological Self" in Drengson, Alan and Yuichi Inoue, eds, *Deep Ecology Movement: An Introductory Anthology* (Berkeley: North Atlantic Books, 1995) 114.
[25] Christopher Belshaw, *Environmental Philosophy* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's U. Press, 2001) 193.
[26] Freya Matthews, "Deep Ecology" in Dale Jamieson, ed, *A Companion to Environmental Philosophy* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2001) 221.
[27] David Rothenberg, "A Platform of Deep Ecology" in Drengson, Alan and Yuichi Inoue, eds, *Deep Ecology Movement: An Introductory Anthology* (Berkeley: North Atlantic Books, 1995) 158.
[28] Christopher Belshaw, *Environmental Philosophy* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's U. Press, 2001) 279.
[29] Ibid, 279.
[30] Ibid, 279.
[31] Ibid, 182.
[32] Don E. Marietta Jr. and Lester Embree, eds, *Environmental Philosophy and Environmental Activism* (London: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 1995) 111.
[33] Arne Naess, *Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy*, trans, David Rothenberg (Cambridge: Cambridge U Press, 1989) 131.
[34] Ibid, 131.
[35] Kent A. Peacock, *Living With the Earth: An Introduction to Environmental Philosophy* (Toronto: Harcourt Brace & Company Canada Ltd., 1996) 261.
[36] Arne Naess, *Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy*, trans, David Rothenberg (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1989) 137.
[37] Ibid, 137.
[38] Ibid, 141.

[39] Ibid, 142-144.
[40] Ibid, 145.
[41] Ibid, 138.
[42] Kent A. Peacock, *Living With the Earth: An Introduction to Environmental Philosophy* (Toronto: Harcourt Brace & Company Canada Ltd., 1996) 255.
[43] Sessions, George. "Arne Naess and the Union of Theory and Practice." in Drengson, Alan and Yuichi Inoue, eds, *Deep Ecology Movement: An Introductory Anthology* (Berkeley: North Atlantic Books, 1995) 61.
[44] Kent A. Peacock, *Living With the Earth: An Introduction to Environmental Philosophy* (Toronto: Harcourt Brace & Company Canada Ltd., 1996) 265.
[45] Arne Naess, *Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy*, trans, David Rothenberg (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1989) 131.
[46] David Rothenberg, "A Platform of Deep Ecology" in Drengson, Alan and Yuichi Inoue, eds, *Deep Ecology Movement: An Introductory Anthology* (Berkeley: North Atlantic Books, 1995) 161.
[47] Arne Naess, *Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy*, trans, David Rothenberg (Cambridge: Cambridge U Press, 1989) 113.
[48] Ibid, 111.
[49] Ibid, 116.
[50] Ibid, 104, 109, 112.
[51] Ibid, 109, 112.
[52] Kent A. Peacock, *Living With the Earth: An Introduction to Environmental Philosophy* (Toronto: Harcourt Brace & Company Canada Ltd., 1996) 265.
[53] Arne Naess, *Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy*, trans, David Rothenberg (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1989) 143.
[54] Kent A. Peacock, *Living With the Earth: An Introduction to Environmental Philosophy* (Toronto: Harcourt Brace & Company Canada Ltd., 1996) 265.
[55] Arne Naess, *Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy*, trans, David Rothenberg (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1989) 143.
[56] Ibid, 143.
[57] Ibid, 149.
[58] Kent A. Peacock, *Living With the Earth: An Introduction to Environmental Philosophy* (Toronto: Harcourt Brace & Company Canada Ltd., 1996) 266.
[59] Arne Naess, *Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy*, trans, David Rothenberg (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1989) 160.
[60] Sessions, George, "Arne Naess and the Union of Theory and Practice." in Drengson, Alan and Yuichi Inoue, eds, *Deep Ecology Movement: An Introductory Anthology* (Berkeley: North Atlantic Books, 1995) 60.
[61] Freya Matthews, "Deep Ecology" in Jamieson, Dale, ed, *A Companion to Environmental Philosophy*, ed. Dale Jamieson (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2001) 223.
[62] Ibid, 224.
[63] Christopher Belshaw, *Environmental Philosophy* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's U. Press, 2001) 182.
[64] Ibid, 182.

Works Cited

Belshaw, Christopher. *Environmental Philosophy*. Kingston: McGill-Queen's U. Press, 2001.

Matthes, Freya. "Deep Ecology". *A Companion to Environmental Philosophy*. Ed. Dale Jamieson. Malden: Blackwell, 2001.

Naess, Arne. *Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: Outline of and Ecosophy.*Trans. David Rothenberg. Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1989.

Naess, Arne. "The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movements: A Summary". *Deep Ecology for the 21st Century*. Ed. George Sessions. Boston: Random House, 1995.

Peacock, Kent A. *Living with the Earth: An Introduction to Environmental Philosophy*. Toronto: Harcourt Brace & Co, 1996.

Choc Islam-Occident?

Gina Mori

La chute du mur de Berlin représente la fin de l'ordre mondial bipolaire. Depuis, plusieurs politologues cherchent à comprendre l'évolution du système international au sein d'une mondialisation de plus en plus imposante. Les guerres et la violence soulèvent, à cet égard, plusieurs interrogations : sous quelles formes et de quelles natures émergeront les rivalités futures? Les thèses exposées à cet effet sont ambivalentes et vacillent de l'optimiste au pessimisme. Alors que certains auteurs dont Fukuyama Francis (1992), prévoient la « fin des conflits et de l'histoire », d'autres comme Samuel Huntington (1993, 1996) pronostiquent le début de conflits de plus en plus désastreux. L'actuel conflit entre l'Irak et les États-Unis rend plus que jamais intéressants et pertinents les propos de l'article et du livre *Le Choc des civilisations* publiés respectivement en 1993 et 1996.

La thèse de Huntington est claire. Les conflits de nature idéologique qui ont caractérisé le XX^{è} siècle, seront au XXI^{è} d'ordre culturel. La fin de la guerre froide, en annulant la dualité entre l'Est et l'Ouest, qui permettait l'équilibre bipolaire entre les nations, entraîne un équilibre multipolaire basé sur des civilisations. Cet événement marque selon l'auteur un point critique qui annonce une transformation des discordes contemporaines, principalement économiques et politiques, en un retour aux conflits culturels.

Ainsi, les événements du 11 septembre 2001 et plus précisément la guerre en Irak présentent-ils des signes précurseurs d'un choc des civilisations ? N'est-il pas possible que cette guerre qui prend place sans l'appui de l'ONU engendre une confrontation entre l'Islam et la civilisation occidentale tout en engendrant une séparation à l'intérieur même de la civilisation occidentale? Certains infirment cette possibilité en qualifiant la guerre en Irak d'une lutte de pouvoir poursuivant des finalités économiques. D'autres soutiennent le contraire et pensent que la guerre en Irak pourrait entraîner un choc entre les civilisations. C'est en relation à cette crainte que le Président Chirac a clairement manifesté sa volonté quant à éviter ce conflit[1].

C'est sur la potentialité de voir la guerre en Irak entraîner un choc des civilisations que s'attardera le présent travail. Une vue d'ensemble de la théorie du choc des civilisations sera en première instance présentée. Ensuite, nous nous attarderons sur différents points de vue qui viennent d'une part confirmer et d'autre part infirmer la possibilité de voir le conflit en Irak évoluer vers un choc des civilisations.

La thèse du choc des civilisations

Le rideau de velours de la culture
a remplacé le rideau de fer de l'idéologie
Huntington

S'inspirant de Spengler, philosophe allemand, Huntington (1996) s'attarde sur la nature des futurs conflits internationaux. Dans le livre *Le choc des civilisations*[2], Huntington présente une vision originale du monde actuel et des conflits de demain où, la structure organisationnelle du monde devient culturelle et civilisationnelle[3]. Plus spécifiquement, Huntington précise que les conflits ultérieurs à la guerre froide ne seront plus principalement d'ordre idéologique ou économique, mais plutôt d'ordre culturel.

> Mon hypothèse est que, dans le monde nouveau, les conflits n'auront pas essentiellement pour origine l'idéologie ou l'économie. Les grandes causes de division de l'humanité et les principales sources de conflit seront culturelles (Huntington, 1996)

Ainsi, les frontières idéologiques et politiques seront remplacées par les clivages entre les civilisations. À cet effet, les deux postulats précisés par Oswald Spengler dans *Le déclin de l'occident*[4] s'avèrent éclairants. D'une part, les civilisations (ou cultures) seraient imperméables aux influences extérieures et d'autre part, elles seraient des entités politiques[5].

L'imperméabilité et l'hybridation politique des civilisations

Le premier postulat qui appelle à l'imperméabilité culturelle rappelle que les valeurs inhérentes à une culture diffèrent de celles développées par d'autres civilisations et qu'elles sont difficilement intégrables. Si encore aujourd'hui quelques valeurs occidentales subsistent dans d'autres civilisations, elles y ont été imposées lors du colonialisme. En réalité, les civilisations confucéennes, musulmanes ou hindouistes trouvent peu d'écho dans les concepts de libéralisme, démocratie, individualisme et droit de l'homme valorisés par l'occident[6].

Les référents culturels interpellent des distinctions majeures entre les peuples[7]. C'est ce qui explique que les civilisations réfutent naturellement les efforts de promotion des valeurs occidentales en tant que valeurs universelles:

> Les efforts de l'Occident pour promouvoir ses valeurs de démocratie et de libéralisme comme des valeurs universelles, pour maintenir sa prédominance militaire et pour faire progresser ses intérêts économiques, engendrent des ripostes en provenance des autres civilisations[8].

Imposer les valeurs occidentales à d'autres civilisations s'avère une source de tension qui émerge de leur réciproque imperméabilité.

Le second postulat de Spengler se réfère à l'hybridation politique de la civilisation. Huntington raisonne en ce même sens lorsqu'il précise que les États-Nations « continueront à jouer le premier rôle dans les affaires internationales, mais les principaux conflits politiques mondiaux mettront aux prises des nations et des groupes appartenant à des civilisations différentes »[9]. À cet effet, les civilisations occuperont un rôle politique où l'équilibre mondial serait fonction de l'harmonie entre les civilisations Chinoise, Japonaise, Indoue, Musulmane, Occidentale, Latino-américaine et peut-être Africaine[10]. Ainsi, un choc entre des civilisations engloberait la politique mondiale et concernerait l'ordre mondial[11].

Selon la théorie de Huntington, les différences entre les civilisations deviennent fondamentales. Elles dicteront l'ordre mondial en rassemblant ou en divisant les pays de part leur culture : « les conflits à venir seront provoqués par des facteurs culturels plutôt qu'économiques ou idéologiques[12] ».

Ainsi, les fractures culturelles seront de graves sources de conflits, faisant en sorte qu'une troisième guerre mondiale résulterait de rivalités entre des civilisations et non entre pays comme tels[13]. Cette situation s'expliquerait de par ce que l'auteur appelle le "syndrome du pays frère[14]", c'est-à-dire que les pays de même culture et valeurs tendent à s'unir lorsqu'ils se retrouvent dans un conflit. La guerre du Golfe pourrait-elle illustrer ce syndrome?

D'autre part, ce rapprochement entre les pays d'une même civilisation s'avère l'une des répercussions de la modernité. La modernité ainsi que les progrès technologiques ont transformé la dynamique économique et sociale provoquant un éloignement des sociétés par rapport à leur identité traditionnelle nationale et par ricochet en renforçant leurs sentiments d'appartenance envers leur

civilisation[15]. En ce même sens, Huntington perçoit la modernité comme un processus révolutionnaire qui a permis aux êtres humains de contrôler leur environnement et ce, grâce au progrès scientifique et technologiques[16]. Il soutient également que ni l'économie ni l'esprit du néolibéralisme ne pourront lier les hommes entre eux[17], car si actuellement ils mettent les hommes en contact, ils ne sont pas nécessairement en harmonie. Ainsi, le vide identitaire est comblé par un retour en force de la religion, « souvent sous la forme de mouvements dénommés fondamentalistes, dans l'Occident chrétien, le Judaïsme, le Bouddhisme, l'Hindouisme et l'Islam »[18]. Par exemple, la modernité aurait comme impact de rapprocher et de renforcer le sentiment d'appartenance des irakiens, des syriens, des iraniens à l'islam en les éloignant de leur identité nationale distinctive. Donc, la religion plus que les nationalités et l'économie devient un facteur de rassemblement. C'est ce que Gilles Kepel appelle la "revanche de Dieu[19]». Mais précisons que ce retour aux racines se développe surtout chez les non-occidentaux.

Ainsi, la religion prend donc une place importante dans les civilisations non-occidentales. Plus précisément, Hassner (2002) soutient qu'« au 21ème siècle, la foi et la famille, le sang et les croyances seront les valeurs pour lesquelles les hommes accepteront de mourir »[20]. À cet égard, la dynamique équilibrant l'ordre mondial est complètement transformée. Lorsque les conflits étaient de nature sociale ou idéologique la question clé était : *«De quel côté êtes-vous[21] ? »*. Il était alors possible de choisir son camp et de changer de position. Lorsque les conflits deviennent d'ordre identitaire et religieux, les conflits entre civilisations transforment la question pour devenir « *Qui êtes-vous[22] »*? Cette remonté en surface de l'identité, qui provoque l'adhésion et la prise en force de différentes civilisations, met l'occident en danger.

L'Occident en danger et pistes de solution

Le déploiement des fondamentalismes religieux ainsi que le renforcement des dictatures engendrent, selon Huntington, la dégradation de la démocratie[23] et un affaiblissement, voir une perte du pouvoir de l'Occident. C'est en fait tout le rapport à la modernité qui est remis en question. Être moderne n'est plus inhérent à la culture occidentale. Les peuples non-occidentaux désirent embrasser la modernité, mais d'une façon qui leur est propre et qui correspond à leurs propres valeurs culturelles. Les Européens et Américains sont contestés et perdent leurs attraits aux yeux des autres civilisations. L'Europe et l'occidentalisation ont permis l'émergence et expansion de la modernité[24]. Rejeter ces valeurs modernes dévoile nécessairement un Occident en défaillance. Selon Huntington, l'Occident est en danger.

Cette thèse va plus loin et affirme que l'Occident perd de sa puissance et de son influence. Ce constat implique que l'Occident devient « minoritaire » et qu'un avenir de tensions ne sera plus une opposition Est-Ouest, mais celle de l'Occident contre tous les autres : « *The West and the rest* »[25].

Huntington illustre cette réalité à l'aide de statistiques explicitant la décroissance de popularité de la langue anglaise, française et allemande[26]. Il rappelle que 9,8% de la population s'exprimait en anglais en 1958 alors que cette langue parlée chute à 7,6 % en 1992 au profit de l'arabe, de l'espagnol et de diverses variantes du chinois[27] . Le manque de cohésion et d'homogénéité dans les pays occidentaux dû au multiculturalisme que permettent des *«frontières trop accueillantes »* expliqueraient la périlleuse situation de la civilisation occidentale. En fait, Huntington critique le multiculturalisme chez lui car ce dernier brise l'unité de la nation. Il prétend que ce même phénomène se réalise à l'échelle planétaire[28]. Laissons Huntington s'exprimer en ses propres termes :

> L'avenir des États-Unis et celui de l'Occident dépendent de la foi renouvelée des Américains en faveur de la civilisation occidentale. Cela nécessite de faire taire les appels au multiculturalisme, à l'intérieur de leurs frontières. Sur le plan international, cela suppose de rejeter les tentatives illusoires d'assimilation des États-Unis à l'Asie[29].

En d'autres termes, Samuel Huntington prescrit l'isolement comme une panacée au danger auquel l'Occident est confronté. Le livre *La mondialisation culturelle* de Gérard Leclerc (2000) aborde en ce même sens. Cet auteur soutient que «, l'universalisme occidental se heurte à des principes culturels et religieux des autres universalismes »[30]. L'objectif consiste à

> ...repousser à la fois le multiculturalisme à l'intérieure et l'universalismes à l'extérieur et se garder d'interférer dans les affaires des autres, avec le grand danger qu'en évacuant l'universalité de certaines valeurs, justifier culturellement des choses injustifiables puisse devenir possible[31]

Ainsi, si l'Occident cesse d'intervenir dans les affaires des autres la paix sera maintenue [32] car en réalité, « les chocs dangereux du futur naîtront probablement de l'interaction de l'arrogance occidentale, de l'intolérance islamique et de l'autoritarisme chinois[33] ». En ce sens, l'objectif d'Huntington vise à mettre un terme à l'ingérence occidentale[34].

La guerre en Irak ; l'évolution vers le Choc des civilisations ?

Pour Samuel Huntington, les événements du 11 septembre 2001 tiennent davantage d'un conflit entre la civilisation et la barbarie que d'un choc entre civilisations. C'est ce qu'il soutient lors d'une entrevue consacrée à l'Express le 25 octobre 2001, en s'appuyant sur la distinction des guerres justes et injustes inscrites dans le Coran qui ne permet pas d'attaquer les civils, les femmes et les enfants et prohibe le suicide[35]. Ainsi, les événements du 11 septembre seraient en contradiction avec l'islamisme et donc à l'encontre de l'idéologie de cette civilisation.

Toutefois, Huntington précise que si l'attaque terroriste survenue à New York n'enclenche pas de choc entre les civilisations, il serait en mesure de se concrétiser si les États-Unis se mobilisent pour renverser le régime de Saddam Hussein. Selon lui, il faudrait des preuves irréfutables et convaincantes qui établissent qu'Hussein ait travaillé conjointement avec le réseau Al-Qaeda afin de ne pas « s'aliéner une grande partie de l'opinion arabe et créer sans doute, aussi, des problèmes avec la Russie et avec la France »[36].

Or, le 19 mars 2003, la Grande-Bretagne s'allie aux États-Unis afin de faire la guerre à l'Irak sans attendre le verdict de l'ONU, où le refus de la France et la Russie était prévisible. La détention d'armes de destruction massive par l'Irak constituant le mobile de guerre soulève de nombreuses interrogations : pourquoi intervenir dans un pays sans preuves tangibles? Pourquoi l'Irak et non la Corée du Nord? Ces questions sans réponse déclenchent une forte réaction dans les pays musulmans et arabes qui pourraient, selon bien des auteurs, entraîner le choc des civilisations « Islam-Occident ».

De ce fait, Hubert Védrine (2003), ancien ministre des affaires étrangères de la France, affirme que la réaction des pays arabes et musulmans est tout-à-fait compréhensible[37]. Cette guerre ne fait que réaffirmer l'ingérence occidentale souvent tolérée, comportement que l'occident tend à oublier mais que les musulmans gardent en mémoire. C'est à ce niveau que s'inscrit le désire proclamer par les États-Unis qui consiste à libérer le peuple irakien afin de faire place à la démocratie. Védrine (2003) prétend que même si une grande majorité des musulmans résistent aux fondamentalistes religieux et dénient le terrorisme, cette majorité conteste autant plus le « *métayage* » de l'Occident et l'imposition des valeurs occidentales. En fait, le monde musulman ne peut se défaire de son passé qui se résume en conquêtes, en croisades, en affrontements et en colonisations chrétiennes pour finalement abdiquer à la domination américaine. À cet effet, la guerre de l'Irak ne fait que fortifier les divergences entre ces deux civilisations[38], ce qui pourrait entraîner leur entrechoquement.

À cet égard, un sondage effectué dans les pays arabes et musulmans pro-américains dévoile le niveau d'hostilité avec l'image fort dégradante associée aux États-Unis. Plus spécifiquement, cette enquête menée sous la direction de Madeleine Albright, ancienne secrétaire d'État sous Bill Clinton, est publié par le *Pew research center for the people and the press* le 4 décembre 2002[39], dévoile que les pays musulmans sont hostiles à l'égard des Américains et qu'ils s'opposent à la « *croisade guerrière* ». Ainsi, dans 42 des 44 pays interrogés, l'opinion publique était défavorable à une intervention américaine en Irak. L'International du 09 décembre 2002 précise que la principale raison qui soutient cette désapprobation repose sur l'idée que le véritable motif de Washington consiste à s'emparer des richesses pétrolières de l'Irak. De plus, on peut remarquer dans cette enquête que plus les régimes participants sont « pro-américains » , plus l'hostilité est grande. Ainsi, l'antipathie envers les américains se situe à 55% pour la Turquie, 59% au Liban, 69% en Egypte et 75% en Jordanie. Ces donnés expriment, pour le quotidien d'Oran du 8 décembre 2002, une image très négative des États Unis dans le monde musulman et « que le clash des civilisations est en marche...une guerre injuste et injustifiée contre l'Irak ne fera qu'exacerber[40] ».

Or, la guerre en Irak a ouvert les yeux à une Égypte modernisée. Depuis Sadate, les islamistes égyptiens avaient fait en sorte d'adapter « *le contenu de l'islam à la mondialisation* »[41]. Par contre, la guerre contre l'Irak et les conflits en Palestine ne font que ramener à la surface des colères refoulées, ce qui entraîne une nouvelle radicalisation de l'Islamisme dans le pays. C'est ainsi que la guerre en Irak a déclenché des protestations (bien qu'elles soient illégales en Égypte) soulignant, qu'au *« nom du Coran et de l'Evangile, nous nous sacrifions pour toi, ô Palestine, et pour toi, ô Irak »*[42]

Mais l'enjeu du problème est plus large. Si l'Égypte a su s'adapter, d'une certaine façon, aux changements créés par l'émergence de nouvelles dynamiques mondiales (économiques) résultant du progrès technologique, on ne peut prétendre que cela soit possible pour tous les pays Islamiques. La majorité des pays musulmans sont dépourvus des besoins fondamentaux dits essentiels à la survie et le modèle occidental est loin d'être la réponse à leurs besoins. Le fait que l'Occident veuille imposer des valeurs de modernité lorsque les circonstances les rendent inaccessibles engendre nécessairement des réactions massives contre celles-ci. L'antidote devient souvent, le retour « aux traditions les plus éculées.[43] »

Ce retour aux traditions se dénote également chez les islamiques installés en Occident. Dominique Dhombres soutient qu'en France les parents musulmans se rapprochent de leurs traditions en envoyant leurs fils dans les écoles coraniques et en voilant leurs filles de la tête aux pieds. Dhombres soutient que c'est la peur de voir leurs enfants se diriger vers la délinquance insufflée par le contact avec la culture occidentale. Selon cet auteur, le choc des civilisations semble en voie de concrétisation[44].

Toutefois, il serait réducteur d'expliquer le renforcement de l'Islam uniquement comme une conséquence de la guerre en Irak. Huntington avait déjà constaté qu' « *en* 1995, tous les pays islamiques étaient, à l'exception de l'Iran, plus musulmans culturellement, socialement et politiquement qu'ils ne l'étaient quinze années auparavant[45] ». Par ailleurs, Abdelwhab Medded, professeur de littérature comparée à l'université Paris-X, soutient que le choc entre l'Islam et l'Occident aurait commencé dans les 1920[46]. L'islamisme définissait l'idée de combattre l'occident comme la « volonté d'imposer la politique au nom de Dieu et de faire table rase de tous les emprunts aux autres civilisations dont s'est nourrie la religion du Prophète[47]. » Sadam Hussein et Bin Laden ne veulent-ils pas poursuivre ce combat en prononçant un discours incitant l'Islam à se livrer à une Guerre Sainte ?

Cependant, il importe de mentionner que ce n'est pas seulement les musulmans qui évoquent Dieu dans leur politique. La foi chrétienne se renouvelle également au sein même de l'administration de Bush. Le président des États-Unis cherche « *conseil auprès de Dieu* » pour mener ses guerres. Or, depuis quelque temps aux Etats-Unis, des jours de prière sont instaurés et Dieu est évoqué dans les discours

politiques. L'Éditeur du Monde considère le « fondamentalisme » du président un danger qui pourrait transformer « le conflit entre la coalition anglo-américaine et les Irakiens en une nouvelle croisade, en un choc des civilisations et des religions aux conséquences dévastatrices bien au-delà de la région »[48].

La présente section s'est attardée à présenter certaines argumentations qui font en sorte que la guerre en Irak risque d'entraîner l'entrechoquement de l'occident et de l'Islam. Une guerre, que Bush qualifie de libératrice, revient à imposer des valeurs occidentales à la civilisation Islamique. C'est ce qui, à la lumière de la théorie Huntington, entraîne d'un pas certain un choc des civilisations.

Les paradoxes du Choc

Pour certains, le conflit en Irak n'entraînera pas un choc entre l'Islam et l'Occident. En réalité, la thèse d'Huntington est contestée et ce, sur différents aspects.

Pierre Hassner prétend que la thèse d'Huntington est ambiguë. D'une part, les civilisations distinguées par Huntington (monde chrétien, islamique, orthodoxe, etc.) ne sont ni harmonieuses et ni fermées sur elles-mêmes[49]. D'autre part, les conflits les plus fréquents prennent source dans des religions de différentes nations qu'Huntington rassemble sous une même civilisation[50]. C'est le cas des populations chiites, sunnites et wahhabites que Huntington regroupe sous une même civilisation alors que ces sectes de l'Islam ont des interprétations différentes du Coran. D'après Hassner, « les guerres intercivilisationelles sont moins fréquentes que les guerres entre nations ethnies ; entre différentes religions, version d'une même religion et sectes à l'intérieur d'une même civilisation »[51]. Hassner appuie ses propos par les affrontements Huti-Tutsi, chiites-sunnistes et Kurdes-Turcs survenus dans les dernières années.

Cette réalité est également présente en Occident. Les intérêts, la religion et les approches politiques et culturelles divergent au sein de l'Occident. Par exemple, la tendance du Président Bush à faire appel à des valeurs chrétiennes annonce un certain renouvellement de la foi. Toutefois, malgré que l'Europe adhère à ces mêmes valeurs, il n'est pas assuré qu'elle emboîtera le pas dans la même direction que les États-Unis. Rappelons que depuis les traités de Westphalie qui ont établi en 1648 une nette distinction entre la religion et l'État, le religieux est dès lors laissé de côté par l'Occident. En fait, la conception des droits à caractère laïque est à l'origine de la tradition occidentale[52].

Outre la religion qui divise les pays occidentaux, les intérêts et les approches politiques et culturelles le sont également. La diversification et la contradiction entre les raisonnements des États-Unis et d'autres pays d'Europe sont parfois très grandes. Ainsi, la conception du terme civilisation comme phénomène unificateur, via la religion, la culture, etc. serait réfutée. À cet égard, Philippe Raggi lors de son analyse du choc des civilisations parue le 6 janvier 2003[53], critique la distinction que fait Huntington entre le « *eux/nous* », qui situe l'Occident contre le reste des civilisations, en précisant que la « *civilisation occidentale* » ne possède pas de « *nous* ». La diversité et l'hétérogénéité de l'occident ne permettent pas ce terme englobant et structurant. Ces quelques propos qui s'inscrivent à l'encontre de la théorie d'Huntington font en sorte que l'actuelle guerre en Irak ne pourrait être considérée comme un choc entre l'Occident et l'Islam.

Toutefois, si Hassner soutient que les conflits ne résultent pas d'un choc des civilisations, il admet cependant que la globalisation liée à la modernisation peut engendrer des problèmes, surtout au sein d'une société qui a de la difficulté à se localiser dans un monde en constante progression. Face à de grands changements et progrès résultants de la modernité, un individu peut se trouver « arraché à ses points de repères familiaux nationaux, culturelles ou religieux, et livrés sans protection aux rigueurs de la compétition dans un monde trop complexe et changeant pour répondre à ses besoins de stabilité ou de sens [54]». L'issue de secours consiste à recherche l'identité, dans une unification de mêmes souches et le

retour aux racines. Cependant, l'auteur souligne que ces « *mouvements de retour à la tradition* » sont subordonnés à la modernité à laquelle ils s'objectent.

De façon générale, les personnes qui s'éloignent de la conception de la guerre comme étant le résultat d'un choc des civilisations, sont en désaccord avec la théorie de Huntington. Certains d'entre eux vont même jusqu'à l'associer à de la propagande. Ainsi, le danger de la théorie du Choc des civilisations vient de la facilité avec laquelle elle peut justifier certaines actions. À cet effet, Edward Said, journaliste de *The Guardian* précise que :

> « le choc des civilisations, que George Bush et ses esclaves tentent de promouvoir afin de justifier une guerre préventive pour le pétrole et leurs vues hégémoniques sur l'Irak, est supposé aboutir à la construction triomphale d'une nation démocratique, au changement de régime et à une modernisation forcée à l'américaine.[55] »

Par ailleurs, certains soutiennent qu' Huntington, en tant qu'ancien membre du conseil de sécurité au sein de l'administration Carter, aurait créé une théorie pour permettre que les Etats-Unis maintiennent leur statut de « unique puissance mondiale ». En fait, certains occidentaux tel que Margaret Thatcher et George Bush ont vu dans la chute du rideau de fer, qui prévoyait l'émergence de nouvelles alliances et la reconstruction des pays de l'Est, une menace pour l'empire financier de Wall Street[56]. La dynamique de la mondialisation ne faisait que renforcer cette peur. La solution résidait alors dans le maintien d'une politique de division. Il fallait donc définir un nouvel ennemi et la réponse s'est formulée dans le « *choc des civilisations* » ou le « *reste du monde* » serait contre l'occident[57]. Les expressions « *we against them* », « *péril jaune* », « *explosion démographique* », « *menace islamique* », « *primauté de l'Occident* » et « *ressentiments qui s'expriment à travers le fondamentalisme* » utilisées par Huntington ne peuvent qu'engendrer un sentiment de peur au lecteur[58].

Nadia Weiss soutient qu'il s'agit manifestement de suggérer aux Occidentaux de « s*e dresser contre la suprématie de cultures étrangères*[59] ». Weiss qualifie l'approche de propagande. Ainsi en postulant que l'Occident est en danger contre le «*reste du monde* », il dresse l'Occident contre la suprématie des cultures étrangères[60]. En plus, il légitime la guerre en justifiant sa nécessité comme une sauvegarde.

À la lumière de ces propos, devient-il surprenant qu'au lendemain des événements du 11 septembre, des hommes politiques postulent que le « *choc des civilisations* » domine actuellement la « *politique américaine* » ? S'il ne s'agit pas de propagande, alors comment expliquer que les projets de guerre contre l'Irak étaient déjà définis par certains hommes politiques [61]? Non seulement une guerre contre l'Irak était déjà prévue, mais celle-ci doit s'étendre contre trente autres pays musulmans incluant la Somalie et la Malaisie[62]. « Ces pays sont certes très différents quant à leurs attitudes politiques, leurs pratiques religieuses et leurs structures sociales, mais ils ont en commun de revêtir pour les Etats-Unis une grande importance stratégique en raison de leurs ressources en matières premières »[63].

Conclusion

La récente polémique au sein de l'ONU concernant le désarmement de l'Irak et les méthodes à employer de même que la scission de l'OTAN, au lieu de témoigner d'un « choc de civilisations » indiquerait plutôt l'existence de différences substantielles à l'intérieur de la civilisation occidentale (ie. position de la France, Canada et surtout Allemagne). Du coté du monde arabo-musulman une division est également évidente entre d'une part des pays comme l'Iran et d'autre part des pays aspirants à plus de démocratie tel que le Koweit (pour des raisons évidentes), mais aussi au sein de certains autres pays traditionnellement conservateurs comme l'Arabie Saoudite. Il faut donc tenir compte de la complexité de chaque civilisation plutôt que de prétendre qu'il y aurait deux blocs antagonistes à l'instar du monde bipolaire désormais révolu. Nous observons au contraire un monde fracturé et ce, au sein de chaque civilisation et même à l'intérieur de chaque pays spécifique.

Or, au lendemain des attentats terroristes de New York et de Washington et particulièrement depuis le déclenchement de la guerre contre l'Irak, les politologues, journalistes et scientifiques tentent de donner des explications aux conflits actuels qui troublent notre monde. En cherchant ces réponses, ces mêmes experts projettent la vision d'un éventuel « *choc des civilisations* » qui pourrait mettre fin à la puissance occidentale et à tout ce qu'elle incarne, soit le droit international, les droits humains et les droits et libertés individuelles. Face à cette éventuelle possibilité, n'est-il pas de notre responsabilité de protéger nos valeurs et idées si biens défendues depuis des siècles ?

À mon avis, la théorie de Huntington, en plus d'être erronée sous l'angle civilisationel, aurait comme objectif d'ériger des frontières en vue de faire perdurer le pouvoir politique et financier de l'Occident. Les États-Unis se sentent menacés par l'accroissement des économies extérieures. Leurs ressources naturelles ne sont plus aptes à satisfaire les besoins matériels exponentiels d'une population s'inscrivant dans des processus de modernisation. Leur propre idéologie se voit confrontée à des dynamiques qu'ils ne peuvent plus contrôler en raison de la mondialisation. En plus, sachant que tout empire (les États-Unis étant la plus grande puissance de monde) est destiné à s'effondrer un jour ou l'autre, le « *choc de civilisations* » aurait comme but ultime de réunir l'Occident afin de conserver son pouvoir le plus longtemps possible. Machiavelli en était le promoteur, il y a plus de 400 ans, alors que le Prince devait réunir son peuple afin de conserver son pouvoir et l'accroître.

À cet effet, les « leaders » du monde semblent utiliser des théories comme celle du « *choc des civilisations* » pour faire peur à des individus qui en réalité ne recherchent que la paix. Ces Bush, Hussein et Ben Laden n'ont qu'un désir : triompher et garder leur pouvoir et ce, peu importe ce que la population mondiale en pense. Qui n'aime pas être au pouvoir ? Qui ne veut pas diriger le monde ? C'est sous cette perspective que j'entrevois le conflit en Irak. Il ne s'agit pas de «*l'Occident contre le reste du monde*», mais bien des «*leaders au pouvoir*» contre «*le reste*», nous qui sommes guidés par la recherche utopique d'un monde meilleur.

Notes

[1] Gurrey Béatrice, *Depuis des mois l'Elysée scrute les opinions en Europe*, Le Monde, (paru le 31 mars 2003).
[2] Huntington Samuel, *Le choc des civilisations*, Editions Odile Jacob, (Paris, 1996), 402p.
[3] Raggi Phillipe, *Le choc des civilisations,* daté du (6 janvier 2003), publiée sur le site : www.confidentiel.firstream.net
[4] Moreau Desfarges Phillippe aborde ces deux postulats dans *L'ordre mondial*, Armand Colin, (Paris, 2000)169.
[5] Ibid, 169
[6] Guatieri Laurence, Herrmann Benoit, Lajous Marion, Macaione Christine, *« Critique du choc des civilisation »*, Travail dans le cadre de sciences-po, (Année 2002-2003), dans le site : *http://demos1.chez.tiscali.fr/partieia.htm#13*
[7] Ibid.
[8] Hutchinson Patrick dans forme condensée de l'article *Le choc des civilisations* (paru dans la revue Foreign Affairs, 1994) dans le site : www.republique-des-lettres.com/h2/huntington.shtml .
[9] Ibid.
[10] Huntington Samuel, *Le choc des civilisations*, Editions Odile Jacob, (Paris 1996) 44 - 46.
[11] Bruckner Pascal, *Samuel Huntington ou le retour de la fatalité*, Esprit no 235-238, (août-décembre 1997) 54.
[12] Huntington Samuel cite Jacques Delors, *Le choc des civilisations*, Editions Odile Jacob,(Paris, 1996) 22.
[13] Huntington Samuel, *Le choc des civilisations*, Editions Odile Jacob, (Paris, 1996).
[14] Expression de H.D.S. Greenway reprit par Huntington Samuel, *Le choc des civilisations*, Editions Odile Jacob, (Paris, 1996) 20.
[15] Kepel Gilles dans Huntington Samuel, *Le choc des civilisations*, Editions Odile Jacob, (Paris, 1996)101.
[16] Huntington Samuel, *Le choc des civilisations*, Editions Odile Jacob, (Paris, 1996), 70.
[17] Bruckner Pascal, *Samuel Huntington ou le retour de la fatalité*, Esprit no 235-238, (août-décembre 1997) 55.
[18] Hutchinson Patrick dans forme condensée de l'article *Le choc des civilisations*, paru dans la revue Foreign Affairs (1994) dans le site : www.republique-des-lettres.com/h2/huntington.shtml .
[19] Kepel Gilles dans Huntington Samuel, *Le choc des civilisations*, Editions Odile Jacob, (Paris, 1996) 101.
[20] Hassner Pierre, *La thèse du «choc des civilisations » est une vision fausse de l'avenir es l'humanité*, paru dans *Le nouvel état du monde : les idées forces pour comprendre les nouveaux enjeux internationaux/ sous la direction de Serge Cordellier*, La découverte, (Paris c2002) 68 -70.
[21] Bruckner Pascal, *Samuel Huntington ou le retour de la fatalité* (Esprit no 235-238, août-décembre 1997) 54.
[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.
[24] Leclerc Gérard, *La mondialisation culturelle: les civilization à l'épreuve*, Presse universitaires de France, (Paris, 2000) 467.
[25] Bruckner Pascal, *Samuel Huntington ou le retour de la fatalité*, Esprit no 235-238, (août-décembre 1997) 55.
[26] Huntington Samuel, *Le choc des civilisations*, Editions Odile Jacob (Paris, 1996) 60.
[27] Ibid, 60-61.
[28] Bruckner Pascal, *Samuel Huntington ou le retour de la fatalité*, Esprit no 235-238, (août-décembre 1997) 61.
[29] Huntington Samuel, *Le choc des civilisations*, Editions Odile Jacob, (Paris, 1996) 339.
[30] Leclerc Gérard, *La mondialisation culturelle: les civilization à l'épreuve*, Presse universitaires de France, (Paris, 2000) 469.
[31] Hassner Pierre, *La thèse du «choc des civilisations » est une vision fausse de l'avenir es l'humanité*, paru dans *Le nouvel état du monde : les idées forces pour comprendre les nouveaux enjeux internationaux/ sous la direction de Serge Cordellier*, La découverte, (Paris c2002) 68.
[32] Bruckner Pascal, *Samuel Huntington ou le retour de la fatalité*, Esprit no 235-238, (août-décembre 1997) 61.
[33] Bruckner Pascal cite Huntington, *Samuel Huntington ou le retour de la fatalité*, Esprit no 235-238, (août-décembre 1997) 61.
[34] Ibid., 61.
[35] Huntington S. dans une entrevue consacré à L'Express, (no 2625 du 25 octobre 2001) 62-65.
[36] Ibid, 65.
[37] Hubert Védrine, *Comment nier le choc Islam-Occident ?*, Le Monde, (jeudi 27 février 2003).
[38] Ibid.
[39] Sondage effectuer par le "Pew reseach center for the people and the press", dans *What the World Thinks in 2002*, obtenu dans le site: http://people-press.org/.
[40] *Un sondage planétaire et réalisé par un institut américain : L'opinion musulmane hostile à l'Amérique de Bush,* Le quotidien d'Oran du 8 décembre 2002 obtenu dans le site : www.tourism-algerie.com/z.houfani/ .
[41] Tincq Henri, *Bouillonnements égyptiens*, Le monde (paru le 29 mars 2003).
[42] Ibid.
[43] Sélim Abou, L'identité culturelle. Relations interethniques et problèmes d'acculturation, (Paris, Anthropos, deuxième édition, 1986) p.xv.
[44] Dhombres Dominique, *Karachi et Bali*, Le Monde (article paru dans l'edition du 17 octobre 2002).
[45] Ibid., Huntington cité par Dhombres Dominique, *Karachi et Bali*, Le Monde (article paru dans l'édition du 17 octobre 2002).
[46] Langelier Jean –Pierre, Le nouveau désordre mondial, Le Monde (article paru dans l'édition du 20 juillet 2002).
[47] Ibid.
[48] Éditorial du Monde, *Dieu et l'Amérique*, Le Monde (article paru dans l'édition du 29 mars 2003).
[49] Hassner Pierre, *La thèse du «choc des civilisations » est une vision fausse de l'avenir es l'humanité*, paru dans *Le nouvel état du monde : les idées forces pour comprendre les nouveaux enjeux internationaux/ sous la direction de Serge Cordellier*, La découverte, (Paris, c2002) 68-69.
[50] Ibid, 69.
[51] Ibid., op. cit., 69.
[52] Fukuyama Francis, Le choc de l'Islam et de la modernité, France-Amérique, édition internationale du Figaro (publiée à New-York dans la semaine du 8 au 14 décembre 2001).
[53] Raggi Phillipe, Le choc des civilisations, paru le 6 janvier 2003 dans le site : http://www.confidentiel.firstream.net/imprimersans.php3?id_article=144.
[54] Hassner Pierre, *La thèse du «choc des civilisations » est une vision fausse de l'avenir es l'humanité*, paru dans *Le nouvel état du monde : les idées forces pour comprendre les nouveaux enjeux internationaux/ sous la direction de Serge Cordellier*, La découverte, (Paris c2002) op. cit., 69.
[55] Said Edward, "Quand allons-nous résister?", The Guardian (paru le 25 janvier 2003).
[56] Le nouveau paradigme de l'après guerre froide : « Le Choc des civilisations » de Samuel Huntington, obtenu dans le site : http ://committeerepubliccanada.ca/Français/Autresdecl.htm .
[57] Ibid.
[58] Weiss Nadia, «Le monde de l'islam dans le collimateur de l'Occident », Horizon et débats (no 9/10, décembre 2001).
[59] Ibid.
[60] Ibid.
[61] Ibid.
[62] Weiss Nadia, «Le monde de l'islam dans le collimateur de l'Occident », Horizon et débats (no 9/10, décembre 2001).
[63] Ibid.

Bibliographie

Bruckner Pascal, *Samuel Huntington ou le retour de la fatalité*, Esprit no 235-238, août-décembre 1997, p.53 à 67.

Dhombres Dominique, *Karachi et Bali*, Le Monde, article paru dans l'édition du 17 octobre 2002.

Éditorial du Monde, *Dieu et l'Amérique*, Le Monde, article paru dans l'édition du 29 mars 2003.

Fukuyama Francis, *Le choc de l'Islam et de la modernité*, France-Amérique, édition internationale du Figaro, publiée à New York dans la semaine du 8 au 14 décembre 2001.

Guatieri Laurence, Herrmann Benoit, Lajous Marion, Macaione Christine, *« Critique du choc des civilisation »*, Travail dans le cadre de Sciences-po, Année 2002-2003, obtenu dans le site : *http://demos1.chez.tiscali.fr/partieia.htm#13*

Gurrey Béatrice, *Depuis des mois l'Elysée scrute les opinions en Europe*, Le Monde, article paru dans l'édition du 31 mars 2003.

Hassner Pierre, *La thèse du «choc des civilisations » est une vision fausse de l'avenir es l'humanité*, analyse paru dans Le nouvel état du monde : les idées-forces pour comprendre les nouveaux enjeux internationaux / sous la direction de Serge Cordellier, La découverte, Paris, c2002, pp.68 à 70.

Hubert Védrine, *Comment nier le choc Islam-Occident ?*, Le Monde Interactif, publié le jeudi 27 février 2003.

Huntington Samuel, *Le choc des civilisations*, Editions Odile Jacob, Paris, 1996, 402p.

Huntington Samuel, entrevue consacré à L'Express, no 2625 du 25 octobre 2001, p.62-65.

Hutchinson Patrick, dans forme condensée de l'article *Le choc des civilisations*, paru dans la revue Foreign Affairs (1994) dans le site : www.republique-des-lettres.com/h2/huntington.shtml .

Langelier Jean –Pierre, *Le nouveau désordre mondial*, Le Monde, article paru dans l'édition du 20 juillet 2002.

Leclerc Gérard, *La mondialisation culturelle: les civilisations à l'épreuve*, Presse universitaires de France, Paris, 2000, 486p.

Moreau Desfarges Phillipe, *L'ordre mondial*, Armand Colin, Paris, 2000, p.169-170.

Raggi Phillipe, *Le choc des civilisations,* daté du 6 janvier 2003, publiée sur le site :www.confidentiel.firstream.net

Said Edward, *"Quand allons-nous resister?"*, The Guardian, article paru le 25 janvier 2003.

Tincq Henri, *Bouillonnements égyptiens*, Le monde, article paru dans l'édition du 29 mars 2003.

Weiss Nadia, «Le monde de l'islam dans le collimateur de l'Occident », Horizon et débats, no 9/10, décembre 2001.

The Impact of the International Community on the Fall of the South African Apartheid System: A Realist Perspective

Patricia Di Brigida

Historically, South Africa was a segregated society, but it was in 1948 that the system known as apartheid became the legally sanctioned policy of the white Afrikaner National Party Government. It was not one single policy, but a set of acts that restricted the lives of people of African origin. Rather than the implementation of a complete transformation of the political climate, changes were made as situations developed. The ruling party wanted to create a society that would ensure the separation of the races, while maintaining a limited and controlled presence of the African people. The nature of the system required that the state possess a high level of power.[1] The white majority government used this power to assuage white society's fear of being overwhelmed by the black majority.[2] South African leaders attempted to justify, at the international level, this rigid conduct and control when the attention was directed towards their country following the Sharpeville incident of 1960. During this event, sixty-eight protesters were killed and two hundred were wounded during a peaceful demonstration against the 'pass laws', which restricted the movement of Africans within the apartheid state. Although South Africa's racial policies were debated in the United Nation's General Assembly from 1946 onwards, it was the Sharpeville incident that marked the turning point in the international response to the South African apartheid question.[3]

There is a consensus that the development of a worldwide anti-apartheid movement, beginning at the grass roots level and organized by citizens' groups, combined with the continuous dialogue occurring within international institutions put the spotlight on South Africa and received credit for affecting a universal repugnance for the discriminatory political system of apartheid. Repeated international calls for reform in the treatment of its citizens are considered to be the catalyst for the release of African National Congress (ANC) member Nelson Mandela after twenty-seven years of imprisonment. In conjunction with this, foreign governments, through their imposition of sanctions, are credited with having forced South African President F.W. de Klerk's decision, in 1991, to abandon apartheid policies. These capitalist nations that imposed sanctions are said to have chosen to follow a universal norm of racial equality, even if this constrained their economic interests.[4]

The preceding interpretation of the impact of the international community on the fall of apartheid calls into question realist assumptions that the state is the unitary actor in the international system, that international organizations do not achieve effective change, and that states are not guided by ethics, but consider their own self interest above all else. A deeper analysis of the international response demonstrates, however, that the realist model can explain states' reaction towards South Africa. The debate, spanning forty years, which occurred within the United Nations (UN) underscores that power relations had an impact on shaping the actions taken, as well as on the decisions to refrain from taking action. Conflicts between different organs of the UN, as well as conflicts between different principles of the UN Charter precluded the organization from agreeing on appropriate action[5] thus debilitating its role. The situation, which occurred within the Commonwealth, stressed the importance of plurality and that international institutions are a reflection of the international system. Although there were varying degrees of results, both the UN and the Commonwealth proved unable to restrain the behaviour of a member state. Finally, with regards to placating public opinion and the imposition of sanctions, Western governments were able to find a delicate balance whereby they catered to both the demands of public opinion and their national interests.

In the years following World War II, decolonisation was a major development whereby many African and Asian peoples were gaining independence from former colonial powers. This represented a shift in the international system from an imperialistic situation to a more pluralistic one. These newly formed states sought admittance into the UN in order to obtain recognition and a place in the existing world order by joining an inter-governmental organization that could afford them the means with which to voice their concerns and defend their interests. Many of the existing UN members were in agreement with this desire because they wanted the make up of this international organization to mirror the pluralistic nature of the international system. There were, however, some states that were averse to this enlargement. Such an influx of new members would represent a large number of diverse opinions, thus creating a forum where long debates would not easily result in consensus. The Americans, the British, and the French believed that this was a situation which would cause a shift in the existing balance of power[6] within the United Nations where power politics played a very large role. This was evident over the years with the use of the veto by the five permanent members of the Security Council (SC). The use of the veto was a major factor in the admission of new members in the 1950s. The issue of the balance of power was not lost on the smaller powers within the UN: "Pearson said that the UN could not carry out its full function unless the qualified sovereign countries of the world were made members and that the UN should not just be a club of the Western Powers".[7] It was apparent that the Western powers were hoping that the UN would serve as a vehicle to further their own interests, but other members were adamant about advancing their ideology of diversity, mutual respect, the plurality of international actors, and the delimiting of power of all member states. The Western powers' fears of long debates became reality with the inclusion of many of the African and Asian states. This inclusion can be credited with the long history of discussions concerning South Africa at the UN. Scholar Audie Klotz goes as far as to state that "Without a Pan-African commitment to racial equality, there would have been no international anti-apartheid sanctions movement".[8]

These newly independent members found themselves in the General Assembly (GA) where all states are able to voice opinions and vote on resolutions. There was an obvious split of opinion between Pan-Africanists and Western powers, namely, the U.S., the U.K. and France, which would serve to fuel the debates and also cause a rift between the GA and the SC. The latter included the above mentioned Western nations, along with the U.S.S.R. and China as its permanent members. In 1946, a request was made by the Indian government to include the treatment of South African citizens of Indian origin in the GA agenda. The Indian question was then amalgamated with the first resolutions regarding the policies of apartheid in 1952. The introduction of these resolutions and the establishment of the United Nations Commission on the Racial Situation in the Union of South Africa (UNCORS), initiated what would prove to be the beginning of long-term inimical responses from the representatives of the South African government. After UNCORS submitted reports, in three successive years, stating that apartheid policies went against the principles of the UN and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, South Africa disregarded suggestions made in resolution 820 of 1954, which made recommendations on how to resolve their racial problem. Also, in 1955, they withdrew from UNESCO, objecting to the organ's actions against racial discrimination. That same year, they also withdrew their delegation from the tenth session of the GA, as well as the following session in 1956, and they would have only a token representation in the GA until 1958, because of their opposition to the inclusion of the apartheid issue on the GA agenda.[9] In the following years, South Africa's negative reactions and continued unyieldingness to numerous GA resolutions demonstrated the government's unwillingness to allow itself to be checked, preferring to opt out of the UN organs rather than comply with the norms that the organization attempted to implement. In this regard, concerning one of its members, the UN was failing to achieve its objective of setting guidelines for states' behaviour. Under South African Prime Minister, H.F. Verwoerd, the confrontation between South Africa and the international community deepened, due to the impression he gave that his country would never submit and all international pressure would be futile.[10] Despite all this, in the 1960s, the UN attempted to assume the upper hand by taking the initiative and excluding South Africa from

participation in the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the World Health Organization (WHO).[11] This did very little to change South African attitudes.

After fourteen years of debates regarding South Africa's policies in the GA, the SC, upon the request of African and Asian states, considered the apartheid question for the first time following the Sharpeville incident in 1960. The situation in South Africa had reached a point where the international community of states was finally forced to address seriously a political system, which the GA had condemned on numerous occasions. The SC adopted resolution 134, which proclaimed that the South African situation led to 'international friction' and could represent a danger to international peace and security.[12] This resolution was adopted with nine votes in favour and none against. The U.K. and France abstained from voting, marking the first of many conflicts between the GA and the Western members of the SC, when it came to matters dealing with the South African problem. Since 1960, the GA had requested that the SC consider the South African question, under Chapter 7 of the Charter, as a threat to international peace and security, but the SC wanted to refrain from using the strong terminology and the serious implication of Article 39 of Chapter 7. Considering the matter thus would have suggested that serious action was being contemplated against a member state in matters which seemed to fall essentially within the "domestic jurisdiction" clause. The SC preferred instead to be cautiously diplomatic stating that apartheid was 'seriously disturbing' international peace and security.[13]

There were also numerous requests for the imposition of sanctions that continuously received opposition from South Africa's major trading partners. The most significant impediments to effective action came from the opposition of the three Western permanent members of the SC, namely the U.K., the U.S. and France. It was this situation that most frustrated the members of the GA:[14]

> But there were sharp differences of opinion between Member States as to what further action was needed – differences which inevitably limited the ability of the United Nations to exert effective pressure on the South African government to secure an amelioration of the situation inside the country.[15]

The GA continuously attempted to affect change but the reluctance of the SC to endorse its resolutions and the suggestions of UN agencies thwarted its efforts. This situation demonstrated that the aspirations of a few powerful nations dictated the decisions and actions taken by the international body, thus calling into question its legitimacy. The GA showed its frustration publicly when, in a 1966 resolution, it castigated the main trading partners, as well as the SC council members for continuing relations with South Africa, going as far as to suggest that they were responsible for supporting the state's racial policies, which led to violent conflict.[16]

The GA's castigation of the SC may have been prophetic because violent conflict did develop out of the voluntary arms embargo of 1963, in which the nations who imposed sanctions made a distinction between specific types of arms. France and Britain stated that they would restrict items used for internal repression but continue to provide South Africa with items required for self-defence. Thus, they were demonstrating their condemnation of apartheid while simultaneously maintaining economic interests. However, this action would lead to future problems, as South Africa was able to embark upon a military build-up through collaboration with other nations.[17] They then used their military equipment in their continued exertion of control over Namibia as well as in destabilizing efforts in neighbouring African states known as the Frontline States.[18] During the apartheid regime, destabilization caused the displacement of seven million people during the 1980s and cost the Frontline States about twenty-five to forty percent of their GDP annually.[19] One of the main objectives of the creation of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), of which the Frontline states were members, was to reduce economic dependence on South Africa; a situation the apartheid regime sustained through its strength and dominance of the region.[20] Arguments have been made that the Soweto riots of 1976, in which police shot and killed many student protesters, were partly responsible for the adoption of

resolution 418 by the SC, which called for a mandatory arms embargo.[21] However, although resolution 418 condemned South Africa for its internal repression, it also emphasized the SC's concern for the apartheid regime's attacks on neighbouring states and its possible development of nuclear weapons.[22] The catalyst for the embargo was the arms trade, which represented a real threat to international peace and security and not the apartheid issue per se.[23]

A very important event took place in September, 1974 when African members within the SC proposed a draft resolution recommending that South Africa be expelled from the UN, because its apartheid policy was inconsistent with the principles of the Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights.[24] The debate was concerned with the GA's claim that the white minority National Party Government of South Africa did not represent the people of South Africa and did not respect the principle of universal suffrage. Ultimately, the U.K., the U.S., and France went against the majority opinion of the GA and vetoed the expulsion of South Africa from the UN.[25] This was a clear situation where the SC chose the political right of the state above the rights of the individuals, namely the black South Africans.

The conflict between the GA and the SC highlighted the ineffectiveness of the UN to achieve any significant results to bring about change for the people suffering from apartheid in South Africa. GA resolutions made attempts at encouraging member states to restrict diplomatic and economic relations, while mandatory action, through selective sanctions, was imposed for the first time by the SC only in 1977.[26] Most actions taken by the SC were less severe than had been intended by the GA. Due to the division of powers within the UN, the GA, being the more radical body, was restricted from taking enforcement action because this was the responsibility of the more conservative SC. Moreover, the SC's action was also restricted due to the permanent members' veto power, which the Western members invoked throughout the South African debates when they felt their interests were being threatened.[27]

There was also conflict within the UN between the issue of domestic jurisdiction and respect for human rights. The South African government relied heavily upon Article 2(7), which kept other states from interfering with domestic issues of member states. It used the article in its defence whenever it found itself being questioned in the GA. During the 1940s and 1950s, South Africa had the support of some member nations that continued to back the principle of respecting the territorial integrity and political independence of states.[28] The country was using some of the principles of the UN as a shield against any pressure from other states to conform to new norms taking shape within the changing climate of the post-War world.[29] However, when it attempted to apply the domestic jurisdiction principle to the Sharpeville incident, support declined, and apartheid and the principle of human rights were thrust into the international spotlight.[30] Once the SC, whose main function was the maintenance of international peace and security, considered the matter, apartheid was no longer looked at as a matter of domestic concern. It became a question of whether the policy was a threat to the world's peace and security.[31] The South African government was steadfast in maintaining that state rights took precedence over human or individual rights due, once again, to the wording of Article 2(7):

> Nothing contained in the present charter shall authorize the UN to intervene in matters which are essentially within domestic jurisdiction of any state ... but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.[32]

The word *nothing* includes the provision for the respect for human rights found in Article 55 and, as the SC made clear in its debates with the GA, it was not willing to condemn South Africa under Chapter 7.

Clearly the apartheid system was based on discriminatory policies that subjugated the majority racial group. Also, apart form invoking action under Chapter 7, there was no mechanism with which to enforce the respect for and the abidance of human rights. South Africa emphasized Article 55's ambiguity in defining human rights when attempting to thwart the debate relating to its policies.[33] Due to the fact

that this principle was not legally binding on states and that many members had suspect human rights records,[34] the SC did not take any action. Thus, the non-intervention principle held up over the human rights clause stressing the priority of state rights over individual rights. Throughout the long South African debate, while black South Africans were enduring serious abuses, the state was held up as the important actor in the international system whose security was taking precedence over the security of the individual within that state.

Almost from the UN's inception, due to South Africa's racial policies, the country was forced to take a defensive stand.[35] A conflict between South Africa and the international community arose in 1948, when South Africa had been one of only eight nations to abstain from voting in the GA for the adoption of the Declaration of Human Rights: "If anything, this challenge to world opinion spurred the UN into even greater efforts to make South Africa conform to the new international value system".[36] Ironically, former South African Prime Minister J.C. Smuts, who had also been pre-eminent in the creation of the League of Nations, drafted the preamble of the UN charter, which reads: "... to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small ..."[37] Clearly, he never had any intention of applying this to his own nation.[38] Smuts' duplicitous performance, demonstrated by his conflicting domestic and international policies, would foreshadow the problems of credibility that the UN as an effective organization would face in the future. Smuts himself, who had proclaimed that all nations had equal rights, was now calling for a modified world organization which would not be quite so large and would not entail 'incompetents and misfits [ruling] by the counting of heads'.[39] He, like the Western powers mentioned above, was not comfortable with the inclusion of so many dissenting opinions, whose originators he felt had neither the knowledge, ability nor the right to make international decisions that would adversely affect the proud European society which had developed within South Africa.[40] It was apparent that this was not what he had in mind when taking part in the formation of the UN. Therefore, when the organization was transformed and no longer catered to the needs of his domestic issues, Smuts, as well as successive South African leaders, ceased to live and abide by its principles.

South Africa's obstinacy engendered alienation, not only from the UN, but also from other international organizations. In 1961, the country became a republic and even though the Commonwealth had made the decision in 1949 to allow countries to retain membership after having declared themselves a republic, South Africa was asked to reapply for membership.[41] The Commonwealth had, until that point, been a symbol of British dominance with emphasis on the links that each member nation had with the historical colonial power. The focus was on the proud white societies that the British colonials had established within these countries. In the period just after World War II, when decolonisation, the right to self-determination and pluralism were in favour at the global level, South Africa sought refuge and, for a short while, found it within the confines of this organization. In 1953, South African Prime Minister Malan's declaration: "the Commonwealth permits us the greatest freedom that I can imagine" was a reflection of the country's ability to retain membership but sever constitutional links with the British Crown.[42] This allowed them to practise their apartheid policies without having to abide by other states' principles. However, with many members including Western states such as Canada, Australia and the newly independent African and Asian states craving more autonomy, the leadership of the organization shifted. This was a fear that Malan had at the time of his statement.[43] This shift began to force other states, most importantly the British hegemon, into accepting a change in focus from a white British association to a multiracial one in addition to having to yield to a collective policy.[44] Thus the member nations succeeded in putting the accent on the association's pluralism, while limiting the dominance of the ex-colonial power.

There was a common sentiment among many members of the Commonwealth that a set of principles should be established: an obligation to racial equality being of the utmost importance. However, one of the existing principles of the organization, like that of the UN, was the issue of non-

intervention in matters of domestic jurisdiction of member states. Britain and Australia were eager to respect this principle and accept South Africa's membership after it became a republic, but the African states refused to participate in the organization if that country retained its membership.[45] Once again, South Africa was causing a rift within another international organization. In this case, Canada would serve as the mediator in the conflict between domestic jurisdiction and human rights, the same issue which was being dealt with at the UN. Then Canadian Prime Minister Diefenbaker expressed a call for the respect of the multiracial nature of the Commonwealth while not actually wanting South Africa to be ousted from the association, recognizing that the country's continued participation was in the best interest of all parties concerned: "Yet he also would have accepted even minor symbolic concessions from South Africa".[46] World leaders understood the importance of propagating racial equality, but the extent to which they were willing to go to achieve actual equality for the world's diverse groups of people was questionable. The issue was more a matter of following perceived international norms and ensuring that there was a semblance of an adherence to these norms from the states in the international system. Moreover, South Africa was placing itself above the system, not so much by following discriminatory policies, but by its staunch defence of them in the face of international pressure. Some form of symbolic initiative would have appeased the international community for it can be argued that it was not so much their system of apartheid that concerned other states but their refusal to follow universal standards and their insistence on placing their country above or outside the international system.

Ultimately, because Commonwealth nations were not willing to separate the constitutional and racial issues, South Africa was forced to either acknowledge the principle of racial equality or face expulsion. They withdrew their application for membership and were forced out of the organization in 1961.[47] The preceding situation interestingly juxtaposes two realist tenets. It highlights the triumph of enhancing the pluralist nature of an international organization, while simultaneously demonstrating that it was not able to constrain the actions of a member state. As soon as the majority of states achieved the goal of a collective policy and the Commonwealth adopted a principle that no longer suited one of its members' interests, rather than adhere to it, South Africa chose to leave the organization and its principles behind. In the short period between 1953 and 1961, a complete change in attitude of South African Prime Ministers is evident when, upon leaving the Commonwealth, H.F. Verwoerd stated: "... we have freed ourselves from the pressure of Afro-Asian nations who were busy invading the Commonwealth".[48]

The Commonwealth members collectively decided not to separate ethics and politics in their dealings with the South African government, yet on a unilateral basis, Western nations were slow in making any significant efforts to discourage the continued enforcement of apartheid policies. During this time, many nations maintained trade and pursued investment with the African state, acknowledging the benefits of continued economic relations. In the years following the GA's resolution to ban exports to, or imports from South Africa, trade with the renegade state actually increased. In 1962, Britain, the U.S. and Japan accounted for fifty percent of South African exports while West Germany, Belgium, France, and Italy accounted for a further twenty-five percent. In 1966, however, the rate of importation by Britain, the U.S., West Germany, and Japan grew to sixty-two percent. This increase follows the GA's attempts to trigger changes in the foreign policies of Western states towards South Africa. High levels of economic interaction between these countries and South Africa continued into the 1980s.[49] This illustrates that, despite years of condemnation of the apartheid system, ethical and moral factors did not affect the political and economic behaviour of these capitalist countries. However, pressure leading to change in policies towards South Africa did come in the form of public opinion in Western nations, as South African obstinacy "provided grist to the mill of the international sanctions lobby"[50] as well as from black South African groups such as the ANC. Once it was evident that no consequential action was being taken at the international level or individual states' level, the citizens of these Western nations took it upon themselves to raise awareness of the issue.[51] The anti-apartheid movement became the cause célèbre of the 1980s as the outcry against apartheid took different forms in different countries. After a long and

arduous struggle to sway Western leaders, they were eventually led to a consensus on policy. In the United States, for instance: "For liberals and conservatives, Democrats and Republicans, South Africa has become a bandwagon issue ...".[52] In Britain: "Thatcher's subsequent acquiescence to limited sanctions by the European Community against the Republic probably has less to do with South Africa itself than with Britain's status as a leader in international political fora".[53] These situations demonstrated that powerful states or powerful parties within states influenced one another to jump on the political bandwagon of the anti-apartheid issue. Taking up the so-called moral cause legitimized these states and parties in the eyes of the public. Western leaders recognized that the most effective form of displaying support for racial equality with regards to South Africa was the use of sanctions.[54] It is also important to note that although these leaders understood that public opinion was crucial to their longevity, they had to maintain a balance between a positive domestic, as well as international, image and a favourable economic policy.

As noted earlier, Western nations were reluctant to implement sanctions against South Africa. Attempts were made to disprove the efficacy of placing bans on imports and of disinvestment. These capitalist nations, along with the apartheid regime, claimed that the black population would suffer most.[55] They also asserted that, rather than alienating it completely, maintaining friendly relations with the South African government would be more effective in initiating change. Then British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher stated that the effects on the economy of the country and its African neighbours would be extremely damaging and equally so to UK interests.[56] In 1986, U.S. President Ronald Reagan, who experienced domestic pressure, vetoed the implementation of sanctions stating that the situation in South Africa was: " ... a battle between the 'abhorrence' of apartheid and the 'unacceptable alternative of Marxist tyranny'".[57] The House of Representatives and the Senate would subsequently override this veto but these Cold War worries of alienating South Africa and leaving it vulnerable to Socialist regimes underscored a preference, on the part of Western nations, for the apartheid system and an endorsement of realist tenets. Moreover, while sanctions were eventually implemented, this Western reluctance caused a long delay in any form of effective action.

Many scholars argue that the nature of the sanctions placed on South Africa did little to precipitate any real change in its domestic policies. Margaret Doxey states that: " ... sanctions represent 'something' in the way of a response rather than 'nothing' but are deliberately chosen to minimise cost and dislocation while symbolizing a willingness to act",[58] and that the "...'something' is likely to be 'as little as possible'".[59] This type of sanction would then satisfy public pressure without actually hurting domestic interests. Many bold sanctions policies came from Western nations whose economic interests were not tied to South Africa. Sweden, which did not have a significant economic relationship with the nation, introduced a total ban on trade,[60] and Canada implemented coal import sanctions when it had never imported South African coal prior to the sanctions.[61] There is evidence that specific sanctions were selected by states in order to ensure that their interests were not jeopardized. Statistics show that a disproportionate number of sanctioned products were imports rather than exports such as steel, iron, coal, textiles, uranium, agricultural goods and Krugerrands (South African gold coins). The U.K. did not sanction agricultural goods because they were heavily dependent on South Africa for this commodity.[62] William Kaempfer and Anton Lowenberg suggest that some nations benefited from certain sanctions levied against South Africa:

> In the case of coal, only the United States and Canada (or the Commonwealth) applied an import embargo. Significantly, these countries were not large overall importers of coal and in fact were major exporters in competition with South Africa. The intent of the U.S. and Canadian sanctions on coal may have been to pressure Europe, which was a heavy importer of South African coal, to levy a similar import ban. Such a move would have secured almost the entire European market for North American exporters.[63]

All the above clearly supports that even the application of sanctions followed realist principles. Western nations continued to be guided, not by ethics, but by their own self interest.

With regards to disinvestments, U.S. and Japanese firms simply pulled their capital out of South Africa leaving behind the facilities to domestic firms, which profited greatly. However, U.S. firms continued to benefit because they maintained ties through licensing, patent, and export arrangements.[64] Beginning in 1987, there was an emphasis placed on financial sanctions, which proved to be ineffective as foreign banks allowed the South African government to reschedule debt repayment.[65] This was particularly the case with Britain and West Germany, which held $5.5 billion and approximately $2 billion, respectively, of South Africa's $18.5 billion debt, as of 1984.[66] Although investment in South Africa may have been discouraged for altruistic reasons, ultimately, the reality was that investment in the country had become an unwise business venture. South Africa's political system created a volatile climate.[67] The subordination of the majority led to unrest and a desire for equality: sentiments which the ruling minority suppressed forcibly. But this desire for justice could not be quelled indefinitely and led to political gatherings and violent opposition to them. These, in turn, led to riots followed by terrible violence, which rendered South African society extremely unstable and not conducive to economic profit. In such a climate disinvestment was a sagacious action rather than an ethical one.

It would be difficult to belie the importance of international actors other than states in the fall of apartheid. The efforts of the African liberation movement as well as suppressed African groups such as the ANC, attracted international public and institutional support. However, it would be too simplistic to proclaim that international organizations played as large a role as it was perceived that they had in the dismantling of the discriminatory system. The many years of debates proved to be mostly discussion without any real action. Following reluctance to change foreign economic policies, especially on the part of the Western powers, imposed sanctions were mainly symbolic. Sanctions imposed during the late 80s, which represented a period of heightened international pressure against South Africa, cost the country less than one percent of its GNP. Also, these same Western powers were among the first nations to lift trade bans, in 1991, as soon as de Klerk announced the forthcoming apartheid reforms despite negative reaction from the ANC.[68] Therefore, foreign governments had to endure losses for a short period relative to the forty-year struggle of the African people. Furthermore, their haste in lifting bans demonstrated that states would have preferred not to impose sanctions against South Africa at all. The fact of the matter is that Western governments trade with many nations that may have perceived suspect human rights records and they do this because it is in their best economic interest to do so. This was demonstrated in the case with China. The massacre of students in Tiananmen Square, in 1989, was a catalyst for worldwide condemnation. However, although the debate about whether sanctions should be imposed against China raged for years, eventually countries were able to continue to trade with the nation without much pressure to desist. In both the South Africa and China issues, the failure to place individual rights above the rights of the state underscores the realist claim that the state continues to take precedence over the individual. This was clearly illustrated when, in 1966, even though the GA condemned apartheid as a crime against humanity, the international community failed to intervene in South Africa's domestic situation.

Notes

[1] James Barber, *South Africa in the 20th Century* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999) 141.
[2] Ibid, 140.
[3] United Nations, *The United Nations and Apartheid 1948-1994* (New York: United Nations, 1994) 13-14.
[4] Audie Klotz, *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid* (Ithaca: Cornell U. Press, 1995) 111 & 120.
[5] Ibid, 57.
[6] Clyde Sanger, *Canadians and the United Nations* (Ottawa: External Affairs Canada, 1988) 49.
[7] Ibid, 49.
[8] Audie Klotz, *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid* (Ithaca: Cornell U. Press, 1995) 90.
[9] United Nations, *The United Nations and Apartheid 1948-1994* (New York: United Nations, 1994) 12-13.
[10] Deon Geldenhuys, "The Head of Government and South Africa's Foreign Relations" in Schrire, Robert, ed, *Malan to De Klerk: Leadership in*

the Apartheid State (New York: C. Hurst & Co., 1994) 259 & 262.
[11] John Dugard, *International Law: A South African Perspective* (Kenwyn: Juta & Co., 1994) 6.
[12] United Nations, *The United Nations and Apartheid 1948-1994* (New York: United Nations, 1994) 14.
[13] Margaret P. Doxey. *International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspectives* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987) 48.
[14] United Nations, *The United Nations and Apartheid 1948-1994* (New York: United Nations, 1994) 38.
[15] Ibid, 27.
[16] Ibid, 27.
[17] Ibid, 52.
[18] Audie Klotz, *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid* (Ithaca: Cornell U. Press, 1995) 80.
[19] 5 January 2004. <http://www.newint.org>
[20] Bertil Oden, "Regionalization in Southern Africa: The Role of the Dominant" in Ojendal, Joakim, Michael Shulz and Fredrik Soderbaum, eds, *Regionalization in a Globalizing World* (New York: Zed Books, 2001) 84.
[21] Audie Klotz, *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid* (Ithaca: Cornell U. Press, 1995) 51.
[22] United Nations, *The United Nations and Apartheid 1948-1994* (New York: United Nations, 1994) 50.
[23] Margaret P. Doxey. *International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspectives* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996) 23.
[24] United Nations, *The United Nations and Apartheid 1948-1994* (New York: United Nations, 1994) 47.
[25] John Dugard, *International Law: A South African Perspective* (Kenwyn: Juta & Co., 1994) 300.
[26] United Nations, *The United Nations and Apartheid 1948-1994* (New York: United Nations, 1994) 50.
[27] John Dugard, *International Law: A South African Perspective* (Kenwyn: Juta & Co., 1994) 302.
[28] Audie Klotz, *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid* (Ithaca: Cornell U. Press, 1995) 44.
[29] Dugard, *International Law: A South African Perspective* (Kenwyn: Juta & Co., 1994) 19.
[30] Ibid, 18.
[31] Audie Klotz, *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid* (Ithaca: Cornell U. Press, 1995) 47.
[32] United Nations, 25 January 2003. <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter1.html>
[33] Dugard, *International Law: A South African Perspective* (Kenwyn: Juta & Co., 1994) 201.
[34] Ibid, 64 & 203.
[35] Ibid, 18.
[36] Deon Geldenhuys, "The Head of Government and South Africa's Foreign Relations" in Schrire, Robert, ed, *Malan to De Klerk: Leadership in the Apartheid State* (New York: C. Hurst & Co., 1994) 246.
[37] United Nations, 25 January 2003. <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter1.html>
[38] Deon Geldenhuys, "The Head of Government and South Africa's Foreign Relations" in Schrire, Robert, ed, *Malan to De Klerk: Leadership in the Apartheid State* (New York: C. Hurst & Co., 1994) 246.
[39] Ibid, 247.
[40] Ibid, 247.
[41] Audie Klotz, *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid* (Ithaca: Cornell U. Press, 1995) 58.
[42] Deon Geldenhuys, "The Head of Government and South Africa's Foreign Relations" in Schrire, Robert, ed, *Malan to De Klerk: Leadership in the Apartheid State* (New York: C. Hurst & Co., 1994) 251.
[43] Ibid, 43.
[44] Audie Klotz, *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid* (Ithaca: Cornell U. Press, 1995) 10.
[45] Ibid, 59.
[46] Ibid, 60.
[47] Ibid, 60.
[48] Deon Geldenhuys, "The Head of Government and South Africa's Foreign Relations" in Schrire, Robert, ed, *Malan to De Klerk: Leadership in the Apartheid State* (New York: C. Hurst & Co., 1994) 263.
[49] Jennifer Davis, "Squeezing Apartheid: Economic Sanctions Against South Africa", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 49.9 (1993) 16 Dec. 2002 http://web3.infotrac.galegroup.com/itw/infomark/828/172/56524772w3/purl=rc2_EAIM_1_squeezing+apartheid&dyn=sig!1?sw_aep=yorku_main
[50] Deon Geldenhuys, "The Head of Government and South Africa's Foreign Relations" in Schrire, Robert, ed, *Malan to De Klerk: Leadership in the Apartheid State* (New York: C. Hurst & Co., 1994) 283.
[51] Jennifer Davis, "Squeezing Apartheid: Economic Sanctions Against South Africa", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 49.9 (1993) 16 Dec. 2002 http://web3.infotrac.galegroup.com/itw/infomark/828/172/56524772w3/purl=rc2_EAIM_1_squeezing+apartheid&dyn=sig!1?sw_aep=yorku_main
[52] Elizabeth Boles, *The West and South Africa. The Atlantic Institute for International Affairs 67.* (London: Croom Helm, 1988) 58.
[53] Ibid, 58.
[54] Audie Klotz, *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid* (Ithaca: Cornell U. Press, 1995) 106.
[55] Margaret P.Doxey, *United Nations Sanctions: Current Policy Issues* (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1997) 13.
[56] Robert Harvey, *The Fall of Apartheid* (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001) 172.
[57] Elizabeth Boles, *The West and South Africa. The Atlantic Institute for International Affairs 67.* (London: Croom Helm, 1988) 60.
[58] Margaret P. Doxey. *International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspectives* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987) 94.
[59] Ibid, 98.
[60] Elizabeth Boles, *The West and South Africa. The Atlantic Institute for International Affairs 67.* (London: Croom Helm, 1988) 51.
[61] William H. Kaempfer and Anton D. Lowenberg. *The Origins and Demise of South African Apartheid: A Public Choice Analysis* (Ann Arbor: Michigan U. Press, 1998) 116.
[62] Ibid, 111-113.
[63] Ibid, 114.
[64] Ibid, 122-133.
[65] Margaret P. Doxey. *International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspectives* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996) 26.
[66] Margaret P. Doxey. *International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspectives* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987) 136.

[67] William H. Kaempfer and Anton D. Lowenberg. *The Origins and Demise of South African Apartheid: A Public Choice Analysis* (Ann Arbor: Michigan U. Press, 1998) 126.
[68] Margaret P. Doxey. *International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspectives* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996) 25.

Works Cited

Barber, James. *South Africa in the Twentieth Century*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1999.

Boles, Elizabeth. *The West and South Africa. The Atlantic Institute for International Affairs 67*. London: Croom Helm, 1988.

Davis, Jennifer. "Squeezing Apartheid: Economic Sanctions Against South Africa." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. Vol. 49 no. 9, 1993. 16 Dec. 2002 http://web3.infotrac.galegroup.com/itw/infomark/828/172/56524772w3/purl=rc2_EAIM_1_squeezing+apartheid&dyn=sig!1?sw_aep=yorku_main

Doxey, Margaret P. *International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspectives*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1987.

Doxey, Margaret P. *International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspectives*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1996.

Doxey, Margaret P. *United Nations Sanctions: Current Policy Issues*. Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1997.

Dugard, John. *International Law: A South African Perspective*. Kenwyn: Juta & Co., 1994.

Geldenhuys, Deon. "The Head of Government and South Africa's Foreign Relations." *Malan to De Klerk: Leadership in the Apartheid State* Ed Robert Schrire. New York: C. Hurst & Co., 1994.

Harvey, Robert. *The Fall of Apartheid*. Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001.

Kaempfer, William H. and Anton D. Lowenberg. *The Origins and Demise of South African Apartheid: A Public Choice Analysis*. Ann Arbor Michigan UP, 1998.

Klotz, Audie. *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1995.

Oden, Bertil. "Regionalization in Southern Africa: The Role of the Dominant" *Regionalization in a Globalizing World*. Eds. Joakim Ojendal. Michael Shulz and Fredrik Soderbaum. New York: Zed Books, 2001.

Sanger, Clyde. *Canadians and the United Nations*. Ottawa: External Affairs Canada, 1988.

United Nations. *The United Nations and Apartheid 1948-1994*. New York: United Nations, 1994.

United Nations. 25 Jan. 2003. <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter1.html>

5 January 2004. <http://www.newint.org>

NATO Looks East: A Realist Reassessment

Lilly A. Lo Manto

Scholars such as John G. Ikenberry maintain that the resulting post-Cold war order proved certain realist expectations of dramatic shifts in world politics incorrect. Indeed, events such as the disappearance of American hegemony, the return of a great power balance and the downfall of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) did not come to pass.[1] Within academic circles, this period was characterized by a clear disassociation between the credibility of realist rhetoric and its ability to define correctly contemporary inter-state behaviour. In retrospect, a re-evaluation of the behaviour of the alliance's participatory states during NATO's 1990 to 1997 enlargement process does in fact demonstrate their actions as having been parallel to realist dictums of "unitary actors who, at a minimum seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination"[2]. Expansion was not a mere quixotic endeavour undertaken within a multi-polar cooperative international arena, but a carefully considered project realised by the institution's affiliates in the midst of a unipolar world. Throughout the enlargement project, the United States (U.S.), the reigning superpower, used its excess resources to manipulate the strategic weaknesses of Russia, the Visegrád states and the European Union (EU), in order to both expand further eastward its hegemony and to safeguard its existent sphere of influence. On the other hand, the militarily inferior states of Western and Eastern Europe had little choice but to concede the hegemon NATO's expansion, so as to safeguard their immediate survival. During this short time, the resulting world order was consequently one of relative stability where centripetal inter-state forces outweighed centrifugal balance of power tendencies as weaker countries were not able to create a counterweight to overweening American capabilities.

In 1949, catalyzed by the growing Soviet menace, a post-war devastated Europe and a militarily superior U.S. coalesced to form the NATO. The military alliance served to mollify European concerns about a potential German threat, to enhance the continent's unity and security, and, most importantly, to provide a mechanism for American participation in Europe's economic and military recovery.[3] For the following forty years, NATO was the cornerstone of bipolar stability,[4] performing both military and non-military functions for its members.[5] Throughout the Cold War, serving as a bulwark against Soviet encroachment into Western Europe,[6] the alliance became increasingly correlated with resolute American leadership.[7] Nevertheless, as the Berlin Wall tumbled on November 9, 1989,[8] the bipolar structure that had shaped the security policies of the major powers for nearly half a century vanished.[9] From this point onwards, the Soviet Union (U.S.S.R.) quickly disintegrated, with German reunification in October 1990, and the final collapse of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) on April 1 1991.[10] While the demise of the Eurasian behemoth produced the greatest change in world power relationships since the Second World War,[11] it became evident that the military alliance faced an existentialist question.[12] After all, if the U.S.S.R. was no longer NATO's *raison d'être*, what or who would fill this vacuum? History did not offer examples of any alliance that had outlived its enemy.[13] During the Madrid Summit on July 7 and 8 1997, then-American President Bill Clinton produced the solution: the Atlantic Alliance would continue to be dominant in the transatlantic military sphere, with the added memberships of the Visegrád states of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.[14]

Prior to the expansion of 1997, the Atlantic Alliance had enlarged three times:[15] the first wave of enlargement came in 1952 with the entry of Greece and Turkey, 1955 constituted the second wave, with the admittance of the Federal Republic of Germany, and the induction of Spain in 1982 signalled the third period of growth in NATO membership.[16] Consequently, in 1989, the exclusive military alliance consisted of sixteen countries including the mercurial French, and the unstable Turks and Greeks.[17] Among the

members, enlargement did not take precedence in early-day post-Cold War discussions.[18] Nonetheless, NATO's London Summit of July 1990 declarations of intent to "reach out to the countries which were our adversaries in the Cold War, and extend to them the hand of friendship"[19] encouraged Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the U.S.S.R. to visit Brussels to address the North Atlantic Council (NAC).[20] Subsequently, the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in December 1991,[21] originally proposed during the Rome Summit of the previous month,[22] fostered dialogue and cooperation with the Central Eastern European states. In late 1993, this first phase ultimately culminated with the introduction of the Partnership for Peace (PFP). The project was intended to go beyond the NACC, by offering "a practical program of defence planning, and budgeting joint exercises and operations with NATO nations".[23] Although certain scholars like Gerald B. Solomon viewed the PFP as a path into the military alliance,[24] others, including Ann L. Griffiths, criticised the agreement as a mere method by which to avoid altogether the question of expansion.[25]

The second period of NATO's expansion commenced with the Brussels Summit in January 1994, where the PFP framework was promulgated as a *fait accompli*.[26] Correspondingly, the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) were adopted to create a more responsive military structure in crisis management and peacekeeping.[27] Meanwhile, the NAC's announcement that it "expected and would welcome NATO enlargement"[28] was further solidified by the Council's adoption of the Principle of Enlargement in December 1994. The third phase of NATO's evolution witnessed the debate's gradual shift from one of internal governmental and alliance discussions to one of public campaigning, so as to sell the policy externally.[29] During this period, the NACC had grown to encompass thirty-eight countries, providing a forum for consultation on a full range of political, economic, military, scientific, and environmental issues. As well, the Atlantic Alliance invited Russia's cooperation in establishing a political framework for a new relationship. Although the former adversary delayed in responding, negotiations commenced in January 1997, and an agreement was finally reached the following May.[30] The signing of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation on May 27 1997[31] was preceded by the Madrid Summit, the outset of the fourth and final chapter of the alliance's expansion.[32] During this stage, a firm commitment to begin accession negotiations with the Visegrád states was taken,[33] despite the treaty having to face ratification by the affiliated national governments which required a referendum in some countries.[34]

Numerous academics view the above process as having been spearheaded and espoused by the American government: for instance, Gale A. Mattox suggests that NATO enlargement be understood "within the broader context of the debate over the role of the U.S. and its leadership in international affairs in the post-Cold War era",[35] while Kenneth Waltz explicitly accuses the military alliance of being "primarily, if not wholly, an agent of U.S. power".[36] In fact, French Foreign Minister Hervé de Charette would later acknowledge that the Americans controlled the pace and the scale of expansion by hastening the process and establishing a tight timetable.[37] Throughout the enlargement project, NATO affiliates frequently witnessed American hegemonic authority and the country's penchant for unilateral action.[38] Examples range from Clinton's premature announcement: "the question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members, but when and how",[39] made during the preliminary stages of the PFP program, to the staunch American supervision under which all consultations between NATO's Secretary General and Russia were conducted.[40]

American dominance over NATO's evolution mirrored the existent unipolar world in which the U.S. enjoyed preponderance in all underlying components of power: military capabilities, technology, geography, population, and economic resources.[41] This advantage can be traced back to the 1950 adoption of the National Security Council (NSC) Directive 68 which confirmed American readiness to take on a more pronounced leadership role in the post-war world order.[42] Indeed, throughout the Cold War, the United States' superiority steadfastly drove its foreign policy and reflected such leadership perceptions[43] as John F. Kennedy's belief that the U.S. was "powerful enough to deter any aggression",

and Lyndon Johnson's view that America's role was that of world policeman.[44] This tradition was continued with the Pentagon's 1992 New Grand Strategy, a scheme intended to preserve unipolarity by preventing the emergence of a global rival[45] and thereby foster a "world environment in which the American system would survive and flourish".[46] A key result of this policy was the exponential degree of U.S. confidence in the longevity of American hegemony, illustrated by Ambassador George C. McGhee's comment: "the U.S. is and will, in the twenty-first century, continue to be by far the most influential country in the world...it faces no important enemies or threat".[47]

In light of such sanguine self-assurance, the hegemon felt free to disregard substantial criticisms made against the feasibility of NATO enlargement. Firstly, opponents pointed to the institution's existent volatile structure, for, as Brigadier General Robert T. Osterthaler suggests, "three time bombs [were] already built into NATO – Turkey, Greece, and France".[48] Since, the Atlantic Alliance required unanimity to act,[49] expansion could potentially destabilise NATO cohesiveness, prevent the institution from performing its important functions, and lead to the alliance losing credibility as a military entity.[50] Secondly, critics argued that the monetary costs of enlargement greatly outweighed any benefits gained in security. NATO would have to undergo improvements in communications, training, command and control arrangements, and infrastructure in the new member countries.[51] Also, expansion would include large increases in the institution's force projection capabilities, including naval forces, ground-based and carrier-based combat aircraft, and explicit reliance on nuclear weapons.[52] Although Washington supplied a figure of between 27 and 35 billion dollars over twelve years for the program's total cost, RAND estimated that the expense of integrating the new members would run as high as 100 billion dollars over ten years. In fact, despite the United State's initial accountability for only fifteen percent of the total fee,[53] the parsimonious military spending of the European members and the weak economic climate of the Visegrád states would leave the hegemon responsible for over half of the total costs.[54]

However, the most fervent cluster of protest to American-led NATO expansion was found in the country's intellectual community that focused on Russia.[55] The father of containment, historian George Kennan averred: "NATO enlargement would inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion, have an adverse affect on the development of Russian democracy, [and] restore the atmosphere of the Cold War to east-west relations".[56] Such opponents warned that NATO expansion would feed the paranoia that maintained nationalist fervour in Moscow,[57] weaken the support of those Russians most inclined toward liberal democracy, and force the ex-superpower to look to China for a military ally.[58] In addition, expansion came at a time when the second Strategic Arms Reduction (START II), which called for further decreases in nuclear weapons, remained unratified by the Duma.[59] Critics questioned whether NATO enlargement would not encourage "a bunker mentality in Russia that would obstruct the development of a constructive relationship with the West and a cooperative approach to arms control and non proliferation".[60] Consequently, fears abounded that the decision to enlarge NATO eastwardly would not only destroy the prospects for the START II treaty's approval by the Russian parliament,[61] but also postpone further reductions in armaments including START III,[62] and permit the possibility that the former adversary's nuclear weapons "fall into the hands of warring bands".[63]

NATO's intentions for eastward expansion certainly fostered an inimical relationship between Russia and the West. The May 1992 issue of *Military Thought* asserted that the ex-superpower reserved the right to take "necessary measures to guarantee its own security"[64] against the advance of foreign troops into the territories of neighbouring countries or the increase of army and naval groupings near its borders. In 1993, then-Russian President Boris Yeltsin went so far as to surreptitiously write letters of complaint to the American, British, French, and German Heads-of-State claiming: "relations between our country and NATO should be several degrees warmer than the relations between the alliance and Eastern Europe".[65] By 1996, the wide range of threats emanating from the former adversary had become ominous, as evident in ex-First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Chubais' assertion that NATO's enlargement "would force Moscow to reappraise its policy of co-operation with the West, [and] threaten to trigger a fresh arms

race".[66] Indeed, in the Duma, the dominant feeling was one of betrayal: Russia had been friendly towards the West and did not deserve NATO expansion.[67] Ultimately, the former foe perceived the alliance's enlargement and traditional balance of power considerations to be congruent,[68] accusing NATO of taking advantage of its temporary economic, political, and military difficulties.[69]

Certain scholars, including Owen Harris and Sergei Plekhanov, justified the ex-superpower's suspicions by maintaining that one of the goals behind the alliance's U.S.-led expansion was, indeed, to increase American dominance over Eastern Europe by relieving Russia of its former Cold War sphere of influence, and exploiting its substantial weaknesses.[70] At the time, the former adversary's dwindling influence in international affairs was reflected in the downsizing of its conventional forces due to budgetary constraints,[71] and the full withdrawal of Russian troops from Europe.[72] Post Cold-War Western attempts to deter Russian ambitions had, in fact, begun shortly after the opening of the Berlin Wall with the reunification of Germany and the incorporation of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) into the Atlantic Alliance, despite months of vehement opposition and objections from Mikhail Gorbachev and the Soviets.[73] NATO's strengthening influence in Eastern and Central Europe only acted as a further deterrent against renewed Russian imperialism, by "bolstering the alliance's geostrategic weight to hedge against a disequilibrium in Europe in which a preponderance of power rested in the hands of a hostile power"[74]. Indeed, during the preliminary stages of the institution's enlargement, Waltz suggests that "NATO, led by America, scarcely considered the plight of its defeated adversary", but violated the 1990 Two-Plus-Four Agreement that former WTO members would not be allowed to join the military alliance.[75]

The negotiation process preceding the signing of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security ultimately delineated the zero-sum relationship held between the U.S. and Russia. The ex-superpower was not granted veto rights over the broadening of NATO,[76] nor did Yeltsin obtain substantial strategic and military concessions. Instead, under previously mentioned close American direction, the alliance refused to promise both the non-deployment nuclear arms on its new member-states' territories and/or draft the agreement as a legally binding document. Moreover, NATO made no precise commitment to Russia's request that military spending resulting from the institution's expansion be held to no more than five percent above current levels.[77] In the end, although "verbally challenging U.S. hegemony [had become] a political fashion in Moscow",[78] Russia had little choice but to either agree with the formal enlargement of NATO, and accept the accompanying vague promises of cooperation and dialogue, or watch the alliance expand with neither its approval nor influence.[79]

The inclusion of the Visegrád states in an NATO fulfilled the hegemon's goal of expanding eastward its sphere of influence, so as to subsume a greater geographic area into an American-led world order of democratic regimes and free-market economies. Throughout the enlargement process, Washington viewed the process as the primary method of solidifying democracy in Eastern Europe.[80] The Clinton administration delineated the five criteria for inclusion into the Western institution: contending members would have to comply with the following criteria: 1) abstain from territorial disputes with neighbours, 2) be democracies, 3) have market economies, 4) have civilian control of the military, and 5) have forces with NATO interoperability (Russel 87). Waltz claims that the measures taken by Clinton, to enhance these ideologies around the world, during the expansion program, acted to "camouflage the great leverage the U.S. enjoy[ed] in international politics by making it seem that [all] nations [were] similarly entangled in a thick web of interdependence".[81] According to proponents of the hegemonic stability theory, the result was the American manipulation of weaker states in order to create, maintain, and perpetuate a peaceful international order.[82]

The malleability of the Visegrád states to American demands stemmed from the security vacuum which had been created by the collapse of the WTO.[83] Although Eastern European countries had considered filling the void with such options as neutrality and an institutionalized form of regional-

security cooperation,[84] precipitous declines in defence budgets and obsolete equipment could not provide for their national security without external assistance.[85] Furthermore, the Visegrád states were haunted by the events of their past, when only sixty-four years earlier, Berlin's 1939 invasion of Poland fuelled a world-wide conflagration that left their fate in the hands of the Soviets.[86] Anxiety about future hypothetical Russian aggression made NATO membership attractive to the Eastern European states[87] who feared the ex-superpower's location, size, demography, economic potential and nuclear capabilities.[88] Also, the war in the former Yugoslavia proved to the Visegrád states that the Atlantic Alliance was the continent's only credible security system,[89] for Europe would not act to stop wars even among near neighbours.[90] Lastly, these fledging market democracies wanted affirmation that they belonged to the West.[91] NATO membership was principally important as a symbol that they were fully European, and as "a means of back door entry into the European Union (EU)".[92] Indeed, admission into the alliance was initially easier and faster to obtain than entry into the EU, which, at that time, called for achieving unfeasible economic objectives.[93]

Such reasoning led Eastern European countries to express a desire to join NATO, as early as 1990.[94] The Visegrád states sought, at a minimum, political participation in the alliance and, as the Slovak and Czech Federal Republic proposed in September 1991, a treaty-based security arrangement with NATO.[95] Nevertheless, because these governments lacked the political clout necessary to drive the enlargement campaign, "the strongly expressed desire of the Central and Eastern European countries themselves to become active members of the alliance had to be interpreted as a secondary rather than primary source of the policy".[96] The PFP program was a clear demonstration of this point. The initiative proved to be a sobering event for the Visegrád states, in particular for Poland, because the plan demonstrated the difficulties the countries faced in attaining their goal of membership.[97] Then-Polish Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak stated that although Poland was not happy with the process, "we can accept it if we are certain that Poland will ultimately be able to become a full member".[98] In the end, viewing the PFP as the only possible way into the military alliance,[99] Poland put aside its initial displeasure and, on July 5 1994, became the first partner to sign an Individual Partnership Program (IPP), (Simon 54). Furthermore, certain academics argue that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were really only chosen for entry on the basis that they guaranteed the hegemon minimal effort in maintaining a zone of security: as David Law suggests, expansion brought into the alliance "those countries least needing a security umbrella",[100] while denying vulnerable areas like the Baltic states a protective mantel.[101]

Indeed, the U.S. avoided such superfluous costs so as to initially expend its resources on safeguarding its existent sphere of influence in Europe. Enlargement seemed to offer the perfect opportunity for the Americans to rededicate themselves to European security in a fashion reminiscent of the original guarantee to Western Europe a half century before.[102] Throughout the Cold War, Washington elites, including Zbigniew Brezinski, had linked American primacy to "preponderance on the Eurasian continent".[103] Following the demise of the Soviet Union, the hegemon's commitment to Europe's stability continued to be paramount.[104] The U.S. understood the area's strategic geographic utility: retaining American forces on the continent allowed for easier access to, and influence over, volatile regions of Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa.[105] According to David D. Newson, the Pentagon at that time viewed possible threats to American security as stemming from the Middle East and North Korea and, in turn, all military planning was based on such a two-war structure. Consequently, the role of NATO expansion was perceived as one of maintaining over one-hundred thousand U.S. troops in Europe as a reserve unit for deployment to such recalcitrant areas of the globe.[106] Washington therefore deemed it necessary to exercise its power to prevent "centrifugal forces – both old and new – from breaking the alliance apart".[107]

Traditionally, attempts to destabilize America's dominance within NATO had come from France's endeavour to bolster its own prestige and assert itself as a major power.[108] General de Gaulle's emergence

as President of France in 1958 precipitated fundamental changes in U.S.-European dialogue. Previously, American policymakers had considered Europe's political unity as a prerequisite to the formation of an Atlantic community that would share with the U.S. the burdens of containing communism all the while accepting American dominance. Nonetheless, De Gaulle's increasingly vocal criticisms of U.S. interference in Europe, his clear opposition to the 1962 Nassau Agreement, which tied the British nuclear program to that of the U.S.,[109] and his 1966 decision to withdraw France from NATO's military command to support French nuclear forces[110] led the superpower to perceive a united Europe as the single greatest internal challenge to an American dominated Atlantic policy.[111] Scholars, including Waltz, agreed, predicting the EU as the next great power that would restore a balance in the world, emphasising the continent's population, resources, technology, economy, and military capability.[112]

Increasingly, France's post Cold-War strides to demonstrate Europe's autonomy in defence and foreign policy led to contentious relations with the U.S.[113] Specifically, Washington interpreted the country's efforts to bolster the role of both the Organisation on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Western European Union (WEU) as direct attempts to undermine an American-led Atlantic Alliance. Consequently, in 1991, the Franco-German EUROCORPS produced a sharp reaction from Washington.[114] Then-U.S. Undersecretary of State Reginald Barthalomew's letter to the governments of the European members of NATO clearly warned against Europe formulating any independent policies on defence and/or reviving the WEU so as to create an instrument to vehicle a European security identity. To American satisfaction, the subsequent Maastricht Treaty of December 1991 delineated the role of the WEU as a mere component of NATO, leading then-American president George Bush Sr. to remark: "we are pleased that our allies in the WEU...decided to strengthen that institution as both NATO's European pillar and the defence component of the EU".[115] Moreover, despite initial appeals to strengthen the OSCE on the grounds that it transcended NATO and offered better prospects for collective security, to the delight of the U.S., the organisation faltered because of difficulties related to consensus decision-making.[116] Although the OSCE summit held on December 2, 1996 ruled out any concrete steps to strengthen the organisation,[117] the institution had already fallen "victim to the war in the former Yugoslavia and lost credibility".[118]

Clearly, Europe's attempts at autonomy could not be instantaneously accomplished by concentrating resources on the realisation of a strategic balance of power. Instead, taking advantage of the relatively weak military position of their Eastern European neighbours, EU members set aside immediate concerns over state security for the longer-term regional goal of a successful European Monetary Union. To join the unified currency, a state had to achieve certain benchmarks: a budget deficit less than three percent of GDP, a national debt less than sixty percent of GDP, an inflation rate no more than one point five percentage points above the average of the three lowest-inflation EU members, and stable interest rates and national currency values.[119] In July 1990, as a first step at fulfilling these requirements, major European affiliates of NATO unilaterally announced large reductions in their force levels, all the while supporting the entry of the Visegrád states into the military alliance. Numerous academics, including Harris and Newson, attached Germany's and France's overt support of NATO expansion to the aim of avoiding, or at least delaying, the eastward enlargement of the EU.[120] As suggested by then-German Defence Minister Volker Ruhe's 1993 statement: "it [is] conceivable and also desirable that Eastern European membership be more likely in security policy, that is, in NATO ...These countries probably need a good ten years" for EU membership,[121] the admission of the Visegrád states into the EU was perceived as problematic. The expense of EU enlargement would have significantly outweighed the gains: member-states would have had to shoulder economically the Eastern European countries as free-riders,[122] at a time when the Maastricht Treaty had already increased the EU budget by 25 billion dollars to provide economic assistance to the poorer member-states of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain.[123] Ultimately, the alliance's European counterparts set a more cautious timetable for EU expansion and acquiesced the hegemon NATO's enlargement, in order to successfully realise monetary objectives of a common European currency, a precursor to future increased power capabilities and regional autonomy.[124]

In summation, claims that the demise of the U.S.S.R. and the subsequent end of the bipolar world order dissolved the foundations of realism as a paradigm of choice for explaining post-Cold War inter-state behaviour were premature. The above analysis of the conduct of NATO members and contenders between the years of 1990 to 1997, in fact, delineates the continued importance of such realist rhetoric as the retention and expansion of power capabilities and the need for states to guarantee their survival. NATO's fourth phase of enlargement provided all participants with the vehicle with which to fulfil their respective unitary goals. The Atlantic Alliance was the platform which the U.S., the reigning post Cold-War superpower, used to manipulate militarily weaker states in order to both safeguard its existent sphere of influence over Europe and expand its hegemonic authority further eastward into Eurasia. Moreover, the Visegrád states' entry into the military alliance provided the former Warsaw Pact allies with an enhanced national security, formal protection against a resurgent Russia, and tangible evidence of acceptance by the West. Lastly, NATO's European members conceded to the U.S. the alliance's easterly expansion, so as to buy sufficient time that would permit them to focus on domestic concerns of successfully establishing a European Monetary Union – a path to regional autonomy. Indeed, in terms of inter-state relations, the short period of 1990 to 1997 was an anomaly, for there was no evidence of power balancing but a general acceptance and propagation of the unipolar world system. Nonetheless, an attempt at equilibrium would come five years later as a stronger France, Germany, and a more confident Russia joined forces to counter America's unilateral strides to expand its jurisdiction into the Middle East by invading Iraq and toppling its regime. Ultimately, such efforts demonstrated the international system's innate penchant for pure balance of power politics, its future potential to check American. capabilities, and the possible reestablishment of a pluralistic world.

Notes

[1] John. G. Ikenberry, "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order". *International Security* 23.3 (1998): 43-44.
[2] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (New York: Random House, 1979) 18.
[3] Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War." *International Organization* 50.3 (1996): 453.
[4] Richard L. Russell, "The Atlantic Alliance: Balancing Powers in Europe after the Cold War" in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed, *NATO Expansion* (Maryland: UP of America, 1998) 83.
[5] Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War." *International Organization* 50.3 (1996): 453.
[6] Richard L. Russell, "The Atlantic Alliance: Balancing Powers in Europe after the Cold War" in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed, *NATO Expansion* (Maryland: UP of America, 1998) 83.
[7] Alexei K. Pushkov, "A View From Russia" in Jeffrey Simon, ed. *NATO Enlargement: Opinions and Options* (Washington: National Defense UP, 1995) 50.
[8] Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War." *International Organization* 50.3 (1996): 453.
[9] William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World". *International Security* 24.1 (1991): 5.
[10] Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War." *International Organization* 50.3 (1996): 453.
[11] William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World". *International Security* 24.1 (1991): 5.
[12] John G. H. Halstead, "Trying to Square the Circle". *NATO Expansion: Two Perspectives*. (Queen's U. Occasional Paper Ser. 57. Kingston: Centre for International Relations, 1997) 9.
[13] Glen Brown, "A NATO Perspective on Enlargement" in Ann L. Griffiths, ed, *NATO Enlargement: Who Benefits?*. (Dalhousie. Centre for Foreign Policy Studies., 1998) 37.
[14] Lawrence J. Korb, "The Question of NATO Expansion." in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed, *NATO Expansion* (Maryland: UP of America, 1998) 57.
[15] Gerald B. Solomon, *The NATO Enlargement Debate, 1990-1997 Blessings of Liberty*, (Washington Papers. 172. Westport: Praeger, 1998) 2.
[16] Glen Brown, "A NATO Perspective on Enlargement" in Ann L. Griffiths, ed, *NATO Enlargement: Who Benefits?*. (Dalhousie. Centre for Foreign Policy Studies., 1998) 38.
[17] Lawrence J. Korb, "The Question of NATO Expansion." in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed, *NATO Expansion* (Maryland: UP of America, 1998) 58.
[18] Glen Brown, "A NATO Perspective on Enlargement" in Ann L. Griffiths, ed, *NATO Enlargement: Who Benefits?*. (Dalhousie. Centre for Foreign Policy Studies., 1998) 38.
[19] Gerald B. Solomon, *The NATO Enlargement Debate, 1990-1997 Blessings of Liberty*, (Washington Papers. 172. Westport: Praeger, 1998) 9.
[20] Jeffrey Simon, "The PfP Path and Civil-Military Relations" in Jeffrey Simon, ed, *NATO Enlargement: Opinions and Options* (Washington: National Defense UP, 1995) 47.
[21] Gale A. Mattox, "NATO: Past and Future" in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed, *NATO Expansion* (Maryland: UP of America, 1998) 26.
[22] Alain Pellerin, *NATO Enlargement – Where We Came From and Where it Leaves Us* (Aurora Papers. 29. Ottawa:

CCIPS, 30 May 1997) 4.
[23] Gerald B. Solomon, *The NATO Enlargement Debate, 1990-1997 Blessings of Liberty*, (Washington Papers. 172. Westport: Praeger, 1998) 20.
[24] Ibid, 34.
[25] Ann L. Griffiths, Introduction in Ann L. Griffiths, ed, *NATO Enlargement: Who Benefits?*. (Dalhousie. Centre for Foreign Policy Studies., 1998) 3.
[26] Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War." *International Organization* 50.3 (1996): 453.
[27] John G. H. Halstead, "Trying to Square the Circle". *NATO Expansion: Two Perspectives*. (Queen's U. Occasional Paper Ser. 57. Kingston: Centre for International Relations, 1997) 10.
[28] Alain Pellerin, *NATO Enlargement – Where We Came From and Where it Leaves Us* (Aurora Papers. 29. Ottawa: CCIPS, 30 May 1997) 4.
[29] Gale A. Mattox, "NATO: Past and Future" in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed, *NATO Expansion* (Maryland: UP of America, 1998) 27.
[30] Glen Brown, "A NATO Perspective on Enlargement" in Ann L. Griffiths, ed, *NATO Enlargement: Who Benefits?*. (Dalhousie. Centre for Foreign Policy Studies., 1998) 38, 41.
[31] Marie-Claude Plantin, "NATO Enlargement as an Obstacle to France's European Designs" in Charles-Philippe David and Jacques Lévesque, eds, *The Future of NATO: Enlargement, Russia, and European Security* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's UP, 1999) 105.
[32] Gale A. Mattox, "NATO: Past and Future" in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed, *NATO Expansion* (Maryland: UP of America, 1998) 28.
[33] Ann L. Griffiths, Introduction in Ann L. Griffiths, ed, *NATO Enlargement: Who Benefits?*. (Dalhousie. Centre for Foreign Policy Studies., 1998) 3.
[34] Gale A. Mattox, "NATO: Past and Future" in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed, *NATO Expansion* (Maryland: UP of America, 1998) 28.
[35] Ibid, 24.
[36] Richard Rosecrance, "Has Realism Become Cost-Benefit Analysis"? *International Security* 26.2 (2002): 6.
[37] Marie-Claude Plantin, "NATO Enlargement as an Obstacle to France's European Designs" in Charles-Philippe David and Jacques Lévesque, eds, *The Future of NATO: Enlargement, Russia, and European Security* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's UP, 1999) 100-101.
[38] Jacques Lévesque, "NATO's Eastward Enlargement: An Instructive historical Precedent" in Charles-Philippe David and Jacques Lévesque, eds, *The Future of NATO: Enlargement, Russia, and European Security* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's UP, 1999) 166.
[39] Gerald B. Solomon, *The NATO Enlargement Debate, 1990-1997 Blessings of Liberty*, (Washington Papers. 172. Westport: Praeger, 1998) 38.
[40] Marie-Claude Plantin, "NATO Enlargement as an Obstacle to France's European Designs" in Charles-Philippe David and Jacques Lévesque, eds, *The Future of NATO: Enlargement, Russia, and European Security* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's UP, 1999) 105.
[41] Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited". *International Security* 25.3 (2000):141.
[42] Alain Pellerin, *NATO Enlargement – Where We Came From and Where it Leaves Us* (Aurora Papers. 29. Ottawa: CCIPS, 30 May 1997) 22-23.
[43] Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited". *International Security* 25.3 (2000):129.
[44] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (New York: Random House, 1979) 201, 206.
[45] William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World". *International Security* 24.1 (1991): 5.
[46] Alain Pellerin, *NATO Enlargement – Where We Came From and Where it Leaves Us* (Aurora Papers. 29. Ottawa: CCIPS, 30 May 1997) 23.
[47] George C McGhee, "The Future of NATO in the World at the Beginning of the 21st Century" in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed, *NATO Expansion* (Maryland: UP of America, 1998) 102.
[48] Robert T. Osterthaler, "NATO Enlargement into Eastern Europe" in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed, *NATO Expansion* (Maryland: UP of America, 1998)13.
[49] Lawrence J. Korb, "The Question of NATO Expansion" in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed, *NATO Expansion* (Maryland: UP of America, 1998) 59.
[50] Robert T. Osterthaler, "NATO Enlargement into Eastern Europe" in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed, *NATO Expansion* (Maryland: UP of America, 1998) 12, 15.
[51] David D. Newson, "Some Further Thoughts on NATO Expansion" in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed, *NATO Expansion* (Maryland: UP of America, 1998) 72.
[52] Jonathon Dean, "Expansion Now is Unnecessary" in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed, *NATO Expansion* (Maryland: UP of America, 1998) 111.
[53] Lawrence J. Korb, "The Question of NATO Expansion" in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed, *NATO Expansion* (Maryland: UP of America, 1998) 56, 63.
[54] Jonathon Dean, "Expansion Now is Unnecessary" in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed, *NATO Expansion* (Maryland: UP of America, 1998) 111.
[55] Gale A. Mattox, "NATO: Past and Future" in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed, *NATO Expansion* (Maryland: UP of America, 1998) 34.
[56] John G. H. Halstead, "Trying to Square the Circle". *NATO Expansion: Two Perspectives*. (Queen's U. Occasional Paper Ser. 57. Kingston: Centre for International Relations, 1997) 13.
[57] David D. Newson, "Some Further Thoughts on NATO Expansion" in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed, *NATO Expansion*

(Maryland: UP of America, 1998) 79.
[58] Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War". *International Security*. 25.1 (2000): 22.
[59] David D. Newson, "Some Further Thoughts on NATO Expansion" in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed, *NATO Expansion* (Maryland: UP of America, 1998) 71.
[60] John G. H. Halstead, "Trying to Square the Circle". *NATO Expansion: Two Perspectives*. (Queen's U. Occasional Paper Ser. 57. Kingston: Centre for International Relations, 1997) 16.
[61] Alexei K. Pushkov, "A View From Russia" in Jeffrey Simon, ed, *NATO Enlargement: Opinions and Options* (Washington: National Defense UP, 1995) 137.
[62] Lawrence J. Korb, "The Question of NATO Expansion" in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed, *NATO Expansion* (Maryland: UP of America, 1998) 62.
[63] Richard L. Russell, "The Atlantic Alliance: Balancing Powers in Europe after the Cold War" in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed, *NATO Expansion* (Maryland: UP of America, 1998) 86.
[64] Gerald B. Solomon, *The NATO Enlargement Debate, 1990-1997 Blessings of Liberty*, (Washington Papers. 172. Westport: Praeger, 1998) 15.
[65] Ibid, 24.
[66] Gale A. Mattox, "NATO: Past and Future" in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed, *NATO Expansion* (Maryland: UP of America, 1998) 38.
[67] Alexei K Pushkov, "A View From Russia" in Jeffrey Simon, ed, *NATO Enlargement: Opinions and Options* (Washington: National Defense UP, 1995) 135.
[68] Denis Crickard, "NATO Enlargement: Who Benefits?" in Ann L. Griffiths, ed, *NATO Enlargement: Who Benefits?* (Dalhousie. Centre for Foreign Policy Studies., 1998) 61.
[69] Alain Pellerin, *NATO Enlargement – Where We Came From and Where it Leaves Us* (Aurora Papers. 29. Ottawa: CCIPS, 30 May 1997) 69.
[70] Sergei Plekhanov, "NATO Enlargement as an Issue in Russian Politics" in Charles-Philippe David and Jacques Lévesque, eds, The Future of NATO: Enlargement, Russia, and European Security (Montreal: McGill-Queen's UP, 1999) 184.
[71] Marie-Claude Plantin, "NATO Enlargement as an Obstacle to France's European Designs" in Charles-Philippe David and Jacques Lévesque, eds, *The Future of NATO: Enlargement, Russia, and European Security* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's UP, 1999) 52.
[72] Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War." *International Organization* 50.3 (1996): 455.
[73] Jacques Lévesque, "NATO's Eastward Enlargement: An Instructive historical Precedent" in Charles-Philippe David and Jacques Lévesque, eds, *The Future of NATO: Enlargement, Russia, and European Security* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's UP, 1999) 157.
[74] Richard L. Russell, "The Atlantic Alliance: Balancing Powers in Europe after the Cold War" in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed, *NATO Expansion* (Maryland: UP of America, 1998) 96.
[75] Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War". *International Security*. 25.1 (2000): 22.
[76] Richard L. Russell, "The Atlantic Alliance: Balancing Powers in Europe after the Cold War" in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed, *NATO Expansion* (Maryland: UP of America, 1998) 90.
[77] Jacques Lévesque, "NATO's Eastward Enlargement: An Instructive historical Precedent" in Charles-Philippe David and Jacques Lévesque, eds, *The Future of NATO: Enlargement, Russia, and European Security* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's UP, 1999) 164-165.
[78] Sergei Plekhanov, "NATO Enlargement as an Issue in Russian Politics" in Charles-Philippe David and Jacques Lévesque, eds, The Future of NATO: Enlargement, Russia, and European Security (Montreal: McGill-Queen's UP, 1999) 183.
[79] Alexei K Pushkov, "A View From Russia" in Jeffrey Simon, ed, *NATO Enlargement: Opinions and Options* (Washington: National Defense UP, 1995) 139.
[80] Lawrence J. Korb, "The Question of NATO Expansion" in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed, *NATO Expansion* (Maryland: UP of America, 1998) 50.
[81] Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War". *International Security*. 25.1 (2000): 16.
[82] William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World". *International Security* 24.1 (1991): 12.
[83] Jane M.O. Sharp, "The Case for Opening up NATO to the East" in Charles-Philippe David and Jacques Lévesque, eds, The Future of NATO: Enlargement, Russia, and European Security (Montreal: McGill-Queen's UP, 1999) 28.
[84] András Balogh, "The Atlantic Dimensions of Central European Security" in Charles-Philippe David and Jacques Lévesque, eds, The Future of NATO: Enlargement, Russia, and European Security (Montreal: McGill-Queen's UP, 1999) 192.
[85] Gerald B. Solomon, *The NATO Enlargement Debate, 1990-1997 Blessings of Liberty*, (Washington Papers. 172. Westport: Praeger, 1998) 9.
[86] Richard L. Russell, "The Atlantic Alliance: Balancing Powers in Europe after the Cold War" in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed, *NATO Expansion* (Maryland: UP of America, 1998) 85.
[87] Charles-Philippe David. "Fountain of Youth or Cure Worse Than Disease? NATO Enlargement: A Conceptual Deadlock" in Charles-Philippe David and Jacques Lévesque, eds, The Future of NATO: Enlargement, Russia, and European Security (Montreal: McGill-Queen's UP, 1999) 11-12.
[88] Andrzej Karkoszka, "A View From Poland" in Jeffrey Simon, ed, *NATO Enlargement: Opinions and Options* (Washington: National Defense UP, 1995) 77.
[89] András Balogh, "The Atlantic Dimensions of Central European Security" in Charles-Philippe David and Jacques Lévesque, eds, The Future of NATO: Enlargement, Russia, and European Security (Montreal: McGill-Queen's UP, 1999) 190.
[90] Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War". *International Security*. 25.1 (2000): 31.
[91] Alain Pellerin, *NATO Enlargement – Where We Came From and Where it Leaves Us* (Aurora Papers. 29. Ottawa: CCIPS, 30 May 1997) 13.
[92] Owen Harris, "The Dangers of Expansive Realism". *The National Interest* 50 (1997): 5.
[93] Robert T. Osterthaler, "NATO Enlargement into Eastern Europe" in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed, *NATO Expansion*

(Maryland: UP of America, 1998) 18.
[94] Philippe Hérbert and Paul Létourneau, "NATO Enlargement: Germany's Euro-Atlantic Design" in Charles-Philippe David and Jacques Lévesque, eds, The Future of NATO: Enlargement, Russia, and European Security (Montreal: McGill-Queen's UP, 1999) 112.
[95] Gerald B. Solomon, *The NATO Enlargement Debate, 1990-1997 Blessings of Liberty*, (Washington Papers. 172. Westport: Praeger, 1998) 10.
[96] Denis Stairs, "A Geopolitical Interpretation of NATO Enlargement" in Ann L. Griffiths, ed, *NATO Enlargement: WhoBenefits?* (Dalhousie. Centre for Foreign Policy Studies., 1998) 51.
[97] Andrzej Karkoszka, "A View From Poland" in Jeffrey Simon, ed, *NATO Enlargement: Opinions and Options* (Washington: National Defense UP, 1995) 81.
[98] Jeffrey Simon, "The PfP Path and Civil-Military Relations" in Jeffrey Simon, ed, *NATO Enlargement: Opinions and Options* (Washington: National Defense UP, 1995) 54.
[99] Andrzej Karkoszka, "A View From Poland" in Jeffrey Simon, ed, *NATO Enlargement: Opinions and Options* (Washington: National Defense UP, 1995) 81.
[100] David Law, "Why Spain Should Have Been NATO's Last Member" in Charles-Philippe David and Jacques Lévesque, eds, The Future of NATO: Enlargement, Russia, and European Security (Montreal: McGill-Queen's UP, 1999) 35.
[101] Ann L. Griffiths, Introduction in Ann L. Griffiths, ed, *NATO Enlargement: Who Benefits?*. (Dalhousie. Centre for Foreign Policy Studies., 1998) 5.
[102] Dean F. Oliver, "Another Day, Another Doom? An Overview of NATO's Great Enlargement Debate" in Ann L. Griffiths, ed, *NATO Enlargement: Who Benefits?*. (Dalhousie. Centre for Foreign Policy Studies., 1998) 19.
[103] Owen Harris, "The Dangers of Expansive Realism". *The National Interest* 50 (1997): 9.
[104] Alain Pellerin, *NATO Enlargement – Where We Came From and Where it Leaves Us* (Aurora Papers. 29. Ottawa: CCIPS, 30 May 1997) 23.
[105] Gale A. Mattox, "NATO: Past and Future" in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed, *NATO Expansion* (Maryland: UP of America, 1998) 30.
[106] David D. Newson, "Some Further Thoughts on NATO Expansion" in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed, *NATO Expansion* (Maryland: UP of America, 1998) 78.
[107] Richard L. Russell, "The Atlantic Alliance: Balancing Powers in Europe after the Cold War" in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed, *NATO Expansion* (Maryland: UP of America, 1998) 96.
[108] Ibid, 94.
[109] Henry A. Kissinger, *The Troubled Partnership: A Re-appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance*, (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1966) 33, 37, 40.
[110] Richard L. Russell, "The Atlantic Alliance: Balancing Powers in Europe after the Cold War" in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed, *NATO Expansion* (Maryland: UP of America, 1998) 94.
[111] Henry A. Kissinger, *The Troubled Partnership: A Re-appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance*, (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1966) 40.
[112] Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War". *International Security*. 25.1 (2000): 30-31.
[113] Richard L. Russell, "The Atlantic Alliance: Balancing Powers in Europe after the Cold War" in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed, *NATO Expansion* (Maryland: UP of America, 1998) 93.
[114] Gale A. Mattox, "NATO: Past and Future" in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed, *NATO Expansion* (Maryland: UP of America, 1998) 30.
[115] Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War". *International Security*. 25.1 (2000): 21.
[116] Philippe Hérbert and Paul Létourneau, "NATO Enlargement: Germany's Euro-Atlantic Design" in Charles-Philippe David and Jacques Lévesque, eds, The Future of NATO: Enlargement, Russia, and European Security (Montreal: McGill-Queen's UP, 1999) 112.
[117] Marie-Claude Plantin, "NATO Enlargement as an Obstacle to France's European Designs" in Charles-Philippe David and Jacques Lévesque, eds, *The Future of NATO: Enlargement, Russia, and European Security* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's UP, 1999) 107.
[118] Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, "Phase II Candidates: A Political or Strategic Solution" in Charles-Philippe David and Jacques Lévesque, eds, *The Future of NATO: Enlargement, Russia, and European Security* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's UP, 1999) 201.
[119] Joshua S. Goldstein, *International Relations*, (New York: Longman, 2001) 453.
[120] Owen Harris, "The Dangers of Expansive Realism". *The National Interest* 50 (1997): 5; David D. Newson, "Some Further Thoughts on NATO Expansion" in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed, *NATO Expansion* (Maryland: UP of America, 1998) 72.
[121] Gerald B. Solomon, *The NATO Enlargement Debate, 1990-1997 Blessings of Liberty*, (Washington Papers. 172. Westport: Praeger, 1998) 21.
[122] Ann L. Griffiths, Introduction in Ann L. Griffiths, ed, *NATO Enlargement: Who Benefits?*. (Dalhousie. Centre for Foreign Policy Studies., 1998) 2.
[123] Joshua S. Goldstein, *International Relations*, (New York: Longman, 2001) 453.
[124] Owen Harris, "The Dangers of Expansive Realism". *The National Interest* 50 (1997): 5;

Works Cited

Harris, Owen. "The Dangers of Expansive Realism." *The National Interest* 50 (1997).

Mattox, Gale A. "NATO: Past and Future." *NATO Expansion*. Ed. Kenneth W. Thompson. Maryland: UP of America, 1998.

McGhee, George C. "The Future of NATO in the World at the Beginning of the 21st Century." Ed. Kenneth W. Thompson. Maryland: UP of America, 1998.

Osterthaler, Robert T. "NATO Enlargement into Eastern Europe." Ed. Kenneth W. Thompson. Maryland: UP of America, 1998.

Pellerin, Alain. *NATO Enlargement – Where We Came From and Where it Leaves Us*. Aurora Papers. 29. Ottawa: CCIPS, 30 May 1997.

Plekhanov, Sergei. "NATO Enlargement as an Issue in Russian Politics." *The Future of NATO: Enlargement, Russia, and European Security*. Eds. Charles-Philippe David and Jacques Lévesque. Montreal: McGill-Queen's UP, 1999.

Russell, Richard L. "The Atlantic Alliance: Balancing Powers in Europe after the Cold War." Ed. Kenneth W. Thompson. Maryland: UP of America, 1998.

Simon, Jeffrey. "The PfP Path and Civil-Military Relations." *NATO Enlargement: Opinions and Options*. Ed. Jeffrey Simon.Washington: National Defense UP, 1995

Solomon, Gerald B. *The NATO Enlargement Debate, 1990-1997 Blessings of Liberty*. Washington Papers. 172. Westport: Praeger, 1998.

Stairs Denis. "A Geopolitical Interpretation of NATO Enlargement." *NATO Enlargement: WhoBenefits?* Ed. Ann L. Griffiths. Dalhousie. Centre for Foreign Policy Studies., 1998.

Waltz, Kenneth N. "Structural Realism after the Cold War." *International Security*. 25.1 (2000).

The European Union's Enlargement to the East: Can a Constructivist Perspective Explain Integration in Europe?

Aldona Sienkiewicz

Explaining integration and regionalism among states has been the purpose of many theories in international relations and underlying some of these theories is the assumption that material self-interest is a main force driving integration. For instance, neo-functionalists see material self-interest, technology, and economics as driving regionalism and integration, because they claim that it can create prosperity. Likewise neo-liberal institutionalism shares this emphasis on material self-interest but sees governments as being the major force increasing integration. Yet scholars have begun revisiting and disputing this idea that self-interest, free of normative concerns, is the only rational motive and explanation behind the integration phenomenon in international relations. The instance of regionalism that I would like to discuss is the integration of the Eastern European countries in the European Union (EU). This choice makes sense if we consider that the eastward expansion of the EU is not in the best interest of many current EU members. This greater integration of Europe can have many negative consequences in terms of economic cost, agricultural policy, social cohesion, law and order, immigration, and many other concerns for both special interest groups and governments in EU member countries. Therefore, theories on integration that refer to material interest do not adequately explain this move to expand integration in Europe.

Given the apparent disincentives for the members in expanding the EU eastward, how can we explain why the members of the EU are expanding the union to include the former countries of the Soviet bloc? I propose that constructivist theory can help explain eastern enlargement in the EU, because of its emphasis on community, values, identity and dialogue. I will begin by summarizing three groups of theories that explain regional integration. Then, I will describe disincentives to enlargement. Thirdly, I will describe a constructivist theory of how past rhetoric can entrap actors into commitments. Fourthly, I will show how such rhetorical entrapment was used to advance eastern integration. Finally, I will move on to some of the outcomes of the norm-based arguments.

The neo-functionalist perspective on regionalization has certain core assumptions. Neo-functionalists rather, stress that incremental but deliberate decisions at the hands of bureaucrats, such as the creation of institutions that would lead to further integration, as the preponderant force behind spillover of integration from the 'low politics' of technical decisions into 'high politics'.[1] Neo-functionalists would also argue that supranational institutions are the best way of solving common problems, and that the shift in institutions from the oversight of technical and non-controversial issues to decision making in 'high politics'[2] is desirable. Neo-functionalists do consider states to be central to politics and yet propose that technocrats can take part in politics and effectively plan sectors of integration.[3] Another principle of this theory is that it downplays the importance of identity, and instead emphasizes utilitarian factors in community and nation-state formation;[4] the priority in integration is the assurance of peace, security, and *economic prosperity*. According to neo-functionalists, questions of values, norms, justice, or intersubjectivity do not factor into the considerations that political actors make, and self-interested motives like the desire for economic prosperity are the only intersubjective values that communities are thought to share.

Functionalist assumptions about the role of technocrats may have been applicable to the European Community or European Union at times because technocrats are largely responsible for certain

issues such as unifying product standards or technology across the EU, for example. Even the structure of decision-making itself seems as though technocrats are governing the EU and not the elected representatives or Member State governments. It is true that integration among EU members has been deepening. For instance at one time only trade was integrated, but now currency has also been integrated as well. Neo-functionalist thinkers also point to the Commission because it is a technocratic organization whose members are not elected, and who are career civil servants, but who make technical and political decisions. However, while policies concerning technical issues are integrated, the EU has not integrated national policy in politically controversial areas like social welfare and unemployment benefits. Europe does not have a common criminal code, foreign policy, or social welfare policy either. Many would argue that the nation state remains responsible for these political domains and that technocrats have not yet supplanted the political process at the domestic level. The widening of the EU to include the Central and eastern European states is itself a decision that could not have been advanced by the technocrats themselves and requires the assent of the national governments of Member States. Although the neo-functionalist perspective is relevant in explaining some features of the EU, it does not accord enough importance to the activities of national governments in integration.

Neo-liberal institutionalism is a theoretical perspective that, for this author, better explains European integration in the EU. As Andrew Hurrell enumerates, firstly, the cooperation and collective action that institutions provide are a way for states to achieve their interests in conditions of increasing interdependence. Second, states are central actors and the aim of analysis is to determine the conditions of power and preferences that enable or constrain cooperation among these rational and self-interested actors. Third, institutions matter because of the benefits that they provide to states and because of the ways in which they alter the decision-making by introducing factors like transparency, mechanisms to discourage 'cheating', or the development of convergent expectations.[5] Andrew Moravcsik writes that state preferences, bargaining between governments and the cooperation and 'pooling' of sovereignty in institutions are important to understanding European integration and he emphasizes the central role of material interests in determining state preferences and behaviour.[6] Yet what may be lacking in the neo-liberal institutionalist conception of the EU and its processes is that it also overemphasizes the importance of material interests, but does not accord much importance to values, norms or identity in the interaction between political actors. The enlargement of the EU to include the countries of central and Eastern Europe is better explained by a combination of neo-liberal institutionalism and constructivism.

Andrew Hurrell provides a good account of some core arguments on which constructivist theories are based. When applied to questions of regionalism, constructivism focuses on regional awareness and regional identity, and on the sense of belonging to a particular regional community. He says that "instead of focusing solely on material incentives, constructivists emphasize the importance of shared knowledge, learning, ideational forces, normative and institutional structures".[7] According to constructivists, perceptions influence behaviour and therefore they consider it important to observe how identities interact with material incentives, how language and discourse influence actors, as well as how actors interpret their social context because their perceptions influence their behaviour.[8] They also claim that states are constructed by historical processes and that therefore they can be deconstructed; that interests and identities are constructed by histories and cultures, by domestic factors, and by interactions with other states. Other scholars are also claiming that identity is currently becoming more relevant in international relations, and that the politics of regionalism are becoming complicated by the existence of different identities that overlap, coexist, interact and are interdependent. For instance, conceptions of regional identity may vary from nation to nation and may conflict with each other.

Some elements of neo-liberal institutionalism that I think are applicable to Eastern enlargement are its recognition of the centrality of state actors in the political processes that increase integration, and of the bargaining between the actors. Yet neo-liberal institutionalist thinkers like Moravcsik may overemphasize the significance of material interests in state preferences and behaviours in the case of eastern enlargement of the EU.

According to neo-liberal institutionalists, state preferences are an important element for analyzing the European Union and they are also important in understanding enlargement to the East. With respect to national preferences of current EU members, many of them are not compatible with enlargement. Poorer, less developed, and more agricultural member states like Spain, Portugal, Greece, or Ireland, could incur high costs from enlargement from trade competition and budgetary competition. Many of these member countries tend to specialize in the same traditional and resource-intensive industries as countries in Central and Eastern Europe do. These industries include agriculture, textiles, leather and metalworking.[9] Therefore, the competition with candidates because of trade integration could adversely affect these poorer current member states.

Furthermore these poorer members are currently net recipients of EU budget transfers, but Central and Eastern European (CEE) members would also become net recipients of transfers. They would qualify for funding under regional development programs and under the Cohesion Policy since there is a great disparity in income between the prospective eastern members and even the least developed current Member States.[10] Agriculture comprises a very large part of the CEE economies, and therefore eastward enlargement will also affect the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). These redistributive programs comprise eighty percent of the European Union's budget[11] and major net contributors oppose an increase in EU spending. Given the magnitude of the CEECs' funding needs and the contributing members' unwillingness to significantly increase spending, reform of these funding programs is unavoidable if the EU is to accommodate the new members. To illustrate the dimensions of this dilemma, the CEE candidates produce three percent of the EU's gross national product, while they attain thirty percent of EU agricultural production, and possess forty-four percent of the productive land.[12] Furthermore, it is estimated that agricultural production will actually increase rather than diminish because the current CAP would provide an incentive for production.[13] In the current beneficiary countries, reforms and enlargement were unpopular because fewer farmers would be eligible for support and transfers would be reduced.[14] Even wealthier member states like France would be affected by reforms because its agricultural sector is relatively large and benefits from the CAP. In order for the EU to reach the objectives of the Cohesion Policy including the CEECs, the funding might even need to be reformed so that current members may no longer qualify for them after enlargement.[15] On the whole, the Mediterranean region would receive less funding, and this is problematic for Greece because Cyprus would also receive less funding as a new EU member. Others like the Benelux countries are also reluctant about enlargement, largely because they will benefit little but may have to contribute more to the EU budget. If state preferences of these countries were shaped by rational materialistic calculations as neo-liberal institutionalist scholars claim, then many member states would not have supported enlargement.

To many current members, maintaining association with the eastern European governments through the Trade and Cooperation Agreements and subsequently the Europe Agreements would have been a preferable and more rational alternative to extending full membership to the CEECs.[16] These agreements benefited the existing members while not obligating them to include CEECs in EU decision-making, or extend the CAP or regional development policies. Since 1989, the EU signed bilateral Trade and Cooperation Agreements with all of the former member states of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). Besides the promotion of joint ventures and other economic cooperation, these agreements involved trade liberalization that could provide CEECs with hard-currency export markets as well as imports that could aid economic reconstruction.[17] However, the EU maintained protectionist

guards in the sectors where CEEC exporters could gain the most and compete effectively with industries in existing member states. Trade liberalization in the agreements did not extend to textile products, did not alter specific arrangements on trade in agricultural products, and did not affect products covered by the treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community.[18]

The Trade and Cooperation Agreements formed the basis for the subsequent negotiations of the Europe Agreements, where CEE governments fought unsuccessfully to gain more access to sensitive EU markets. In fact when Romania and Bulgaria negotiated Europe Agreements, Spanish steel lobbies and French agricultural lobbies were partly responsible for allowing even less access to EU markets than the Visegrad (Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland) countries received.[19] Combined with pressure on eastern European states to open up their economies, the EU's protectionism helped cause the CEECs to run a trade deficit with the EU. In 1989, the EU had a deficit with the CEECs of 600 million ecus (European currency unit) but by 1993 that deficit had turned into a surplus of 5.6 billion ecus.[20] Countries like Italy also blocked and delayed the signing of a bilateral agreement with Bulgaria,[21] and the agreements themselves acted as a delay for granting full membership. Association was a kind of solution for the EU members in their relations with eastern European governments because it seemed to satisfy some of the CEECs' desires for closet dealings with the EU. It opened up their markets to the EU, but it excluded them from the valuable dividends of membership, i.e. the CAP or participation in decision-making.

Based on their material interests, the preferences of many member states would have been to maintain association and postpone membership indefinitely. Yet despite these disincentives to enlargement we know that enlargement is indeed proceeding. What additional factors can explain this discrepancy between self-interest and the enlargement outcome? I will now draw on Frank Schimmelfennig's constructivist arguments in order to demonstrate that the strategic use of norm-based arguments helped overcome the uncooperative and self-interested behaviour of some of the member states.

The success of these arguments lies in the actors; namely, the government leaders being part of a social community with shared norms and values, and in being committed to upholding and promoting these norms and values, including their community's standard of legitimacy. Legitimacy is important to politics because it distinguishes rightful or improper ways of acquiring or exercising political power, as well as desirable or permissible political programs. Standards of legitimacy allocate different degrees of legitimacy to political actors' preferences and behaviours and act as constraints on political actors.[22] To gain legitimacy, actors are obligated to argue and justify their political goals in terms of the community's identity, norms and morals,[23] and these arguments involve rhetoric. If a political actor's preferences are in line with the community's standards of legitimacy the actor has greater bargaining power, which in turn affects outcome and which shows that outcomes are the result of more than the interplay of interests and power alone.[24]

Yet what if an actor has materially-based preferences that do not follow the community's standards? What then forces the actor to comply with the community's values? On the domestic level, public support for enlargement has tended to be low, so it is unlikely that voters would retaliate if a government actor opposed enlargement. In the realm of international relations and in the case of the EU there is no central authority that can force compliance. Therefore other mechanisms such as social influence would explain the participation of self-interested actors in the project of eastern integration. Frank Schimmelfennig posits that shaming, which entails the public exposure of illegitimate goals and behaviour, is largely at work behind eastern enlargement of the EU. He explains how such shaming can be accomplished through the use of norm-based arguments. If an actor has publicly declared support and belief in the community's standard of legitimacy in the past, and (s)he deviates from the standard out of

self-interest, members of the community can shame the actor into compliance by exposing the inconsistencies between his past declarations and his present actions. According to Schimmelfennig, the actor could then feel genuinely ashamed and would want to change his behaviour. Even if a political actors manipulated the community's standard for opportunistic reasons, they could still wish to change their behaviour out of concern for their reputation and standing in the community. But, in order to avoid conforming to the community's standard of legitimacy, the shamed actor could use rhetoric to manipulate and downplay community norms and values. However, this is difficult and risky because community standards could be unambiguously defined and also because the actor could lose credibility if seen to be cynically manipulating norms and values. So we see that political actors can be entrapped by their public declarations - even if the declarations are insincere and opportunistic - and can be exposed by their community and be forced to comply.

Representatives of reticent EU Member States faced this type of exposure and scrutiny, and it is a major reason why they modified their self-interested behaviour and became more cooperative in efforts to integrate the CEECs. Government representatives from the eastern European countries and from existing Member States pointed out that some members were not heeding their past commitments to the Community's norms, values, and identity. These community standards included pan-Europeanism, overcoming the divisions in Europe, and extending peace and prosperity to Eastern Europe. Being part of a community, being accountable to its members, sharing certain norms and values, as well as maintaining legitimacy within a community became constraints on member states, eventually making them accept enlargement. These are constraints, which neo-liberal institutionalist thinkers do not deal with, but which the constructivist perspective can better explain.

Charles de Gaulle expressed his desire to see a Europe stretching all the way from the Atlantic to the Urals. Many in the Soviet bloc remembered such Cold War rhetoric and interpreted it as a genuine commitment. In the past, speeches and documents made by EU officials and government leaders have expressed and contained ideological commitments to the integration of all European societies, and these past commitments serve presently to entrap government officials and silence open opposition to enlargement by existing members.

The organizations that preceded and led up to the European Community, like the European Coal and Steel Community, were based on a pan-European, antifascist and anti-communist ideology. Federalist Congresses of the late 1940s like the Resolution of the Congress of Montreux of the Union Européenne des Fédéralistes of 1947,[25] were directed to all European peoples and rejected the division of the continent. They expressed their hope that the rest of Europe would join integration in Western Europe and would create a "free and peaceful community".[26] The European Economic Community was founded in 1958, and the preamble to the EEC treaty states that its founding states were "determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe" and called "upon the other people of Europe who share their ideal to join these efforts", and accorded any European state the right to apply for membership (Art. 237 EEC Treaty).[27] In a ceremonial speech in 1968 the first president of the European Community's Commission invoked a "sentiment of pan-European solidarity" and in 1980, Francois Mitterand stated that "what we term Europe is a second-best option which alone cannot represent all European history, geography, and culture".[28] During the Cold War, whether genuine or a cheap political device, espousing pan-European ideology was an opportunity for EC member state officials to confirm their allegiance to their community, all the while it was becoming a public verbal commitment.[29] For eastern European peoples who felt oppressed by Soviet rule, these West European declarations and expressions of solidarity must have been memorable. The rhetoric must have strengthened their sense of identity as Europeans, as part of liberal Western European traditions, as belonging to the organizations of European integration. Just as the community ideology was used as a reason for integration in Western Europe, it played a role in strengthening the drive for European integration in Eastern Europe. During the Strasbourg summit in December of 1989, heads of state and government of the EC declared that:

> the current changes and the prospects for development in Europe demonstrate the attraction which the political and. economic model of Community Europe holds for many countries. The Community must live up to this expectation and these demands: its path lies not in withdrawal but in openness and cooperation, particularly with other European states... The objective remains...that of overcoming the divisions of Europe.[30]

Some government leaders in the former Soviet satellite states took these pan-European liberal commitments at face value and interpreted past rhetoric as a promise of membership, even though the EC did not make such explicit promises after the Cold War.

Leaders in the Central and Eastern European states began to point out the discrepancy between past commitments, values, and practices, and the EU's current level of support for Eastern countries seeking membership. Stalling and delaying tactics and protectionism have already been mentioned and are prime examples of this discrepancy. Past enlargements also contrast with the current treatment of eastern European candidates. In 1990, the Hungarian foreign minister argued that the Spanish and Portuguese membership was the result of a political decision and that the EU should make the same decision in the case of Eastern Europe. Others also pointed out that in the case of Mediterranean enlargement, even though the candidates were also poor relative to EU standards, the requisites of membership did not affect the initiation of negotiations.[31]

Central and eastern European government officials complained about their association arrangements - the Europe Agreements. Some questioned why they did not contain more unambiguous support for full membership, while others also pointed out that they established trade arrangements that were biased against the CEECs. The Europe Agreements were signed with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in 1991 and with Romania and Bulgaria by March of 1993 in later negotiations.[32] It was not until June 1993 that at their summit in Copenhagen that the European Council outlined the criteria that candidates would need to meet before future membership. Representatives for CEECs and other EU officials were disappointed by the lack of any clear link in the Europe Agreements between association and accession and the agreements did not outline a clear strategy for integration. Poland's chief negotiator for the Europe Agreements complained, "I think we were all disappointed about the format and the political climate of the talks. It soon turned into pure trade bargaining with the two sides across the table".[33] They remarked that the Agreements seemed to focus on economic factors rather than enlargement. Vladimir Dlouhy, Czechoslovakia's economics minister, commented on the negotiations for his country's Europe Agreements: "When we started our political changes and then economic reforms, we had a lot of support from Western European political circles. But now, when we are really coming to the terms of the support, only cool-blooded economic facts are put on the table".[34]

Another complaint was that the Europe Agreements seemed to be aimed at protecting the EC members against perceived economic threats from the CEECs.[35] It was clear that the Agreements were biased against the CEECs and this is apparent in the figures on trade surpluses and deficits. 83% of the EU's trade surplus from 1992 to 1997 was accumulated in trade with the ten CEECs[36]. In 1997, five years after the implementation of the first Interim Agreements, Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus openly criticized the Europe Agreements for being biased in the EU's favour and for being largely responsible for the rising trade and account deficits of the Czech Republic and other CEECs.[37] We have here examples of CEEC governments uncovering how the EU, rather than seizing the opportunity to build a plan for accession, attempted to block any serious discussion of accession by using association to placate the CEECs. They also pointed out that instead of supporting the economic development of the CEECs and really assisting to prepare economically for accession, the EU was protecting its own industries while

exploiting the CEECs' cooperation and desire to integrate. Their disillusionment informs us that they had taken the Cold War promises on 'overcoming the divisions in Europe' at face value.

The governments of eastern candidate countries were not the only ones to notice the EU's double standard. In one of her speeches in 1990, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher declared that "We can't say in one breath that they are part of Europe and in the next our European Community Club is so exclusive that we won't admit them" and also stated that "the Community should declare unequivocally that it is ready to accept the Central and Eastern European countries as Members".[38] It is true the British government's promotion of 'widening' may have been done in order to halt 'deepening' of the EU. Nevertheless, remarks made by British officials had the effect of calling into question the EU's credibility. During the 1991 coup d'état in the Soviet Union, Commission president Jacques Delors urged Member States to "show consistency between their actions and their statements".[39] At another time Delors exposed some EU members' hypocrisy in their behaviour towards the candidates when he said that

> It's no good making fine speeches with a sob in your voice on Sunday and then on Monday opposing the trade concessions enabling those countries to sell their goods and improve their standards of living" and that" it is not enough to send encouraging signals to the East European countries.[40]

Other representatives brought up the EU's behaviour and implications for its future Legitimacy. In referring to Italy's treatment of Bulgaria, Commissioner Sir Leon Britton expressed his concern that blocking of association negotiation Member States could damage the EC's credibility. Also in 1993, the European Parliament feared that blockage of the interim agreement with Bulgaria could damage the EU's credibility in Eastern Europe.[41].

Some Member States like Germany, Denmark, and Sweden were also promoting eastern enlargement. It is true that their preferences in this matter were influenced by material gains from possible economic ties with these eastern countries. Geographic proximity alone is a great determinant in this. However, the strength of cultural and historical links, as well as a sense of moral obligation in Germany's case, cannot be underestimated as driving reasons for these states' support of eastward expansion. The Kohl government claimed that Germany was obligated to be the primary advocate on behalf of the CEECs' aspirations for EU membership because of its historical record of aggression in the east and because of Germany's debt of thanks to the peoples of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland for their part in precipitating the political transformations that led to Germany's reunification.[42] Enlargement was part of Germany's policy of historical reconciliation and Bonn wished to form a special relationship with Poland, similar to the one they had formed with France.[43] Since the beginning, Germany wanted the EU to give the CEECs a firm prospect for membership.

The candidate governments also referred to their identity as Europeans in order to persuade and embarrass the EU into enlargement. They have claimed that the division of Europe during the Cold War was artificial and that they share the norms and values of the West. For many eastern Europeans a considerable part of their identity was tied to their 'Europeanness' and to their belonging to the rest of Europe and to its institutions. Vaclav Havel's idea of a "return to Europe" is an example of the politics and rhetoric of identity that EU membership has involved. The Romanian ambassador to the EU had said that Romania has always been part of West European traditions", and Hungarian foreign minister considered his country's membership bid to be the "return to this Community to which it has always belonged".[44] This 'Europeanness' also served as an opposite to 'Sovietness",[45] and thus the identity became important to them and a part of the dissent against the Soviet system. It is difficult for the EU to deny people a part of their identity, and even more difficult because they themselves engaged in the

rhetoric of identity. Some groups, like EU technocrats as well as some governments, had a vested interest in the issue of a European identity and engaged in promoting it.[46]

We now turn to the outcomes of the strategic norm-based arguments and begin with its effect of silencing outright criticism of enlargement. One of the outcomes of this strategy using norm-based arguments is that the Member State governments had few rhetorical maneuvers available to respond to the rhetorical arguments exposing their hypocrisy and resistance to eastern expansion. They could not dispute pan-European liberalism because that would have meant admitting the hypocrisy of their past public statements, as well as rejecting the very principles, values and norms that were part of the foundations of the European Community. Disputing that the candidate states adhered to the EC's values or that they did not fulfill the accession criteria was not a powerful argument either because nobody was suggesting that totally unprepared candidates become members. The EC could have stated that eventual membership was open and that it would assist the candidates in preparation for it.

As a result of the rhetorical strategy of the candidates and of some Member States, opponents and skeptics of enlargement were silenced in their open criticism of eastern enlargement. France has often been seen as a hindrance, but has had to conform to the community's past commitment to integration. President Mitterand's adviser wrote that in 1991 when the President publicly declared his support for Czech, Hungarian and Polish aspirations for membership, it was done because he believed that he was in a morally awkward position and felt obliged to make the declaration.[47] His commitment was further cemented when the Hungarian Prime Minister stated that he had "confidence in the French President's word",[48] thus making it known that France's promise would be remembered, especially if it was broken. The French government has also found itself accused of being the main obstacle to enlargement and had felt obligated to soften its position because it feared losing the sympathies of the Central and Eastern European societies,[49] which indicates that integrity in the eyes of others (other members of their community) *is* important to political actors.

Another indication that member states were silenced on criticizing enlargement is that when the Commission strongly supported the enlargement, EC members did not dispute them. For instance, in the preambles of the drafts for association negotiations and in the 1992 report for the Lisbon summit, the Commission would refer to enlargement as if it were a common agreed upon objective.[50] However, if some member states deeply opposed enlargement and wished to postpone it indefinitely, this was not evident since in the many hours of discussion leading up to the Copenhagen summit, the Commission's bold advancement of eastward expansion was hardly discussed at all, let alone disputed.[51] Members must have realized that failure on the part of the EC to achieve the goal of successful integration of eastern countries could damage the EU's international credibility and fragile political image.[52] The timing and circumstances surrounding this reaction could be evidence that Member State representatives were shamed into accepting eventual membership for the former Soviet countries.

If we examine some historical points in the formal and lengthy process of eastward enlargement, one of the initial open commitments to enlargement came in 1992 when the European Council, which is a council comprising the heads of EU Member State governments, and which meets annually, agreed that it "would reach decisions on the various components of the Commission's report in order to prepare the Associate countries for accession to the Union", which meant that the CEECs could eventually become members.[53] Some critics would say that the mounting moral and political pressure for enlargement in 1992 and 1993 led to the 1993 Copenhagen summit, in which the Commission proposed criteria for EU membership to candidates and also proposed different areas of intergovernmental cooperation in order to prepare the CEECs.[54] Preceding the Copenhagen Summit, in a series of joint memoranda aimed at the Commission in 1992 and 1993, the Visegrad countries (Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia) reiterated their demand for full membership and asked the European Council to enumerate explicit conditions for membership and a timetable for negotiations.[55] In 1993, the Commission came out with a report

suggesting specific measures for deepening the association's relationships, such as amendments to the Europe Agreements that would have allowed the CEECs a greater economic benefit from trade with the EU than they had previously known. The European council also called on the Commission to submit proposals in order to replace existing trade arrangements with the Baltic States with free trade agreements. Also, with the enumeration of criteria for membership, countries such as Romania, Bulgaria and Slovenia became potential members.[56] The chain of events in this period of time would suggest that the pressure from the CEECs embarrassed the Commission and the European Council, because they highlighted the gap between the past rhetoric about welcoming the East into the EC and the actual substance of EU policy towards the CEECs.[57]

At the 1994 Essen Summit, the German government, which then held the presidency of the European Council, along with other heads of government, pushed for the Commission to deliver 'White Papers'. This was one of the procedural steps in EU enlargement which would have given CEEC governments an assessment of the stage of each candidate country's application and a detailed guide of the steps they needed to take in order to comply with criteria.[58] They entail the evaluation of each application, the readiness of each applicant to implement the *acquis communautaire,* to meet the high EU standards, as well as the application's possible specific consequences for the EC, be it in terms of structural funding, or justice and home affairs, for example.[59] In 1998, the Council of Ministers commenced accession negotiations with the "Visegrad" countries of Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic.

Also in 1998, it was decided that accession negotiations with the rest of the CEEC Applicants (Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) should start in 2000, and so they did. The Commission recommended that accession negotiations take place with all of the applicants that had so far been undertaking reforms and the European Council accepted the Commission's recommendation.[60] Even the poorest applicants like Romania would eventually become members. Many member states such as Britain and Germany also favoured a more inclusive strategy for accession. Romano Prodi, the new Commission President at that time, argued that an inclusive strategy was more likely to ensure security and that EU enlargement should be guided by a 'political vision, not a technocratic one".[61]

The process leading to the enlargement negotiations was gradual and the steps involved were numerous and small. However, this does not necessarily support the functionalist -inspired explanation that enlargement was a process of 'drift' in which technocratic officials made incremental decisions. One could instead argue that governments decided that they could no longer oppose integration of the candidates, and that they would face damaging their credibility if they openly disputed it. Instead, the government actors that stood to lose materially or politically from enlargement have abandoned open criticism of enlargement itself. Yet in accession negotiations they pursue self-interested tactics in order to minimize their economic losses for when the inevitable enlargement of the EU comes to a conclusion.

In conclusion, I hope I have demonstrated that constructivism can explain regional integration in the case of eastern enlargement of the EU. I began by presenting brief summaries of how neo-functionalists, neo-liberal institutionalists, and how constructivists explain regionalism. Then from the neo-liberal institutionalist perspective, I analyzed the preferences of some EU members. I then moved on to a theoretical constructivist explanation of norm-based arguments, and then applied it to eastern enlargement. Finally, I tried to show that the strategic norm-based arguments were important in causing the integration of Eastern countries into the European Union. Norms, community, identity and dialogue all were important in European regionalism and eastward enlargement of the EU. It is always difficult to ascertain outcomes in a precise and accurate way, especially with a constructivist analysis and admittedly, constructivist perspectives have been criticized because they are difficult to demonstrate empirically. But there are clues that ethically based constraints and norm-based arguments used by actors supporting

enlargement have embarrassed and influenced other members states to accept enlargement and allow integration of the eastern countries.

This way of thinking about social influence and its place in politics recognizes that political actors are part of a community and act in a certain social context. Cost-benefit calculations, self-interested and rational decision-making, and the pursuit of self-interested preferences usually only goes so far and is often constrained by values of the political actor's community. Identity is constructed by the community and brings along with it certain responsibilities and standards of appropriateness. Norms and values are very much a part of forming political arguments, goals, bargaining and processes. State preferences do exist and often they are not in line with community standards. We also see that these interactions involve actors (in governments) making decisions that sometimes contradict their material interest.

Notes

[1] Michael Schulz et al, "A Framework for Understanding Regionalization" in Fredrik Soderbaum, andJoakim Ojendal, eds, *Regionalization in a Globalizing World* (New York: Zed Books, 2001) 9.
[2] Ibid, 9.
[3] Ibid, 9.
[4] Ibid, 20.
[5] Andrew Hurrell, "Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective" in Fawcett, Louise and Andrew Hurrell, eds, *Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order* (Oxford: Oxford U. Press, 1995) 55.
[6] Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe* (New York: Cornell U. Press, 1998) 9.
[7] Andrew Hurrell, "Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective" in Fawcett, Louise and Andrew Hurrell, eds, *Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order* (Oxford: Oxford U. Press, 1995) 64.
[8] Ibid, 64.
[9] Ian Kearns, "Eastern Europe in Transition into the New Europe" in Gamble, Andrew and Anthony Payne, eds, in *Regionalism & World Order* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996) 78.
[10] John Agnew, "How Many Europes? The European Union, Eastward Enlargement and Uneven Development", *European Urban and Regional Studies* 8.1 (Winter 2001) 32.
[11] Ibid, 31.
[12] Frank Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union", *International Organization* 55.1 (Winter 2001) 52.
[13] John Agnew, "How Many Europes? The European Union, Eastward Enlargement and Uneven Development", *European Urban and Regional Studies* 8.1 (Winter 2001) 29-38.
[14] Desmond Dinan, *Ever Closer Union*. Second Edition. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999) 198.
[15] John Agnew, "How Many Europes? The European Union, Eastward Enlargement and Uneven Development", *European Urban and Regional Studies* 8.1 (Winter 2001) 32.
[16] Ian Kearns, "Eastern Europe in Transition into the New Europe" in Gamble, Andrew and Anthony Payne, eds, in *Regionalism & World Order* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996) 79.
[17] Ibid, 78.
[18] Ibid, 79.
[19] Ibid, 79.
[20] Ibid, 81.
[21] Frank Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the EasternEnlargement of the European Union", *International Organization* 55.1 (Winter 2001) 56.
[22] Ibid, 63.
[23] Ibid, 63.
[24] Ibid, 62.
[25] Ibid, 67.
[26] Ibid, 67.
[27] Ibid, 67.
[28] Ibid, 67.
[29] Ibid, 67.
[30] Ibid, 67.
[31] Ibid, 71.
[32] Desmond Dinan, *Ever Closer Union*. Second Edition. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999) 198.
[33] Michael J. Baun, *A Wider Europe: the Process and Politics of European Union Enlargement* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000) 35.
[34] Ibid, 35.
[35] Ibid, 36.
[36] Ibid, 37.
[37] Ibid, 37.
[38] Frank Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the EasternEnlargement of the European Union", *International Organization* 55.1 (Winter 2001) 71.

[39] Ibid, 72.
[40] Ibid, 72.
[41] Ibid, 72.
[42] Michael J. Baun, *A Wider Europe: the Process and Politics of European Union Enlargement* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000) 41.
[43] Ibid, 41.
[44] Frank Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union", *International Organization* 55.1 (Winter 2001) 68.
[45] Michael Wintle. "The Question of European Identity and the Impact of the Changes of 1989" in Shahin, Jamal and Michael Wintle, eds, in *The Idea of a United Europe* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000) 22.
[46] Ibid, 20.
[47] Frank Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union", *International Organization* 55.1 (Winter 2001) 74.
[48] Ibid, 74.
[49] Michael J. Baun, *A Wider Europe: the Process and Politics of European Union Enlargement* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000) 109.
[50] Frank Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union", *International Organization* 55.1 (Winter 2001) 75.
[51] Ibid, 75.
[52] Desmond Dinan, *Ever Closer Union*. Second Edition. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999) 199.
[53] Michael J. Baun, *A Wider Europe: the Process and Politics of European Union Enlargement* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000) 44.
[54] Desmond Dinan, *Ever Closer Union*. Second Edition. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999) 190.
[55] Michael J. Baun, *A Wider Europe: the Process and Politics of European Union Enlargement* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000) 45.
[56] Desmond Dinan, *Ever Closer Union*. Second Edition. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999) 191.
[57] Michael J. Baun, *A Wider Europe: the Process and Politics of European Union Enlargement* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000) 45.
[58] Ibid, 56.
[59] Desmond Dinan, *Ever Closer Union*. Second Edition. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999) 192.
[60] Michael J. Baun, *A Wider Europe: the Process and Politics of European Union Enlargement*. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000) 116.
[61] Ibid, 124.

Works Cited

Agnew, John. "How Many Europes? The European Union, Eastward Enlargement andUneven Development", *European Urban and Regional Studies* Vol.8, no.1, 2001.

Baun, Michael, J. *A Wider Europe: the Process and Politics of European Union Enlargement*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000.

Dinan, Desmond. *Ever Closer Union*. Second Edition. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999.

Hurrell, Andrew, "Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective". *Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order*. Eds. Louise Fawcettand Andrew Hurrell. Oxford: Oxford U. Press, 1995.

Hettne, Bjorn. "Europe: Paradigm and Paradox". *Regionalization in a GlobalizingWorld*, Eds. Michael Schultz, Fredrik Soderbaum, and Joakim Ojendal. New York: Zed Books, 2001.

Kearns, Ian. "Eastern Europe in Transition into the New Europe". *Regionalism & World Order*. Eds. Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996.

Moravcsik, Andrew. *The Choice for Europe*. New York: Cornell U. Press, 1998.

Schimmelfennig, Frank. "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union". *International Organization*. Vol.55, no.1, 2001.

Schulz, Michael et al. "A Framework for Understanding Regionalization". *Regionalization in a Globalizing* World. Eds. Michael Schultz, Fredrik Soderbaum and Joakim Ojendal. New York: Zed Books, 2001.

Smith, Martin and Graham Timmins. *Building a Bigger Europe: EU and NATO Enlargement in Comparative Perspective*. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2000.

Wintle, Michael. "The Question of European Identity and the Impact of the Changes of 1989". *The Idea of a United Europe*. Eds. Jamal Shahin and Michael Wintle. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000.